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2ABSTRACT
This study is a comparative investigation of the 
law of obligations in Ghana and Nigeria. It has often 
been suggested that the law of civil responsibility in 
Ghana and Nigeria is the same as the current English law 
position. This thesis sets out to examine the basis 
of this assumption, an exercise which has never before 
been attempted by any previous writer in West African law. 
This investigation is in eight Parts of a total of twenty- 
one sections.
In the Introductory Part, the meaning, scope and 
content of the title are fully discussed. The case for 
a new approach to the classification of obligations in 
Ghana and Nigeria is stated and argued.
Part II examines the vital question of the sources 
of obligations. This is the issue of the juristic basis 
for the application of extraneous law in Ghana and Nigeria, 
what this law is, limits on its application and the con­
current application of indigenous rules of law. A re­
assessment of the whole position in the light of extant 
documentary data is attempted.
3The law of obligations is substantially made up of 
case-law. Part III examines what cases bind which 
courts. Parts IV and V deal with valid agreements, the 
former with two-party situations while the latter treats 
situations in which more than two parties are involved.
Part VI examines the all-important category of defective 
agreements, an approach totally different from the conven­
tional treatment of the subject. Part VII is a functional 
study of obligations. Here in three sections, we examine 
the role of the Courts in the enforcement of agreements, 
the role of the state, and the effectiveness of remedies 
for breach of agreements. The final part analyses and 
sets out to argue a case for obligations imposed by law.
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"THE IAW OF OBLIGATIONS IP GHANA M D  NIGERIA: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY"
Introductory Part
1, Why lav/ of obligations:
The word 1 obligation1 is an exotic term in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. As a special branch of the law,
it occupies a very prominent place in the civil law systems.
Its introduction into an investigation of legal systems
substantially based on English law, as those in Ghana and
Nigeria are, requires a very satisfactory explanation and
justification, if it is not to be lightly dismissed as a
red herring. This we propose to do in this section.
Meaning of Obligation:
The Latin verb Obligare (meaning ‘to bind1) is a
comparatively old one^. In Classical and post-Classical
Roman legal language it occurs in two connections, namely -
2obligare rem - to bind a thing ; and obligare personam - to 
impose a duty upon a person.
In contrast to the verb, the noun obligatio, appeared 
much later. This is, of course, explained away by the 
general reluctance of the latin language to admit nouns,
1. See E. Schulz, Classical Roman Lav/, (Oxford, 1951) 
pp. 455 et sequT We find obligare used as early as 
Plaott^s' Comedies, Bacch. 748 - cited by Schulz.
2. e.g. to give it as a mortgage, pi gnus or hypothec.
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where a verb could have served the same purpose .
Obligatio was not defined by the classical lawyers but
it was used like obligare, in connection with things and
persons. Its meaning in that context was "a legal bond
between two persons which implied a duty of one towards
the other, recognised by ius civile and enforceable by an
actio in personam"^.
Its use in this way in classical Roman law period was
restricted to the ius civile, (cf. ius honorarium) , and
only arose where a duty was enforceable in personam.
It was not until the post-glassical Roman lav; period
that obligatio fused the dual conceptions of ius civile and
ius honorarium. Contemporary Roman lav; definition of the
term is that attempted by Lewin and Short as "an engaging or
pledging; an obligation, an obligatory relation between
two persons one of whom has a right and the other a duty,
5
e.g. the right of a creditor and the duty of a debtor.1*
As a special branch of the law, •obligation* attained 
a high degree of sophistication in Roman law. Justinian, 
following Gains had attempted a classification under four 
heads^ namely,
(a) ex contractu,
5. Other examples can be seen in the verb contrahere, which 
was in use long before its noun, contractus; this is 
equally true of adstingere, used by the classical lawyers, 
while the noun adstrinetio, came much later.
4. p. Schulz, op.cit., p. 456.
5. Lewin & Short, A Latin Dictionary, p. 1256.
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(b) ex quasi-contractu,
(c) ex delicto, and 
(a) ex quasi-delicto.
This arrangement has had considerable influence on European
systems of law as Otto Gierke admitted in these words:
"The victory of Roman law was more complete 
in the domain of the law of obligations than 
in any other. Undoubtedly, this law was 
the greatest and most perfect creation of 
the Roman legal genius, applicable to a 
world-wide commerce and trade and logically 
developed down to the finest issues, which under 
Germanic law had hardly been raised. Besides, 
it had a universal character and was not as 
closely connected with the special conditions 
of Roman law. Thus it ascended the throne 
and has maintained its sovereign power down 
to the present." 6.
Classification in English law:
In spite of the above merits of a law of obligations,
one is still up against the taunt that there is no such
thing as the flaw of obligations1 as a separate branch of
study in Anglo-American legal classification. Earl Jowitt* s
7
definition of •obligation1 in his Dictionary of English L a w , 
as "the relation between two persons, one of whom can take 
judicial proceedings, or other legal steps to compel the 
other to do or abstain from doing a certain act", would tend 
to lend support to this view. Consistently with the learned 
author’s definition, obligations would span the whole gamut 
of English municipal law, encompassing among other things,
* trust, matrimonial causes, admiralty law, landlord and
6. Cited by Schulz, op.cit., p. 462.
7. (1959) p. 1256.
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tenant, and even the law of succession, not to mention 
contract, tort and allied subjects. Obligations in the 
above sense, worthy as it is as a lifetime pursuit with 
a view to imitating Blackstone and Kent in English and 
American laws respectively, can hardly be an attractive 
topic for a research thesis.
Now, this attitude of English law towards obligations 
is attributable to its history. The early common law did 
not concern itself with the classification of rights that 
could be enforced against the person. In his description
g
of the attitude of medieval English jurisprudence, Maitland
aptly pointed out that
"legal remedies, legal procedure, these are 
the all-important topics for the student.
These being mastered, a knowledge of sub­
stantive lav; will come of itself. Not the 
nature of rights but the nature of writs 
must be his theme....so thought our fore­
fathers
But the forms of action were abolished in 1852 by the Common 
Law Procedure Act of that year, and English law was faced 
with the necessity of classifying substantive rights.
Unfortunately, it has not quite succeeded in shaking off 
the procedural inhibitions of the forms of action. Thus, 
for a century English law has been stuck with an attempt
Q
to classify civil responsibility into contract and tort .
8. "The history of the register of original writs" (1889)> 
in Select essays in Anglo-American legal history, (1908), 
p. 54 ^
9. For the doubtful third head of liability in English 
lav; - quasi-contract, see infra.
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Critique of the English classification:
The classification of civil liability into contract 
and tort has been found both inadequate and productive of 
unjust results. There are several factual situations in 
which a plaintiff can neither sue in contract nor in tort, 
but where the lav; ought not to allow the defendant to retain 
a benefit obtained at the expense of the plaintiff. If A 
intended to pay a grocer B for items bought from his stores, 
but paid grocer C in error, there is neither a contract 
between A and C, in any ordinary sense of the term, nor has 
a tort been committed by any of them. It is not enough to 
imply a contract to repay A, since C did not request the 
payment from A in the first instance. Also if I left my 
suit-case in the boot of X fs car with his consent, but the 
car was towed away by the Police for some reason, and I had 
to pay £2 to redeem the car, there has been no contract 
between A and me for the refund of the £2, nor can any tort 
be proved. Yet the law ought to take care of situations 
such as these and several others.
It might be asked, what about quasi*contract, does it 
not cater for the residual group of heads of civil liability 
to which reference is made above? The answer to this is a 
predictable negative, and for two reasons.
Firstly, nobody quite knows what quasi-contract is.
A typical definition of the term by Sir Percy Winfield, 
that it "signifies liability not exclusively referable to
any other head of the law, imposed upon a particular 
person to pay money to another particular person on the 
ground of unjust benefit”^ ,  leaves an inquirer more confused 
than before. Quite apart from the curious attempt at 
defining a term by excluding every other term, one still 
has the secondary duty of finding out what l!other head" of 
the law means, as used in the learned author’s context.
It is unpersuasive to enumerate specific heads of 
claim, such as ’money had and received to the plaintiff’s 
use’; claims on quantum meipUlt, and quantum valebant; 
all of which are said to come under quasi-contractual 
liability. Quite apart from the fact that all these are 
money claims (cf. property claims), it has not been easy 
to delimit the scope and content of quasi-contract on this 
basis, and this leads us to the second reason.
The controversy over the juristic basis of quasi- 
contractual liability is another cause of its ineffective­
ness as a third head of civil liability even for monetary 
claims. More will be said about this aspect of the 
subject in another place. It is enough to mention here 
that Maitland’s gibe about the forms of action ruling the 
courts from their grave, is most true in quasi-contractual 
actions. This is the whole question of whether quasi- 
contractual liability is based on a contract implied by law, 
or on unjust enrichment. The former theory has produced
10. Province of the law of tort, (1930), p. 119*
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so many absurd results in practice^ that the recognition of
a more effective tertiun quid in civil liability in English
law has become urgent.
This recognition has been ably canvassed in two recently 
12published works , and has been partially accepted by the 
English law Commission, established under the law Commission 
Act (England), 1965^ . It must, however, be pointed out 
that the pathology of Civil liability in English law is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Our main concern * is 
with the state of the lav; in Ghana and Nigeria, and to this 
we shall now return.
CLASSIFICATION IN GHANA AND NIGERIA: THE CASE FOR A NEW
APPROACH:
From our examination of the classification of civil
11 . For these, see Part IX infra.
12. DP./. Waters, The Constructive Trust, (London, 1964).
R. Goff & G.H. Jones, The Law of Restitution, (London,
1966).
13. In their First Programme, the Commission has the following: 
H an examination of the law of contract, quasi­
contract, and such other topics as may appear in the 
course of the examination to be inseparably connected 
with them, with a view to their codification. In this 
examination it will be necessary to take into account
the results of the examinations recommended under headings 
11 (Exemption by contract from common lav; liabilities), 
and 111 \consideration, third party rights etc.), and 
pay special attention to the recommendations on innocent 
misrepresentation made by the Law Reform Committee in 
its Tenth Report (1962, Cmnd. 1782), to its pending 
report on the transfer of chattels, and to those topics 
on which the law may be considered to be unsatisfactory, 
such as mistake, unjust enrichment and the restitution 
of money, and (so far as relevant), other property.1* - 
See p. 6 of the Programme.
responsibility in English law between contract and tort,
it is clear that this division is unsuitable even in
English law and that steps are already being taken to
improve on the system. What is not so clear is why in
Ghana and Nigeria, civil liability should adopt the same
mode of classification that is already being discredited
in England. Yet this is what the learned authors of
14Nigerian Cases and Statutes on Contract and Tort , have
done. More will be said about this work later. Here it
must be stated that the division of civil liability into
contract, tort and a doubtful third (quasi-contract), is
confusing in theory and clumsy in practical application.
This is made more so by the statutory recognition in Ghana
and Nigeria of laws other than the imported law. The
categories of the latter set of laws are not exhausted by
the English classification into contract and tort. A
new mode of classification is therefore called for.
It has to be admitted that the English law of civil
15responsibility was introduced into Ghana and Nigeria •
But this does not presume that its development need follow
the nominal compartments as existed in English law on the
16
dates of reception . If it, becomes necessary (and this 
necessity has been sufficiently demonstrated), to change or 
modify the system of classification to suit local conditions
14. McNeil & R. Rains, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1966).
15. The reception of English lav; will be examined in the 
subsequent part.
16. 24th July, 1874 for Ghana; and 1st January, 1900 for 
Nigeria.
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or to meet the requirements of justice, this will not be
the end of a thousand years of history, as could easily
be said in the case of any change in the English system.
17American law, also based on the English common law , has
evolved the concept of Restitution as a separate and
independent head of civil remedy, similar to the continental
concept of unjust enrichment. Recent academic opinion
in England, tend to favour the American classification.
Secondly, the State of California in the United
States, adopted a Civil Code in 1872, with a classification
and terminology that differed from the traditional Common 
18
law system . The aim of the Code was said to be, "to
restate in systematic and accessible form, the common law
as it had been modified to suit American conditions; to
settle questions upon which disputes had arisen, and to
introduce such reforms as might seem necessary to make the
19legal system harmonious and free from anachronism."
A reappraisal of the position fifty years afterwards,
17-. With the minor exception of the State of Louisiana which 
has civil law background.
18. e.g. Trust and bailment were both classified under 
contract; the distinction between law and equity was 
abolished.
19. See (1921-22) California L.R.185* It is remarkable that 
while Justice Stephen J. Field described the Code rules
as ’perfect in their analysis, admirable in their arrange­
ment, and furnishing a complete code of laws’, Sir 
Frederick Pollock condemned them as "about the worst 
piece of codification ever produced". The explanation 
for this conflict lies, of course, in the divergent 
attitudes of the authors, to codification.
revealed a remarkable harmony in the State1 s judicial
+ 2'° system .
Thirdly, the State of Senegal, an ex-French West
African colony has embarked upon a project of reforming
her private law. On this experiment, a learned author
21has had this to say in a recent article :
"The importance of the reform derives 
rather from the light that they may 
shed upon the problems of adapting a 
European legal system to a developing 
country. The need for some re-shaping 
of French private lav/ for continued use 
in the newly independent States of 
francophone Africa is two-fold. First, 
since the Napoleonic Codes date from 
another century, they have become less 
suitable simply by the iDassage of time.
Secondly, because the Napoleonic Codes 
were designed for European Social institutions 
and economic conditions, they are less 
suitable to those of a distant and developing 
land. These two factors of time and space 
lie at the roots of most of the reform in 
Senegal."
It may be added that what the learned author has said 
about 'time and space1 is to some extent true of the common 
law and its application in Ghana and Nigeria. In fact 
the Senegalese Code of Civil and Gommerical Obligations, 
has modified several aspects of the received French law.
A particular instance is the abolition by the code of the 
notion of tort and contract, treating both bases of
20* See M.E. Harrison, "The first half-century of the Calif­
ornia- Civil Code" (1921-2) 10 California L.R.185.
21. E.A. Farnsworth, "Law Reform in a developing country:
A new Code of obligations for Senegal" (1964) 8 J.A.L.6.
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liability together.
Another unique feature of the reform in Senegal is
the acceptance of French law as the basis of Senegalese
jurisprudence, with modifications taken from the laws of
Morocco, Italy and Switzerland.
Finally, brief mention will be made of the case of
Ethiopia, where a Civil Code primarily based on the French
22system, but with obvious modifications , was adopted in 
23I960 . It must be observed, however, that the common
law is too firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of Ghana and 
Nigeria, for any useful guidance to be had from the 
Ethiopian experiment.
Yet the futility of striving to justify the use of 
terms has often been stressed. Lawyers move within defini­
tions and terms of their own creation. A vital consider­
ation is how conducive to harmonious analytical treatment 
any chosen term is.
In our comparative investigation of civil responsi­
bility in Ghana and Nigeria, therefore, we have postulated 
a general theory of civil responsibility, which we call 
obligations. This we have defined to mean 'a legally 
enforceable relationship created either by the act of the 
parties or imposed by lav/1 . The use of obligations in this 
wTay, has, however, been criticised by Roscoe Pound in his
22. The French law distinction between civil and administrative 
contracts, for instance, was not observed in the Gode.
23. See Rene David, "A Civil Code for Ethiopia" (1962-3)
37, Tulane L. Rev. 187.
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24Introduction to the Philosophy of Lav; . He argues that 
the relationship imported by the Roman law sense of the 
term is not a significant factor in extending obligations 
to the "capacity or claim to exact, and the duty to answer to 
the exaction". He would prefer the use of the term ’lia­
bility1 for this purpose.
Our quick retort would, of course, be that we are not 
kevc
using the term^in its Roman lav; sense. But even if we 
were, the fact that some obligations are not enforceable 
against persons, is only valid as an exception to a general 
rule of its enforceability. The category of imperfect 
obli gations (i.e. obligations which cannot be enforced), 
have no common universal content. They vary according to 
any given legal system. Further, Pound’s use of the word 
’liability’, in this context presupposes the qualifying 
adjective ’civil’, to distinguish it from criminal lia­
bility. Civil liability could then be used interchange­
ably with obligations. It is submitted, however, that 
’obligations’ has the added advantage of avoiding the 
confusion which could arise from the use of ’civil lia­
bility’ in Ghana and Nigerian legislation to refer to tort 
25liability ♦
p £
Finally, Sir Frederick Pollock has entitled his 
work on the law of torts, "A treatise on the principles of
24. (Yale University Press, 1961), p. 73.
25. See the Ghana Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176);
the Nigerian (Federal) Civil Liability (Miscellaneous fen/* 
^visions) Act, 1961.
26. Pollock on Torts, (15th ed. P.A. London, 1950).
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obligations arising from civil wrongs", and throughout the 
bookte fifteen editions, no one has objected to this mode of 
treatment.
Classification in Customary laws:
The celebrated controversy as to the claim of customary
law to be included in the definition of "law properly so
27called11, is outside the scope of this thesis . It is 
enough to repeat what Julius Stone has said in this connection, 
that it is very difficult to justify any theory or definition 
of law that would exclude even "institutionalised social 
control in less developed societies, whose function and 
effectiveness are scarcely distinguishable from those of law 
in modern societie^^. • The futile and academic nature of 
the anxiety to prove that customary law is law, is under-
27. The wealth of literature in this of legal theory 
is out of all proportion to its material value in the 
analysis of the actual practice of individual systems.
See for example: The Austinian theory of law (ed.
Jethro Brown, 1926*7^ pp. 27-28; Lord Bryce, Stud ie s in 
history and Jurisprudence, (1901) Vol. 11, pp. 44 and 
2495 Sir Frederick Pollock, First Book of jurisprudence, 
(6bh ed. 1929) » P« 24; Glanvi1le Villiams , 111nternat£onal 
law and the controversy concerning the word ’law’"
(1945) B.Y.B.I.L., 146 at pp. 147-8; John Salmond, 
Jurisprudence, 10th ed. 1947, p. 54; Hobhouse, Morals
in evolution (7th ed.) pp. 71-73; G.Paton, A textbook of 
jurisprudence (1st ed.) 1946, p. 64; A.L. Goodhart,
"The Importance of a definition of law" (1951) 3 J.A.A.
106 at p. 109; F.B. Holleman, "The recognition of 
Bantu customary lav/ in South Africa", in The Future of. 
Customary Lay/ in Africa, (Afrika Instituut, Leiden,
1955, p. 232 at p. 248; J. J&ewin, "Some problems 
involved in the recognition of African Native law"
(1941-3) 24 J. of Comp. Leg. 108; T .0. Elias, The 
nature of African Customary law, (Manchester, 1957)).
See also A.nY Allott, Essays in African Law (London,
I960).
28. Province and Punetion of Law (1950) p. 715.
69
lined by the actual practice of British colonial policy,
which steered clear of the Austinian imperative theory of
law, by laying down machinery for the recognition and
29enforcement of customary laws . On the other hand, the 
conceptual query as to whether customary lav; admits of 
any classification at all, cannot lightly be passed over 
in the same way. Two facets of this query have been 
recognised, namely:
(i) Is there any division into civil and criminal 
liability in customary laws?; and
(ii) If the answer to (i) is positive, are there any 
other recognised sub-classifications in civil liability?
It is, however, with the second facet that we are primarily 
concerned here.
It must be admitted that until rather recently, all 
discussion on this subject had been conducted at a very high 
level of abstraction, based on generalisations about the
basic qualities of “primitive law”. Sir Henry Maine ,
31 32 33 34.Badcliffe-Brown , Seagle , Driberg , and lately, Elias ,
are but a few of the participants in this exercise.
2 9 . Bor a further discussion of this topic, see infra.
30. Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, (10th ed.), J. Murray,1909)•
31. Radcliffe-Brown, l!Primitive law", in Structure and 
Function in Primitive Society, (London^ Cohen & V/est,
1952") , reprirrhed from the Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, 1933, ix. pp. 202-^6; see al's0 Hoebei, “Three 
Studies in African law" op.cit. pp. 423-4.
32. V/. Seagle, The quest for law, (New York: Knopf,1941)p*34.
33. J.H. Bribe rg-^ “The African conception of law", (1934) 
Journal of Comp, leg., 230.
34. T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary law, 
(Manchester U • Press, 195ST*
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Fortunately, contemporary conclusions on the existence or 
otherwise of the categories of contract, tort and unjust 
enrichment, have proceeded on the basis of the actual
•5c
practices of some of the individual systems . he shall
first look at Paul Bohannanfs monograph on the Tiv of
Horthern Nigeria. He states that the "cardinal error of
ethnographic and social analysis is raising folk
systems like ’the law1, designed for social action in one1 s
own system, to the status of an .analytical system, and then
trying to organise the raw social data from other societies
36into its categories" . In an attempt to avoid this error,
he explains that the Tiv word intj&, translated as ’debt*,
covers a wider range .of phenomena and social relations than
the English word ’debt’ usually does. One is in debt if
one borrowed but did not repay; if he herds stock for his
kinsman; if his animals damage his neighbour’s crops; if
he marries a woman from another group without return, and
if one assaults another. Liability arising from witchcraft
37is referred to in Tiv law as "flesh-debts" . In addition
to these, personal relationships in Tivland are expressed
in terms of debt. Bohannan concludes that
"rather than fit Tiv cases into European 
categories like tort, contract, property 
rights, etc., thus hiding the most important
35. See M. G-luckman, The judicial process among the Barotse, 
(Manchester U. Press, 195"5)» I. Schapera, A handbook of 
Tswana law and custom, (London, O.U.P., 1955); also 
"Contracts in Tswana law", (1966, Int. African Institute).
36. P. Bohannan, Justice and judgment among the Tiv, (Int. 
African Inst*7 O.U.P., 1957)7 P*
37* op.cit., pp. 69 et sequ.
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thing about them, I have organised the cases 
in such a way as to illustrate the Tiv notion 
of debt or injo, while allowing us to make
finer distinctions outlined......
Though we found it possible to say that Tiv 
have actions which resemble tort, contract,
or the like were we to do merely that,
we should miss the organising concept which 
contains several Bnglish categories. This 
categorising concept is debt. Many torts 
have debt aspects; most contracts have debt 
aspects. Tiv classify on the notion of debt, 
as it were, not on the notion of tort or 
contract.**
He adds that the same general type of material can be classi­
fied in several ways, but that the one that interests the
rZ Q
social anthropologist is the folk-classification of concepts .
Bohannan’s insistence on a detailed study of the folk-
classification of concepts, is understandable. It may be
added that the folk-classification is equally of interest to
the lawyer. But surely in the cases collected by the learned
39author, there are several contractual situations , many
40cases of delictual liability and other cases where the
Qj%d
fnbatar^f imposed liability because of the strength of the 
plaintiff’s case irrespective of contract or tort^. Even 
if his term ’debt1 is accepted as the general basis of these 
categories of liability, it could only serve as a genus of 
which the other sub-heads are species. This argument is 
given greater force by the fact that the Tiv word info has
38. at p. 212. See also FI. G-luckman, African Jurisprudence, 
Reprinted from f,The Advancement of Science*’, Hot 74, 
November, 1961, where the learned author joined issue 
with Bohannan.
39. See Market Jir Nos. 2 and 3 at pp. 154-155.
40. See Market jir Nos. 4 and 5, pp. 155-156.
41. See Criminal jir disputes Nos. 63 and 72 at pp. 129 and
145.
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been said to mean ’liability* or *debt*. This information
42was given to the present writer by some Tiv colleagues^ .
Secondly, even if the Tiv concept of debt is very 
different from its English law counterpart, there is no 
doubt that its function in Tiv law is similar to the 
function civil liability plays in English law* This 
functional approach to the subject, it must be observed, 
received scant treatment in Bohannan*s scheme* It is 
submitted, however, that the value of any folk-classifi­
cation of concepts is better appreciated on a basis of 
functional comparison with other systems. Whether the name 
is debt or civil liability the important consideration is 
that each covers situations in which a relevant system 
recognises, and in varying degrees, enforces rights.
The *debt* mode of classifying heads of civil liability
was adopted in respect of cases in the Ghana local courts 
43in 1963 . It is obvious from this attempt, that ’debt*
42. During field studies in 1965 and from some Tiv students 
in London.
43. Ghana: Local Court returns, 1963, Ministry of Justice,
Accra.
Region Debt cases Other heads of liability 
Central Region SO90 9 maintenance, 11 land.
Western Region 11407 4 succession, 574 defamation.
Ashanti Region 4884 12 succession, 467 defamation.
Volta Region 2593 480 land, 2 succession.
Buong Ahafo 275 1 succession,
northern 870 159 matrimonial causes.
Upper 586 336 matrimonial causes.
Under debt were included such heads of liability as 
detinue, petty debts, and service agreements; Defamation 
cases, curiously enough, were‘given a separate head.
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was treated as a genus of which contract, tort and resti­
tution were species^.
Apart from the actual instances of contracts, delicts 
and a third category of civil liability, a linguistic 
study of the subject in some of the indigenous systems 
in Grhana and Nigeria points very clearly to the conclusion 
that classification into contract, tort, etc. is recog­
nised. Among the Yoruba there is a general theory of 
contract, represented by the word ipihun, or adehun, each 
of which means an agreement or promise to perform. The 
verb 1 to agree1 or fto promise* is represented by the words 
ke-kuru or dinku.
Among the Ashantis (in Ghana), there does not appear 
to be any general theory of agreements, specific types
of agreement are recognised. Bopaa means to hire labour, 
or a * labour agreement*, while abusa and , abunum, are 
varieties of land agreements. Also among the Ibos, the 
word 'agreement* or 'covenant* is represented by the
indigenous word mgbugba; while debt is represented by
45 ugwo .
44. Ibo Village Affairs (1947). See also J.S. Read and
H. Morris, tlganda: the development of its laws and 
constitutionT (London, 1966)# P. 508 on customary 
contracts in Uganda.
45. Similar linguistic evidence is available for the proof 
of the existence of wrongs and other heads of civil 
liability. See Rattray, Ashanti law and Constitution, 
pp. 285 et seq. On the linguistic approach generally, 
See A.N. Allott, haw and Language t (1965).
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4.6Classification in Islamic law: *
Muhammedan jurists divide law broadly into the religious 
and the secular. The former category of laws relates to 
matters appertaining to the next world, namely acts of 
worship. Secular laws are those dealing with matters of 
this world. This second category of laws are also sub­
divided into public and private^ Public rights are the 
rights of God while private rights reside in individuals. 
Since public rights exist for the benefit of the community, 
they are exercised by the State in the form of criminal 
or revenue laws. The law of obligations belongs to private 
rights.
The Muhammedan jurists do not, however, recognise
* law of things* as forming a separate and independent
juristic division. laws, according to them, are concerned
*
with the acts of men through the juridical medium of rights 
and obligations. Often such acts have reference to 
physical objects, but not always. The law does not deal 
with such objects except as 'property*, i.e. things over 
which mean exercise acts of possession and enjoyment. ^
46. See Abdur Rahim, Muhammedan jurisprudence, (1903), pp.
50 et seq.; P.H.. Ruxton, Haliki Law, (London, 1916)
passim; see especially J.N.D." Anderson "The Moslem 
ruler and contractual obligations" (1958) 33 New York 
Uni.L.Rev. 917; and also, J.N.L. Anderson, "The Puture 
of Islamic law in British commonwealth Territories’*
(1962) 27, Law & Contemp. Prob. 617; J. Schacht, 
Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964) p. 144; L. 
Milliot, Droit Musulman, SS 641 et seq.
47. Abdur Rahim, op.cit., p. 50.
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Nevertheless the categories of contract, tort and 
unjust enrichment have been treated by a recent author 6n
A O
Islamic lav/ under the heading of obligations * After 
a general discussion on the concept of the lav/ of obli­
gations in Islamic lav/, Schacht proceeded in Chapter 21 
of his very informative work, to treat specific obligations. 
This latter head included instances of specific contracts 
like the suftaja, the howala and what he called aleatory 
transactions^.
On the juristic basis of obligations created by 
agreement in Islamic law, Anderson and Coulson in the 
article to which reference has been made above, came to the 
conclusion, after a penetrating survey of the authorities, 
that the category of contract is recognised in Islamic 
legal theory. Prom the Koran, the following are but a 
few of their available documentary data:
1. ™ 0 h  ye v/ho believe, observe your covenants*
(or * be faithful to your engagements 1). 50.
Here the leading commentators are agreed 
that the words apply to all contracts and 
covenants concluded between man and man,
in addition to spiritual covenants between 
man and God." 51.
2. "Be faithful in the covenant of God when 
you have covenanted, and break not your 
oaths after you have ratified them: for 
you have made G-od your surety. Verily,
God knows what you do. And be not like
48. Schacht, op.cit., p. 144.
49* op.cit., p. 154.
50. Sura, V.l. cited by the learned authors at p. 923 
of the article.
51. See Anderson and Coulson, op.cit., p. 923.
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unto her who unravels to thin filaments 
the thread which she hath strongly spun, 
taking your oaths between you with perfidy, 
because one party is more numerous than 
the others.1
Apart from the Koran, there are also passages from the
practice of the prophet which indicate quite clearly that
agreements were recognised in Islamic law. The following
is a typical example of this:
"Moslems are bound by their stipulations 
except a stipulation which makes lawful 
what is unlawful, or makes unlawful what 
is lawful." 52.
Ibn Taymiya, a leading Islamic legal scholar has also been
quoted as saying:
"G-od has commanded that contracts be 
fulfilled, and this is of general appli­
cation. He has thus commanded us to 
fulfil the covenant of God and covenants 
in general, and has included in this the 
contracts a man takes upon himself.
This is proved by the Qur'anic verse:
'They had previous covenanted with God 
that they would not turn their backs 
and of the covenant of God enquiry will 
be made'. This indicates that in the 
covenant of God is included the contracts 
a man takes upon himself, even though 
God has not expressly commanded this 
particular covenant before, as in the 
case of an oath or sale, but merely 
commanded that it be fulfilled." 53.
It is obvious from these authorities that Islamic law recog­
nises and observes a general category of obligations, of 
which contract, tort and unjust enrichment are parts.
52. Bukhari, Sahih, 111,187 (Qastallani, Bulaq, 1079) cited
by Anderson & Coulson, op.cit., p. 925*
53. Majmu'at Fatawa, 111, 329 (Cairo 1908-1911).
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12 * V/hy Ghana and Nigeria:
The choice of G-hana and Nigeria might at first sight 
appear questionable. The reason for this joint treatment 
is fourfold. Firstly there is the fact of common descent 
in the imported laws of the two territories.
The former colony of the G-old Coast and the Lagos 
Colony were jointly administered between the years 1874 
and 1886. Thus the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 which 
introduced English law into the Gold Coast, was also the 
reception statute for the Lagos colony. The lav/ in force 
in both colonies was the common law of England as was in 
force on 24th July, 1874; together with statutes of general
1. Until midnight on March 5, 1957 > the territory now called 
Ghana, was the British colony of the Gold Coast. The 
origin of the latter name has been discussed somewhere 
else. The name Ghana is taken from an old African 
empire of the same name. Ghana had been one of the 
three great African empires of Gana, Melle and Songhay. 
The adoption of the name for the Gold Coast was first 
suggested by the late Dr J.B. Danquah. But it was 
Dr Nkrumah, the then Prime Minister of Ghana, who on 
August 3, 1956, in a motion in the then Gold Coast 
National Assembly, requested Her Majesty1s Government in 
the United Kingdom, for the independence of the territory 
under the name of ’Ghana*. Thus, from the 6th March, 
1957, Gold Coast became the Sovereign State of Ghana.
The new name was said to have obvious advantages.
Apart from its being a much more convenient name than 
Gold Coast (which latter name was considered too clumsy 
and involved), it served as a necessary emotional break 
v/ith the colonial past. It was also intended to serve 
as a reminder to Africans of the glories of the former 
empire of Ghana.
At the early stages of our enquiry,’ Ghanaf and the 
’Gold C oast * will be used interchangeably, since all 
the pre-independence legislation came under the latter 
name. All post-independence references will, however, 
be made under the name ’Ghana’.
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application and doctrines of equity. Also, both the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria were served by the former West 
African Court of Appeal (which was also a Court of Appeal 
for the Gambia and Sierra Leone). The judges of the Full 
Courts of Nigeria were ex-officio members of the Gold Coast 
Full Court, and vice versa. These administrative and 
judicial links were factors that tended to unite the two 
countries and made for a uniform development of their 
laws. Instances of such similarity are easily found in 
their enacted laws. The Moneylenders Ordinance of the 
Gold Coast was in similar terms to the corresponding 
Nigerian enactment on the subject. This was equally true 
of the Illiterates Protection Ordinances, the Pawnbrokers 
Ordinances, the Auctioneers Ordinances and the Bills of 
Exchange Ordinances.
The case law also developed along similar lines 
because of both the West African Court of Appeal and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which latter 
Board was the last court of appeal for the two countries.
The second reason, for the joint treatment is the 
existence and recognition in both countries of laws other 
than the imported law. This is, of course, the whole 
question of the recognition and enforcement of customary 
and other personal lav/s. Mention has already been made of 
the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, which introduced the main 
body of English law into the two territories (the reception 
date for Nigeria was later shifted to 1st January, 1900)•
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It must be mentioned here that the same ordinance under
its section 19 also empowered the courts to observe and
enforce tlie observance of customary lav/s under certain
conditions. No doubt, the detail of the rules of customary
laws in the different societies that made up the two
countries, varied. But these variations in detail did
not distort the similarity of the structure of the two
judicial systems. In addition to this structural
similarity, certain rules of customary law, through the
agency of the courts, came to be recognised as generally
applicable to the two countries* The rule in the 
2
Amodijtt Tijani case was an example of this.
Thirdly, apart from the two above instances of simi­
larity, there is also the interesting question of the 
varying fortunes of the imported lav/ in the two territories. 
This has been almost entirely due to legislative action.
Since Independence, Ghana has modified different aspects 
of the received lav/. Company lav/, Sale of Goods, Bills of 
Exchange, Contract lav/ generally, Gaming and lotteries, 
the law of Insolvency, and Civil liability are but a few of
these instances of modifying the imported law. On the
other hand, in Nigeria, apart from the Western Region (which 
for this purpose includes the Mid-western Eegion) , and to 
a rather limited extent, Lagos (Federal territory), the 
search for the applicable law still involves researching
1 . (1915) 5 21.
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into old and in many cases, long repealed English statutes, 
and to some extent, English, case law* A joint and 
comparative treatment of the positions in Ghana and the 
different jurisdictions in ITigeria will necessarily spot­
light these instances,of divergence*
Finally, the value of this type of treatment "both as 
an opportunity for re-stating the applicable impwted laws 
and for noting any recognised rules of indigenous laws, 
can hardly be over-emphasised .
3* See A.N. Allott & 2. Cotran, "Restatement of laws in
Africa", where the learned authors made out a convincing 
case for restatements both in the imported lav/s in 
Africa., and in the indigenous rules of law.
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SECTION 2
THE LA.U OF OBLIGATI PITS IN GHANA AITD IMIG-SRIA; A GENERAL
EXPLANATION:
In the preceding section we laid down a "basic 
structural mould for the investigation of this topic.
In this section we are concerned with the scope and 
content of the title and our method of approach.
1. Scope and Content of the title:
The definition of obligations as a legally enforceable 
relationship created by the act of tho parties or imposed 
by the law, has already been noted. The former category 
of obligations could be created by the agreement of the 
parties to a relationship or arise out of delict. This 
thesis is, however, concerned with obligations that are 
created by the agreement of the parties, and those 
obligations imposed by the lav/ as a matter of policy. 
Fascinating as it is for us to discuss obligations arising 
from delict, it is felt that the latter subject cannot 
usefully be included here without sacrificing necessary 
detail for brevity. This does not derogate one bit from 
the case which has already been made out, that there are 
three constituent elements in civil responsibility, i.e. 
that agreement, delict and restitution are all species of 
the same genus - obligations. It rather emphasises the 
importance of a detailed examination of each of these heads 
of liability. It is *rery strongly felt that a general
treatment of the three heads together, will still leave the 
vital need for a detailed treatment of each of them.
For our purpose here, therefore, obligations created by 
the acts of the parties will be co-extensive with obli­
gations created by agreement. The other head of liability 
will still be that of obligations imposed by law.
Having said this, the case for this kind of study 
has got to be stated and argued. Two factors would
apparently tend to militate against a separate treatment
of any facet of civil responsibility in Ghana and Nigeria, 
or, for that matter, any other jurisdiction that has 
received English law. One of such factors is the feeling 
that Ghana or Nigerian lav; on a subject like, say contract, 
is the same as English law. All one has to do in order to 
ascertain the Ghana or Nigerian position on the subject, 
is to refer to the handy and available English literature 
on the subject. It must be admitted that this would be a 
good thing if tv/o basic conditions are satisfied, namely, 
if the imported law in the two countries is the current 
English law on the subject; and, secondly, if the said 
current English law, even if it were applicable, was in a 
satisfactory state. Unfortunately, however, none of the 
two basic requirements is present in the case of Ghana and 
Nigeria. The lav: received into Ghana was the law in force
in England on 24th July, 1874, and for Nigeria, the
reception date is 1st January, 1900. It needs hardly be
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argued that English law has changed considerably since 
1874 and 1900 respectively, and that these changes in 
English law have not all been adopted in either Ghana or 
Nigeria. Further, the received laws were made applicable 
so far as local circumstances allowed, and in some cases 
subject to customary and Islamic law rules. Surely such 
instances of modification, as are shown in this study, 
cannot be said to represent the 1874 or 1900 state of
English law on any matter. In any case, even if it could
be said to be the same as the then English law position, 
that will PepPeSeirt olie viewpoint about the impact of 
indigenous lav/s on the common law. It is the intention 
of the present writer to state and argue all the available 
points of view, after examining all the documentary and 
other extant data. This need for an examination of all 
the available evidence, judicial, statutory and academic, 
enhances the unique place of a study such as this, in the
overall legal system of each of Ghana and Nigeria.
The second factor, particularly in the case of Nigeria, 
is the recent publication by two learned authors of 
Nigerian cases and statutes on contract and tort'*'. This 
is, of course, the first more or less comprehensive digest
on this aspect of the law in any Anglophonic West African
2territory # Undoubtedly it is the product of the pains-
1. J.L• licNeil & R. Rains, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1966).
2. For general discussions on civil liability in Ghana and 
Nigeria, see T.O. Elias, Nigerian Legal System, (London, 
1961); V.C.E. Daniels, Common-law~in vVest Africa, 
(London, 1964) .
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taking efforts of the learned authors, intended, as it was 
said to be, to fill a gap in this sector of Nigerian 
law. It is respectfully submitted, however, that the 
limitations of this work enhance, rather than diminish the 
need for and the value of this thesis, even if the book 
had covered identical ground in Ghana law, A close study 
of the work will reveal the following short-comingss
Firstly, the case for a new approach to the classifi­
cation of civil responsibility in Nigeria and Ghana has 
already been convincingly made out in the preceding section. 
It must be added here that the learned authors, by adopting 
the English law classification without comment, are 
perpetuating a system which, even in English lav;, is under­
going thorough revision and modification*
Secondly, a digest on this or any aspect of Nigerian 
law as in any other, cannot be complete without adverting 
sufficiently or at all, to the customary and Islamic law 
facets of the subject, The authors1 preoccupation with, 
and emphasis on the decisions of the superior courts, 
has left the question of the place of customary obligations 
still to be argued.
Thirdly, the learned authors did not show any interest 
or concern in the all-important question of the freedom 
or otherwise of the parties to a transaction to choose 
their own law. This is, of course, the whole question of 
the internal conflict of laws. Any digest on any aspect
of civil liability in Nigeria or for that matter, Ghana, 
that overlooks this facet of the subject is necessarily 
incomplete.
Fourthly, there is no discussion at all on the authority 
of English decisions in Nigerian Courts. One is not at 
all persuaded by the authors1 casual mention in their 
introduction, that there is a case for the view that 
English decisions have binding authority in Nigerian Courts. 
No indication is given of which English decisions are 
binding on which Nigerian Courts. In a digest on the law 
of contract and tort, which lav; is largely dependent on 
judicial precedent, a clear statement of which decisions 
are binding on which Courts is of paramount importance.
An author's omission of such a clear statement can be very 
frustrating to the student.
Fifthly, the learned authors made generous use of the
process of filling the so-called gaps in Nigerian law.
3 4Ghanaian and Australian decisions were freely cited as
authoritative in the Nigerian Courts. It is submitted
that there ought to have been a qualifying statement to the
5
effect that non-Nigerian authorities*' are only persuasive
3. At p . ^  the learned authors cited the Ghana case of 
Hamilton v. Mens ah (1937) 3 W.A.L.P. 224 as authority for 
the application in Nigeria of the Statute of Frauds, 1677. 
Also at p.?3- Thomas Hutton-Mills v Mkansah (1940) 6 
W.A.L.&. 32, another Ghana case, was cited as a Nigerian 
authority on ’implied terms* in contract.
4* At p./fdio the Nev; South Wales appeal of Overseas Tanks hip 
Ltd. v. Horts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. ■|T'9'6T1"A.C# 388 
was cited as a Nigerian authority on measure of damages 
in tort.
5. (1962) N.R.N.Ii.N.92 at p. 39 of the authors’ w/ork.
but not binding on the Nigerian Courts,
Sixthly, the authors merely narrated the facts of the
decided cases and presented the courts1 decisions in such
cases without any comments on the value of the legal
principles laid down in any of them. It would obviously,
have been more helpful to the law student, (for whom the
work is said to be primarily intended), if instead of
passages^from the decisions of the judges, a more
complete picture of the judges1 reasoning was included in
the reported cases. This aspect of the reports as presented
in the work under review, is sadly inadequate.
Finally, mention must be made of some cases, the basis
of whose decision has been altered by subsequent legis-
£
lation. In Splanke v. Abed & Ogunlowo , the defendant in
an action for trespass to land, could not successfully
plead an illegality caused by his own failure to comply
with Section 11 of the Nigerian Land and Native Rights 
7
Ordinance . One of the reasons for this conclusion was 
that section 11 did not impose any penalty for non-compliance.
o
But the Northern Nigeria Land Tenure Law , which repealed 
and re-enacted the former Ordinance (so far as it applies 
to Northern Nigeria), does under Section 6(f) impose such 
a penalty. One would have thought that the effect of 
this change in the law could have been.mentioned by the 
learned authors in assessing the authority of the Solanke
6. (1962) N.R.N.L.R. 92 at p. 59 of the authors1 work.
7. Cap. 105, law of Nigeria (1948).
8. Cap. 59, Laws of.Northern Nigeria, (1965 Consolidation).
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decision .
It may be added, but without emphasis, that although a 
case-book is not the appropriate place to draw any conclusions 
on the functional aspects of the subject treated, yet if, 
as his Lordship the Chief Justice of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court, suggested in his introduction to the work under 
discussion, the case-law method of the American law schools 
is to be usefully deployed, then the role of contract and 
tort in Nigerian law should have been assessed in the light 
of the decided cases. This the learned authors have not 
done.
The above limitations notwithstanding, it must be 
re-stated that the learned authors have made some useful 
contribution to the study of this facet of Nigerian law.
2. Method of approach:
Comparative law, it has often been said, is not a 
topic but a method of study. In this sub-section we shall 
be attempting answers to the questions:
(i) hhat is to be compared with what?; and
(ii) What factors determine the emphasis to be left on 
what features of the analysis?
(i) What is to be compared with what?
It is common knowledge that in the two territories with
which the title is concerned, i.e. Ghana and Nigeria,
customary and Islamic laws exist side by side with the
9. This is specially desirable in view of the fact that the 
latter statute was not; included in the learned authors1 
digest of statutes subjoined to the.' cases.
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imported law. It is also true that the general laws of 
both G-hana and Nigeria stem from English law. There have, 
of course, been many variations from the parent stock (i.e. 
from English law) in both cases, and also several variations 
inter se. At least three varieties of law- emerge from the 
nature of the topic, namely, the customary laws of Ghana and 
Nigeria; the general laws of Ghana and Nigeria; and 
finally, English lav;, the common parent; of the two general 
laws. A comparative study of the lav; of obligations in 
Ghana and Nigeria necessarily ihvolVeO ah examination of all 
these, although there will be varied emphasis in detail.
The issue of emphasis leads us to the next question, 
namely,
(ii) What factors determine the emphasis to be left on what 
features of the analysis?
Professor lav/son has aptly said in his Cooley lectures 
at Michigan University in 195 3 > that one of the virtues of 
legal comparison (which it shares with legal history) is 
that it allows a scholar to place himself outside the laby­
rinth of minutiae in which legal thinking so easily loses its 
way and to see the great contours of the law, and its 
dominant characteristics^. In his famous work^\ however,
10. F.H. Lawson, A common lawyer looks at. the Qivil Law,
1953. Although this statement refers; to two mature and 
relatively independent legal systems, it is submitted 
that it is equally true of any comparative study at all.
11. P.H. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law, (Oxford, 1950).
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what one sees is clear evidence of the fact that the "eye
of one who can see the wood need not be blind to the tree
12or even to its smallest twigs and leaves" . One view 
of a synthesis of this apparent paradox is that selective 
emphasis is vital to any comparative analytical exercise.
The factors that determine the emphasis do predictably 
vary from subject to subject. The law of obligations as 
defined above is one branch of the lav/ in which the relation­
ship between the different varieties of the law - imported,
customary and Islamicf are yet to be worked out. The
13impact of illiteracy on the notion of agreement , partic­
ularly, in exception clauses in standard-form contracts; 
the immunity of family head from account in certain juris­
dictions on the notion of agency and fiduciary relation­
ships do require, and have been accorded some emphasis in 
the work. Also the reconciling of the Islamic law prohibition 
against aleatory transactions to the notion of hire- 
purchase agreements and noneylending transactions are other 
instances of customary/lslamic law and imported law 
cleavage. Any treatment of the law of obligations in G-hana 
and Nigeria that does not advert sufficiently or at all to 
these aspects of the subject, is so much the poorer for it,
12. 0. Kahn Freund, Comparative lav/ as an academic subject, 
(Oxford, 1965)•
13. This was in issue in the G-hana case of Reindorf v. Akna, 
(1926-29) F.Ct.152, where the Full Court held that the 
question of an illiterate understanding the terms of a 
written agreement is one of fact.
Apart from the cleavage between the customary and the 
imported laws, there is also the divergence of the imported 
laws in G-hana and Nigeria from the current position in 
English law. Reference has already been made to this 
divergence in the preceding section. Here it must be 
stated that such differences are due to any one or both of 
the following two factors, namely, changes in the lav/ in 
England; and/or modifications or changes in the imported 
law. A quick example of the former situation is the
ro-S-Ue pAee.
English law relating to While this
is regulated in England by Statute^, it has been abolished
1 *5in G-hana by the Contracts Act, I960 * An example of the
latter feature is found in the Ghana modification of the 
doctrine of consideration, third-party rights in agree­
ments, and the treatment of fundamental obligation in the
16Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962 . Situations such as these
do deserve, and have, in fact, been given emphasis in this 
study.
Also, there are differences in the rates of growth of 
the received law, between Ghana on the one hand, and the 
various jurisdictions in Nigeria. In the field of sale of 
goods, for instance, the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 
is not a Statute of general application in Ghana, being 
a post-1874 English enactment, not specifically said to
14. S eevi/i^  A&ti, ,
and iie Resale Prices Act, 1984 (England).
15. S.5(2)b of the Ghana Contracts Act., I960.'
16. S.5(2) (a) of the Ghana Contracts Act, I960.
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apply to Ghana. The local enactment on the subject (the 
Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962), has repealed sections 4 and 
17 of the Statute of frauds (England); i.e. the provisions 
relating to contracts in writing. The Ghana enactment 
retains writing for contracts of guarantee and land agree­
ments, with saving made for transactions governed by 
customary law. This is also the position in Nigeria (Lagos), 
and to a certain extent, in the western and Mid-Western 
Regions. But in the Eastern and Northern Regions of 
Nigeria, the Sals of Goods Act, 1S93 (England) still applies 
without modification. It is quite possible, therefore, 
and this has been argued somewhere else, that an agreement 
may be valid and enforceable if made in Accra, Lagos,
Ibadan or Benin, but unenforceable if made at fcnutju. cnr 
Kaduna in the Eastern and Northern Regions (Nigeria) 
respectively.
There is also the Ghana Lotteries and Gaming Act, I960, 
which governs gaming and wagering agreements, but which has 
no counterpart in any of the jurisdictions in Nigeria.
Instances such as these have been treated with some 
emphasis in this thesis.
Apart from these instances of cleavage between the 
different varieties of law, we have adopted an entirely new 
mode of presentation for the discussion of obligations 
created by agreement. 3?o>r this purpose agreements are 
divided into two groups, namely, ‘valid .'agreements* and 
‘defective agreements* . The former category have been
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sub-divided into (i) agreements involving two parties; 
and (ii) agreements involving more than two parties. The 
merits of this treatment have been discussed in another 
place. Further, the vital, question of a. functional study 
of agreements (including interpretation o>f agreements and 
their enforcement) has also been fully investigated.
The menace of exception clauses and standard-form contracts 
has been fully investigated, and there is a special plea 
for a change of judicial and legislative attitudes to suit 
modern conditions. These facets of the subject have 
received scant attention in the conventional treatment.
There is also the relationship between criminal law 
and civil responsibility. This has been adequately 
covered under obligations imposed by law.
Finally, our treatment of the subject has been on the 
basis of an integrated law of obligations, clearly recog­
nising the freedom of the parties to choose a 1 proper law* 
to govern their transaction. This approach to the topic 
has been canvassed by recent academic opinion of which the 
following are but a few.
(i) tfThe clock cannot be put back. It is
impossible to restore the rtribal’ legal 
systems of the pre-colonial past. The 
communities which evolved these systems 
have radically altered or, in some cases, 
vanished. They are no longer closed and 
autonomous communities; their economic 
basis has altered; the social organisation 
of which the legal order was; the expression 
is daily crumbling away. -ifriean countries 
are now .part of the modern industrialising 
world; and their legal systems must recognise
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this fact.” A. N. Allott 17.
(ii) "The task of the court is to divert the
gradual convergence of native and European 
notions of civil law, to fuse them where 
fusion does not damage the feelings of 
those concerned, to adapt old customs to 
modern life, and to interpret one legal 
system to the other with insight, sympathy 
and dignity." 18.
(iii) "If we look at Commonwealth countries in
Africa as a whole, it is clear that, today, 
Islamic lav/ represents a very minor problem 
outside the sphere of family relationships 
and succession - or, in East Africa, the lav/ of 
waqf (i.e. pious foundations) . In the lav/ 
of contract there can be scant objection to 
its application, probably to an ever decreasing 
exteht, AS tile laW under v/lliell a particular 
contract was concluded. In. the field of 
tort there is little difficulty in reconciling 
Islamic concepts with English principles, 
and the Islamic law of tort is in fact seldom 
cited as such today." - J.M.h. Anderson. 19•
The above views were shared by the London Conference on the
20Future of Law in Africa in I960 ; by H.F. Morris and U.S.
21
Read in their recent work on Uganda law , and by B.O.
22Uwabueze in a paper submitted to the Ife Conference on
the integration of laws in African countries.
It has not been considered necessary, therefore, to 
devote any special parts of the study to a discussion of 
customary and Islamic obligations. These have been sub­
joined to each relevant section of the investigation.
17. Cited by E„ Cot ran in "The law of Civil wrongs and obli­
gations in Commonwealth African Countries", 1966, p.12.
18. Cited in The future of lav/ in Africa (ed. A.U. Allott,
I960), p.~T3T
19. "The Future of Islamic lav/ in British Commonwealth Terri­
tories" (1962) 27 lav & Contemp. Problems, 617.
20. pp. 39-41 of the Report of the proceedings.
21. Uganda, The development of its laws and constitutions,
(London, ut ev ensT iT bona) , p.' 30 8 .
22. "Integration of the law of contracts,” (1 9 6 4).
PART II SOURCES OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS.
!• The Imported laws
Paley, in his preface to the once celebrated Principles 
of Moral and Political Philosophy, remarks that "when a writer 
offers a book to the public upon a subject on which the 
public are already in possession of many others, he is bound 
by a kind of literary justice to inform his readers, dist­
inctly and specifically, what it is he professes to supply 
and what he expects to improve."
To answer the second and more invidious injunction 
the learned authors of the Law of Contract hastened to dis­
own with Paley "any propensity to depreciate the labours of 
our predecessors, much less to invite a comparison between 
the merits of their performances and our own", but suggested 
that even on so well-trodden a road, there is need for a new 
guide.
The above attitude of the learned autnors is equally
true of the present writer. There is however, a slight
variation in detail. Although the reception of English
law in British dependencies has been the subject of some
2
comment in various quarters, there has not been any agreement
1. Cheshire and Pifoot, The Law of Contract, (1st ed.1945)
2* Cf. Viscount Kilmuir, wno in his Falconer lectures
delivered at the University of Toronto in 1958, regretted 
that "so little had b^en written on the history of the 
Common law in its travels overseas."
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on what was received, v/hen it was received or even how it 
was received!^ Since the subject of our enquiry depends to 
an enormous extent on the results of the above queries, 
we feel compelled to join in an examination of the facts and 
to venture an opinion.
The imported law is, of course, a facet of the multi­
plicity of laws in G-hana and Nigeria. What we propose to 
do here is to examine the juridical basis of its application 
in Ghana and Nigeria, and the nature of what was received#
(i) Juridical basis of its application?
It has often been stated^ that the extent to which
English law was introduced into any British dependency varied
partly according to the manner in which that territory was
acquired. The implications of this statement were elaborated
by the Master in his report in Freeman v Farlie as follows:
"I apprehend the true general distinction to be in 
effect between countries in which there are not, and 
countries in which there are, at the time of their 
acquisition, any existing civil institutions and laws; 
it being in the first of those cases, a matter of nec­
essity that the British settlers should use their native
3* Some have even objected to the use of the word deception1
in describing the importation of English law into the
colonies. They argue that since the colonies had no choice 
in the matter, the better word should be the 'impositipnf 
of English lawS
4. Halsburyfs Laws (3$d ed#)vol.5 pp-591 et seq.; A.N#
Allott, Essays in African Law (I960) p.3; W.C.Daniels, 
Common Law in West Africa (1964) p.117.
s. u m r  1 Moo. Ind. App# 324*
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laws, as having no others to resort to; whereas, in 
the other ca-e, there is an established lex loci, which 
it might be highly inconvenient all at once to abrogate; 
and therefore it remains till changed by the deliberate 
wisdom of the new legislative power. In the former 
case, also, there are not, but in the latter case there 
are new subjects to be governed, ignorant of the English 
laws, and unprepared, perhaps in civil and political 
character to receive them. The reason why the rules 
are laid down in Books of authority, with reference to 
the distinction between new-discovered countries on 
the one hand, and ceded or conquered countries on the 
other, may be found,I conceive, in the fact that this 
distinction had always, or almost always, practically 
corresponded with that, between the absence and the 
existence of a lex loci, by which the British settlers 
might without inconvenience, ior a time, be governed; 
for the powers from which we had wrested colonies by 
conquest or had obtained them by treaties of cession, 
had originally, if not always, been, civilised and 
Christian states, whose institutions, therefore were 
not wholly dissimilar to our own*n6
We are not here concerned with the accuracy or otherwise of
the reporter's reference to non-Christian legal institutions.
It is in respect of the modes of acquisition of the then Cold
Coast territory (now Chan a), and Nigeria, for purposes of
the introduction of English lav/, that th<e above statement is
relevant. The two questions that we have to address ourselves
to, therefore, ares firstly how were the territories acquired;
and secondly, how was the extraneous law introduced?
6. See also Halsbuffy's law;s - supras "there is an essential 
difference between a possession acquired by conquest or 
cession, in which an established system of law of Euro­
pean type exists, and one acquired by the.^settlement of 
British subjects, which is Unoccupied or Sccupied only 
by uncivilised inhabitants, and therefore without an 
established system1** Of., the statement of Lord Watson 
in the case of Cooper v Stuart (lba;9) 14 App. Oas. 2 8 6  
at p.291*
Modes of Acquisition
7
The Gold Coasts
Varying accounts have been given by officials and text-
writers of the mode of acquisition of the G-old Coast* Jn
the official returns to the British Parliament in 1845* Cold
Coast is reported to..have been acquired in 1618 under the
8category of African forts* Then again in the third edition 
of Halsbury's Laws of England, the learned editor lists the
Q
Gold Coast as having been acquired by settlement* In an 
earlier edition of the same work, Keith had grouped the Gold 
Coast with the Gambia and Sierra Leone under settlements*^"^
The picture however, is not as chaotic as the accounts tend 
to suggest* The important consideration for our purpose here
7* It has been suggested that the French got to Elmina near
Cape Coast as early as 1381 where they built a fort. Gold
from the interior was bought and sold at this fort and
since it was along the coast, the territory became known
as Gold Coast* See Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth
and Colonial Law, (London, Stevens, 196b) p * 7 8 d (n*92)*
8* Parliamnetary Papers, session 1845, Vol.31 p.32.
9. Vol. 5 p.544*
10. Ibid, p. 694. Cf. Sir Charles Tarring who as one of the
joint authors of the title, Gold Coast, in the 1st edition
of Halsbury's Laws, had grouped it under conquered and
ceded colonies* This is of course true of the position
of Ashanti which after a series of seven wars, was con­
quered in 1900. Banish territories were ceded to 
Britain in 1850 and those of the Butch v/ere ceded, also
to the British in 1871* See Hals bury1 s Laws, (1st ed.)
Vol. 10 pp. 566-56? paragraph~986♦ But in his book 
relating to the Colonies Sir Charles deals with the 
Gold Coast under settled colonies (4th ed.) p.5*
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is that by the Letters Patent of 20th September, 1916 wnich 
revoked those of 1886, 1905, 1906 and 1912, the whole of 
the Gold Coast colony had come to be regarded as a settlement 
for the purposes of Section 6 of the British Settlements 
Act, 1887* ^  The Northern Territories over which a Protect­
orate was declared in 1901 remained a Protectorate till 1957
12when it became part of Independent Ghana* It had been 
acquired in 1896 through treaties of trade and protection 
made with several northern chiefs*
Nigeria*
Nigeria can be described as a mixed bag as far as modes
of acquisition go* Parts of Northern Nigeria have been said
to have been acquired by conquest* J Lagos was ceded in 
1862;^ and by the conclusion of 37 treaties by Consul Hewitt 
with the various tribes on or near the rivers Niger and Benue
in 1884 Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland
undertook to extend to the chiefs 11 and to the territory under 
their authority and jurisdiction her gracious favour and 
protection", the chiefs on their part promised "to refrain
fcp— rats1 Section uf "fLur-’l-cL’ defines seltied trui~0TTle~s'»-------
12* After the 1914-18 war the Western part of the German 
territory of Togo became a Mandated Territory under 
British administration and was administered with the 
Gold Coast; the Northern part with the Northern Territ­
ories, and the Southern part with the colony.
13* Halsburyfs Laws, (3rd ed*; Vol.5 P*544* See also Sir 
Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 
(London, Stevens, 1966) pp*792-794* "
14* By a treaty dated August 6, 186L, King Docemo of Lagos
ceded to the ■uritish Crown the port and Island of Lagos, 
with all rights, profits, territory and appurtenances 
whatsoever thereunto belonging*
from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty |
with any foreign nation or power, except with the knowledge
15and sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Hovernment1*'  ^ The
detailed story of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
16need not detain us here* Our main interest is in the
mode of introduction of the extraneous law and to this we 
shall return.
Modes of Reception:
How was the extraneous law introduced into the former 
Hold Coast and Nigeria? In other words, v/hat is the const­
itutional authority for the application of the principles of 
English law in the two territories?
The Hold Coasts
It has already been noted under ’’Modes of Acquisition” 
above, that the Hold Coast was made up of the Colony (which 
included Ashanti and Southern Togo) and the Northern Territ­
ories (which included Northern Togo). The former was a 
settlement for purposes of Section 6 of the British Settlements 
Act, 1843 (and subsequent amendments), while the latter was 
a Protectorate for purposes of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 
of 1843.
Towards the latter part of the first half of the nineteen-#
15* See Hall, A Treatise on the foreign .jurisdiction of the <
British Crown, (T894T P *217* j
16* For this see Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria, passim* I
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century it was recognised that there was required some
* 17
wider power to legislate for Settled Colonies than the
limited rights under the Royal Prerogative allowed* Con-
18sequently in 1843 the first British Settlements Act, was 
enacted entitled "An Act to enable Her Majesty to provide 
for the Government of Her settlements on the Coast of 
Africa and in the Falkland xslands". This enaoted inter 
alia -
"Whereas divers of Her Majesty's subjects have resorted 
to and taken up their abode and may hereafter resort to 
and take up their abode at divers places on or adjacent 
to the Coast of the Continent of Africa and on the 
Falkland Islands: And whereas it is necessary that Her
Majesty should be enabled to make further and better 
provision for the civil government of the said settle­
ments: Be it therefore enacted........ that it shall
be lawful for Her Majesty, by an Order or Orders to be 
by Her made, with the advice of Her Privy Council, to 
establish, all such laws, Institutions, and Ordinances, 
and to constitute such courts and officers, and to 
make such provisions and regulations for theproceedings 
in such courts, and for the administration of justice, 
as may be necessary for the peace, order and good 
government of Her Majesty's subjects and others within 
the said present or future settlements respectively, 
or any of them; any law, statute or usage to the
17* This was equally true of Protected Territories and 
Protectorates - See the foreign Jurisdiction Act, 
1843.
18. 6 & 7 Viet. Cap. 13.
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contrary in anywise notwithstanding."^
Soon after the enactment of this statute the Crown made 
use of its provisions* On 3rd September, 1844, by an Order 
in Council, Cape Coast Castle was appointed a place for the 
tiial of offenders. It was recited that the order was made 
partly under the 1843 enactment. xhen again on 4th April 
1856 another Order in Council was made which recited as 
follows:
°And whereas Her Majesty hath acquired power and juris­
diction within divers countries on the said coast of 
Africa* hereinafter called "the protected territories" 
on the Cold Coast, near or adjacent to Her Majesty fs 
Ports and Settlements on the said G-old Coast, and it is 
expedient to determine the mode of exercising such 
power and jurisdiction:"
On the 19th February, 1866, a Commission was passed under 
the Creat Seal, Clause VII of which recited the 1843 enact­
ment and went on to provide, inter alia, for the establishment
19* By the British Settlements Act, 1860, the provisions of 
the 1843 enactment were extended to all possessions, 
but both the 1843 and i860 Acts were repealed in 1887 
by the British Settlements Act, 1887 the preamble to 
which is as follows: "Whereas divers of Her Majesty's 
subjects have resorted to and settled in, and may here­
after resort to and settle in, divers places where there 
is no civilized government, and such settlements have 
become or may hereafter become possessions of Her Majesty 
and it is expedient to extend the power of Her Majesty 
to provide for the government of such settlements, and 
for that purpose to repeal and re-enact with amendments 
the existing Acts enabling Her Majesty to provide for 
such government." See also the Hpitish Settlement Act, 
1945* The introduction of extraneous law in the Northern 
Territories was based on the powers of the Crown as ex­
tended in the foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, (which 
replaced the 1843 Foreign Jurisdiction Act). See the 
Northern Territories Order in Council, 1901.
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of a Legislative Council for forts of Y/est Africa including
po
the forts and settlements on the Gold Coasts It was ;
the Legislative Council established under this Commission
that passed the Court Ordinance of 1876 on which the reception
of English Law into the then Gold Coast and Nigeria sub-
21stantially based.
The detailed constitutional history and law of the Gold 
Coast is, of course, outside the scope of our enquiry. It 
is enough to mention that the introduction of extraneous law 
into the Gold Coast did not derive its constitutional just­
ification from any theory of English settlers taking English 
law as part of their kit to wherever they went. The authority
20. On 26th February, 1867, an Order in Council was passed 
reciting the 1845 British Settlements Act as its author­
ity, and cresting the first Y/est African Court of Appeal* 
This Court is not the same as the one that appeared 
under the same name in 1928 and 1948.
21* Letters Patent were passed unaer the Great Seal on 
13th January, 1886 separating the Government of Her 
Majesty’s Settlement at Lagos from the Government of 
Her Majesty’s Settlements on the Gold Coast (which had 
been joined in the previous Letters Patent of 22nd 
January, 1883)* The Letters Patent of 1886 after 
amendments in 1905, 1906 and 1912, were finally revoked 
and fresh Letters latent were issued dated 20£h September 
1916. See also to the same effect the Letters Patent 
dated 23rd May, 1925* It is curious to note that 
neither the 1916 nor the 1925 nor indeed any subsequent 
Letters Patent recited the British Settlements Acts as 
the basis of its authority. For the uncertainty caused 
by this omission, see Rev. V Thompson (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 
201, where Kingdom, C.J. held on a case stated, that 
the -British Settlements Act, 1887 was the constitutional 
basis for the existence of a local legislature in the 
then colony of the Gold Coast.
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is to be found mainly in local legislation which derive 
their legal validity from Orders in Council, whose const­
itutional validity depend on the provisions of the British
22Settlements Acts and the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts#
Thus Section 14 of the Courts Ordinance, 1876, to which
reference has already been made provided as followss
"The common law, the doctrines of equity, and the 
Statutes of general application which were in force in 
England at the dare when the colony obtained a local 
legislature, that is to say, on the 24th day of July,
18Jl4, shall he in force within the jurisdiction of 
the courts.M23
section 17 of th§ §§m§ Ordinance limiigd the application of 
section 14 by this proviso that such lews would apply so 
far only as the limits of the local jurisdiction and local 
circumstances allowed# The first mode of reception, therefore
22. See Sir Y/illiam Brandford Griffith, A Note on the History 
of the British Courts in Gold Coast Colony, with a 
brief account of the changes in the Constitution of the 
Colony, p.26, where he stated that the 1916 Order in —  
Council was made under Section 2 of the British Settle- 
ments Act, 1887* See also Berriedale Keith, Constitution, 
Administration, and Laws of the Empire, p.268, where 
the learned author also referred to the British Settle­
ments Act, l8o7 as the Constitutional authority for the 
establishment of a legislature in the Gold Coast. See 
generally, A.K.AIiott, Essays in African Law (i960) 
pp. b et seq., ‘ IT.A.Ollennu, “The influence of English 
law in West Africa1 (1961) 5 J.A.L.'21, S'&/AE.C.Daniels, 
Common Law in West:Africa, (1963) p.120; Blackstone *s 
Comm. Vol. 1 pp.lQ6-iQY; Campbell v Hall (1774) 20 State 
Tr. 239*
23* No. 4 of 1876
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24is that of the main body of English law.
Nigeria:
What has been said above about the British Settlements
Acts and the foreign Jurisdiction Acts, is equally true of
Nigeria, i.e. in respect of the Constitutional basis fbr the
introduction of extraneous law. Wnen in 1862 the Colony of
Lagos was created, one of the initial measures of tne British
administration was the introduction of the main body of Engl-
26ish law into the territory.  ^ The English law applied
was that which was in force in England on 1st Janury 1863•
In 1876 when the Lagos Colony was for administrative purposes
already part of the Gold Coast colony, English law was re-
26
tained by the same formula. The effective date of recep­
tion was 24th July, 1874. In 1900 when the Colony and Pro­
tectorate of Nigeria was merged, the effective date of re­
ception was shifted to 1st January, 190U. Since the later 
date there have been many changes in the Constitutional 
structure of the country but the general reception provisions 
have remained substantially unchanged.
24# Bor the other modes of reception, see infra pp.
25. By Ordinance No. 3 of 1863.
26. S.14 of Ordinance No. 4, 1876.
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Apart from the reception of the main body of English 
law there are three other modes of reception in both G-hana 
and Nigeria*
Eirstly, some Acts of the United Kingdom are expressly
declared to extend to all overseas Territories, the limiting
date of the main body of jsnglish law, notwithstanding. The
Bankruptcy Act, 1863 (England) has been said to apply in the
27then Gold Coast in spite of the July 24th, 1874 limitation® 
Also, Section 9 of the foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, em­
powered the Queen in Council to assign the same jurisdiction 
to Courts in British possessions as to British Courts in 
foreign countries* In the first Schedule to the 1913 Act,
(a re-enactment of the 1090 Act with some amendments), certain 
Acts of the united Kingdom Parliament, such as the Colonial 
Solicitors. Act, 1690, and Sections 34, 35 and 36 of the 
Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1906, could be extended to 
foreign countries under British jurisdiction. Tne Colonial
Stock Acts, 1877 to 1900 and the evidence (Colonial Statutes)
2 8
Act, 1907 came under tnis category.
Secondly, some Acts or the United Kingdom Parliament 
are declared to extend to particular territories as distinct 
from a-1 the territories, even if tne date of tneir enact-
27. Callender, Sykes & Co. v Colonial Secretary of Lagos & 
anor* 1691 A.C. 4 6 0 See also the Keport of the Commiss­
ioners appointed to enquire into insolvency law in 
Ghana (19bl).
2 8. See S.b of the latter Act. It wao extended to Nigeria 
anu tne northern Territories of the Gold Coast in 
juec-muer 192*, see S.l. No. l^lc of 1922.
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meat was a post-reception aate. 1‘he Colonial Probates 
Act, 1892 is one of such Acts* It was extended to The 
u-oid Coast Colony on May 6, 1893; to AshanTi and the Lagos
OQ
Colony in 1920, and to the Northern territories of the 
u-old Coast and to logo in 1939
the Coinage Acts 1870 - I89I; the finance act, 1894; 
the Colonial Loans Act, 1899; the Copyright Act, 1911, the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1920 (Part 11), ana the 
Evidence and Powers of Attorney Act, 19^0, are other examples* 
Lastly, some Acts of tne united Kingdom Parliament are 
auopted by logal legislatives* This mode of reception was 
particularly common m  the vxamuia and Sierra Leone* The 
Companies Ordinance of Nigeria, however, is with minor ex­
ceptions, an exact copy of the (English) Companies Act, 1929*
This is equally true of the Bills of Exchange Legislation in
1^the former Gold Coastf and Nigeria*
29* S.l. No* 1663 of 1920 (Ashanti) 5 and S.l* No. 887 of 
1920, (Nigeria Colony).
30. S.l. No. 1702 of 1939.
31. There has since 1961 been a Bills of Exchange Act in 
Ghana which replaces the former Bills of Exchange 
Ordinance. For a discussion on this, see infra pp.
i
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(ii) The Nature of the Beceived Law:
we shall at this stage examine the meaning and content
of the following standard form reception provision. Section
14 of the Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance 1876, hs has
already been noted provides as follows:
“The Common law, the doctrines of equity, and the 
Statutes of general application which were in force in 
England • • • • • •  on the 24th day of July, 1874, shall
be in force within the jurisdiction of the Courts•"
( a) The Common Law
Like most legal terms the common law defies definition 
but like most v/ords of the English language it can be said 
to have its broad and narrow significations. Broadly it 
represents the basis of a legal system. In this sense it 
is used in contra-distinction to the civil law, and generally 
describes the Anglo-American jurisprudence. Secondly, it 
could be defined in terms of the unenacted or unwritten 
law of England. It has also been used to indicate that part 
of the unenacted law that is not equity.^-
Sir William Blackstone has written in the first Volume 
of his Commentaries on the laws of England that the first 
ground and chief cornerstone of the laws of England is gen­
eral immemorial custom, or common law, from time to time
1. It appears from the context of the reception provisions 
in the British dependencies that the term is used in
this third sense "She common law, the doctrines of equity, 
and statutes of general application11.
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declared in the decisions of courts of justice. ±$lackstone
divides the municipal law of England into two parts: the
lex non scripta, the unwritten or common law; and the lex
scripta, the written or statute law; and continues:
"Shis unwritten or common law is properly distinguishable 
into three kinds: (l) General customs, which are the 
universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common 
law in its stricter and more usual signification; (2) 
Particular customs, which for the most part affect only 
the inhabitants of particular districts (3) Certain par­
ticular laws, which by custom are adopted and used by 
some particular courts, of pretty general and extensive 
jurisdiction. M2
Kent in his commentaries on American law has this to say
of the common law:-
!,A great proportion of the rules and maxims which con­
stitute the immense code of the common law grew into 
use by gradual adoption, and received, from time to time, 
the sanction of the courts of justice, without any leg­
islative act or interference. It was the application of 
the dictates of natural justice and of cultivated reason 
to particular cases#"3
And as Sir Mathew Kale has aptly put it:
"The Common lav; of England is not the product of the 
wisdom of some one man, or society of men, in any age, 
but of the wisdom, counsel, experience, and observation 
of many ages of wise and observing men. "4
2* I Commentaries 67*
3. Kent: Commentaries on American Law, 13th Edn. by Charles 
M.Barnes, boston Ldd4,p.56l* But cf. the observation of an 
eminent English Judge, lord Chief Justice Wilmot, 2 Wils. 
348, 351> that n1a Statute law is the will of the legis­
lature in writing, and. the common law is nothing but stat­
utes worn out by time; and all the law began by the consent 
of the legislature".
4. Preface to Holle-s Abridgment Vol.36. Cicero, in like 
manner, ascribes t.he excellent Institutes of the Roman 
Republic to tbe gradual and successive improvements of 
time and experiemce; and he held that no one mind was equal 
to the task: D<e Re pub. lab. (ii) 1. 'Ihe Roman system of 
law, says M.V&lette, " w&s not the result of philosophical 
theories conceived & priori, but slowly elaborated by 
everyday experience., aind conformed, under the influence of
m % l Se V ^ % . ^ ^ A m^ :i■SQ^0)lasuI’fcs, t0 t h e  G e c e s s i 'ties of
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Sir Carleton Allen has vividly summarised the position 
as follows
"..........What is even more certain is that many of
those things that we now take for common law were 
developed by the sovereign’s judges. The cardinal 
fact in the settlement of our medieval law is the gradual 
domination of a permanent central tribunal over the 
jurisdiction of local courts. This process, beginning 
under Henry I, may be said to have become irresistible 
under Henry III; royal justice establishes approximate 
uniformity in essentials as against the bewildering 
diversity of local custom, and the supreme custom 
becomes the custom of the King's court. There is still 
great variety of usages in manors, boroughs, and local­
ities; but in what may be called the working basis of 
a general system of justice, the Hoyal Courts carry on, 
and have ever since continued, a perpetual process of 
reconciliation and harmonisation, so that local diver­
gences, though always respected and often jealously 
safeguarded, do not impair the symmetry of the main 
fabric. Beyond doubt, the greater part of this process 
of consolidation was the conscious task of the King's 
expert advisers.M5
An attempt to define the common lav/ in terms of juris­
diction,^i.e. Jthat part of the law of England which, before 
the Judicature Acts, 1873-75 was administered by the Common 
law Courts as opposed to equity), has not been generally 
followed.^
From the above authorities three inescapable conclusions 
emerge. Firstly that the common law is a peculiar product
7
of what has often been described as the English legal genius.
5. Law in the Making (7th ed. 1965) pp- 124 et seq. See 
also Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law i.86,
132, 161A; et passim.
6. Jowitt, The Dictionary of English Law (1959) p*426.
7* Though in the United States some philosophers and patriots 
comment that Blackstone never understood - or, if he
understood, invariably excused — the corrupting process by 
saxon simplicity had been transformed into imperial 
subtlety. See the Migration of the Common Law (I960)p.l2.
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Secondly, that the common law when used by Anglo-American 
writers to indicate the unwritten or unenacted law (c.f.
o
legislation), generally includes equity* The third and 
perhaps the most far-reaching conclusion for our purpose here 
is that the common law is a growing institution. To say 
this, is not just to repeat what has already been said of law 
as a means of social control. It is rather to emphasise, 
even if by repetition, the importance of the creative role of 
the courts in the growth of this branch of the law.
The Common law as an emigrant
Is the common law a peculiar creature of the English
climate and temperament or is it capable of emigration to
other and alien lands? A helpful answer should begin with
the content of the common law. Mention has already been
q
made of ” general customs”. In his Commentaries Blackstone
glosses general customs as follows:
"That is the law, by which proceedings and determinations 
in the King's Ordinary Courts of justice are guided 
and directed. This for the most part, settles the 
course in which lands descend by inheritance; the manner 
and form of acquiring and transferring property; the 
solemnities and obligations of contracts, the rules of 
expounding wills, deeds, and Acts of Parliament; the 
several species of temporal offences; with the manner 
and degree of punishment; and an infinite number of 
minute particulars, which diffuse themselves as ex­
tensively as the ordinary distribution of common justice 
requires*”
8. But this cannot be the sense in which the term is used in 
the reception provisions since the doctrines of equity 
were specifically mentioned.
9* I Comm. 68*
Ill
The first part of this passage deals with the practice 
and procedure of the courts; the second part deals with 
rules for the acquisition and transfer of titles; while 
the third leg deals with the rules for the interpretation
a
of statutes; there is a residual provision for incidental
matters* We may mention that mahy of the heads enumerated
by Blackstone have now been amended by or consolidated in
statute law in England*
The law merchant has also been said to be part of the
common law. Says Blackstone:
,fA particular system of customs used only among one set 
of the King’s subjects, called the custom of the mer­
chants or lex mercatorias which however different from 
the general rules of the common law, is yet engrafted 
into it and made part of it; being allowed, for the 
benefit of trade, to be of the utmost validity in all 
commercial transactions."10
But early writers regarded the law merchant as part of 
the law of nations. This cannot be said to be inconsistent 
with Blackstone’s position since it has been argued that the 
law merchant wqs part of the law of England because it was 
part of the law of nations* It has been suggested by Smith 
in A Compendium of Mercantile Law that the assertion that the 
law merchant was part of the law of nations meant no more than
that the law merchant was free from some technical rules of
the common law* Others have enumerated some other differences 
between the law merchant and the common law* Sir John Davies
10. 1 Comm*75* But Lord Blackburn in A Treatise on the Effect
of the Contracts of Sale, (1st EdtT) p.207 has commented
that 'che process of engrafting was by no means a smooth
one.
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had this to says
H * . . . • in a sute at the common law no manfs writing 
can be pleaded against him as his act and deed, unless 
the same be sealed and delivered; but in a sute between 
merchants “bills of lading, bills of exchange, being 
but tickets without seals, letters of advice and cre­
dence, policies of assurance, assignations of debt, all 
of which are of no force at common lav/, are of good 
credit and force by the law merchant1 ♦
The general tenor of academic opinion in this head has however
been that although the law merchant did not start as a branch
of the comi.ion law, it later merged with it. ^his merger
owes much to the work of Lord Mansfield and the other judges.
The judgment of Lord Alverstone in west Hand Central
1 3Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v R. has often been regarded as laying 
down the condition under which customary international law 
will be part of the common law and this is a third element 
of the common lav/#
• But any doctrine so involved must be really 
accepted as binding between nations, and the internat­
ional law sought to be applied must, like anything else, 
be proved by satisfactory evidence, which must show 
either that the particular proposition put forward has 
been recognised and acted upon by our country, or that 
it is of such a nature, as has been so widely and gen­
erally accepted, that it can hardly be supposed that 
any civilised state would repudiate it. The mere op­
inions of jurists, however eminent or learned, that it 
ought to be so recognised, are not in themselves suff­
icient.1
11# (13th Edn.) by H.C*Gutteridge and others p. (CCVIII)
12. Cited in Smith ^ "Mercantile Law p. CCXX1 
13* u-9053 2 K.B# 391 at p. 407# But see Jennings, The
Law and the Constitution (3rd ed.) p.1^5#
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Before 1708 the immunity of ambassadors and their 
suites derived from comity.^ Perhaps this practice might 
satisfy Lord Alverstone's test. But with respect one would 
take leave to doubt the inclusion of International Customary 
Law as part of the common law. In the Franconia, two judges, 
Sir R. Philmore and Kelly C.B., seemed to incline to the 
opinion that legislation could not override a rule of inter­
national law. Said the Chief BaronJ
"I hold that no one nation has the right to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction.,over the ships of other nations, 
or the subjects of other nations within such ships, 
navigating the high seas . . . .  unless, general and 
long-continued usage, evidenced by the actual exercise 
of such jurisdiction acquiesced in by the nation or 
nations affected by it.“15
Admittedly, this statement is too wide and might tend 
to invalidate any statute that is inconsistent with an inter­
national law rule. Perhaps the construction put on the
*| /r
Acts of 1807 and 1811 prohibiting the slave trade, tend to 
lend support to the Chief Baron’s views. These enactments 
which were passed as a result of a strong humanitarian move­
ment were expressed in very wide extra-territorial language. 
This was morally commendable, but violated a cardinal prin­
ciple of public international law. Thus in the case of
14. The Diplomatic Privileges Act 1708, & Ann. C.12 only 
declared the existing common law situation. But see 
Lord Mansfield in Triquet v Bath (1754), 3 Burr 1478.
As to waiver of privilege, see Reg, v Madam (1961) 2 Q.B.l
15. Reg, v Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D.63.
16. 47 Geo. Ill, C36, 5 Geo. Ill, 0.23.
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17Madrazo v Willes, the Court of King’s Benc£ so narrowed
the statutes that a Spaniard was enabled to recover large
damages in an English Court for interference at Havang, with
18his slave ship and traffic* On the other hand, on quest­
ions of jurisdiction over crimes committed in British ships, 
the English courts have not hesitated to depart from an inter­
national law rule. Their autnority. for so doing has not
19only been statutory but also under the common law* ^
20Maxwell has said that the restrictive force of the 
rules of international law goes no further than this, that 
1 every statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as 
its language admits, as not to be inconsistent with the comity 
of nations, or with the established rules of international 
law.” Reduced to this, customary international law will be 
a variant of the common law since the courts also interpret 
statutes as much as possible according to the rules of the 
common lav; except where the language is clear to the contrary* 
Finally, ecclesiastical law has also been said to be 
part of the common law* Both Lord Hale and Sir William
17.(1820), 3 B & Aid. 353.
lb.Eorbes v Cochrane (1824)# 2 B & C. 448; Sanitos v Illidge 
(i860) 8 C.B.N.S* 861. 
l9*Keg. v Anderson (1868), L.R. I.C.u.R. 161; Reg. v Keyn 
TTo76) 2 Ex. 63.
20*Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed.), 308 • See also 
Lord Parker, delivering tjae judgment of the Judicial 
Committee in the Zamora Q-916J 2 A.C. at p.93* Said that 
a municipal court is bouncl by the legislative enactments 
of its own sovereign state.
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21Blackstone classified the civil and canon laws as part 
of the common law. In his commentaries Blackstone had 
this to says
"It may seem a little improper at first view to rank 
-.these laws under the head of leges non scriptae, or 
unwritten laws, seeing they are set forth by authority 
in their pandects, their codes and their institutions, 
their councils, decrees, and decretals, and enforced 
by an immense number of expositions, decisions, and 
treaties of the learned in both branches of the law*
But I do this after the example of Sir Mathew Hale, 
because it is most plain that it is not on account of 
their being written laws, that either the common law 
or the civil law, have any obligation within this king­
dom: neither do their force and efficacy depend upon
their own intrinsic authority, which is the case of our 
written law, or acts of Parliament. But all the stren­
gth that either the papal or imperial laws have obtained 
in this realm (or indeed in any other kingdom in Europe) 
is only because they have been admitted and received 
by immemorial usage and custom in some particular cases, 
and some particular courts; and then they form a branch 
of the leges non scriptae, or customary laws; or else, 
because they are in some other cases introduced by 
consent of Parliament, and then they owe their validity 
to the leges scriptae, or statute law*”
Opinions diverge on the inclusion of ecclesiastical law as
22part of the common law* In R v Milles Tindal O.J* accepted 
the view that ecclesiastical law was part of the common law* 
American judges and writers hold different views. Perhaps 
their cynicism is understandable. Those whose forebears
21* 1 Comm. 79-80. On the position of common law in England
after the Reformation, see Lord Hardwicke in Middleton 
v Crofts (1736), 2 Atk 650* The influence is most felt 
in test anient ary law of the rules governing soldiers1 
wills (now embodied in Y/ills Act, 1837, S.2 and extended 
by the Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act, 1918. See also 
Drummond v Parish (1843), 3 Curt 522; In re Wernber,
CL918J 1 Ch. 339 (affirmed (1918) 2 Ch. 82); In re Wingham 
L1949VM87.
22. (1844) 10 CL. & P, 534*
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left Britain in protest to religious persecution would not 
easily reconcile themselves to the view that ecclesiastical
2
law forms part of their common law. Thus in Burtis v Burtis
Chancellor Semford held that ecclesiastical law did not form
a part of the common law. In his view
"The English law concerning divorce . . . .  is chiefly 
the ecclesiastical law and not the common law of that 
country”•
Since Probate and matrimonial causes form the largest 
chunk of ecclesiastical law and these subjects are substant­
ially covered by statutory law the dispute as to whether or 
not ecclesiastical law forms part of the common law, should 
not detain us further. Y/e shall be investigating their
24.applicability in Ghana and Nigeria in a subsequent chapter.
23- 1st Hopkin’s Chancery, 5579 New York, 14. See also
American Journal of Comparative Law (1908) Vol.21, p. 
231; and Crump v Morgan, Supreme Court of North 
California; 1843 3.1* Eg. R.91.
24« Blackstone felt that ecclesiastical law was not suitable 
for exportj | So-
i
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Was the Received Common Law the Common Law of England?
There has recently been some controversy among certain
writers over the meaning of the received common law and equity*
n
The orthodox, and till 1963, the only view was that the common
law of England is the law that was received. But it is
being suggested that the law the Nigerian Courts (and for
that matter the courts of Ghana before I960) are to apply is
the common law as a system. Thus Nwabueze has said:
"As applied to the common law countries, the expression 
*common law* is used to mean the legal system and 
habits of legal thought that Englishmen have evolved.
In this sense it is contrasted with systems of law 
derived from Homan law. It is in this sense that the 
common law is applied in some of the older Commonwealth 
countries and in America and, itiis submitted, should 
be applied in Nigeria. It is wrong to suggest that 
our courts are absolutely bound by the specifically 
English text or version of the common law . . . .  Having 
adopted the English habits of legal thought, we are to 
apply and develop them according to our own lights and 
circumstances, and not regard ourselves as absolutely 
bound by their particular elaborations in the English 
courts."
Nwabueze further argues that it is no objection to his 
theory that the word "English" appears in the receiving en­
actments, since it also appears in the wider definition of
25*A.Allott: Essays in African Law (i960) p.3. B.0.Nwabueze,
The Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (1963), 21; Park, 
Sources of Nigerian Law (1963) 19« Allott, "The Common Law 
of Nigeria", I.C.li.Q., Supplementary Publication No. 10
(1965) 32. - ......
26.Nwabueze, ibid.
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common law. It is interesting to note that Park has 
different ideas about the effect of the phrase "of England.1
o
To Park the phrase inhibits the development of a uniquely 
Nigerian common law. It is tempting to sympathise with
Nwabueze^ position. It is very fashionable indeed to
found the Nigerian legal system on something more embracing 
than just one other legal system however great. After all, 
if the Tiber and the Thames have produced great systems, 
the Niger is equally capable of the same feat. The Nigerian 
courts have to invoke :. their legal rules from the anonymity 
of Anglo-American judicial literature. They are not bound 
by the specifically English text of the rules.
But as has been pointed out by another writer such an 
approach bristles with difficulties. One of such is the 
obvious uncertainty inherent in the reception of the common 
law as a system. Where for instance would a Nigerian judge 
look for a particular rule if he was faced with a factual 
situation in a case1' Would he have to wade through the 
chaotic mass of Anglo-American jurisprudence before deciding 
a particular case? To nod approval to such a line of action 
is to assume such omniscience as can hardly be reposed in 
the judiciary of any system, having regard to the training 
of the Nigerian judiciary. In any case if this were the 
intention of the legislature it could be said in express
27* Park, loc it. p.19*
2 8 . Allott, "Common Law of Nigeria” p.32.
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words which is hardly the case here. On the contrary, the
courts have now and then come out with open and ex cathedra
acknowledgements that the common law they enforce and are
required to enforce is the common law of England* Says Speed
29Ag* C. J* in Lewis v Bankole
"It is of course well kpown that the colony of Southern 
Nigeria is under the sovereignty of the British Crown 
and the law applicable to the colony and in force within 
the jurisdiction of this court is the common law of 
England, the doctrines of equity, and statutes of 
general application which were in force in England on 
the 1st day of January, 1900."
Eight years later, the same judge, then Chief Justice 
of Nigeria in the case of In re Trademarks Ordinance, 
W.B.MacIver and Co. Ltd. v C.P.A.O.*^ also said:
1 1  ' - - - . tar— m m m m i  ■ i ■ ^
"It seems clear that the learned judge in the court 
below would have come to a contrary decision had he 
not felt constrained to a contrary conclusion by the 
decisions of English courts. These decisions are 
of course binding on us but they must be construed having 
regard to the local conditions which are widely diff­
erent from those that obtain in England."
To the same effect Rose J. in Amachree v Kalio and ors^  had
this to say:
"I now refer to the Supreme Court Proclamation and later 
to the Supreme Court Ordinance aftern;ihe amalgamation of 
the Lagos and Southern Nigerian Governments. Ink that 
law it is clearly stated to what laws the people within 
the jurisdiction of the court are amenable, and it will 
be there found that the Common law of England with all 
its principles was applicable to the country".
29* (1909) 1, N.L.R. 82 at p. 83* Bull Ct. decision.
3 0. (1 9 17) 3 , n;l.e: 1 6.
3 1. (1913) 2, n.l.r; 1 0 8.
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j
Of course, one will justifiably and with respect reserve 
unqualified approval to the learned judge's "with all its 
principles". But even this objection does not invalidate I
the broader principle involved, i.e. the application of j
j
the common law of England. ;
In his speech to the Nigerian Bar Association, the Federal 
Chief Justice, Sir Adetokumbo Ademola, accepted that the law 
the courts apply in Nigeria is the English common law but ! \
added that some of its technicalities do not neatly fit into !i
Nigerian circumstances. In the face of such an impregnable 
battery of academic and judicial authority Nwabueze has a
very heavy onus to discharge to stand his theory on its feet.
This he has not done. To suggest that the recent addition 
of the phrase "of England" in the receiving enactments in 
some Nigerian jurisdictions, bears out his interpretation, 
is to adopt a very restricted and narrow view of the new 
provisions. V/e shall be returning to these provisions later.
Allott"^ has adduced two other reasons why the received 
common law should be the common law of England. Firstly 
he examines contemporary United Kingdom Colonial legislation 
in pari materia. The Zanzibar Order In Council, 1884, Art.d, 
applied
"the common and statute law of England in force at the 
commencement of this Order”
32. Nigerian Bar Journal July-August (1963) p.17 at p.19. 
33* Allott, "The Common Law of Nigeria" op.cit.
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as the residual law in Zanzibar. Also Art. 12 of the Africa
Order in Council 1889 provided that:
11. . . . the civil and criminal jurisdiction shall, so 
far as circumstances admit, be exercised upon the prin­
ciples of and in conformity with the substance of the 
law for the time being in force in England."
Where it was intended that any other law should apply, it was
so stated in express terms as in the case of ±iechuanaland
where Roman-Butch law applies. The Cape of Good Hope and
Ceylon also retain a large amount of Roman-Butch law, while
Malta retains a great deal of Sicilian law.*^ In the case
of West Africa, apart *from the savings for customary law no
specific mention of any other law was made in the receiving
enactment. To import the general common law, therefore
is to strain the meaning of the provision far beyond the
intentions of the legislature.
Present Position in Ghana:
Section 40(3) of the Republican Constitution of Ghana, 
I960 includes common law among the laws of Ghana. The 
application of this common law is provided for in Section 64 
of the N.l.C. Courts Becree, 1966. An attempt was made in
.f
Section 17(i) of the Interpretation Act, I960, to define the
Content of the Common law of Ghana. It goes:
"The Common Law, as comprised in the laws of Ghana, con­
sists, in addition tolhe rules of law generally known as
34* (1896-7) 1 Journal of Comp. Leg. 137*
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the doctrine of equity and of the rules of customary
law included in the common law under any enactment
providing for the assimilation of such rules of custom­
ary law as are suitable for general application."
Sub-section (3) includes the statutes of general application 
in the definition of the common law of Ghana, while Sub­
section (4) empowers the courts to have regard to the expos­
ition of any particular rule in any country. The common
law of England no longer plays a premier role. This is as
35far as theory goes. A learned author has doubted the 
effectiveness of this robust attempt to jettison the old 
reception provisions. It has been added that English law 
is "too firmly entrenched" in Ghana for the judges to be 
tempted to ransack the jurisprudence of the common law world 
before coming to a decision on a question of common law."J 
Perhaps it is too early to draw any conclusions on the effect 
iveness of the recent provisions. Five years of judicial 
decisions has not produced ^ny remarkable deviations from the 
old and accepted practice of the courts, ile. the resort 
to the familiar English rules and concepts. One thing how­
ever, is clear. The judges now have statutory authority to 
resort to the formulation of the rules of law in any country.
This provision is new. It is different from the old law on 
37the subject.
35* F.A.R.Bennion, Constitutional Law of Ghana. 1962 p.406* 
36. Allott, "The Common Law of Nigeria" ]p*37*
37* The Courts Decree, 1966 repeals and ssubst anti ally re­
enacts the Courts Act, I960 (c.A.9)*
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Secondly, the learned author relied on some rules of
)
statutory interpretation. He argued that from the tenor of 
the whole Ordinance English law was intended to apply.
Section 19 which makes saving for the application of customary 
law in certain cases, excepts cases where substantial in­
justice would be done to either party by a strict adherence 
to the rules of English law. He mentions but not with any 
noticeable emphasis that the side-notes state "How far the 
law of England in force". Professor Allott however, con- 
cedes that if as has been advocated in some quarters, the 
reception of the Common law is dateless, then it would be 
feasible to imagine the contingency of the received common 
law being at large.
Now, this second ground deserves closer scrutiny. 
Admittedly the English rules of statutory interpretation are 
part of the common law. In Nigeria the English Interpre­
tation Act 1889 is an Act of general application. G-hana, 
then Gold Coast also inherited English procedure and prac­
tice of which the interpretation of Statutes is part. But 
are we importing English rules to prove that English law 
was the law received? Even if the English rules were app­
licable, it has been repeatedly affirmed that side notes
38. Sir Kenneth Boberts-Wray, "The Adaptation of Imported 
Law in Africa" (i960) J.A.L. 66; Park op.cits Nwabueze 
op.cit., 22. ~
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are not part of the enactment and should not be resorted to
39as an aid to interpreting any provision of an enactment.
Nigeria (Federation and Lagos):
There is no corresponding provision in Nigeria to Section
17(1-5) in the (jhana Interpretation Act. Section 45(1) of
40the 1955 Interpretation Act of the then Federation of Nig­
eria provides as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this section and except in 
so far as other provision is made by any Federal law, the 
common law of England and the doctrines of equity, to­
gether with the statutes of general application that 
were in force in England on the 1st day of January,
1900, snail be in force in Lagos and, in so far as they 
relate to any matter within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the Federal legislature, shall be in farce 
elsewhere in the Federation."
The controversy over the significance of the addition of the
words "of England" to the common law has already been referred
to.41 It is enough here to reiterate our view that the
words, if tney have any material significance, only restate
the old position. The Nigerian Courts are still to observe
39* Iffaxwell; Interpretation of statutes,(IQth Edn.) 1953*42. 
But see Nicholson v Fields (lb62) 31 L.J.Ex.253> where 
Martin B. used marginal notes to interpret a statutory 
provision. Also in Bushell v Hammond P-904J 2 K.B. 563 
at p*5b7, Collins M.E. said: "Some help will be derived 
from the side-note (though of course it is not part of 
the Statute), which shows that the section is dealing 
with certain matters." These cases, nowever, will no 
longer be authoritative in Nigeria (reueral) and Hhana 
in view of the recent statutory provisions about side- 
notes m  those jurisdictions, tihana, Interpretation Act 
I960 SS.2-4; Nigeria, Interpretation Act, 1964 b*3 (l) 
and (2).
40. Cap. 69, L.N. 47 of 1955.
41. Page \l<g supra.
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the rules of the English Common law as at the date of the 
42reception except such rules have been modified by Statute 
or are excluded on the basis of inapplicability owing to 
local circumstances.
Eastern, Western and Iii d-Western regions;
under section 42 of the Nigeria (Constitution) lOrder-in- 
(Jouncil, 19 24, each regional Legislature was authorised to 
establish courts of justice for that Region# In pursuance 
of this Order, under Section 50 of the 1963 Constitution of 
Eastern Nigeria} Section 48 of the Western Nigeria Constitu­
tion and Section 48 of the Mid-Western Nigeria Constitution, 
Regional High Courts have been established in each of the 
Regions# What has become of the reception provisions?
Section 14 of the Eastern Regional High Court L a w ^  re­
enacted in Section 15 (l) of Cap# 61 (1963) provides as 
follows:
•’Subject to the provisions of this section and exsept in 
so far as other provision is made by any law in force 
in the Region, the common lav/ of England, the doctrines 
of Equity and the Statutes of general application that 
were in force in England on the 1st day of January,
1900, shall in so far as they relate to any matter for
42. This conclusion is now doubtful in view of the provisions 
of the Interpretation Act ten, 1964, which applies in 
Lagos, and in the Regions in subjects where the Federal 
Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction# Section 3(1) 
provides: ‘'Punctuation forms part of an enactment, and 
regard shall be had to it accordingly in construing the 
enactment". Section 3(2) "A Reading or marginal note 
to an enactment does not form part of the enactment and 
is intended for convenience of reference only."
43* No.27 of 1955 A. 249 Cap.61 1963 Revision.
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which the Legislature of the Region is for the time 
being competent to make laws, be in force within the 
jurisdiction of the Court."
Also Section 3 of the Western Nigeria Law of England (Appli­
cation) Law of 1959^ provides:
“From and after the commencement of this law and subject 
to the provisions of any written lav/, the common law of 
England and the doctrines of Equity observed by Her 
Majesty's High Court of Justice in England shall be in 
force throughout the Region".
The provision in the Eastern Nigeria High Court lav/ is sub­
stantially to the same effect as the Federal provision. There
is in each case the addition of the words "of England" to 
the common law. As has already been argued, this provision 
restates the older reception enactments. Commenting on the 
Western Nigeria provisions it has been argued^ that (1) it 
is merely declaratory of the pre-1959 position or (ii) that 
it applies the 1959 common law of England; or (iii) that it 
applies the law from time to time in force in England. The 
learned author added that the last view has least to commend 
it.
This comment on the third view, we submit is as it should
be. It will be patently absurd for the legislature of the
Western Region to saddle the courts with the enforcement of 
the law for the time being in force in England over the whole 
body of the common law*
44. Cap. 60, Laws of Western Region of Nigeria (1959) Revision 
45* Allott: Common Law of Nigeria. p*41*
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This view is reinforced by the fact that the Western 
Legislature had already re-enacted all the applicable Stat­
utes of general application as part of the Revised laws of 
the Region. ^f the intention was to observe the rules of 
the English common law for the time being in force, express 
words to that effect could have been used. As to the second 
view, i.e. that the Courts are to observe the 1959 English 
Common law and equity, we submit that there is very little 
to commend it. Unlike the older reception provisions, there 
is no reference as to date in the Section under consideration.
We are therefore left with the first and in our opinion 
the only justifiable view that the intention of the legis­
lature was to declare the existing position, howbeit in diff­
erent words. This change of wording runs through the whole 
enactment as witness the section that saves the application 
of customary law. Our conclusion is that the courts in
Western Nigeria still apply the common law of England but 
that they are as free as their judicial brethren in the 
common law world to develop the law in Nigeria to suit 
changing Nigerian circumstances.
The provsiions in the Mid-Western Region are substantially
47the same as those of the Western Region.
46. S.5s "Nothing in this law shall affect the provisions of 
any law relating to the right of the High Court or Mag­
istrates Courts to observe or enforce the observance of 
any existing customary law nor shall it affect the jur­
isdiction of or the law to be administered by any cust­
omary court established within the Region."
47* Mid-Western High Court Law (1964).
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Northern Nigeria:
The operative provisions in the Northern Region are
ar
found in Section 28 of the Regional High Court Law which
is as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of any written lav/ and in0 
particular of this Section and of sections 26^°, 33'? 
and 35 of this law -
(a) the common law
(b) the docttines of equity; and
(c) the statutes of general application which were in 
force in England on the 1st day *of January, 1900,
shall, in so far as they relate to any matter with
respect to which the Legislature of Northern Nigeria is 
for the time being competent to make laws, be in force 
within the jurisdiction of the court."
Prirria facie it is arguable; that the Gammon law and equity 
here referred to are not the common law of England. This 
cohid be seen from the exclusive nature of the sub-sections
(a) to (c).
But such a view of the provisions will be a very narrow
one indeed. It is obviously not borne out by the general
tenor of the enactment of which the section under discussion 
is but part.
Section 28 (c) makes reference to the Statutes of gen­
eral application which were in fareelin England on the 1st 
January 1900. The other sections of Part Three of the High 
Court Law make references to the law of England. It is
48. Cap.49
49. S.26. This section refers to the jurisdiction of the High 
Court to make orders of mandamus, prohibition and cert­
iorari. It is provided that the law shall be as in England 
from time to time.
50. S.33 deals with Probate.
51. S.35 provides for practice and Procedure.
52. SS.13( i); 20,24( i) and (2); 26,29(l); 30, 33, 34 and 35*
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interesting to note that there is not one reference in the 
whole law to the law of any other country, the law of England 
excepted. One is therefore not persuaded to share the view 
that the courts are empowered to apply any other than the 
English common law with the usual caution that they are mod­
ified by local circumstances. Here as in the provisions of 
the other jurisdictions in Nigeria, the courts are as free 
as they should be to evolve a "uniquely Nigerian common law."
53* To Park the Northern Nigeria provisions leave room for 
the development of a truly iNigerian common law, but 
as we have attempted to explain above, the Northern 
High Court law does not introduce any novel provisions 
in the reception pattern. See Park: Sources of Nigerian 
Law, p. 19#
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(b) The Doctrines of Equity:
The term "equity” was deployed in three contexts in 
the reception ordinances of Ghana and Nigeria* It is im­
portant to emphasise the past tense, in view of the recent 
changes in Ghana and in some jurisdictions in Nigeria*
1Firstly Section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1876,
already referred to above, provides:
"The common law, the doctrines of equity and Statutes of
general application .........  shall be in force within
the jurisdiction of the courts#”
Here, there is little doubt that the reference is to technical
equity in contradistinction to common law# In its second
and third contexts, equity is used to delimit the scope within
which customary laws should be judicially applied# Section
19 of the same Supreme Court Ordinance provides as follows:
"Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the courts of 
the right to observe and enforce the observance, or 
shall deprive any person of the benefit, of any native 
law or custom existing in the Colony, such law or custom 
not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by 
necessary implication with any enactment of the colonial 
legislative existing at the commencement of this Ord­
inance.”
"No party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any 
local law or custom, if it shall appear either from 
express contract or from the nature of the transactions 
out of which any suit or question may have arisen, that 
such party agreed that his obligations in connection with 
such transactions should be regulated exclusively by
1# No# 4 of 1876* Subsequent pre-1960 versions of the 
provisions of this section do not affect the present 
meaning.
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English law; and in cases where no express rule is 
applicable to any matter in controversy, the court 
shall be governed by the principles of justice equity 
and good conscience*1'
The provisions of the above section have commonly been referred 
to as the repugnancy and residual reception provisions 
respectively* While the repugnancy provisions have been 
used by the courts to disallow customary law rules in certain 
cases, the residual clause, it has been claimed, has intro­
duced a 'watered-down* version of English law* This later 
facet of equity will be examined in some detail later* Here 
we are concerned with the technical equity as contained in 
Section 14 of the Supreme Cojirt Ordinance, 1876, referred to 
above. V/e shall briefly be examining its nature, and, in 
some detail, its content as a source of the law of obligations 
in Ghana and Nigeria*
Its nature:
As has already been mentioned, the phrase 'doctrines of 
equity1 introduces English technical equity (cf. common law)
2* See A*N*Allott, "The extent of the operation of native
customary law", (1950) 2 J.A*A*4; also by the same author 
Essays, p*194; J.Harrigan "The Impact of English law 
upon the Existing Gold Coast Custom and Possible Develop­
ment of the Resulting System" (1956) 8 J.A*A*126,
Guttman, "The Reception of the Common Law in'the Sudan", 
(1957) 6,I*C.L*Q. 401; J*D.Derrett, "Justice, Equity and 
Good Conscience"“in Changing Law in -Developing Countries 
(ed. J*N*D*Anderson, 1963; p*ll4; A.W.Park, Sources of 
Nigerian'‘Law (1963), V/.C.E* Daniels, "Common Law in West 
Africa, (1964)•
3* See infra under Customary law as a source of the law of 
obligations*
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into the laws of Ghana and Nigeria* C.K.Allen^ has called
this facet of equity, ’particular equity’• Equity as a type
of corrective justice is easily traced back to the Greek
philosophers and orators as recorded in Plato's Statesman
and Aristotle 's Ethics* It must be said that equity in
England has become, by a peculiar historical development, the
name of the special body of judicial rules administered in
the exercise of a special jurisdiction* Yet one must not
forget that this is but the narrow signification of the word.
Broadly, it has been equated to conscience, equality, fairness
and natural justice. This in fact was the whole theme of
5
Christopher St* German's work in the sixteenth century.
"Equity is a righteousness that considereth all the 
particular circumstances of the deed . . . and it is 
called also by some men epieikeia; the which is no 
other thing but an exception of the law of God, or the 
law of reason, from the general rules of the law of man, 
when they by reason of their generality would in any 
particular case judge against the law of God or the law 
of reason - the which exception is secretly understood 
in every general rule of general positive law."
This broad concept of ’equity1 as corrective justice is said
to be inherent in ail legal systems worthy of the name. But
St. German’s work based on conscience as it was, was also a
landmark in the development of English equity jurisdiction.
4* Law in the Making, (7th ed.) p.385* 
5* Doctor and Student, dial 1, C.16.
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It meant the partial acceptance of English courts of doctrines
of the common law; and as has been aptly put by Sir Carleton
Allen, it was viewed not as a charter of mere caprice but
as a foundation for enlightened scientific interpretation.
Gradually and perhaps imperceptibly equity took the shape
of the chancellor*s jurisdiction, supplementing the common
law. Under ^ord Eldon it had reached a stage of approximate
completeness, having been encouraged in its growth by James
7
I in the Earl of Oxford fs Case and the judicial creative-
o
ness of Lord Mansfield. Since the Judicature Acts, law
6. C.'K.Allen, Law in the Making (7th ed.) p.424*
7. (1616) 1 Hep. Ch. 1.
8. This merger of jurisdiction was also introduced into Ghana 
and Nigeria. For Nigeria, see S. 13, High Court of Lagos 
Act, Cap. 80 Laws of Nigeria (Federation, 1958); S.13 
Western Nigeria High Court Law, Cap. 44 Laws of Western 
Nigeria (1959 Revision); S.19, Eastern Nigeria High Court
Law. Cap. 61, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, (1983 Consolidat­
ion); and S.30, Northern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap.
49> Laws of Northern Nigeria, (1963 Consolidation). For 
Ghana, Section 17(l) of the Interpretation Act, I960 
(C.A.4) provides as follows:*HThe common law, as comprised 
in' the laws of Ghana, consists, in addition to the rules 
generally known as the common law, of the rules generally 
known as the doctrines of equity and rules of customary 
law included in the common law under any enactment pro­
viding for the assimilation of such rules of customary 
law as are suitable for general application.H It is 
remarkable, however, that Section 86 of the Court
Ordinance, (Cap. 4 of 1951) which provided for the primacy 
of the rules of equity over the rules of law, has been 
omitted from the recent Courts legislation. Ollennu 
has indicated in a recent lecture (to the Sarbah Society, 
Sept. 1962), that the courts would apply the new law 
in the spirit of the older provisions. His views are not 
shared by S.K.B.Asante; see (1964) Un. Gh. Law Journal,
Vol. 1 p. 52. S . ^ cU
(VV£^ > as j pricey 'Wks.
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and equity are administered in the same courts.
This brief functional resume of ’equity1 is essential 
for a clearer appreciation of its role in the development 
of the laws in Ghana and Nigeria, into which territories 
it was formally introduced on the reception dates already 
mentioned.
Equity as a source of the law of obligations:
Although equity is not a complete system, yet there 
are certain general principles on which the court of chancery 
exercised its jurisdiction. Many of these have been embodied 
in what have often been called the maxims of equity. Twelve 
such maxims have often been recognised as follows:
1. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be v/ithout a remedy.
2. Equity follows the law.
3. Where there is equal equity, the low shall prevail.
4. Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall 
prevail.
5. He who seeks equity must do equity.
6. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
7. Delay defeats equities.
8. Equality is equity.
9. Equity looks to the intent rather than the form.
10. Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done.
11. Equity imputes an indention to fulfil an obligation.
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9
12* Equity acts in personam*
Many of these maxims do of course, overlap* For the 
purposes of the law of obligations we shall be examining 
items 4, 5 and 7 above, which we shall proceed to re-number 
as 1, 2 and 3 for purposes of the discussion* ^
9* Equity jurisdiction is not restricted to the Superior 
Courts in Ghana and Nigeria* The Customary Courts 
also do exercise equity jurisdiction* See the Western 
Nigeria Customary Courts Manual, p*67, and the Ghana 
Local Courts Procedure Regulations, 1962 (L.I. 2085*89). 
But the recent N.L.C. decree, the Courts Becree, 1966 
(N.L.C.D. 84), has abolished the local Courts in Ghana 
with effect from 23rd September, 1966. See however, 
Bannerman, J. in Tsuru v Yebuah (1941) 7 W.A.C.A* 172 
at p*173, and Ollennu, J. in Kwg.me v Fio (i960), May 
9th, at the Accra Land Court, where the learned judge 
suggested obiter that specific performance existed in 
customary law long before the introduction of English 
law. This latter statement of the position by the 
learned judge should command respect, coming as it does 
from an expert in the Customary laws of Ghana* It is 
very respectfully submitted, however, that in respect 
of executory transactions there is insufficient evidence 
.except that of his Lordship, to support his contention*
10. The detail of the contents of the twelve maxims of 
equity is outside the scope of this study.
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1* Where the equities are equal the first in time shall 
prevail:
The Latin version, Qui prior est tempore potior est iure,
is not any more elegant. This maxim is found mostly at
work in property transactions both real and personal, and
governs priorities and notice. Section 16 of the Eastern
11Nigeria Land Instruments Registration Law provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Law every instrument 
registered under this law shall, so far as it afreets 
any land, take effect, as aginst other instruments 
affecting the same land, from the date of its registrat­
ion as hereinafter defined in the proper office as 
specified in Section 3 afrd every instrument registered 
before the commencement of this law shall be deemed to 
have taken efiect from the date provided by the law in 
force at the time of its registration."
12But in Monbarak v J apour, a Ghanaian case, it was held by 
the West African Court of Appeal that the Land Registry 
Ordinance (Cap.112, Gold Coast) did not give to a registered 
deed any priority over an earlier grant by native customary 
law. This was a case between two Syrian traders at Sekondi 
in Ghana. The plaintiff had in 1913 obtained the disputed 
piece of land from the owners under customary law. The 
defendant's title stems from a grant made by the same owners 
in 1920 also under customary law. In 1933 the plaintiff 
further obtained a conveyance in English form and got this
11. Cap.72, Laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963)
12. (1944) 10 V/.A.C.A. 102. See also Anyidoho v Markham 
(I905) iten.318 Oreyeim v Consolidated Trust Ltd1. (1949) 
12 'J.A.C.A. 443*
137
duly registered with a plan attached. He brought this 
action against the defendant for mesne profits and a dec­
laration that the defendant had built on his (plaintifffs) 
land. The plaintiff’s claiM to the main premises was dis­
missed but the claim for a narrow strip and mesne profits 
were sustained ty the trial judge. On appeal and cross­
appeal by both parties, it was held that the 1933 plan had 
not been proved to accurately represent the 1913 grant and 
could not be sustained. secondly, that the registration of 
the 1933 deed did not give it priority over the 1920 grant 
in favour of the defendant. It is not clear from the judg­
ment of Graham Paul C.J. what the attitude of the Court would 
have been if the 1913 transaction had been registered instead 
of the subsequent 1933 one; or if the 1920 grant haa been 
in English form. Perhaps in the latter case Section 23 
of the Land Hegistry Ordinance of the Gold Coast (Ghana):
"Every instrument executed before the 24th day of 
March, (except a will and a Judge’s certificate),
and every will of a testator who died before that date, 
snail, as regards any land affected thereby, take effect 
as against other instruments affecting the same land 
from the date of its registration under this Ordinance
tl 1  ”5» • • # «L j
would apply.
An important qualification to the rule of priorities 
is the doctrine of notice. It has often been stated that a 
purchaser for valuable consideration who obtains a legal
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estate at the time of his purchase without notice of a 
prior equitable right is entitled to priority inequity as 
v/ell as at law* This was decided in the English case of
Pilcher v R a w l i n s Also in Johnson v Qnisiwo and others^  
a Nigerian appeal (from Lagos), the Y/est African Court of 
Appeal applied this doctrine of notice* Three conditions 
were given without which the doctrine could not be prayed 
in aid:-
"As to those equities counsel for the appellant pointed 
out that where an estate is affected by an equitable 
interest a subsequent purchaser for value will not be 
affected by that equitable interest provided three con­
ditions are fulfilled, vizs-
(i) He must have obtained the legal estate
(ii) He must have given value for the property
(iii) He must have had no notice of the equitable
interest at the time when he gave his consideration.
To the same effect is the judgment of the same court
17in another Nigerian case of Ollivant Ltd. v Alakija.
1 o
Blackall P. gave the facts of the case as follows:
"In the present case the former landlord, having re­
ceived rent in advance from Messrs. G. B. Ollivant 
(the appellants), was in equity bound to treat that 
advance as a fulfilment of the latter *s obligation to 
pay the rent and the respondent who purchased the right, 
title and interest of the former landlord, is bound 
by the tenants 1 equity against him. Now, in the appeal 
before us the respondent had not only constructive but 
actual notice of the appellant's equity, for Halliman J.
14. (1872) 7 Ch. App. 259.
15. (1943) 9 './.A.C.A* 189.
16. Per Graham Paul C.J. at p.192 et seq*
17. (1950) 13 V/.A.C.A. 63. Of. Oshinusi v A&itoye (1932)
11 N.L.H.132.
18* At p* 67*'
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found as a fact that the bailiff announced at the sale 
that it was understood that rent had been paid in advance
up to 31 December, 1963 ........ In these circumstances
it would be clearly inequitable, in the popular as well 
as the legal sense, to permit the respondent to exact 
from the appellants a rent which they have already paid."
2. He who seeks equity must do equity:
In order to obtain equitable relief the plaintiff must 
be prepared to do "equity" in its wider signification. In 
the English courts this maxim has been applied in illegal
iq 20
loans, the doctrine of election, consolidation in mortgage
21 22 transactions , wife's equity to a settlement, Equitable
2 3 24-lien and equitable estoppel.
In the West African Courts the maxim has been applied
in equitable lien cases, election and equitable estoppel cases
We shall look at each of these cases.
(a) Equitable Lien
"The General principle is, beyond all question, that 
work and labour done or money expended by one man to 
preserve or benefit the property of another do not 
according to English law create any lien upon the prop­
erty saved or benefited, nor, even if standing alone, 
create any obligation to repay the expenditure. Lia­
bilities are not to be forced upon people behind their
19. Lodge v National Investment Co.Ltd. r 1907J 1 Ch.300,
23 T.L.R. 187. ■ '
20. Re Lord Chesham (1886) 31 Ch.P. 466 at p.473 per Chitty J 
21* Tweedale v Tweedale (1857) 23 Beav. 341«
22. Elibank v Montolieja Xl801) 5 Ves.373; IW & T.L.C.541*
23* Re Sims1 Questions (jl946j 2 All E.R. 138 (wife's army
allowance)
24. Central London Property Trust Ltd. v High Trees House Ltd[1947^ .1.130.
140
becks any more than you can confer a benefit upon a 
man against his will.1125
To this general rule enunciated by Bowen L.J. there are 
exceptions. A lien will arise if the plaintiff made pay- 
of his own money,
under a contract with the beneficial owner 
as a trustee 
as a mortgagee
in circumstances giving rise to a claim by sub­
rogation
where the property was in the hands of an official
receiver or other officer of the court who knew
that the payments were being made; or
in the erroneous belief that the property was his,
and the true owner, knowing that he was the owner
and knowing of the other's belief, stood by and
26allowed him to make the payments.
27The Kola Tenancy Law of Eastern Nigeria comes under 
the fourth sub-heading. Section 12 provides:
25* Ealcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 ch. 
B. 234 at 248, per Bowen L.J. Maritime salvage was said 
to be an exception. Por further discussion of this, 
see infra pp.
26. Snell, Principles of Equity, (25th Bdn.) p.446.
27* Gap. G7 Laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963)* This is
a re-enactment with minor changes of the Kola Tenancy 
Ordinance, Gap. 98, Laws of Nigeria (1948)/\£;5 &
ments out 
(i) 
(ii)
(iii) 
(iv)
( V*) ;
(vi)
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"In assessing any compensation the tribunal shall have 
regard to the improvements effected on the land by the 
tenant or his predecessors in title, and to the value 
of any rents or other advantages which the tenant may 
derive from the grants made by him or his predecessors 
in title of interest in the land to other persons, 
but shall not otherwise have regard to the value of the 
tenancy."
The significance of this provision will be appreciated
after a cursory look at the history of the Ordinance. Hither
to it had been the customary practice for land-owning familie
to alienate the use and possession of such lands to needy
tenants on a nominal original payment in the form of Kola
nuts or drink. Such tenants were usually known as 'Kola
28tenants' and the tenure was Kola tenancy# The practice 
was most common in Onitsba in Kastern Nigeria#
As time went on the economic value of land increased 
enormously and the Kola tenant was the lucky beneficiary of 
the surplus. This state of affairs triggered off an incred­
ible array of litigation. The landlords wanted a share of
the increased value or a surrender of the land by the tenant.
29In the case of Mgbelekeke Famil.y v Madam Iyap the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria held that the landlords who were the 
plaintiffs (appellants) in the case, had no share in the in­
creased value of the land.
2 8. See L.T.Chubbs, Ibo Land Tenure (1946). Also S.N.C. 
Obi, Ibo law of Property (1953), H-3, and C.K.Meeks" 
Land Law and Custom in the Colonies, p.298. Hr. Meek 
doubts the value of the 'Ordinance and suggests that it 
is of no practical value.
29. Suit No.4 (Onitsha)j 19 31 (Nigeria).
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Needless to say, with respect, that this attitude of 
upholding a custom that was patently inequitable did not 
improve the position one bit. The important result was the 
passing of the Kola Tenancy Ordinance in 1935 which abolished 
Kola Tenancies. But in respect of those already existing, 
provisions were made for their regulation and eventual ex­
tinction. The landlord was not allowed to take over his 
land which for generations may have been developed by the 
Kola tenant, without adequately compensating the tenant. 
Section 12 of the Ordinance, now Kola 'Tenancy law of Eastern 
Nigeria, was inserted to cater for the situation.
(b) Election:
■5Q
In Taylor v Williams & Anor, a Nigerian case, Graham
Paul, J. enunciated the principle of election as follows
“The law as to election under a will is clear enough 
in its main principles. Where a testator under his 
will disposes or professes to dispose of property not 
his to dispose of, the disposition is of course of it­
self void and of no effect. But if the person to whom 
the property wrongly disposed of in fact belongs and 
who has the power to dispose of it, is a beneficiary 
under the will, he is put to his election, that is to 
say he raust refuse the benefit he gets under the will 
or allow his property to go under the testator’s devise 
of it, or compensate the devisee thereof for the 
failure of the devise.M
The facts of the case were that Mrs. Williams, the test­
atrix had devised to her son Ekundayo her undivided share in
30. (1935) 12, N.L.E. 67* See also ICcLaren Brothers (Manchester] 
Ltd. v Nartey (Gold Coast - Ghana,) Div. Ct. 1929 p*30.
31. Taylor v Williams, Supra at p. 68.
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i
a family house* Agnes Taylor, one of the children of the 
deceased, challenged the devise on the ground that the test­
atrix had no alienable share in the family house* The 
defendants argued that the plaintiff having accepted some 
benefit under another provision of the same instrument could 
not validly challenge the devise. It was further argued 
that such a claim would be tantamount to approbating and 
reprobating the testator fs will. It was held that the dev­
ise was valid. Since the plaintiff had no alienable share 
in the family house, the principle of election could not 
validly be evoked.
(c) Equitable Estoppel:
Before the nineteenth century, the domain of the 
doctrine of estoppel was restricted to a representation as 
to an existing fact. The rule was that there would be an 
estoppel where there has been a representation, by words or 
conduct, of existing facts intended to be acted upon and i n 
fact acted upon to his prejudice by the person to whom it was 
made. J Since the Hughesdecision, the doctrine has been 
extended to cases where the representation has been of inten­
tion and not of existing facts. The modified doctrine has
32. Hughes v Metropolitan Railway (1877)2 App. Gas.439,
Birmingham and District Land Go. v L. & N.W.Ry. (1888)
40 Oh.5. 268; Central London Property Ltd. v High Trees 
House IT1947? K.B.130;' (1956/1 All E.R. 256.
33* Canadian Pacific “By* v R. £l931j A.C. 414 at 429*
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been variously called equitable estoppel, ^  promissory 
estoppel*^ or quasi-estoppel# In Basil v Said Ha ad and 
Sons"^ an appeal from the decision of Quashi-Idun J# sitting
in the Land Court, Accra, the parties entered into a tenancy
agreement dated April 1, 1950, in respect of certain premises 
known as House No. E/19/2, Boundary Road, Tudu, Accra, at a 
rent of £660 per annum# She tenancy was for a period of 
five years as from April 1, 1950* The agreement also con­
tained the usual provision restricting the defendant from 
sub-letting the premises or any part thereof without the 
approval and consent of the plaintiff# The defendant con­
tinued in possession of the premises after March 31* 1955* 
the date of expiry of the tenancy, and thereafter, as the
trial judge found, became a statutory tenant#
In the action brought by the plaintiff against the 
defendant the claim was for (a) recovery of possession of 
the said premises; (b) £300 damages for breach of agreement 
under which the said premises were held; and (c) £423 arrears 
of rent#
As regards the question of the claim for arrears of rent, 
it was admitted that the defendant paid rent at the rate of 
£45 from 1st January, 1953* to the end of April, 1955* instead
34* Snell: Principles of Equity (25th Edn.) p. 29*
35* Bridman, “Promissory Estoppel” in (1957) Can B#R# 279*
36# Basil v Said Baad & Sons (1957)3* w#A#L#R# 231*
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of £55* The plaintiff’s evidence was that this reduction 
was a temporary concession by him and that the defendant 
promised to pay the balance when he was in a better financial 
position to do so. The defendant, on the other hand, said 
that it was the plaintiff who, on being approached, had 
agreed to reduce the rent from £55 to £45* as he was afraid 
that if he did not reduce the rent the Rent Assessment Comm­
ittee would do so. The defendant produced some twenty-nine 
receipts for rent paid since January, 1953# The learned 
trial judge believed the evidence of the plaintiff as to the 
reason he gave for accepting the smaller amount and gave 
judgment against the defendant accordingly for the arrears 
of rent as he claimed in the v/rit* It appears from the 
judgment of the trial judge that his decision was based on 
the oral testimony of the parties and that he did not take 
into consideration the receipts for rent tendered by the 
defendant. On appeal to the Court of Appeal by the defendant 
it was held
(i) that receipts for rent paid by the defendant after 
January, 1953* were couched in such terms as to indicate that 
the full amount of rent then due was £4-5* and not that £45 
was received on account of the larger sum. The finding of 
the trial judge on this point was thus against the weight of 
the evidence and could not stand*
(ii) Where parties enter Into an agreement with intent 
to create legal relationships and where, in pursuance of
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such agreement, one party makes a promise to another with 
intent that it shall be acted upon and it is so acted upon, 
then the party giving such promise will not be allowed to 
act inconsistently with it even though it may not be supported
yr* y O
by consideration# The High Trees principle was cited 
with approval#
In the High Trees case it was pointed out by Denning J. 
(as he then was) that equitable estoppel does not create a 
cause of action where there was none, but coikld. only be 
effective as a defence* This was ^lso the decision in 
Combe v Combe * It is not clear, however, what the attitude 
of the Ghana Courts would be in view of Section 8(2) of the 
I960 Contracts Act which substantially enacts the High Trees 
principle thus elevating it to a right under statute# It 
could be argued that since this is a Statutory right, it could 
found a cause of action as well as serve as a defence# On 
the other hand it could be argued that the provision no more 
than enacts the r^tio of the Basil case which purported to 
follow the High Trees decision. If the latter view is acc­
epted, it follows that equitable estoppel could only serve as
37* See also section 8(2) of the Ghana Contracts Act, I960, 
Act.29 which provides as follows: “A promise to waive 
the payment of a debt or part of a debt or the perfor­
mance of some other contractual or legal obligation 
shall not be invalid as a contract by reason only of 
the absence of any consideration therefor#11 
38. fl9501 All E.H*256.
39* Q.951) 1*K.B. 215*
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a 'shield and not as a sword. ' But the former view appears 
to be the better one. The whole aim of the Ghana Contracts 
Act, I960 was to modify the doctrine of consideration as 
far as promises intended to create legal relationships go.
It could hardly have been intended that such modification 
could only be useful as a defence. Ghana case law on the 
matter was sufficient to have achieved that much. The int­
ention of the legislature therefore, was to create a cause 
of action as well as a defence. It is interesting to watch 
the future attitude of the Courts as far as these provisions 
go.
3* Belay defeats equities: or as it is more commonly put,
40Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveninut•
As has been vividly stated by Lord Camden in Smith v 
Clay^, a Court of equity Mhas always refused its aid to 
stale demands where a party has slept upon his right and 
acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth 
this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and 
reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is 
passive, and does nothing.*1 The delay which stays the hand 
of a court of equity is technically called laches. This 
doctrine of laches has done yeoman service in the Ghana and 
Nigerian Courts. Its exploits have been most marked in
40. 2 Co. xnst. 690.
41. (1767) 3 Bro C.C. 639n. at 640n.
transactions relating to land# v/e shall be looking at
some of these presently.
42In Lindsay Petroleum Co. v Hurd , Lord Selborne L.C. 
laid down what has often been cited as a classic exposition 
of the doctrine of laches. In course of his judgment he 
said:
"Now the doctrine of Laches in courts of Equity is not 
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would 
be practically gmjust to give a remedy, either because 
the party has, by his conduct done that which might 
fairly be regarded as equivalent to* a waiver of it, or 
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though per­
haps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party 
in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to 
place him if the remedy were afterwords'.to be asserted, 
in either of these cases lapse or time and delay are 
most material. "4 3
Concluding, the learned Lord Chancellor said:
"Two circumstances always important in such cases are, 
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done 
during the interval, which might affect either party 
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking 
the one course or the other, so far as rfelates to the 
remedy."
In fay I or v Williams & another^, already referred to 
in another connection, one of the arguments of the defendants
42. (1874) L.H. 5 P.O. 221.
43* Ibid pp. 239-240. See also Erlanger v New Sombrero Phos­
phate Co. (1878) 3 JLpp. Gas. 1218 at pp. 1279 - 1280; and 
Halsburyfs Laws, 3rd Ed.Vol.18 p.641. Ihe defence of 
laches is only allowed where there is no statutory bar. 
If there is a statutory bar operating either expressly 
or by way of analogy, the plaintiff is entitled to the 
full statutory period before his claim becomes unen­
forceable.
44. (1935) 12 N.L.B. 67-
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was that the plaintiff was guilty of laches, acquiescence
and estoppel for electing - not to challenge the provision
in the will in issue for a period of seven years# Says
Graham Paul J., on this arguments
"In my view this plea of the defendant is bad# I'here 
is no averment by the defendant that at any time during 
the period of seven years he did, to the knowledge of 
the plaintiff, any overt act based on his right under 
the devise#fW5
If there had ueen any such overt act by the defendant to
the knowledge of the plaintiff, it is reasonable to fe&pect
that the plea would have succeeded# i'he plea succeeded in
46
Morayo v Okiade & four others, the facts of which were as 
follows: the plaintiff bought a piece of land in 1924, and
soon after instructed an auctioneer to sell it and handed 
him her conveyance# later she brought an action against 
the auctioneer in which cost3 were awarded against her, and 
the land was attached# One Oshodi paid the costs (without 
authority of the plaintiff) and the auctioneer handed him 
the conveyance# Oshodi died in 1930 and the land was sold 
in pursuance of an order of court by his administrators, 
who had the conveyance and receipts for the costs, to four of 
the defendants; and a part was resold to the remaining 
d ef e nd ant •
In 1933» the plaintiff made another attempt to sell the 
land; the defendants were then in possession and posted a 
caution notice as a result of which‘the sale was not proceeded
45* Ibid. p.6b.
46. (1940)15 rJ.l.k. 131.
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with. The plaintiff did nothing until December, 1938, 
when she issued the writ in this action by which time the 
defendants had built on tne land. It was held by the 
Supreme Court of nigeria that the plaintiff's conduct amounted 
to such acquiescence on her part to the adverse possession 
of the defendants as to estop her from bringing the claim*
Per Butler Lloyd Ag. C.J.:
. iis regards lb) (i.e. the plea of acquiescence by 
the defendants), the case is altogether different, the 
plaintiff oecame aware of the defendants 1 adverse 
possession in 1933 and aid nothing to assert her title 
against tnern for more than five years during which time 
they changed their positions by buildings on this land 
and I am clearly of opinion that this amounted to such 
acquiescence on her part as to operate as an estoppel 
against the present claim.1147
It in customary law transactions relating to land that
the full impact of the doctrine of laches has been most felt*
48As has been aptly pointed out by a learned author, the 
judges have not been consistent in the reasons they adduce 
for disallowing certain claims for the recovery of land where 
there have been delay. Some base their decisions on es­
toppel;^ some on laches^ and still others on the doctrine
51of a bona fide purchaser.
47* Ibid p.133* See also Brikitola v Alii & others (1941) 16 
N.L.32* 56; La rye a v U.A.C. Ltd. (193975 " W. AT c7a. 166 
a Ghana case; Ephraim v Asuquo (1923) 4, N.L.Pi. 9 8 ; 
but see Nwakobi y Nzekwu (1961) All N.L.R*445*
4 8. Allott, Essays in African Law p.
49* Abbey v Ollenu (1954) 14 W.aVc .A* 236*
50* Akpan-Awo v Gam (1913)2, N.L.R.10Q*
51. Boodoo v Bissa (1910) Pen.585, Bull Court. Equitable 
remedies will be examined below, under enforcement of 
obligations see ppr. *7Xf infra*
I5i
(c) Statute L&w;
Apart from the general common law and the doctrines 
of equity, the third facet of the received law is statutory
law. In this sub-section we shall be looking at two
related topics namely:
(a) V/hat have often been called statutes of general app­
lication, and (b) local enactments in Ghana and Nigeria*
(a) Statutes of general application:
Y/e have repeatedly come across this phrase in the
standard-forra reggptiea provisions in the Courts Ordinances
and High Court Laws of Ghana and Nigeria, namely:
"The common lav;, the doctrines of equity and statues 
of general application which were in force in England 
on the 24th day of July 1874 (for Ghana), shall be in 
force within the jurisdiction of the courts11.1
This provision for Statutes of general application has been
saved by Section 93(2) of the National liberation Council
Courts 'Decree, 1966, which provides as follows:
"The provisions relating to Admiralty jurisdiction, 
inf ant?, persons of unsound mind, probate and matrimonial 
causes, and Statutes of general application which were 
in force in England on 24th July, 1874 and applicable 
' to Ghana immediately before the commencement of this 
decree, shall continue to apply on and after such 
commencement until su-ch provisions are modified amended 
or revoked under this decree."2
1. No.4 of 1876.
2. N.L.C. decree No.84 of 23rd September, 1966. This decree 
has repealed the Courts Act, I960 with similar provisions 
in S. 154* The new decree has, however, omitted any ref­
erence to adapting the statutes to suit local conditions 
in Ghana. It can be argued however, that any statute or 
provisions thereof which are found unsuitable, could be 
repealed or amended respectively.
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In V/esern Nigeria, Section 4 of the Law of England (App- 
lication) Law, has abolished the operation in the Region of 
the Statutes of General Application. This step is not as 
revolutionary as it appears at first sight, because, the 
abolition isoonly in those natters which the Regional 
Assembly can legislate Thus in matters within the
exclusive legislative competence of the Eederql Parliament, 
the Statutes of general application still apply in the Region* 
Secondly, the former statutes of general application^have 
all been re-enacted as Western Regional laws, thus bringing 
to an end in patters within the Region's legislative compet­
ence, the old method of deciding which pre 1900 English 
Statutes were of general application. It has been suggested 
in some quarters that this step should be taken by the other
4
jurisdictions in Nigeria.
several attempts have been made by the courts and academic
writers to delimit the content of the statutes of general
with
application. The first and perhaps/the least to commend it 
has been that if an Act did not apply throughout the United
5
Kingdom it could not be of general application*
3* Gap. 60, Laws of V/estern Nigeria, (1959 Revision).
4* Nwabuezsr, Machinery of Justice in Nigeria p. 18*
5* Chief Young Dede v African Association (1910)1, N.L.R* 
l30, per Y/ebber J; Re Sholu 11932) 11, N*L.R. 375 
Yonng v Abina (19401 E] 577A.C.A* 180; but see Lawal v 
Young (196TJ~l", All N.L.R. 245 et 256 per Brett E.J* 
as to whose arguments see post
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Another view has been that "general application1 refers 
to '‘generally in application” in the Colonies. It was 
summarily dismissed by Osborne C.J. in Attorney-General v
/r
John Holt & Go*, before whom it was argued by Counsel.
As was aptlv stated by the learned Chief Justice, were that
the correct view, the question would depend upon evidence
that was not available to the court. Park has further 
7
argued that the contention would involve a logical im­
possibility since each territory would wait for another to 
apply an iiaperial statute so that they could decide whether 
it was generally applied in the colonies. It would, Park 
argues, result in no territory applying English law, a sit­
uation hardly contemplated by the Legislature in making the 
provision.
The third view has been that of Osborne C.J. himself in
O
Attorney-General v John Holt & Co. Since the learned Chief 
Justice *s views here have been the subject of some comment in 
many quarters we shall reproduce the relevant portion where 
he said:
"No definition has been attempted of what is a statute 
of general application . . . .  and each case has to be 
decided on the merits of the particular statute sought 
to be enforced. Two preliminary questions can, however, 
be put by way of a rough, but not infallible test, viz.
6. This view was submitted by Counsel to Osborne C.J. in 
Attorney-General v John Holt & Co. (1910) 2,N.L.N.l*
7. Park Sources of Nigerian Law p.25 et seq.
8. (1910) 1, N. L~.il. 1 at p.21. See also Elias, Nigerian Legal 
System (1962,2nd I'd.) p. 19, and Allott, Essays, p.9»
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(l) by what courts is the Statute applied in England? 
and (2) to what classes of the community in England 
does it apply? If, on January 1, 1900, an Act of 
Parliament were applied by all civil or criminal Courts, 
as the case may be, to all classes of the community, 
there is a strong likelihood that it is in force within 
the jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, it were 
applied only by certain courts (e.g. a Statute regulat­
ing procedure), or only to certain classes of the 
community, (e.g. an Act regulating a particular trade), 
the probability is that it would not be held to be 
locally applicable."
9
It has been suggested that this test is too restrictive 
and Park gives two reasons for this suggestion. Firstly, 
he argues that statutes regulating procedure could be and 
have in fact been held to be of general application in 
England and some of them have been held to apply in Ghana
and Nigeria. Park cites the cases of Adam v Duke’*’?
11 12 Fd-beiro v Chahin, and Inspector-General of Police v Kamara
to support his case. 7e shall be looking at the merits of
his submission presently. Secondly, the learned writer
argues that an Act can be of general application in England
even if it applies only to certain classes of the community
13and he cites the curious case of labinjoh v Abake , and the 
case of Young v Abina, ^  for good measure. Concluding,
Park gives his own test as (a) geographical generality, and
(b) generality with regard to persons. He defined persons 
to include a class of persons.
9* Park, op.cit. p.26 et seq.
10. (1927) 8, N.Ii.R. 88
11. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 476.
12. (1934) 2, Y/.A.C.A. 185.
13. (1924) 5, N'.L.R. 33.
14. (1940) 6, Y/.A.C.A. 180.
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Now as regards Park’s general criticism, it is not 
eqsy to see his point of disagreement with the learned 
Chief Justice in the John Holt case. As can be seen from 
the passage cited from the Chief Justice’s judgment, he 
admits that his test was "a rough, but not infallible1* one.
In no part of the judgment was this test said to be exclusive 
and comprehensive. Even where there was an indication that 
Statutes regulating procedure may be excluded., this was only 
by way of example and the words used are ”. . .  the probab­
ility is that it would not be held to be locally applicable”. 
It is hard to see how restrictive such a test can be in the
face of such liberal wording. Secondly, as Park admits,
15Adam v Puke is a very doubtful authority since the-decision 
was based on a statute that had been repealed. Sections
l fi
210-212 of the Common Law Procedure Act, If 52 repealed and
re-enacted Sections 2-4 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1730,
and the substance of the rule dealt with in those sections is
on the power of the court to give relief against forfeiture
on re-entry by the landlord for non-payment of rent. It
18was on this basis that the Hibeiro case was decided by the 
West African Court of Appeal, an appeal from Ghana (then Gold
Coast). Even in the case of Inspector-General of Police v
15. (1927) 8, N.L.ii. 88.
16. 15 & 16 Victoria C. 76.
17* Landlord and Tenant Act, 1730.
18. (1954) 14, W.A.C.A. 476.
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Kamara, ^  already referred to, the Y7est African Court of
Appeal held the Summary Jurisdiction Act, I8 4 8, inapplicable
in Ghana and gave two reasons, namely, inapplicability to
local circumstances and that there were local provisions
governing the case in point* How else co>uld Osborne's test
be better vindicated? It is submitted that a better test
is yet to be found#
As to Park’s second objection, i#e# that an Act can be
of general application without applying to every class of the
community, we have already pointed out the liberal nature of
the learned Chief Justice 's test* Surely Park cannot be
understood to argue that all imperial Acts regulating only
sections of the community will be of general application and
applicable ±n Ghana or Nigeria# The Statutes in Mortmain
20are obviously not applicable nor are the Bankruptcy Acts*
21Thus even if we admit that the decision in Labin.ioh v Abake, 
(which ruled that the Infants Belief Act, 1874 is a statute 
of general application in force in Nigeria) Is an instance 
of a statute relating to a class in England being in force in 
Nigeria, it does not detract from the generality of Osborne’s 
test* It will be naive to argue that the Land Transfer Act,
19# (1934) 2, W.A#C*A. 185#
20* Halliday v Alapatira (i860) 1, N.L.e * l.for purposes of 
21* (1924) 5, N.IuK. 33* Bankruptcy jurisdiction.
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18971 referred to a class of the community. This side of
the argument can be laid to rest by the dicta of the Y/est
African Court of Appeal in Young & Anor. v Abina & ors, that
"The land Transfer Act of 1897 applied quite generally 
to all estates in England of persons dying after 1st 
January 1898. It is difficult to see how a statute 
could be of more ’general application1 in England than 
that, and it was in force in England on 1st January,
1900."22
To criticise Park’s objections to Osborne’s test is not
is
to disagree with his summary of the position,that/geographical
generality where the test is ’England 1 and generality as to
persons in any given ola§g« But it is submitted that this
position is not any different from the stand taken by the
learned Chief Justice whose test the learned writer purports
to substitute with his own*
It must at this stage be pointed out that the Statutes
of General Application are progressively diminishing in their
importance and application. This is due to the fact that
in many of the areas where they were held to apply,local
statutes have been enacted. Reference has already been made
to the position in Western Nigeria. In other jurisdictions
2 3their volume is being eroded on by local enactments. J In
24the recent Nigerian case of Lawal & ors v Younan & ors.
Brett E.J. made a penetrating study of the statutes of General
22. Young & anor. v Abina & ors. (1940) 6, Y/.A.C.A. 180 at 
p.183*
23* Park suggests that there are 30-40 such statutes in 
24. (1961) 1 All IT.l.H. 245 at p.254 et seq..
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application which have been held to apply in Ghana and 
gigeria. These include, for our particular purpose (i.e. 
the law of obligations), the Statute of Fraudulent Convey­
ances,^ the Wills Act, 1 8 3 7 * the Conveyancing Acttl88l,^ 
the Settled land Act, 1882,^ the Trustee Act, 1888,^^ the 
Partition Acts,^ Statute of frauds, ^  the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1893^ and the Statute of Limitations.^
Local Statutes and other laws 
Nigeria*
The history of a unified statutory law in Nigeria can be 
said to have its genesis in 1914 when the administrations 
of the Northern and the Southern Provinces were united.^
25* Braithwaite v Polarin (1938) W.A.C.A. 76*
26* Thomas v De Souza (1929) 9* N.L.E* 81*
27* Sanusi v Daniel C1956) 1 F.S.C. 93*
2 8. Thomas v Nabhan (19473 W.A.C.A* 229*
29* Ta.ylor v Taylor (1934; 2 Y/.A.O.‘A. 229*
30. Sule v A.iisegiri (1937) 13* N.L.E. 146; Stephen v 
fedrocchi (1959) N.H.N.L.E. 76.
31. Qline v Qbodo (1958) 3 F.S.C. 8 4.
32. Khami v Me Caul and Co.Ltd. (1956) 1, N.L.E. 32.
33* Money v U.T.G. (1934) 2, W.A.C.A. Ibtf.
34. In iagos there was Statutory law as far back as 1862.
Also in 1900 there were separate High Commissioners 
in tne Northern and Southern Provinces and Lagos with 
power to make laws (Proclamations). In 1906 when 
Lagos became part of the Southern Provinces, there was 
a legislature with power to make laws called Ordinances. 
It was not however, until 1914 that the two administrat­
ions of the North and South were merged.
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One of the objects of this merger was the unification
of the legal systems of the two administrations. By
1916 all the pre-existing laws of the two units were replaced
by Ordinances of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.
Thus no pre-1914 law of any of the units can be considered
as part of the law of Nigeria if it was not re-enacted by
the unified central authority.
But this legal unity was short-lived. By 1951 the
centrifugal forces prevailed and in 1954 Nigeria was already
a Federation with three Regions and a Federal Territory,
excluding of course the Southern Cameroons. Each of these
units had powers under the Constitution to make laws in
35certain specified matters# Thus in 1954 there were in 
Nigeria five streams of locally enacted law as follows:
(i) Federal Laws applying generally in the Federation,
i.e. in matters in which the federal Covernment had 
legislative competence:
(ii) Federal laws applying only to Lagos:
(iii) Laws of Northern Nigeria:
(iv) Laws of Eastern Nigeria: and
(v) Laws of Western Nigeria*
The status of pre-1954 existing laws were provided for
37in Section i/7 of the 19t>4 Constitution of Nigeria as
35* See Section 5 of the 1954 Constitution of Nigeria (S.l. 
1146).
36. Since 6th August 1963> there is the Mid-Western Region.
See Section 3 of the Repuolican Constitution of Nigeria
(1963)* The Mid-Western started off with the Laws of
Western. Nigeria but the Laws of the Mid-Western Region, 
are fast taking the place of toe laws of Western Nigeria. 
3 / •  a . i .  :l ,4c> (
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re-enacted in the Republican Constitution (1963), briefly 
as follows:
(a) All existing lav/s are deemed to have been enacted by 
the Federal Legislature in so far as they relate to matters 
within its exclusive competence or in so far as they relate 
to Lagos:
(b) All existing laws relating to matters within the con­
current legislative list are deemed to have been enacted
by the Regional Legislature, except in so far as the Governor 
General may have otherwise declared.
(c) All existing laws relating to matters outside the ex­
clusive and concurrent legislative lists are deemed to have 
been enacted by the Regional Legislature. All post 1954- 
laws must be within the legislative competence of the body en 
acting them. Thus although Marriage under the ordinance is 
a Federal Subject, the regional legislatures legislate on 
customary and Islamic law marriages and succession. Thus
a study of the Statute Law of Nigeria on any subject necess­
arily involves a study of the Legislative Lists.
Since 1956 there has been the Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria and Lagos, a revised edition undertaken by Sir Donald 
39Kingdon, in twelve volumes. In western Nigeria there has
3 8. By the concurrent Legislation (Designation as Federal 
Ordinances) Order, 19595 No. 19» such Ordinances have 
been so declared.
39* The Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation and Lagos) 
Ordinance, 1 9 5 8.
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40 malso been since 1959, the Laws of Y.restern Nigeria* The 
Northern and ^astern Regions undertook similar schemes in 
1963^ and while the North have brought out a comprehensive 
series of five volumes excluding an Index Volume, the Eastern 
Region intend producing ten Volumes only eight of which have 
been published.^
Ghana*
We are not here concerned with the Statutes of general 
application to which reference has already been made in the 
preceding section. We have already noted that the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana) has had a local legislature since 1874, and 
since that date there have been local Ordinances by the said 
legislature. There have also been, since March 6, 1957, 
but before the Republican Constitution was enacted, Acts of 
the Ghana National Assembly. Since I9 60 there nave been 
Acts of Parliament and the statutory and legislative instru­
ments made thereunder. There are also* Acts passed by the
40. western Region, Revised Edition of the Laws Law, No. 6 
of 1959.
41. The Revised edition of the Laws of Northern Nigeria Law,
No. 4 of 1963; and Eastern Nigeria Revised Edition of
the Laws Law (1961).
42. Since 15th January, 196b, Nigeria has been mnder a
military government and legislation is by Decrees and
Edicts. These have the same effect as any lav; enacted 
by Parliament except that there is no provision for 
judicial review. The decrees and edicts cannot there­
fore be questioned in any court of law. See Eeay, 
Constitutional and Legal Developments in Nigeria since 
the military coup (1966) 10 J.A.2..1X-
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Constituent Assembly - all enacted and brought into force 
on the same date as the constitution and the statutory Instr­
uments made thereunder# These constitute the bulk of the 
statutory Law of Ghana# Article 40 of the Republican Con­
stitution provides for the laws of Ghana as follows:
(a) The Constitution.
(b) Enactments made by or under the authority of the Parl­
iament established by the Constitution#
(c) Enactements other than the constitution made by or under 
the authority of the Constituent Assembly*
(d) Enactments in force immediately before the coming into
43operation of the constitution#
(e) The common law, and (f) customary law#
A nine-volume revised edition of the Ordinance (Caps#1-272)
together with subsidiary Legislation is contained in Laws of
the Gold Coast (1951) and supplemented by a 19t2-b4 Supplement
Prom 1952 Ordinances, (and after Independence, Acts) and
Instruments were published annually# Statutory Instruments
_ 44
were published in a Volume entitled, Subsidiary Legislation# 
Beginning with July 1, I960 when Ghana became a Republic 
all Statutes are numbered consecutively and contained in a
43* It has been rightly argued by the learned authors of the 
Constitution and Government of Ghana (2nd Ed*1964) p#
182, that the powers of review conferred on the Supreme 
Court under Section 42 (2) of the constitution could 
by inference be extended to include review of pre-1960 
legislation in Ghana where such enactment was repugnant 
to the Constitution*
44# See Rubin and Hurray, Constitution and Government of 
Ghana, (1964, 2nd Edition), p•1ol•
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cumulative binder service entitled the Acts of Ghana#
Amendments to Acts are incorporated into the main statutes
by means of replacement pages# Up to December 1966 there
are five Volumes. A separate binder service contains Ghana
Legislative Instruments (L#I#). Executive Instruments (E.I.J
are published in a loose-leaf binder*
There is in hand a programme of Statute Law Revision,
the aim of which is to consolidate and clarify the existing
47law# The State Proceedings Act, are some oi the products
48of the new Law revision Commission#
45* Act 51•
46# Act 3b#
47• Act 55*
4 8 . By Legislative Instrument ^  as amended by Legislative
instrument 104, the Cnief Justice is empowered to make
modifications to any pre-republican enactment to bring 
such enactment in accord with the Courts Act, 1960#
See Nsiah v U.T.C. Ltd# , (1959) G.L.R# 79# There 
have also been , since 24th February' 1966, decrees of 
the National Liberation Council of Ghana# See my 
article in (1966) 10 J.A#L# 106#
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2. Customary and Islamic Laws:
Ve have so far been looking the extraneous or 
imported law and the locally enacted laws as sources of 
the law of obligations in G-hana and Nigeria* In this sect­
ion we shall be examining the extent to which customary and 
Islamic laws form sources of the legal systems of the two 
countries* We are not here concerned with the jurisprud­
ential question as to whether or not customary law is law.
*
This aspect of the subject is outside the scope of this 
thesis.^ Y/hat we propose to do here is to state and discuss 
in some detail the statutory provisions for the application 
of indegenous laws in Ghana and Nigeria*
Li ke the provisions for the application of the im­
ported law, the authority for the application of customary 
and Islamic laws are found in the Courts Ordinances and in 
the High Court Lav/s. The Courts are empowered to observe 
and enforce the observance of customary law, where such 
customary law is ’’not repugnant to natural justice, equity
p
and good conseience, or incompatible either directly or
1. lor a brief discussion on this, see the Introductory
chapter pp. ei supra.
2. S. 27 of the High Court of Lagos Act, Cap. 80, Laws of
Nigeria and Lagos (1958 Revision); 3.14(3) Evidence Act, 
(Nigeria, federation); S.2 8, Eastern Nigeria High Court 
Law, see also paragraph 15(a) of the Eastern Nigeria Cus­
tomary Courts Edict, 1966, (No.29 of 1966); S . 34 of the 
Northern Nigeria High Court Law. Cap.
Nigeria, (1963 Consolidation}; 3.23 P 
Native Courts Law, Cap.78 (Laws,1963)
Western Nigeria High Court Law, Cap.44 Laws of Western 
Nigeria (1959 Revision).
49, Laws of Northern 
f the Northern Nigeria 
and S.12 of the
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by implication with any law for the time being in force."J 
These provisions, as has already been mentioned, have often 
been referred to as the repugnancy provisions. Several 
attempts have been made by both judges and academic writers 
to discover their meaning and content. Some of the writers 
have adopted the analytical approach, thereby firstly breaking 
the expression into its component parts, only to examine it 
as a whole later. The judges on the other hand, have treated 
the expressLOhftTustice, equity and good conscience" as a single 
entity#^ Needless to say that whether one adopted the 
analytical or the functional approach, the purport of the 
repugnancy doctrine is to empower the Courts to disallow 
customary law rules where to do otherwise would lead to a 
miscarriage of justice. To say this is not to deny the fact 
that individual judges have utilised the clause in striking
down customary law rules to which they are personally op-
5 6posed, or in penalising individual litigants# Such
3# The repugnancy provisions have been deleted from the Court
Decree 1966 of the Ghana N.-j.C# Paragraph 64, however in­
cludes assimilated customary law as part of the Common 
law. See also S.58 of the Chieftaincy Act,1961. Cf. Sunkwa
v Sunkwa (l960)H.Ct. (Unreported) Cape Coast, slander case
4. Speed C.J. in Lewis v Bankole (1908) 1 N.I.E.82 at p.84* 
where the'learned judge after stating that' a'particular 
custom must be proved to exist went further to say MI am 
not sure that I know what the terms, natural justice and 
good conscience mean# They are high-sounding phrases and 
it would of course not be difficult to hold that many of 
the ancient customs of the barbaric tribes are repugnant 
thereto, but it would not be easy to offer a strict and 
accurate definition of the terns."
5. As in Re ',/fayte (1946) 18,H.L.R.70.
6. See for ansiTahce the decision of Tibourn J. in Dawodu v 
Da nmole 119 621 1 N.L.E* 1.0*5 3* Privy Council affirmed' the 
aecisldn of the Nigerian Sup.Ct. which reversed the 
first instance decision.
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judicial excesses could not be explained or justified id 
terms of any inherent indulgence of the provisions any 
more than a negligent surgeon is an inherent fault in surgery. 
We shall presently be discussing the meaning and application 
of the provision as a touchstone for the applicability of 
customary law rules in Ghana and Nigeria.
Meaning of the Provision:
Sir Frederick Pollock has in a book review offered words
of wisdom to those who would otherwise engage in the futile
pursuit of definitions. "There is" he said, "rather too much
talk about definitions. A definition, strictly speaking,
is nothing but an abbreviation in which the user of the term
7
defined may please himself. . . ." .
With the above comment of the learned author we could not 
agree more. A more useful exercise for our purpose here 
would ue an investigation of the application of the provision 
in Ghana and Nigeria#
Its Application:
Although it is difficult to discuss instances of its
7. (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 583.
8. See J. Lewin, "The recognition of Native Law and Custom 
in British Africa" (1938) 20 J. of Comp. Leg. (3rd 
series) pp.16-23; also (1942) 24 J* of Comp. Leg. (3rd 
series; pp.169 et seq.; A.N.Allott, "The extent of the 
operation of native customary law; applicability and 
repugnancy", (1950) 2 J.A.A.4; see also Essays (I960) pp. 
153 et seq; T.O.Elias, "Customary Law, the limits of its 
validity in Colonial Law" (1954) 13 Afr.Stud.97; A.J.
g§£916S£5t"SSi.55?s?V fiM M .l?L f28?  KS .t& lfjfhe
application of native law in the Supreme Court"(1957)74
S.A#L. J. 313;rtp#H#Perr.ott, . "Justice,.Equity and Gopd^Con- 
science" m.Changing law m  Developing Countries ved.
. r ^ m T XTauiels' Comm'on Law in 'ifesT~I£xioa
16?
application in terms of neat and separate compartments, 
the trend of judicial opinion reveals a rough division into 
three categories, namely, repugnancy to natural justice, to 
equity and to public policy or public morality or both* We 
shall be looking at each of these, and in the above order*
(i) Natural justice:
The phrase was described as "an expression sadly lacking
in precision" in the English case of R* v Local G-overnment
9Board, ex p. Arlidge* Its orthodox treatment in relation to 
the West African Courts has been under
(a) repugnancy relating to substantive law:
(b) repugnancy relating to procedure; and
(c) repugnancy relating to the degree of punishment*
(a) Repugnancy relating to substantive law:
Most of the cases considered under this sub-head are 
concerned with status and its incidents, and some had been 
so fundamentally repugnant that the legislature stepped in 
and abolished the practices by statute*^ The first and per­
haps the most far-reaching in its incidents and consequences 
was slave-dealing. we are not here concerned with the sombre 
tale of the historic slave trade and slavery. It is enough 
to say that in 1874 the Gold Coast Slave-Dealing Abolition
-9rz 3T9T4T I KT.'B.-T6<K----------------------------------
10. The Crbld Coast Slave-Dealing Abolition Ordinance, No. 1
of 1874; and the Gold Coast Emancipation Ordinance; No 
2 of 1874, (December 17, 1874).
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11Ordinance was enacted, and to deal with the incidents
of Slave-Dealing, the Emancipation Ordinance was enacted
12 13five months later* Section 314 of the Ghana Criminal
Code makes Slave-dealing an offence:
”(l) Whoever
-(a) deals or trades in* buys, sells, barters, transfers
or takes any slave; or
(b) deals or trades in, buys, sells, barters, transfers,
or takes any person in order that that person may
be held or treated as a slave; or
(c) places or receives any person in servitude as a
pledge or security for debt, whether then due and
owing or to be incurred or contingent, whether 
under the name of a pawn or by whatever other name 
that person may be called; or
(d) conveys any person, 02? induces any person to come
to Ghana in order that such person may be dealt or
traded in bought, sold, bartered, transferred, or 
become a slave, or be placed in servitude as a 
pledge or security for debt; or
(e) conveys or sends any person, or induces any person 
to go out of Ghana in order that that person may be
dealt or traded in, bought, sold, bartered, trans­
ferred, or become a slave, or be placed in servit­
ude as a pledge or security for debt; or
(f) enters into any contract or agreement with or
without consideration for doing any of the acts or 
accomplishing any of the aforementioned purposes; 
or
(g) by any species of coercion or restraint otherwise 
than in accordance with the labour ordinance, 
compels or attempts to compel the service of any 
person,
shall be guilty of a second degree felony*”
11. No# 1 of 1874* See also Section 12 of the Slavery Abol­
ition Act 1883*
12. No. 2 of 1874*
13* Act 29 (i960) Ghana* Section 369 of the Nigerian Crim­
inal Code is to the same effect. The punishment for 
contravention in Nigeria is fourteen years imprisonment*
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2* This section does not apply to any such coercion as
may lawfully be exercised by virtue of contracts of service 
between free persons or by virtue of the rights of parents
and other rights, not being contrary to lav;, arising out of
the family relations customarily used and observed in Ghana*
It is obvious that any customary rule that is repugnant to
the above section of the Criminal Code cannot be enforced by
the courts. But any innocuous incidents may be enforced.
In Kodieh v Afram,^  it was held by Howes J. in the Court of
Appeal (Accra), that the native custom laying down that a
child of a slave woman should be considered as a member of
its father's family, is benevolent and should be recognised.
15Also in Ohebeng v Darkwa and Anor. another Ghana case, the
custom that the child of a slave woman is considered for
purposes of succession and otherwise to be a member of the
father's family, was upheld. But in the Nigerian case of
1
In re Effing Olon Ata, Ekpan v Henshaw & anor. it was held 
that the personalty of an emancipated slave is his own prop­
erty and not subject to the head of the House. In that case 
the deceased was slave-born and had died intestate. The 
head of the House to wnich the deceased belonged resisted 
the application for letters of administration to the deceased 
sister on the ground that in spite of emancipation, the dec­
eased had continued to reside on the communal land and
14. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 12.
15. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 52.
16. (1930) 10,"N.L.E. 65.
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therefore remained subject to the Head of the House.
Said Butler Lloyd J.:
“The effect of the abolition of slavery was to make all 
persons equal before the law. Personal property ac­
quired by slaves is in their absolute disposition sub­
ject to the ordinary rules of law as to dealings with 
it, and to hold that the mere fact of the slave con­
tinuing to reside on the communal property confers any 
rights whatever on the Head of the House in respect to 
personal property would be very largely to render nug­
atory the provisions of the Slavery Abolition Ordinance; 
and to import a native custom to that efrect would be 
to my mind contrary to natural justice, in which case 
by section 20 of Chaper 3 it would be improper to 
apply it."
18Ooker in his book refers to Ajisafe and Johnson with 
approval on a Yoruba custom known as the "Iwofa System”.
By this custom a person (or a group of persons) renders 
personal services periodically to another in lieu of interest 
on money lent# Coker claims that the ^iw&fa System” is 
recognised by Yoruba law and custom# The persons who are 
engaged in such services to a moneylender in lieu of interest 
are treated as slaves in the sense that the master allots jobs 
to them and after the master *s death they are compelled to 
work for his successor so long as the dfebt remains unpaid. 
Although Johnson has suggested that the master - servant 
relationship is so cordial that many Iwofas prefer to incuradd* 
itional obligations, it could be forcefully argued that this
17• Ibid p#65 et seq_. See also Hart in v Johnson & Anor.
(1935) 12, N.L.-rt. 46# 
lb. Family Property Among the Yorubas, (1st ed. London 1958).
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practice comes within the prohibition of Section 369 13) 
of the Criminal Code and could be said to be repugnant to 
statute. It could hardly be denied that the custom creates 
a type of status whose social incidents are undisputably 
undesirable.
Other undesirable practices have also been abolished
by statute. Among these are the "Osu" cult in Eastern 
19Nigeria; attempt to bury corpse in a house without the
20permission of the Governor; and the burning of twins. The
payment of very high "bride-price" has also been regulated
PIby statute in Eastern Nigeria*
(b) Repugnancy relating to procedure;
& convenient starting point as far as procedural natural
justice goes, could be a look at the Report of the Committee
22on Ministers1 Powers in England. The Committee stated 
the following three fundamental principles of natural justice
1. "A man may not be a judge in his own cause. The 
mind of a judge ought to be free to decide on 
purely judicial grounds and should not be directly 
or indirectly influenced by or exposed to the 
influence of, either motives of self-interest or 
opinions about policy or any other consideration 
not relevant to the issue.
19* Abolition of Osu System Law Cap.*.Laws of Eastern Nigeria 
(963); also Nwachukwu v Nnoremele (1957) 2 E.N.L.R.
50; Green, Ibo Village Affairs p.24*
20. Section 246 of the Nigerian Criminal Code. See also 
Thomas, "Some Ibo .burial Customs" (1917). 47 J.R.A.I., 
160 - 164. '
21. Eastern Nigeria Limitation of Lowry Law, Cap.76 Laws of 
T-?cm H- a vi m T\T-i rron ° (1963) Revision.
22.
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2* The second principle is twofold* "No party ought
to be condemned unheard; and if his right to
be heard is to be a reality, he must know in 
good time the case which he has to meet. . . ."
3* When further proceedings are open to a disappointed
parjry, he is entitled to know the reason for or
grounds of the decision."23
The above principles have often been narrowed down to two
cardinal rules often though not better expressed in the
Latin tags "nemo jude in cause sua", and "audi alteram
partem". It is these two principles that were embodied in
a memorandum issued by Sir Donald Cameron for the guidance
of the administrative officers under him who were charged
24with the supervision of native counts in Tanganyika* In
Ghana and Nigeria the superior Courts will not enforce any
custom the import of whici is a denial of the Canons of
natural justice* As has aptly been pointed out by the Nige-
o R
rian Federal Supreme Court, (as it then was)*
"A procedure is not contrary to natural justice merely 
because it is foreign to English law, so long as it is 
clear that substantial justice is done. This was laid 
down in the case of Scarpetta v Lowenfold*26 
We agree that natural justice requires that an accused 
person must be given the opportunity t o  put forward 
his defence fully and freely, and to ask the court to
hear any witnesses whose evidence might help him, but
we do not. regard the decision in Auzinawa v Kano N.A.27
23* There is a doubtful fourth principle to the effect 
that parties affected by a quasi-judicial decision 
are entitled to have access to the report submitted as 
a result of public enquiry, on which the decision is 
based.
24* Tanganyika Territory: Native Administration Memoranda
No. 11 Native Courts (2nd Ed. 1930) p. 3*
25* Kano native Authority v Obiora (i960) N.R.N.L.R. 42 at 
p.47*
26. (1911) 27 T.C.B. 509*
27* (1956) F.S.C. 27* See also Dei v Pong (1959& G.L.R*,
p.135 and Lord Hailey, African Survey (1956) pp.628-9*
173
requiring the appellate courts to hold, as a matter 
of course, that there has been a denial of natural 
justice merely because a native court has not adopted 
any particular method of achieving this end."
28Thus in a case where the appellant was convicted by a
customary court some members of whose panel did not hear the
whole case against the accused, it was held by the High Court
that the procedure disclosed was a mockery and a travesty of
the administration of justice. A custom of that kind was
said to be clearly repugnant to natural justice, equity and
good consce/Lnce. It is also contrary to natural justice to
punish a person for an offence in respect ox wuich there nas
29been no charge. In the curious case of Nzekwu v Qnowu - 
alias u-hasuzo^  Ben Nzekwu had been charged with inciting 
people to disregard native law and custom with regard to 
second burials but was convicted of refusal to make peace 
with the elders of Onitsha in Eastern Nigeria* 1'ne convict-
# H,Vl S I’ve ■£
ion was qfesdaaed by few J. on an application for Habeas Corpus 
and Nzekwu was released*
2 8. (1936) 13, N.L.k. 77*
29* Dzakpe v Tiv Native Authority (l958) N.K.N.L.ii. 135 at 
p.137* see also Thomas & ors v Ademola & ors. (1945)
18 N.L.k . 12.
30. (1928) f, N.L.E. 70. See also section 15 (a) of the
Northern Nigeria Sharia Court of Appeal Law, which states 
inter alia that: "Ifhe court, in the exercise of the 
jurisdiction vested im it by this law as regards both 
substantive law and practice and procedure, shall ad­
minister, observe and enforce the observance of the 
principles ancl provisions of natural justice, equity 
and good conscience."
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Also where a chief who Was President of a council that 
was insulted by the accused, sat as chairman of the panel 
that tried the accused, it was neld that the chief was a 
judge in nis own cause and the conviction was quasned on 
that ground.^ chapter III of the Constitution of the 
Pederal Republic of Nigeria laid down safeguards for a 
fair nearing of an accused. Since under Section I of the 
said constitution, the constitution is the Supreme law it 
is inconceivable that the courts would countenance any 
custom that is repugnant to its provisions.
(c) itepugnancy relating to the degree of punishment:
In Nigeria this is summarised m  oection 19 of the 
Republican Constitution as ioliows:
"1. ino person shall oe subjected to torture or to
mnuinaa or uegraum& punishment or other treatment.
2. Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law 
by reason only that it authorises the infliction 
in any part of Nigeria of any punishment that was 
lawful and customary in that part on the first day 
of November, 1959•*'
In Ghana it is improbable that a customary rule could 
become part of the common law if such a rule involves ex­
cessive punishment on any offender than is prescribed in the 
criminal code or any other written law*
31* Modibo v Adamawa N.A. (195b) N.R.N.L.R. 101*
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(ii) Repugnancy with regard to equity:
As has already been indicated, equity has a broad
corrective sense and a narrow technical signification*
Equity as corrective justice has been equated to conscience,
fairness and Plato's "giving to each nan his due". The
function of technical equity in English law has already
been investigsted. ^hen we say that a customary rule is
repugnant to equity, what do we mean? Is it enoughtto say
32as has been suggested in some quarters that such a rule
is inconsistent with what has often been called British
standards of justice? Fortunately, this question has been
33answered in the negative by several judges and writers.
Some judges also have been accused of introducing English 
equity through the clauses and this practice has been frowned 
at.*^ Dr. Daniels has objected to LIr. Hannigan's suggest­
ion that "if the courts decide that a custom is repugnant
they have to fall back on the principles of justice equity
35and good conscience in deciding the case before them." ^
Daniels argues (l) that since technical equity is already
32. Sir Sidney Abrahams, "The Colonial Legal Service and 
the administration of-justice in the Colonial depend- 
ancies" (1948) Leg. and I.L. (3rd series) (parts 3-4) ^ 
1-11 at p.8. G-wao bin kilimo v Lisunda bin Ifuti 0-938) 
I.T.L.B. (R) 403.
33. See Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, "Eon-fehristian Marriage" 
(1900) 2 J. Comp. Leg. 379.
34* Common Law in West Africa p. 280.
35* Hannigan, "The present system of succession amongst the 
Akan people of the Gold Coast" (19 5#iS)j*A.A. 166-171*
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introduced into West African law under another section of 
the enactment, it is not necessary to import them again under 
this section; and (2) that the resort to justice, equity and 
good conscience (a provision normally reserved for what have 
come to be called the residual provisions) can only be valid 
where there is a case of internal conflict or where there is 
no applicable customary law rule.
To answer the first objection, equity as has been noted 
has its broad and narrow meanings. The judges deploy both 
in applying the repugnancy clauses. '^ here it would be in­
equitable to apply a particular rule of customary law, the 
courts exclude such a rule. Also where a rule of customary 
law conflicts with a rule of equity, the rule of equity (if 
it is a fundamental rule) will prevail. If we accept that
a rule of customary law is a legal rule, then it is subject 
to the overriding consideration that where there is a con­
flict between law and equity, the rule of equity prevails. 
Admittedly, to allow the courts an emending power to custom 
will be to leave too wide a discretion to the courts, and the 
dicta in the Bleko case is a counterblastJ of very high 
authority. But Daniels has criticised the Bleko dicta for 
its rigidity. He argues that there ought to be severance in 
cases where a custom could be accepted in part.
3?. See Fiscian v Nelson (1946) 12 W.A.C.A.21. Akpan Awo v 
Cookey-U-am 2, 177171177 100. ^
37* EsBufioayi~E1 ek0 v Government of Nigeria 0-93y A.C.662
at b’73."if it’ (i.e. customary’rule) still stands in its 
barbarous character it must be rejected as repugnant 
to gat^al justice, equity and good conscience" per
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Of course when there is sufficient proof that a particular 
customary rule has become obsolete it is desiraole that the 
courts should accept the existing position* Fanti Customary
■3Q
Law has been modified enormously since Sarbah wrote*
With regard to Daniel's second objection, the residual 
provisions were not meant to be exclusive. 'Where a judge 
rejects a customary rule as being repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience, he still has got to 
decide the case before him* It is true that the judges in 
West Africa have introduced what has been described as a 
watered down form of English law through these provisions*
To criticize this practice is not to deny the fact that 
the courts have got to do their best in cases where there is 
either no applicable customary law rule or the rule there 
is has been excluded on grounds of repugnancy*
38. But Daniels criticises the decisions of Brooke O.J*
in He Whyte (1946) 18 N.L.R. 70 where the learned judge 
modified Fanti custom to cater for the up-bringing of 
a daughter of the deceased; and the decision of McCarthy, 
Ag. O.J* in Disci an v Nelson (1946) 12, Y/.A.C.A* 21, pre­
cisely on this score, i.e. that the courts have no amend­
ing power with regard to proved native custom which is 
not repugnant to natural justice, equity or good conscienc 
He would prefer a rephrasing of the provisions to allow 
for any severance* The decision of Mr., Justice Jibowu 
at first instance in Dawodu v Danmole O.962J 1,¥*L.R*
1053 was reversed first by the Nigerian Federal Supreme 
Court and finally by the judicial Committee on the ground 
that the Idi-Igi custom was still widely practised by 
the Yoruba people and that it was not inequitable in the 
particular case under reference.
S«-
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(iii) Ee pug nancy with regard to public policy and morality;
Under this head can be grouped cases in which the courts 
have refused to recognise a particular custom on grounds of 
morality which has often been equated to Christian morality*
But on this head the courts, since the decision in H.yde v
4-0 41Hyde which is now discredited, examine each custom care­
fully before disallowing it on grounds of public policy or
morality. As was aptly pointed out in the Privy Council
42decision from Nigeria of Dawodu v Danmole, the principle 
of natural justice, equity and good conscience (in this case 
public policy and morality) applicable in a polygamous 
country in a matter of this kind (polygamous marriage and 
succession), should not be readily equated to that practised 
in a monogamous country.
39* See in the Estate of Antubam, Quaico v Fosu, High Court
Accra, 11/3/1965, unreported, where Archer J., observes
that "certain concepts, notions and conditions which 
prevailed when Sarbah wrote his book no longer prevail’1 
and that "customary law in Ghana has progressed and 
developed in accordance with the tempo of social, 
commercial and industrial progress." Also E.D.Kom in 
Ghana Current Ca. es, 1965, October, p.IX: "The last 
edition of this learned treatise (i.e. Sarbah fs Fctuttu 
Customary Law) was in 1903, more than half a century ago 
how far it is valid and an authority today en Fanti 
or Akan Custom, let alone Ewe law and custom, is, with 
all due respect, in doubt."
40. (1866) L.E. 1 P & I). 130. ,
41. Bamgbose v Daniel (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. Ill, on appeal
119541 A. C. 107.
42. U9621 1 W.L.Ii. 1053 P.O.
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PART III
PRECEDENT ai-.E TRP AuThURIII OP i,nULiJH DECISIONS
In this Part we shall firstly be examining in 
some detail the authority of English decisions in the 
Ghanaian and Nigerian Courts, and secondly, the binding 
nature of judicial precedent in the two countries. We 
shall also be examining into whether or not the received 
common law was the common law of England as at a particular 
date or whether common law is by its nature dateless. It 
is important to investigate the authority of English 
decisions in the West African Courts. Such an exercise 
will reveal the merits or otherwise of the common practice 
of "filling gaps" 111 the law, to which many an author has 
resorted with a view to presenting a so-called complete 
picture of trie law of any particular territory. The 
importance of an examination of the practice of the Nigerian 
and Ghanaian Courts with regard to judicial precedent cannot 
be over-emphasised. Almost the whole corpus of the law 
of obligations is case law. In order to know what that 
law is, it is vital to ascertain the value that the courts 
will attach to their previous decisions.
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Section 1
The authority of English decisions in the Ghanaian and 
Nigerian Courts.^
The title of tms section might appear irrevelant 
at first sight, at least in respect of one of the countries,
i.e. Ghana. What is the value of a disquisition on the 
authority of English decisions ina country where by statute 
the Courts are empowered to refer to the decisions of 
courts in any other parts of the world in deciding any
matter before theni,^ and the Supreme Court is not bound by
. 3  . M  ,
the previous decisions of any other court? Apparently, 
the legislative authorities have purported to present a clean 
judicial sheet for the courts to write in fresh decisions, 
and any long discourse on whether or not the Ghanaian 
Courts are nevertheless bound by English decisions is 
therefore a boring irrelevance! but the position is much 
more complicated than this. The attempt to jettison 
English authority ana concepts, baby-and-bathwater, has
1. bee T.c.' Elias, "Colonial Courts and the doctrine of 
judicial precedent" (1955) lb M.L.R. 356; A.N. Allott, 
"The authority of English decisions in colonial courts", 
(1957) 1 J.A.L. 23; Essays, p.28; a . J. Kerr, "The recep­
tion and codification of systems of law in Southern 
Africa", (1958) 2 J.A.L. 82; Sir Kenneth Rooerts-Wray, 
"The adaptation of imported law in Africa" (i960) 4 J.A.L. 
66; P. A. Ajayi, "English law and Customary law in Western 
Nigeria" (I960) 4 J.A.L. 98; N.A. Ollennu, "The influence 
of English law on West Africa" (1961) 5 J.A.L. 21; See 
also oir Kenneth Roberts-Wray , Conmionwealth & Colonial 
law, (London, btevcxis, I966).
2. o. 17 (4) of the Interpretation Act, I960 (C.A.4.)
3. for the current provision on the subject, see Paragraph 
2 (3) of the Courts Decree, 1966.
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been far from complete. Firstly, Article 40 (d) of the 
Republican Constitution which has been saved by paragraph 3 
of ihe National Liberation Council Proclamation of 24th 
February, 1966 still retains "enactments in force immediately 
before coming into operation of the constitution, " as one 
of the major sources of Ghana law. Also Article 40 (e)
of the same constitution provides that the common law is
. . 4part of the law of Ghana, howbeit, with a local definition.
Secondly, paragraph 93 (4) of the Courts Decree, 
lROO^ which repeals and substantially re-enacts Section
c
154 (2) of the Courts Act, I960, provides as follows:
"the provisions relating to Admiralty jurisdiction, 
infants, persons of unsounu mind, probate and matri­
monial causes, and statutes of general application 
which were in force in England on 24th July, 1874 and 
applicaole to Ghana immediately before tne commence­
ment of this decree, snail continue to apply on and 
after such commencement until such provisions are 
modified, amended or revoked unaer this decree."
7
Thirdly, there have been doubts as to the
4. S. 17 of the Interpretation Act, i960 (C.A.4.)
5. N.L.C.D. No. 84.
6. C.A.9•
7. See N.A. Ollennu, Speech to Saroah Society, Sept. 1962 
(Unpublished); S.A.D. Asante, "Stare decisis in the 
Supreme Court of Ghana", (1964), University of Gh.L.J. 
52; W.C.F. Daniels, Common law in West Africa, (1964)
XJp.lb2 et seq.
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intentions of the legislature in enacting the new provisions.
inis uncertainty makes "tne authority of English decisions"
in Ghana Courts still a live issue.
Finally the practice of tne courts in G-hana since
the promulgation of the ..Republic an Constitution (now
substantially repealed) and tne attendant mass of subsequent
legislation, nas not revealed any noticeable deviation
from the hitherto understandable dependance on English
authority in pre-1960 days. A re-appraisal of tne position
is therefore called for.
in Nigeria tne position is different. Here the
change-over to a Republican form of constitution involved0
9
only the ministerial detail of changing names. There has 
not been any remarkable changes in the reception provisions 
except periiaps in the »/estern Region to which changes 
refernece has already been made elsewhere. In Nigeria, 
therefore, as in Ghana, there is a pressing- need to investi­
gate the authority of English decisions in the Courts.
b. There is no Nigerian equivalent of the Ghana Courts
Act that is effective ail over the country. There are 
Regional High Court laws and a High Court of Lagos Act.
9. Although certain parts of tne Nigerian Constitution were 
suspended at midnight on Sunday , 16th January 
reception provisions have not been in any way ‘affected.
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We shall examine the subject in the following three stages, 
namely:
(a) decisions at common law;
(b) decisions made under pre-1900 (or in tne case of G-hana, 
pre-1874) English Statutes.
first we shall look at the structure of the courts. We 
are not here concerned with the autopsy of the defunct 
West African Court of Appeal or any other regional courts 
of appeal, it is enough to mention that their functions 
have now been taken over by the penultimate courts of appeal 
in the respective territories. Also, in both G-hana and 
Nigeria, appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council nave been aoolished by the respective Republican 
Constitutions, and the functions of the Privy Council as 
far as appeals go, devolve on the Supreme Courts of the
-1 . 10Republics.
before the abolition of the nest African Court of
Appeal and the abrogation of appeals to the Judicial Com­
mittee, the ortnodox equation of tne court structures in 
G-hana and Nigeria on tne one hand, and. England on the other 
was that the territorial oupreme Counts or the Pull Courts 
were equivalent to tne English High Court; the West African
10. S. 120 of tne Nigerian Republican Constitution (1963);
ana b. 42 (1) of the G-hana Republican Constitution, i960.
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Court of Appeal, to the English Court of Aicpeal (and the
then Court of Criminal appeal), and the Envy Council on
the one hand, to the house of Lords on the other, in a Kind
of co-ordinate friendly neutrality, at the apex of the
11two respective systems. hut tnis striKmg of an equiva­
lence between English and African Courts was based on the 
colonial system. With the coming of independence the whole 
question will oe looKed at afresh. This aspect of the 
suoject will oe examined in tne next following section, 
we shall now go bacx to tile question as to whether the re­
ceived common law is aateless.
(a) was the received common law the commonlaw of England 
at a particular date?:
As has been mentioned earlier, the question of the 
dating or otherwise of tne imported common law, will be 
investigated in the context of the authority of English 
decisions on the common law oefore and after the reception 
dates. since there nas oeen consideraole controversy m  
attempts to tacxle tnis proolem, it will oe wortn our while 
to try and disentangle the stranas and to call for a trh£ce
11. bee Aliot t , Essays, p.2b.
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in what could rightlj oe described as a battle of words.
The standard-form provisions has often been as follows:
1 the com/non law, the doctrines of equity and 
statutes of general application which were in force 
in England on the 24th day of July, 1874, (for 
Guana) shall be in force within the jurisdiction 
of the Courts,"
In some territories there are no commas separating
the 'common law', •doctrines of equity \  on the ona hand
12and statutes of general application on tne other, and 
in other jurisdictions the worn "together with1 is used
instead of !and’ m  separating tne statutes of general
13application from tne rest oi the provisions. otill in
other territories tne three items are given separate 
sub-sections. ^
The controversy has been on whether or not the 
limiting date only refers to the Statutes of general 
application or whether they also extend to tne received 
common law. in other words whether in deciding on the 
content of any common law rule the courts will loon for 
such rules only in pre-1900 (in the case of Nigeria) 
decisions. Now let us loox at the authorities.
12. 8 . 45, Interpretation net, Cap. 89 Laws of Nigeria (1958).
13. Interpretation Act, Cap. b9 laws of Nigeria (1958).
14. Northern Nigeria High Court Law cap.49 8.28 Laws of 
Northern Nigeria (196-3) Revision, in Western Nigeria 
there is no reference to any dates in the section 
receiving English common law. it has been argued by 
Professor Allot that one of the possible meanings of 
tne provision is mat current English law as modified 
oy western Nigerian Courts will be applied.
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In August lo95, Lord Herschell, the President of 
the Society, in a letter to hr. Chamberlain, the then 
Colonial Secretary, enclosed a series 01 questions by means 
of whxch it was sought to obtain information respecting, 
among other things, the common and statute law of the 
several colonies. The questions were transmitted by 
hr. Chamberlain to the respective colonial Governments and 
the official reply from Ghana (then Cold Coast) is very 
instructive. This reply was prepared by Sir William
Brandford Griffith, then Chief Justice of the territory and
it goes:
1 The common law in the Colors is that which was common
law in England on July 24, 1&74 • This
enactment is modified by SS 7, 12, 13 of tne Criminal 
12Cone ( — ), with respect to ^cts which are offences
 ^ 15under that Code."
It can hardly be disputed then that the above 
statement of tne position represents the Official attitude 
towards the provision. Coming as it does from the Chief 
Justice of tne Territory ana one of the greatest judges 
of his time, the statement should, and has till recently, 
been regarded as the authoritative interpretation of the 
law on the subject. This is more so since the Ordinance
15- (1896-7) 1, J. of Comp. leg. p.146.
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that the learned Chief Justice was construing to the
Colonial secretary applied both in G-hana and Nigeria.
Against this nowever is the view of tne learned
16editors oi the Gold Coast Assize,^ a legal journal, who
in construing the same section oi the Ordinance had this 
17to say. "Arum the very punctuation it would appear that 
the words 'which were in force* etc., apply simply to the 
statutes of general application."
Thus the editor argues tnat the reception date 
uoes not refer to the common law and equity. hut he could 
only come to this conclusion on the oasis of the punctuation 
of the provision. We have already demonstrated convincingly 
that Ghana (then Golu Coast) auopted Anglish practice and 
procedure which induces rules of interpretation of statutes, 
it is remarkable that the learned editors left so much weight 
on punctuation when it nan repeatedly been decidea that 
punctuation is not part of a statute and should not be
Q
resorted to as aid to its construction. Admittedly,
. . 19new provisions have nowbeen rnaae m  Gnana and Nigeria
16. (Ibb4) Vol. 2. No. 5 Cited by Daniels in his book,
Common Law in West Africa p.123.
17. Op. cit. p.3.
18. Odgers, Tne Construction of ueeds and statutes, (4th ed. )
p . 220.
19. Ghana interpretation Act, 1900, C.A.4; Nigeria (Federa­
tion ana Lagos) interpretation Act, 1964.
1 8 8
(Pederati021 and Lagos) aooux the sifciaiicance oi* punctuation 
marks in the construction oi* statutes. hut these provisions 
are new and it can rightly oe argued that it is tne State 
oi the law before their enactment that prompted the change.
Je shall however proceed with our examination of the 
authorities.
20in Solomon African steamshij Co., Petrides J.
— ....—  - - —  -- —  —      _ . . . _ .  . —  /
nad this to say:
"1 am satisfied that the Statutes of limitation, which 
are applicable to the present cause of action, were 
statutes of general application which were in force 
in England on the 1st January, 1900, and that they, 
in common with other Statutes of general application 
which were in force on that date, are, together with 
the common law and the doctrines of equity which were 
in force in England on the same aate,^-1- m  force
within the jurisdiction..................................
of this court oy reason of section fourteen of tne 
Supreme Court Ordinance, suoject to the terms of any 
existing Ordinance."
This view 01 the provision nas been criticised by a 
learned author.^ <Ve snail be going into the points of 
nis objection presently.
Another of our eminent witnesses who support what
2 3could rightly be described as the ortnodox view is Allott.
20. (192b) 9, N.L.R. 99 at p.100.
21. Ivly emphasis.
22. Park, Sources of Nigerian law, p.21.
23. Allott, "The Authority of English decisions in Colonial
Courts" (1997) 1, J.A.L. 23; Essays, p.2b; "the common 
law 01 Nigeria" (1965) I.C.L.Q. Supplement, p.31.
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The details of his views have already been fully discussed
in another connection. What must nowever, oe repeated
here is the point that some sections of the reception
enactment empower the courts to apply English law for the
24time oei% in force, m  certain matters. if the
legislature had intended a timeless provision m  respect
of English common law tney could nave said this in so
many words. This view has of course been strengthened by
the new provisions in Western Nigeria,^ Northern Nigeria,^
27and G-hana. it ifiterestihg to ilpte that farm has
argued that the new provisions suppox-t the contention
th t the limiting date referred only to the Statutes of
general application. As has been pointed out by another
author, we have got to draw a line between what ’is* and
what * ought to be1 the law. An ideal reception provision
should introduce English common law for the time being in
force in England subject to adaptation to local circumstances.
24. Probate, Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.
25* Western Nigeria, Law of England (Application) Law.
26. Northern Nigeria Hi&h Court Law, Cap. 49, S.26.
27. Ghana, Interpretation Act, (I960) 3.17 C.A. 4. c.f. The
position in Liberia where Article VI of the Constitution fo
the Government ox tne African Colony at Liberia, 1325, 
stared that the common law, as in force in the U.S.
shall apply in Liberia. Here the reception of tne common
law is dateless, bee il.H. Culp, "sources of Liberian 
Law", (1966) 2 Liberia L.J. 130.
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It is submitted that die new provisions in Ghana and some 
jurisdictions in Nigeria were aimed at achieving this ideal. 
How far tnev have in fact done so is another matter, hut 
it is uuite a different stand to take from stating categori­
cally that that had always been tne position even before the 
new provisions were enacted.
In a recent lecture^0 a leading judge from Ghana 
nas also supported the orthodox view of the old provisions. 
He had this to say:
"now the courts Ordinances passed by each of the 
Legislatures of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and 
Nigeria, made it clear that only so much of the 
English law as was suitable to the circumstances 
of the territory was applicable, and since each 
legislature was empowered as from the date of 
its establishment to make laws for the good govern­
ment of its territory, the English law applicable 
was further limited to such of it as was in 
existence at the date oi,the constitution of the 
particular legislature."^
Prom the above passage it is clear that tne learned 
judge supports the view that the limiting date refers to 
the statuies of general application as well as the English 
common law. This position is consistent with the inter­
pretation of the provisions in several jurisdictions in the 
United States. Here the view is that where a State
26. N.A. Ollennu, "The influence of English law on West
Africa." Text of a lecture delivered at the University 
of Hull, 13th October, i960. (1961) 5 J.A.L. 21.
29. at p.24*
30. C.f. Roscoe found in "Common Law" (1931)? 4 Enc. Soc .
dci. 53•
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Constitution provides tnat "the common law of England
shall remain in force", ,
it is usually construed as referring to the common
law of England as it stood at the time of the adoption of such
constitution.^ To tne same effect is the xj^ actice
32described by Dean G-riswold in his Hamlyn Lectures 
entitled ’Law and Lawyers in the United States*. between 
the years 1779 and 1810 the legislatures of the States of 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and nentuchy passed laws maming 
it an offence for a lawyer to cite in Court an English 
decision which appeared after 1st July, 1776!
This, then, is che state of the authorities as 
far as the argument that the date of reception governs the 
common law and equity as weil as Statute, goes.
There are, however, others who have ably argued 
that the date of reception governs only the Statutes of 
general application. Said Roscoe Pound:^
31. 15 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Common law" p. 6}. 7 (1939 Edn.) 
Cited byLr. Daniels, Common Law in west Africa; p.122.
32. See Sir Lionel drett, "Stare decisis in Nigeria -
Some Random thoughts." 1,1965) 6 IV.b.J. 74.
33* Common Lav/ (193i) 4 Enc. Soc. Sci; 53.
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"The English materials as the colonies received them, 
were for m e  most part set forth authoritatively in 
the writings of Sir Edward Gone, Attorney General 
under Elizabeth ana Cnief Justice under James I. Yet. the 
common law of England, in the sense of the tradi­
tional boay or legal precepts administered m  the 
King's Courts or law continued to develop throughout 
the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth 
century. Also the common law as a system had an 
important development in England in the nineteenth 
century, if tne statutes limit American Courts to 
the .Cinglish legal precepts as tney stood in l601 "the 
traditional element of tne law would have to stand 
still in nmerica.. in its early seventeenth century 
form, while going forward in E n g l a n d . Thus the 
courts would oe grievously hampered in dealing with 
many subjects where m  default of legislation, resort 
must be had to the common law. Hence, although some 
courts insist that in the absence or statutory rules 
they must apply English decisions as they stood in 
the first year of tames 1 , the tendency of American 
decisions is to hold that the doctrine and statutes 
refer primarily to the common law as a system. On 
this ground courts consider chat they may refer to 
recent English decisions, as against the seventeenth- 
century authorities, if the former are setter expres­
sions of tne principles of the common law system."
It is submitted with respect that the learned 
author's fears about the consequences of accepting the 
reception aate to refer to the common law, are unsound in 
principle and falsified oy experience. If the common law 
as received is tne common law of England in the seventeenth 
century, its application ana development in America is 
suoject to local circumstances. The suggestion that m e
34. My emphasis.
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law in America will consequently stand still is a grotes­
que understatement. American jua^es nave always been 
quiCA m  discarding an English doctrine if in their 
opinion it was 1 un-American1’. A judge in Pennsylvania 
has been said to speak with the ’romantic fervour of a 
patriot’ when he refused to enforce the rule of" English 
law which permitted a husband to disinherit his wife if
she should remarry. Said Judge Lewis:
"tne principle of reproduction...... is the
blessing which tempered with mercy the justice 
of expulsion from paradise. Prom the lord of
trie forest to the monster of the deep - from the
elastic embrace of the mountain Kalrnia to the 
descending fructification of the lily of the 
plain, all nature bows submissively to this 
primeval law. liven the flowers wnich perfume tne 
air with their fragrance, ana aecorate tne 
forests ana fields with their hues, are but curtains 
to the nuptual bed. The principles of morality -
the law of nature and the law of G-od------- unite
in condemning ~as voided the condition attempted to 
be imposed by this testator upon his widow.
The importance of this remarkable piece of legal 
rhetoric is to emphasise the fact that irrespective of the
date of reception the common law is adaptable to local 
conditions ana circumstances. When the Texas judges were
35. My emphasis.
36. Cited by Professor Mark Lewolfe Howe, The Migration 
of the Common Law (ed. A.L. G-oodhart, 196>0) p. 13.
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called upon to interpret the State’s reception statute
providing that tne common law of England should be the rule
of cecision, they ainiounced that it meant that the common
law of England as "declared by the courts of the different
btates of tne United States" should govern the contro-
37versies of Texans. Thus tne fact that the common law
as received was the common law in force in England at a
particular aate forms the oasis of a new legal system.
The new common law then becomes a naturalised citizen whose
growth, change and development are determined bj local
circumstances a^ .d conditions. This was the case in the
United states and the older Commonwealth countries, it is
submitted that it is equally the case in G-hana and the
Nigerian jurisdiction.Park's strictures on the orthodox
view are partly based on the Privy Council appeal from
39Eigeria oi United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Sana Owade m
which their Lordships were said to have followed tne House
40of Loras decision m  Llo j- d v. Grace, dmitn & Co., a post- 
1900 English authority on vicarious liability. One cannot
37. bee Howe op.cit. p.14.
30. c.f. Sir Kenneth Pioberts-yVray, "The adaptation of imported
law in Africa", (I960; 4 J.n.L. 66; Kerr, "The reception
and codification of systems of law in Southern Africa";
Daniels, common law in ..est Africa, p. 122.
39. Cl955j A.C. 130.
40. (u.912^  A.C .716.
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reout Park's contention, however, without stating the 
facts of the case in greater detail.
the respondent was a lorry-owner axxd a transport con­
tractor. Hehad introduced two of his servants to the 
appellants addinu that any goods for carriage up country 
(Northern Nigeria) meant for him could oe delivered to tne 
said servants. Accordingly the appellant delivered goods 
worth £4,732:13:4d. to the servants for the appellants' 
branches up country. The servants stole these goods, 
the servants were convicted of the theft and the 
company sued tne respondent among other things in con­
version for the total sum being the value of the goous
converted. At first instance it was held, following the
42House of Lords decision in Lloyd v. G-race, Smith & Co. 
that the respondant was liaole. on appeal to the West 
African Court of Appeal, the appeal court reversed tnis 
finding and held that the respondent was not liable since 
it had not been proved that he was a common carrier. The 
appellants appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council. Here tne learned counsel for the respondent 
ably argued that the facts or the case were on all fours
41. Supra.
m  United Africa Company Ltd. v. Haka Owade41
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with those in One shire v. -bailey where it was held that
tne theft by a servant of a bailee does not arise in the 
course of the servant's employment. it is worth noting that 
the Cheshire case is also a post-1900 decision. On this 
submission by the learned counsel their Lordships had this 
to say:
"Their Lordships do not find it necessary to decide 
whether that case is distinguishable on the facts 
from L1 o yd vr G-race, bmith & Go. or has been 
overruled by the decision m  Lloyd v. Grace Smith
liable on the ground that he was liaole for the theft of 
his servants committed in the coux*se of their employment. 
The relevance of this voyage of discovery into tne facts 
of the Owaae case is threefold, firstly it is to stress 
the fact that Pam's submission that txie Privy Council nad 
to choose oetween a pre-1900 and a post-1900 English common 
law rule, is not borne out by the facts. Chesnire v.
Lailey on which the old rule was supposed to have 
oeen based was decided in 1905, thus itself also a post- 
1900 decision of English Courts. secondly, their 
Lordships of the Privy Council dia not have the choice
it was however held that the respondent was
45. Q. 905j 1 ivB 237.
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attributed to them by the learned author. The dictum
of Lord Oaksey who read the judgment of the Board
bears out this submission.
Finally, even if tne Privy Council were persuaded
by the House oi Lords decision in the Grace case, (Park
did not suggest that they were bound), the Board as the
final court of appeal in the tnen judicial hierarchy of
the territory (i.e. Nigeria) could aid did guide the growth
and development oi the received common law.^ This it
has done in the Qwaae case* How that decision could
be said to have advanced the argument for a dateless common
law one bit, is fanciful in the extreme. it is submitted
that the date of reception governs both the common law and
47the statutes of general application.
Decisions at common law:
A judicial uecision in Bngland is based either on 
a statutory provision or on a common law rule. We shall 
be examining nere tne authority oi the decisions of English 
courts where such decisions are based on a common law rule.
46. bee the Tanganyika case oi Dabholnar V.R., Cl 94b)
A.C. 211 P.O. and tne Hong nong appeal ox Civil Air 
Transport v. Central m r  Transport £19537 A.C. 70 in 
which the Privy Council applied post-reception date
common law principles.
4 7. Mention has already been made oi the recent provisions 
in Ghana axici some jurisdictions in Nigeria.
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We must however, hasten to explain some of our terms.
When we say that English decisions are authoritative in, 
say, Nicenan courts, what exactly do we mean? In the 
following investigation authoritative will mean 'binding* .
It is important to nave tnis clear picture in our minds 
oecause many authors whose minus have adverted to this 
problem do not appear to have given sufficient considera­
tion to the distinction between persuasive and binding
4-U " 4- * 4 6authority.
It is particularly uesiraole to draw this line
in an investigation of the law of obligation since almost
the whole corpus of this law is case law. Another necessary
distinction that must ue made is that between the authority
of pre-1900 (in the case of Nigeria) English cases on
the common law and trie post-1900 cases. We have in the
preceding sub-section demonstrated convincingly the relevance
of the reception date with regard to the received common
law and do not need to repeat tne exercise here.
The fact tnat pre-1900 decisions of the superior courts in
England are part oi the common law anu equity, cannot be
4b. nlias in his article, "Colonial courts and the doctrine
oi judicial precedent", uses tne neutral word 'apply1 
in referring to the authority oi the decision of English 
courts in the colonial courts. Also per Mr. Justice 
Ollennu at p.39 of his article supra, "The courts of 
the Commonwealth countries of west Africa have hitherto 
been Buiaed a^ id bound by decisions of superior courts 
in England.1
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overemphasised. Now it is tins common law and equity that
was received in Nigeria on 1st January, 1900, and, it is
submitted, these aecisions are binding on the Nigerian
courts irrespective of which English courts decided any
49particular case whose ratio is under consideration. It
is further suomitted that this statement of the position is 
separate and distinct from any consideration of judicial 
precedent. hut the statement is subject to certain 
exceptions, firstly, the last court of Appeal in each 
territory could and does guide tile g r o w t h  and development 
of the received common law and equity. Reference has 
already oeen made to the hr ivy Council decision m  It. A .C . 
v. daka Owade. It is submitted that the ultimate courts 
of appeal in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have this
49. c.f. Kerr, "The Reception and codification of systems 
of law in Southern Africa'*, (195b) 2, J.A.L. o2. "when 
there is a decision, given before reception, in a 
court in the country from which the system of law has 
oeen received and when that court is superior in rank 
to the court called upon to decide a matter in the 
receiving country, tne difference in rank is a factor 
requiring consideration". At p.85 he is submitted 
that this statement cannot oe true of the ultimate 
courts of appeal m  Ghana and Nigeria for the simple 
reason that no other court can oe of a superior rank
to the territorial final appeal courts. The case for 
Ghana is further strengthened by a statutory provision,
The interpretation Act,_ sect ion 17. Gee also Amis sail v. 
Amissah, Div. Ct. (1926-9) (Ghana) where Yates J. 
regarded himself bound by dtpate v. btoat (1861) 3 L.f.757
50. {l955) A.C. 130, P.O.
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power of moulding and shaping the common law and equity, 
if any pre-1900 decision is deemed un-Nigerian the Nigerian 
Supreme Court are not bound to follow it. nut a pre-1900
decision of the House of lords is binding on the Nigerian
51 , « . .Supreme Court. such a rule if it occasions hardship
could of course be remedied by legislative action.
52Tne fatal Accidents Act, 1961, the law reform 
5 3I Torts) net, 1961, and the Law Reform (contracts) Act,
54 ,1961, are instances of tne T'edemi duvernment of
Nigeria anticipating a call for help from the Nigerian
Supreme Court m  these fields. Our remark about the
creative power of the courts finds authoritative support
from the speech of Sir ndetoKunbo Adernola, Cnief Justice
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to the Nigerian Bar
55 •Association. He said among other things that
"The common law of England, as all mow, uoes not 
necessarily fit in with every one of our problems 
in Nigeria; they have tneir technicalities; their 
unsuitability in some cases is well Known to you 
ana need not be emphasised. It is evident that 
to understand our own country and law, more 
researcnes are necessary."
51. Robins v. National Trust Co. Ltd. (1927J A • C.5I5 .
52. No. 34 of 1961.
53. No. 63 of 1961.
54. No. 64 of 1961.
55* (1959) 2, N.B.J. 29.
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To the same effect is the dicta of Denning L.J.
(as he then was) in the case of Nyaii, Led, v. Attorney- 
r 6
G-eneral at the court of Appeal. The learned judge was
construing a sub-section of the Kenya Protectorate Order m  
57Council 1902 which laid down a proviso as follows:
"------ Provided always that the said common law,
doctrines of equity and statutes of general appli­
cation shall be in force in the protectorate so far 
only as the circumstances of the protectorate and
its inhabitants -----  permit and subject to such
qualifications as local circumstances render necessary".
The learned Lord Justice had this to say on tne
proviso
"it is a recognition that the common law (of England) 
cannot be applied in a foreign land without coxisiaer- 
able qualifications. Just as with an English oak, so 
with the common iaw. You cannot transplant it to the 
African continent and expect it to retain the tough 
character whicn it nas 111 England. it will flourish 
indeed out it needs careful tending. bo with the 
common law. it has many principles of manifest jus­
tice and good sense which can be applied with advan­
tage to peoples of every race and colour all the world 
over; out it has also many refinements and tecnni- 
caiities which are not suited to other folk. These 
off-shoots must oe cut away. in these far-off lands 
the people must nave a law wnich tnej understand and 
which tne,y will respect with considerable (qualifica­
tions. The task of making these qualifications is 
entrusted to the judges of these lands. it is a great 
one, 1 trust that they will not fail therein."5°
56. Cl95£) lAHE.R.os-b at p.653^bee also (j-550 1 ^.d. 1
99 bot Jo. 21b; affirmed £l956jf 2 All. E.R. 669 
by H.L.; ‘\0-957j A.C. 253; 100 Sol. Jo. 409;
3rd Dig. bupp.
57. Art. 15 No. 661 of 1902 is amended by the 1911 Order 
(S-R & 0. 1911 No. 243)
5b. bee also Allott, Essays, p.25; Park, Sources of Nigerian 
Law p.38; Daniels, Common Law, p.loo.
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Consequently the learned judge modified the English 
common law concepts of tolls-thorough ana tolls-traverse 
to suii Kenyan circumstances.
RQ
It has further been suggested by a learned author
that a House of Lords decision may nox be binding on a
Commonwealth court if the House of Lords were constrained
10 decide in a particular way by the binding nature of
judicial precedent. Since Dr. Daniels had already adopted
the attitude of regarding tne received common law and equity
as dateless ne dia not go further to indicate whether it
was pre-reception aate or post-reception date decisions
of the House of Lords that would not be binding. If his
reference is to the former, it is submitted that it is
not supported by the authority of Ghanaian and Nigerian 
60courts. These courts regard themselves as boundby
the decisions of pre-reception decisions of the superior 
English Courts. Dr. Daniels* suggestion is also directly
59* Daniels, Common Law, pp.ldo et seq.
60. On Ghana, see amiss ah v. Amiss ah, m v . Court Rep. (1926-y) 
where Yates J. regarded himself as bound by the English 
decision in Stoate v. Dtoate (1661) 3 L.l. 757, a case re­
lating to the time of the discharge of an order for payment 
of alimony; Hage v. Oda oawmilis Lta. , per Gllermu J:
H.Ct. buit No. 35/195^, Unreported (contract damages);
Alloteg v. Ghana aluminum Products Ltd.; Mills-Odoi J; 
H.Ct. buit No. 14/60, unreported (admissibility oi oral 
evidence to vary a written contract).
On Nigeria, see iaciver ana Co. Lta. v. C . E. A . 0 . (1917)
3 , N . L. A. 16; Lawsonvv . bifire and Ivlat i~ (1932 ) 11,
Coker (1932) 11, N.L.r_. 13o; unuchuku v. Christiana 
y»lliiams (1935) 12, N.L.-..19; Bada v. The Premier Thrift
oocletj (1936) 13, N.L.A. 47.
2 0 3
contrary to the Privy Council decision of Robins v. 
National trust Co, Ltd.°^  If however, his suggestion 
refers to post-reception date decisions of English Courts, 
it is submitted that it is not only the decisions of the 
House of Lords out 'cnose oi any other English Courts that 
are only of persuasive authority in Ghanaian ana Nigerian 
Courts. As has been repeatedly assertea, the reception 
of English law into Ghana and Nigeria mailed the beginning 
of a new system. There could be no ciuestion of Nigerian
or Ghanaian Courts Doing bound by the post-reception deci­
sions of English courts.
The second exception to our general principle of 
Nigerian courts being bound by pre-reception date English 
decisions is tne fact that certain cases are governed by 
customary law rules. In such cases therefore, the prin­
ciples of customary law may be preferred to the rules of
C p
English Common Law. Chike Ogo v. Aaioa Ogo was a 
Nigerian case of customary defamation. Said Mbanefo 
C . J.
6 1. (U,9 A.C. 515 L.C. Lee particularly Lord Dunedin*s
statement of the position at p.519*
62. (1964) N.K.L.R. (Dec.) 117.
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"In arguing the appeal, appelant*s counsel lias referred 
me to a number of English authorities and text-books on 
what a plaintiff must prove before he could succeed 
in a case of slander. The essence of an action for 
defamation is publication and in tne case of spoken 
words, the exact words or somethin ,^ as close to them 
as possiole must oe proved by evidence. is such 
strict proof necessary in a case of slander in the cus­
tomary court? it has not been suggested that slander 
as a cause of action is not known in the customary 
courts. Any words spoken of a person which exposes 
him to hatred, ridicule and contempt would appear in 
customary law to be actionable......
Concluding, the learned Chief Justice held inter 
alia that there was no need for proof of special damage 
in customary slander actions and secondly that the strict 
proof necessary under English law was not necessary under 
customary law procedure.
Customary law has also operated to reduce damages
64- •for a oreach of promise of marriage action to nominal
damages. baid Waddington, J.:
"1 am little disposed to assess damages at a high
figure; it is impossible to ignore the fact that
in the customs of plaintiff's people, the customs 
into which she and defendant were Dorn, there is
6 3. Op.cit. p.lib.
64. iJgboma v. mo ran (194-0) 15, N.L.R. 78,
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no conception in the least comparable to that .of* 
damages for breach of a promise of marriage.”65
A third exception to our general rule, is that 
English puoiic policy decisions ao not have the same bind­
ing force on the Nigerian courxs or for that matter on 
the courts of Ghana, as decisions based on rules of law.
If the primary function of law is the ‘adjustment of
bearing on the state of civilisation of the society in 
which it is applied. As was aptly pointed out oy Lord 
Watson in Nordenfelt v. Laxim IVordenfelt Guns and Ammunition
"A series of decisions based upon grounds of public 
policy, however, eminent the judges by whom they were 
delivered, carrnot possess the same binding authority 
as decisions which ueal and promulgate principles 
which are purely legal.11®®
6 5. Op.cit. at p.02. See also Labinjoh v. Abake (1924)
5, N.L.R. 33, where it was held by Combe C.U. that if 
there is a native custom whereby an unmarried girl living 
with her parent or guardian will not be held liable for 
the price of goods supplied to her for trading purposes 
without her parent’s consent, the court (at a retrial) 
should consider whether such custom should not oe applied 
instead of English law. Here, of course, the English 
law referred to was the Infants Relief Act, 1S74.
66. J. Stone, Province and function of Law, p. 495*
66conflicting interests', ’ then it must have a direct
1, 23.
6 8. Q&lgl (V C . <p- N. Ss3
535, 6ee also gender v. 8t. John kildmay
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This statement of Lord Watson Las not however, 
received unqualified support both of judicial and academic
opinion. As to this we shall be saying’ more in a sub-
69sequent chapter. it is, however, in the domain of per­
sonal law in Ghana and Nigeria that Lord Watson's dictum
comes to its own. The old and familiar theories of poly-
70gamous marriages as enuntiated in Warrender v. Warrender
71and rephrased in Hyde v. Hyde have been submerged in a
72deluge of recent judicial and academic authority. The
same is true of succession. In Lawodu and others v.
74Danmole and others, already referred to, their Lordships 
of the Privy Council observed that public policy in a 
country where polygamy was generally accepted should not 
easily oe equated to that of a society governed by the 
principles of monogamy.
69. pp. infra.
70. (1635) 2 CL and Pin. 433.
71. (1666) L.R. 1 P and D. 130.
72. Bamgbose v. Lam el [l954l3 All E.R. 263 P.C. (1955)
A.C. 107; Ohochuku v. Qnochuiiu [l960j 1 All E.R. 253,
(I960) 1 W.lTr T 163; Coleman v. bhang (1959) G.L.R.
390, on appeal (19617 A.C. 4ol (P.C .) it must be 
added that Hyde v Hyde is not yet overruled.
73. Lowodu v. Lunmole 11962/ 1 W.L.R. 10^3; Tairro v. Lawani 
L Anor fl9"5lJTAli N.L.R. 703. C.f. Cole v Cole
(1696) l- N.L.R. 15
74. [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1053.
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Post-Reception date decisions at Common Law:
We shall now examine the authority of post-reception 
ctate decisions of English Courts in Ghana and Nigeria.
Two theories have often been propounded the import of which 
is that post-reception date decisions are as authoritative 
as tnose before the date of reception.
One of such theories and the least with anything to commend
it is the declaratory theory of the common law. This
tneory, originally propounded by Blackstone, has been worn
so t h m  as to have become a transparent fiction, in the
South West African case of R. v. Goseb Classen, J.P.
had this to say in support of the theory:
"It is further true that a decision interpreting the 
common law has retrospective effect as if the common 
law had always been in conformity with the later 
decision."
It was held in this case that a post-receptimn 
decision by the Appellate Division of South Africa must 
be read as if it were already operative at the date of 
reception.
75. (1956) (2) 5 A. 696 (S.W.A.) Cited by A.J. Kerr in,
the "Reception and Codification of Systems of Law in 
Southern Ainca" (1956) 2, J.A.L. 62.
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nut as has been rightly observed by Allott this may
well be the position in South-West nfrica since there is
a common ultimate Court of Appeal serving the receiving
country and the country whose legal system is received.
but this cannot be true of Ghana ana Nigeria on trie one
hand and England on the other. The house of Lords, the
final Court of Appeal in England in most matters has no
77jurisdiction to hear appeals from Ghana and Nigeria.
The other theory is that comity requires that 
Commonwealth Courts should hold identical views on the 
growth and development of the Common Law. Thus if the 
House of Lords comes to anj conclusion about the principle 
of the common law, that is the law for the other Common-
rj O
wealth Courts. It is however submitted that the
one thing that comity cannot and should not import is the
idea that the decision of one Commonwealth Court is
binding on the courts of another country. in Corbett v.
79Social Security Commission the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal refused to hold itself bound oj the decision of the
76. Essays, p.33.
77. Although in many cases tne same panel of judges may 
serve the House of Lords as the Privy Council.
76. brett: Stare Decisis in Nigeria, p.74 (1965) 6 N.b.J. 74.
79. (1962) N.Z. L.R. 676.
o 0House of Lords in Duncan v. Cammell Laird.
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Also in the Australian case of Darker v. The- ^ueen,0^
tne High Court of Australia refused to follow the decision
of the house of Lords in P.P.P. v. dim in, ^  in his judgment
in the Australian case Dixon, C.J. said:
"in Stapleton v. The ^ueen,OJ we said: "The intro­
duction of the maxim or statement that a man is 
presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of 
his act is seldom helpful ana always dangerous.1 
That was some ^ears oefore tne uecision in D.x.x. v. 
dmith^4 whicn seems only too unfortunately to confirm 
the ooservation. i say ’too unfortunately* for 
i think it forces a critical situation in our rela­
tion to the judicial authority as precedents of 
decisions in Ln^land. Hitherto i had tnought that 
we ought to fol-ow decisions of tne House of Lords at 
the expense of our own opinions and cases decided 
here, but having carefully studied Smith1s case I 
thinn that we cannot; adhere to that view or policy 
There are propositions laid down in the judgment 
which 1 believe to be misconceived and wrong.
They are fundamental axid they are propositions which 
I could never oring myself to accept ...1 think
Smith’s case should not.be used as authority in
Australia at ail....
80. (1942) A.C*624.
81. (1963) A.L.A.524; (1964) 36 a .L.J.285; (1964)
3 W.L.R.70.
82. (1961) A.C.2 (o.
83. (1952) 66 C.L.R. 358 at p.365.
84. Supra.
85. My emphasis.
66. Op.cit. p.537. Lee also A.L. Goodhart (1963) 79,
L.Q.R., 313.
65
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It is submitted that the altitudes of tne hew Zealand Court 
of appeal and the Australian High Court in the cases cited 
above should be adopted in the Nigerian Courts with regard 
to post-reception decisions of the House of nords. In 
this connection Allott's summary of the position is very 
apt indeed. He said that:
'•Decisions of English Courts on tne principles of 
common law or doctrines of equity given after the 
date when a territory received its English law are 
not of binding authority in the Courts of the 
territory; though they are entitled to the highest 
respect if the English law has not been subsequently 
statutorily modified.
It remains to add that the above summary of the position
represents a more realistic definition of comity than a
suggestion that the courts of Nigeria or Ghana for that
matter are bound by post-reception decisions of English
b6Courts.
87. Essays, p.33.
ob. The above discussion on the authority of English 
decisions under common lav; and equity has oeen in­
evitably confined to non-criminal and non-constitu­
tional law decisions. Fascinating as it is to 
investigate the impact of English decisions on the 
criminal laws of Ghana and Nigeria, and the place 
of constitutional conventions in tne constitutional 
laws of the two countries, these are only remotely 
germane to our subject of enquiry. The aoove dis­
cussion has therefore oeen restricted to civil 
obligations. As neither Ghana nor Nigeria nave 
codified their laws of contract and tort we have not 
found it necessary to discuss the effect of codi­
fication on the authority of English decisions.
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Decisions under statute
In examining the authority of un^lish decisions 
based on the interpretation of btatutes one has got to 
look at three different categories of Statutes, firstly 
we nave the pre-reception—date statutes or statutes of 
general application as they are more often called. Sec­
ondly there are such Statutes of the United ningdom Parlia­
ment as are still part of the laws of Ghana and Nigeria 
even although they are post-reception date Statutes, 
finally there are Publish statutes that have been re­
enacted in Ghana and ^igeria as part of their respective 
territorial laws - these are popularly called Statutes in 
pari materia. The important question is, what is the 
authority of iiinglish decisions oased on the interpretation 
of these statutes? »Ve snail Degin with decisions made 
under the Statutes of general application.
Decisions made under ooatutes of general application:
The theory has often Dee^ x put forward that when
a colonial (or a Commonwealth) legislature decided to
adopt the pre-reception nn^lish statutes, it also adopted
the interpretation placed on the provisions of these
89Statutes by the English courts. Consistently with this
o9. Allott, Essays, p.40.
theory therefore, English decisions made before the date 
of reception are binding on the nigenan and G-hanaian courts, 
rut much will depend 011 tne stature of the English Court
which made the aecision, and also the stature of the
90Nigerian court that is called upon to> adopt the inter­
pretation. Thus a decision of an English High Court will 
not be binding on tne Nigerian supreme Court, altnough it 
will have persuasive autnority. but the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal or the House of Lords will be 
binding 011 all the courts in Nigeria, saving for the 
liberty of the highest court of the land to adapt the law 
to suit local conditions.
it must be added but without any emphasis that the 
courts in Nigeria have regarded themselves as oound by 
the decisions of English courts. but the courts have also 
been quicn to recognise the significance of the limitation 
on the application of imperial statutes. Section 45 (2) 
of the interpretation net of Nigeria provides that:
90. Since the same argument holds good for Nigeria as for 
Ghana as far as tne statutes go, reference to Nigerian 
courts in tne sub-head will oe deemed to include 
reference to one Ghana Courts.
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"Such imperial laws shall be in force so far only 
as the limits oi tne local jurisdiction and local 
circumstances shall permit and suuject to any 
Federal law.1
92 ■ ■ . 1-S " .«! 'Thus in Lawal v. i ounan the Nigerian Federal Supreme
Court held, that under the Fatal Accidents nets 1646-1664, 
children not born in lawful wedlock under tne Marriage 
Ordinance or who are not tne issue of a marriage under 
Native Law and Custom, are, if acknowledged as children 
by the putative fathers, legitimate in Nigeria for the
G ^
purposes of tne Acts. in Bamgbose v. Daniel, it was
held by the .Vest African Court of Appeal and affirmed by
the Privy Council that ‘child* under the English statute
of distributions included any child legitimate under the
law of his domicile. Thus the children of polygamous
unions ranked equally with any child of a marriage under
the Marriage Ordinance. This was also the decision in
9 4the Ghana case of Coleman v. dhaiq- . ' in each of the aoove
91. Cap.69, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos.
See also S. 154 of tne Grhana Courts Act, C.A. 9 • 
"Provided that the said statutes shall be subject to 
such modification as may oe requisite to enable them 
to oe conveniently applied in Ghana."
92. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 245*
93* Cl95^J 3 nil E.L. 264; Ci955j A.C. 107*
94. (1959) G.L.R. 390, affirmed (1961) A.C. 461. dee also 
tne recent Nigerian case of Ooadara cc ors. v. The 
President, Ibadan .vest District Council G-rade "B"
Customary Ct. (1965) N.M.L.R. 39*
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citea decisions the courts in Nigeria did not hold them­
selves bound by tne interpretation placed on such words 
as 1 child* and ’legitimate’ oy the English Courts.
Of the decisions based on such statutes as were 
expressly said to apply to Ghana ana Nigeria, one thing is 
very clear, it is that tne argument, based on "imperial 
legislation being designed to form a coherent system of 
law prevailing in the British possessions" has lost much 
of its force. Neither Ghana nor Nigeria now form part of
Her Majesty’s Dominions ana each oi these territories has
95got her own Nationality and Citizenship Daws. The
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction net, 1876 ceased to apply
9 6to both territories on tiie attainment of independence. 
Since most ox tne enactments under this section were 
operative in the colonies as a necessary consequence of 
Britain’s responsibility for them in international law, 
it is most unlikely that the Courts in Nigeria will con­
sider themselves bound oy the interpretation placed on 
these statutes by English Courts. It is submitted that 
such decisions will only oe of persuasive authority in the 
Nigerian Courts.
95. Such statuoes were generally said to apply in ail Her 
Majesty’s Dominions. Ghana became a Republic on 1st 
July, I960 and Nigeria aaopoed a Repuolican Constitu­
tion on 1st October, 1963.
96. See Ghana independence Act, 1957, 5 <1 6 Eliz. 2.
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Statuses in pari materia:
We shall finally be looxin^ at decisions based
on the interpretation of English Statutes which have in
part or wholly been materially re-enacted in Ghana and
Nigeria. Examples of such statutes are legion. We
shall nowever mention only the following for our particular
97purpose. The higerian bills of Exchange Act^' and bills
QH
of bale net are carbon copies of the English bills of
aq _ _ /
Exchange Act, 16b2 ana the bills of oale Act 1676 (as
amended in looR).1^  The Nigerian Companies Act101 is
a material re-enactment of tne English Companies Act of
192cj. The Civil liability (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 
1021961 is a mixed bag of provisions copied from the
English Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions; Act, 1934;
Married women and Tort-feasors Act, 1935, and the Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) act, 1945* The Law Reform
10t(Contracts) Act, 1961 is to the same effect, a
97. Cap. 21, Law of Nigeria (1956) Revision.
96. C ap. 22.
99- Ch. 61 (1662 statutes)
100.Ch. 43 (loo2 statutes;.
101. Cap. 37 (1956) Revision
102. No. 33 of 1961
103. No. 64 of 1961
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combination of provisions from the English Law Reform
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943; the Statute of Frauds, lb
and the sale of G-oods net, 1893* in 1959 the Western
Nigeria legislature auopted the nnglish new of Property
104legislation of 19^5. The aoovu practice is equally
105true of C-hana. The question winch often recurrs is
the extent to which the Nigerian Courts are bound by the
interpretation of these provisions in English Courts.
The oft-cited authority in this connection is the
observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the
New South Wales appeal of Trimble v. Hill. The Board
107was faced with the interpretation of an enactment of
the English Act on wagering Contracts and had this to say:^-0
"Their Lordships think that the Court in the Colony 
might well have taken this decisiorP-^9 as an 
authoritative construction of tne statute. It is 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, b^  which all
104. see Property and Conveyancing Law, Cap. \c?0 \ n
105. On G-hana see Bill of Exchange net, 1981 (Act 55);
Administration of nstates Act, 1961 (act. 63); sale 
of goods Act, 1962 (Act. 137); Workmen's Compensation 
Act, 1963 (Act. 174;; Civil Liability Act, 1963 
(Act. 176) and Merchant Shipping Act, 1963 (Act. 183). 
These are material re-enactments (lrisome cases, better 
drafting) of tne Corresponding English Statutes.
106. (1879) 5 App. Cas. 342.
107. The Colonial Act, 14 Viet. No. 9, S.8. in the same.
terms as 8 & 9 Viet. C. 109> S.8.
108. Per sir Montague n. Smith who read tne judgment of the 
Board, at p.344.
109. Biggie v. Higgs, 2 Ex. I). 422. bee also Oatterall v.
bw e e trnan (1845) 9 Jur. y51
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the courts in England are bound, until a contrary 
determination has been arrived at by the House 
of lords. Their lordships think that in colonies 
where a line enactment has oeen passed by the 
Legislature, the Colonial Courts should also 
govern themselves oy it."ltO
It is tempting to give unreserved approval to this line 
of reasoning by their Lordships. After all, the Common­
wealth Courts ought to benefit from the experience of the 
English Courts who have construed tne provisions and it 
could be inferred that the copying legislature also 
intended to adopt the interpretation placed on those pro­
visions in judicial decisions, more so if the decisions 
were made before the Commonwealth legislature passed the 
Act. hut one of the cardinal features of this theory is 
that tne legislature is consistent in its use of language. 
The first objection is of course, that in this case 
different legislatures, are involved. Another objection 
is that this practice of following the construction placed 
on enactments by English Courts could easily be overdone. 
It is not very helpful to argue that a statute enacted by 
one legislature is in paid materia with an Act of a dif­
fer exit legislative doay. In fact their Lordships of the 
Privy Council recognised in Grand Trunk Railway v. vVash-
ington 111 an appeal from Canada, that
110. This decision was followed in Hunt v. 
1 Ch. 675.
111. £1899) A.C.275•
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"As these are enactments emanating from a different 
legislative body from tnat which passed the Statute 
to oe interpreted and cannot besaid to be in pari 
materia with that, their Lordships are unable to 
see that tney ou^ht to nave any influence upon the 
question to oe decided arising exclusively upon 
the Dominion Act, and relating only to Dominion 
Railways."112
To the same effect is the Ceylon appeal of 
Chettiar v. Mahamtee,~L~L^  where their Lordsnips also pointed 
out the danger of importing the decisions of English Courts 
in interpreting local enactments on similar terms as the 
c or responding English .acts. in naram v. Commissioner 
of me ome iax t ~ ^Lr it was held by the West African Court of 
Appeal that it woula be unsafe for the Ghana Courts to 
rely on English authority in tax cases, it is respect­
fully submitted tnat there can oe no question of the
Nigerian Courts being oound bv decisions of English Courts
on statutes which are in similar terms to local ones. At 
best, these decisions should be of persuasive authority and 
the degree of their persuasiveness should be determined by 
tne position in the judicial hierarchy of the English Court
112. Op.cit. at p.2b6.
113. Cwsq) A.C. 431; but c.f. the West African Court of 
Appeal decision m  l.otayo v. Commissioner of iolice 
(1950) 13, W.A.C.A. 114.
114. (194b) 12, W.A.C.A. 331.
* 4.. 1 ■ 115that made the decision. 2 1 8
The Privy Council:
The position of the Privy Council in England is 
a very peculiar one. Although it is an English institu­
tion, yet it is not, except in prize, Ecclesiastical and 
Admiralty cases considered as part of the English judicial
-j ~| /T
system. its decisions, except perhaps on the above
_ . pi 7
matters, are not binding on the English Court of Appeal, 
or even on an English divisional Court. ^ They are
115. See further, AlioIt, Essays, p.43» Staines v. Victor 
La Rosa (1933J 1 vV.L.H. 474. in the recent Kenya 
Appeal to the Privy Council of I.atiorial and Grindiays 
Bank v. Lharanshi oc ors Q,966j[ 2 All E.R. 626, New 
Zealand cases based on a statute materially similar 
to the Kenya chattels Transfer Ordinance, 1930, were 
referred to and approved of as a guide to Kenya courts 
in construing the Kenya enactment provisions.
116. it also has appellate jurisdiction in determinations 
of the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical 
Council (by the medical Act, 1950;; and also certain 
default powers under the Profession Supplementary to 
Medicine Act, i960.
117. in Panton v. Denyille C P  32) 2 n .B . 309, Greer, L.J. 
refused to follow the Privy Council's decision in 
Toronto Power Company v. P ask wan {Q-91527 A.C. 734, 
describing the latter decision as inconsistent with 
the whole trend of the English decisions. Also in 
Re Hastings No. 3 0-959^ 1 All E.R. 698, the Court
of Appeal refused to follow the Privy Council decision 
in the Nigerian appeal of nleno v. Government of 
Nigeria fljL92b) n.C. 459.
116. in Port Line Ltd. v. Ren Line Stearners Ltd. 0-95oj 
2 k• B. 1*6, Diplocx J. declined to follow the Privy 
Council decision in Lord Stratncona Steamship Co. Ltd. 
v. dominion Coal Co. Ltd* Q.9p6} A.C. 10b. bee also 
Venn v. Tedesco U32qj" 2 K.B. 227, Lynn v. Ramber CL930J 
2 n.B. 72 j Bulieu v. «<hite jj-901j 2 n.B. 669 c.f.
Smith v. Leach Brain K D o . ”ul962/ 2 Q.B. 405, where 
Lord Parker 0. J . ureferred tne privy Council decision in 
bj:ie A agon Mound 0-9 61} ,,.0.300 to the Court of Appeal 
decision m  he rolemis £1921} 3 n.B.560.
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obviously not binding on the House of Loras,  ^ But
the observation in the Pity of Chester (1884) L.R.9 P.P.182
that "in mercantile or admiralty law, where the same
principles are followed in the colonies as in this country
(England), it is highly undesirable tnat there should be
any conflict between the decisions of the Judicial Committee
and those of the high Court or Courts of Appeal in this 
120country," seems to leave us with the impression that
in these matters tne High Courts and the Courts of Appeal 
are bound by the decisions of the Privy Council,
The hoard was also till lately the last Court of 
Appeal for Grhana and Nigeria, it is still the final Court 
of Appeal for the colonies and some of the Dominions.
Thus we nad a curious situation whereby the Council was 
both a Ghanaian ana a Nigerian Court as well as an English 
Court.
The significance of tne Board is twofold for our 
purpose here. Firstly, what is the authority of its pre­
vious decisions in Ghanaian ana Nigerian Courts? Secondly, 
what was or still is its practice with regard to the bind­
ing nature of yudicj-al precedent, which practice the 
Supreme Courts of Ghana and Nigeria as the Board* s
119• Aosalom v. Talbot A y  4-TJ a .0.204; Bristow v. hichenson 
IU94b7 k.B.321; jJuncan v. Camine 11 Laird & Co. T T 9 4 0 -
A.C.624.
120. Op.cit. at p.207.
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successors may nave inherited?
The Authority of Privy Council Decisions:
Here a distinction must oe made between decisions 
of the hoard arising out of appeals from a particular 
territory on the one hand, and appeals from other terri­
tories on the other, it is necessary to make this vital 
distinction because of the growing habit of certain writers 
ana judges to cite decisions of the Council arising from
appeals from other Commonwealth courts as binding authority
121in the Nigerian Courts.  ^ it is submitted with respect
that only the first category of the hoard’s decisions are
binding on the Nigerian Courts. This must be so for tne
simple reason that it is only when hearing an appeal from
Nigeria that the Privy Council was sitting as a Nigerian
Court, it is further respectfully submitted tnat the
observation of the Supreme Court 01 Nigeria in Thomas v.
122Ademola 11 ana Others, that
"Colonial courts must give precedence to the
decisions of tne Privy Council before those of 
any other tribunal",
lays down too wide a principle and was unnecessary for the
• • 123decision of the case. In fact a contrary view is by
121. oee McNeil and Rains, Nigerian Cases and Statutes on
Contract and Tort (1965) passim.
122. (1945) N.L.R.12, bee also 0 no gen v. Leventis (1959)
G-.L.R. 105.
123. bee also the New Zealand case of ot evens on v. Basham & 
Another (19227 N.Z.L.R.225, where a similar attitude
was adopted by the New Zealand High Court.
221
inference supported by the Authority of the hoard itself
in the Zanzibar appeal of Patuma hinti i.ohammed -bin Lalim
124hakhshuwen v. Mohammed join nannsnuwen. in that case their 
Lordships warned against the assumption m a t  its judgments 
in a series ol cases from India on points of Mohammedan 
Law were confined to that law as applied in India, it 
was stressed that on a question of Mohammedan Law, which 
was alleged to be the same in Last Africa as in India, the 
judgments of tne Privy Council in appeals from India must 
be taken as binning on the Last African Court of Appeal.
Thus where tnere is no such similarity the hoard’s deci­
sions will not be binding on the courts of another terri­
tory. This view is further strengthened by the case of
125Negro v. Pietro’s hreaa Co. Lta., where the Ontario
Court of Appeal declined to follow the Privy Council
12 6decision in Victoria Pailway Comm. v. Coultas. Their
124. 0-952} A.C.l, c.f. J.N.L. Anderson who feels tnat the 
laws are different Islamic Law m  ^.frica pp.96-7, 340-2.
125. 0-933,3 0-R.112.
126. (lbo7) 13 App. Gas. 222.
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reason was tnat since tne latter case was a New Zealand
appeal it was not binding on the Canadian Courts. An
analogy can oe drawn to the practice of the Scottish Courts
127who feel tnat they are not Dound by the decisions of
the house of Lords on appeals other than those from Scottish
Courts. Thus it was held in Glasgow Corporation v.
Central Land hoard  ^ that a decision of an English appeal
does not override a different, pre-existing rule of Scots
law. Thus the house of Lords decision in Dune an v.
12QCamrnel, Laird & Co. which laid down the rule concerning 
the Court* s discretion as to privileged documents, was 
said not to apply go Scotland, The position is of course, 
different where English law and Scottish law are the same 
on a particular subject. It is submitted that this 
attitude is tne correct one ana should oe adopted by the 
Nigerian Courts in relation to Privy Council decisions on 
areals from other than Nigerian courts.*^
127. Except perhaps pronouncements of ’general jurisprudence*, 
nut c.i. Prof. Walker "Some Characteristics of Scots 
Law" lu M.L.R. 321.
126. (1955) S.L.T. 155; and (1956) S.L.T. 4 1 .
129. 19^2 A.C. 624.
130. As to the position in Ghana, see the discussion on 
judicial precedent in the Guana Court of Appeal, 
infra.
Section 2: JUDICIAL PRECEDENT IN GHANA AND NIGERIA 223
The pros and cons of the binding nature of 
judicial precedent in English law need not detain us here, 
nor are we concerned with a comparative study of the Anglo- 
American and Continental practices on the subject. It 
is enough to say that any workable system of binding judi­
cial precedent depends for its success on three primary 
pre-requisites. These are: an easily ascertainable
hierarchical system of courts; an efficient and fairly 
reliable system of law-reporting, and an independent 
Bar i.e. of legal practitioners. In England, since the 
nineteenth century, these three conditions appear to be 
present. This is exemplified in the often cited dictum 
of Park, J; in Mirehouse v. Rennell,^ that
,fOur common law system consists in the applying to new 
combinations of circumstances those rules of law 
which we derive from legal principles and judicial 
precedents; and for the sake of attaining uniformity, 
consistency and certainty, we must apply these rules, 
where they are not plainly unreasonable and incon­
venient, to all cases which arise; and we are not at 
liberty to reject them, and to abandon all analogy 
to them, in those to which the;y have not yet been 
judicially applied, because we think that the rules 
are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves 
could have devised. It appears to me to be of great 
importance to keep this principle of decision steadily 
in view, not merely for the determination of the par­
ticular cause, but for the interests of law as a 
science.1
1. (1833) 1 C.L. and E.527, at p.546
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This dictum is of course, an elaboration. Blackstonefs
statement that "it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents except when they are contrary to 
2
reason." There have been a number of decisions in 
English Courts since 1883, laying down that the Divisional 
Courts are bound by their previous decisions;^ that the
A
Court of Appeal is bound by its previous decisions, and
that the House of Lords is also bound by its previous
. • 5decisions.
2. 1 Comm. 69.
3. Police Authority for Huddersfield v. Watson (JL9473 K.B. 
F 42I Younghusband v. Luftif p.949"7 2 K.B.354; Moore 
v. Hewitt ( 1947 \ K.B.831; Jeffrey v. Johnson £jL952fJ
2 Q.B. 8. But in Nicholas v. Penny Q.95Q32' K.B.466^ 7 
the Court dissented from it-s previous majority decision 
in Melhuish v. Morris [1958J 4 All E.R.9&.
4 . Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. |jL944)K.B.7l8, affirmed 
but not on the question of precedent in 1946 A.C.163. 
But see A.L. Goodhart, "Precedent in the Court of Appeal 
(1949) Camb. L.8. 349; and G.P. Peter Mason, "Stare 
decisis in the court of Appeal" (1956) 19 M.L.E. 136.
5. London Tramways Co. v. London County Council 1848 
A.C.375. The Lords have, however, related the coercive 
nature of binding precedent in the House. See The 
Times (London), Wednesday 27th July, 1966. The 
announcement was made by Lord Gardner, L.C. on behalf
of the law lords after the resoltuion had been taken by 
the House sitting quasi-judicially.
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Judicial precedent in the Privy Council:
Although the Privy Council is no longer part of
the court structure of either Ghana or Nigeria, yet its
practice with regard to judicial precedent is still of
considerable interest in the two countries for two
reasons. Firstly, the attitude of the Judicial Committee
towards its previous decisions, particularly when such
previous decisions come from a jurisdiction different from
*
that of a case in point, will determine to some extent, 
the attitude of the final courts of appeal in Ghana and 
Nigeria towards such cases. Secondly, since the Privy 
Council was till recently, the last court of appeal for 
the two countries, their practice in precedent matters 
might serve as a guide to the present penultimate courts 
of appeal in both Ghana and Nigeria, particularly in the 
latter territory where there are no statutory provisions 
regulating judicial precedent.
There appears to be an apparent conflict in the 
authorities as to whether or not the Privy Council is 
bound to follow its previous decisions. In Gideon 
Nkambule v. R,^ a Swaziland appeal, the Board declined
6. 1950 379.
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to follow their previous decision on the construction of 
section 231 of the Swaziland Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Proclamation, 1938 (as amended by Proclamation No. 14 of 
1944), and adopted the attitude of the former English court 
of Criminal Appeal. This was stated by Lord Parker in
Q
R. v. Taylor, to be that a Pull Court would, when the 
liberty of the subject was involved, not feel absolutely 
bound by a previous decision, which in its opinion was 
wrong.
But in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Canada
Q
Temperance Pederation, the Board felt bound by its decision 
in Russell v. Reg^ ,  on the ground that the latter decision 
established a principle which was deeply embedded in the 
constitutional law of Canada. This former case has been 
widely relied on by writers as laying down the principle 
that the Board is bound by its previous decisions in con­
stitutional law cases. But the dictum of Viscount Simon 
who jread the judgment of the Board, that
7. Tumahole Bereng v. The King (jr949^ ] A.C.253.
8. G.939J 1 All E.E. 330.
9. (19463 A.C.193.
10.(1882) 7 App.Cas. 829.
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"Their Lordships do not doubt that in tending humble 
advice to His Majesty they are not absolutely bound 
by previous decisions of the Board, as is the House 
of Lords by its own judgments, " H
cannot be said to lend support to any rigid theory of
binding judicial precedent. On the contrary, in the case
12of Mercantile Bank of India v. Central Banh of India,
the Board refused to follow its own previous decision
1*1
in Commonwealth Trust v. Allotey, J a Ghana appeal. An 
attempt to reconcile the decisions in these cases can be 
attempted along the following lines. The Privy Council 
is in principle bound by its previous decisions. The 
fact that the appeals arise from different jurisdictions 
does not affect this principle. But the Board may refuse 
to follow a previous decision, (l) on the principle in 
v Taylor as mentioned above; and/or (2) if the older 
decision is, in the opinion of the Board, no longer good law. 
(having regard to all the circumstances.*^
14. See especially the judgment of the Board in the
Attorney-General for Ontario case at pp.206 et seq. 
c .f . He Transferred Civil Servants (Ireland compensa­
tion  ^ /19297 A.C.242, where it was stated that "to 
suggest that ... this Board is constrained blindfold 
to adhere to a decision based on a material error in 
fact, appears to be repugnant to good sense, and to 
attribute to the Board, as a court of final resort, 
an impotence which would be deplorable11, at pp.252 
et seq.
11. At p.206.
12. (JL93§3 A.C.287.
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15Judicial precedent? m  Ghana:
As has already been shown in another sub-section, 
that the essential requirements of any workable system of 
binding judicial precedent are a unified hierarchical 
arrangement of courts, a reliable and regular system of 
law-reporting, and an independent Bar (which includes the 
Bench). As far as the first requirement goes, the Courts 
Act, I960, established in Ghana, a kind of judicial 
pyramid with the Local Courts at the base and the Supreme 
Court at the apex. The present position, however, is that 
contained in the recent Courts Decree of the National 
Liberation Council. This decree establishes a Supreme 
Court of Judicature, consisting of the Court of Appeal 
and the High Courts (these constitute the Superior Courts
l f i
of Ghana), and the Circuit and District Courts.
The Local Courts which were established under Section 92
17of the Courts Act, I960, have been abolished and it appears '
15. See S.K.B. Asante, "Stare decisis in the Supreme Court 
of Ghana" (1964), Universityof Gh. L.J. 52; A.N. Allott, 
Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa, (London, Butter- 
worths, 1962) pp.21 et seq.
16. Para. 32 of the Courts Decree, 1966.
17. Para 87 (3) of the Courts Decree provides as follows 
"Every case pending before a Local Court immediately 
before the commencement of this Decree shall be continued 
and concluded by a District Court having jurisdiction over 
the area in which such Local Court was situated." Since 
no other provisions were made in the decree in respect of 
the jurisdiction of Local Courts, it is arguable that 
cases that were started in the Local Courts before the 
promulgation of the decree, will henceforth be started
in the district Courts.
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that their jurisdiction has been transferred to the
District Courts.
Appeals from District Courts in civil and criminal
18matters lie to the High Court. Above the District
19Courts are the Circuit Courts,  ^which could be described 
as a strange hybrid of the English Quarter Sessions, the 
County Courts, and a bit of the English High Court juris­
diction in civil matters where the amount involved does
not exceed f! 4,800 (i.e. £2,000). Then there is the 
20High Court whose jurisdiction and powers are similar to 
those of a Divisional Court in England, and to which 
appeals lie in criminal matters from the District Courts, 
and in civil matters from the Circuit Courts. The
21Court of appeal is at the apex of the judicial system.
The second requirement is law-reporting. It 
is of course, essential that a judgment which is being 
cited and relied upon as an authority should be available 
to both the Bench and the profession. Unfortunately,
the history of law reporting in Ghana as in other parts 
of Africa has not been at all encouraging. This of
18. Para. 61 of the Courts Decree, 1966.
19. Paras. 32 and 33 of the Courts Decree, 1966.
20. Para. 26.
21. Para. 2.
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course explains, though it does not justify, the all too 
ready reliance on the handy reports of English Courts.
The first reports in Ghana, those of John Mensah Sarbah 
appeared in 1 8 9 6, twenty years after the enactment of the 
first Supreme Court Ordinance in 1876. Even these were 
essentially on Fanti Customary Law. The Fanti Law Reports 
followed in 1906 edited also by Sarbah. Between 1907 
and 1919> law reporting was in its doldrums. There were 
however sporadic attempts by both the Bench and the Bar 
as evidenced in the two volumes of Rennets Reports and 
those of Earnshaw in 1910. In 1920 there was instituted 
a kind of official reports of the Divisional and Full 
Courts which slowly ground to a half ih 1937* The 
establishment of the West African Courts of Appeal started 
a new series, usually called the V/.A.C.A. reports. These, 
like its predecessors were most irregular. Ten years 
elapsed between the publication of 11 W.A.C.A. in 1946 and the 
publication in 1956 of 12, 13 and 14 W.A.C.A! Volume 15 
appeared in 1957.
The years 1956 and 1957 Baw a new series called the 
West African Law Reports which ceased to exist after the 
publication of the first three volumes. Since 1959 
there has been the Ghana Law Reports organised by the 
General Legal Council which was established by the Legal
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Practitioners’ Act, 1958. But in spite of its ambitious 
take-off (three volumes were published in 1959) the 
1961 cases are yet to be published. But the reports 
of the decisions of English Courts are always available 
and are freely cited. We discuss their authority in 
another place. It remains to add that on the third 
requirement, the Bench and Bar in Ghana are as independent 
as they could be in spite of heavy knocks from the execu­
tive in 1963.
We shall proceed to examining whic decisions bind
which courts in Ghana. It needs hardly be argued that
Ghana inherited the common law tradition of judicial pre-
22cedent as laid down in Blacxstone’s Commentaries and 
by Parke J. in Mirehouse v. Rennell to which reference 
has already been made. The common practice has always 
been that courts which are lower in the judicial hierarchy 
consider themselves bound by the decisions of courts 
higher in the judicial pyramid. Thus the Local Courts, 
the District and Circuit Courts will consider themselves 
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. It appears, 
however, that the opinions of a Superior Customary Court 
on a question of customary law will be accorded high
22. 1 Comm. 69.
23. (1833) 1 CL & P.527, at p.546.
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persuasive force in the Supreme Court, as shown in this
pointed dictum of the G-hana Court of Appeal (as it then
x 24was) in Anane v. Mensah, that
“Native Customary law is peculiarly within the know­
ledge of the Native Courts, and the opinion of a 
superior native court on native custom must be 
preferred to the opinion of an infaior native court, 
unless it is either contrary to a decision of the 
Supreme Court or the Privy Council on the point.”
The handicap in this regard is that cases decided in the
Customary Courts, except those that go on appeal to the
Superior Courts are not reported. This is equally true
of the District Courts. The decision of one Circuit
judge will not be binding on another circuit judge
although the latter will be reluctant to depart from the
principle laid down in such previous decisions.
The High Court:
The position in the High Court is a bit more
complete. Under paragraph 2 (3) of the Courts Decree,
1966, the High Court is bound to follow the previous
decisions of the Court of Appeal, although it is not bound
by the decisions of any other court on questions of the law
the provision is, however, silent on the question as to
whether or not the High Court of G-hana is bound by its own
24* (1959) G.L.R. 50, at p.53. This question is now 
purely academic in view of the Courts Decree, 1966.
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previous decisions. This question has also been posed
by the learned editors of the G-hana Current Cases, under
the heading of "Stare decisis, what binds whom?1
Now, section 89 (3) of the Courts Act, I960, which Act
25repealed the former Courts Ordinances, ' made savings
P £
for pre-1960 practice and procedure. Although para-
27graph 86 of the Courts Decree, 1966 empowers the Rules
Committee established under that paragraph to make
rules regulating practice and procedure, the position is
still the same as it was under the Courts Act, I960,
which was repealed by the Courts Decree, since no such
rules have been made. It could therefore be argued that
the practice and procedure of the English High Court of
Justice still covers the position in Ghana. This
2 8position was re-stated in Osborn v. Rowlett, that
25. 58, 15 and 84.
26. This practice and procedure was that of the High Court 
of justice in England.
27. N.L.C.D. No. 84 of 23rd September, 1966.
28. (1879-90) 13, Ch.D.774. See particularly p.7 8 4. See 
also R. v. Benyon, 41 Or. App.R.123 at p.128, where a 
High Court judge on Circuit declined to follow a decision 
of another judge of the High Court in a Criminal patter, 
which had been given also on circuit four years previously 
In Forster v. Baker p-910j| 2 K.B.636 at p.638, a judge of 
the Xing’s Bench Division refused to follow a previous 
decision of another judge of the King’s Bench Division: 
Skipper & Tucker v. Holloway (j.910]f 2 K.B. 630. See
the Ghana case of Sasraku v. David (1959) G.L.R.7.
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•while a High Court judge will always follow a decision 
of another judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction, he is not 
bound by it and if,after careful consideration, he comes to 
the conclusion that he does not agree with it, it would be 
his duty to depart from it.' It is submitted that the 
High Court in Ghana is not absolutely bound by its 
previous decisions made in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, decisions made in the 
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, i.e. on appeals from 
the Local, District and Circuit Courts, should be binding 
unless such decisions were made in ignorance of a Statutory 
provision, a decision of the Ghana Supreme Court or any 
of its predecessors in functions, or inconsistent with an 
earlier decision of the High Court which was binding.
It appears that the principle enunciated by Brown C.J. in
pq
the Northern Nigerian case of 01 o way in v. Attorney-General.  ^
that the High Court is bound by its previous decision given 
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, is equally 
applicable in Ghana. This is because Section 35 ofthe 
Northern Nigeria High Court law is in the same terms as 
Sections 15 and 84 of the Ghana Supreme Court Ordinance 
(Cap.4 of 1951) It Has already been shown that those
29. (I960) N.R.N.L.R.53.
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provisions of the Supreme Court Ordinance were retained 
under Section 89 (3) of the Courts Act, I960, and that 
the later provisions are still in force, although they 
could he altered under paragraph 86 of the Courts Decree, 
1966.
Precedent in the Court of Appeal:
Paragraph 2 (3) of the Courts Decree, 1966, provides 
as follows:
"The Court of Appeal shall he hound in principle to 
follow its own previous decisions on questions of 
law and the High Court shall he hound to follow 
the previous decisions of the Court of Appeal, but 
neither Court shall he otherwise hound to follow 
the previous decisions of any Court on questions 
of law.*1
This provision which is a re-enactment of Article 42 (2) 
of the G-hana Republican Constitution, has been the subject 
of some controversy recently. The sitting targets of this 
powder and shot have been (l) the the meaning and sig­
nificance aflthe words 1 in principle1 for purposes of 
coercive judicial precedent; and (2) the meaning and 
content of the phrase "its previous decisions". Bennion^ 
has argued that
30. Bennion, Constitutional law of Ghana (London, 1962).
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"Article 42 (2) is intended to provide a suitable com­
bination of certainty and flexibility in the enun­
ciation and development of legal principles. Once 
the Supreme Court, as the highest court available to 
Ghanaians, has delivered itself of a proposition of 
law relevant to its decision in a particular case, 
that proposition is binding without modification in 
the High Court and the inferior Courts. It is also 
binding in principle in the Supreme Court itself, 
but the use in this occasion of the expression ’in 
principle' is intended to indicate that the Supreme 
Court may in a particular case depart from its own 
previous decision if it considers that the decision 
was given per incuriam or should for any other 
exceptional reason not be followed.”31
In accepting the learned author’s explanation of the meaning
of the phrase ' m  principle', AsanteJ has suggested that
"exceptional reason" should include situations where the
previous decision was wrong,^ or where in the fullness of
experience the decision proved 'no longer responsive to
the needs of the society'. Asante has further argued
that since there is a constitutional provision for judicial
review of legislation in Ghana, a rigid adherence to
precedent would have the undesirable effect of depriving
31. Op.cit. p.173* It is interesting to note the similarity 
of approach between the current House of Lords practice 
on the subject on the one hand, and Bennion's 
explanation of the position in the Supreme Court of 
Ghana, on the other.
32. S.K.B. Asante, "Stare decisis in the Supreme Court of 
Ghana" (1 9 6 4) 1 University of Ghana Law Journal, at 
p. 63.
33* Perhaps this means wrong in law. If so, then it is 
sufficiently covered under Bennion's "per incuriam" 
exception.
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the Supreme Court, in constitutional cases, of the power 
to change its mind about the meaning of an entrenched 
clause. This would leave the clauses more rigid than they 
need be. He bemoaned the ineptitude of resorting to 
constitutional amendment which in some cases require a 
referendum. In a very informative survey the learned 
author reviewed the practice in six Commonwealth and ex- 
Commonwealth countries, bringing in the United States practice 
for good measure. The conclusion he came to was that 
apart from England and Malaysia, no other common law 
country still kept any doctrine of coercive judicial 
precedent in her final court of appeal. He concluded that 
this explains the insertion of the phrase ’in principle* 
in the Ghana Supreme Court provision and that it meant 
no more than that the Court was at liberty to depart from 
a previous decision "when considerations of good policy 
so demand."
In this he is at one with Daniels.^
The contrary view has however, been put forward by
Mr. Justice Ollennu.  ^ He maintains that the Supreme
Court is bound by its previous decisions. The learned
judge’s evidence for this startling proposition will be
examined in the next section.
34. Common Law in West Africa  ^ pp- \%Z dt 
35* Supra.
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As to the meaning and content of previous 
decisions*, Professor "‘Harvey in his inaugural lecture at 
the University of G-hana posed these questions:
1 If only the decisions of the Supreme Court are in 
future to he binding, what is the 'Supreme Court' 
for this purpose? Is the Court as constituted under 
the Republican Constitution to be deemed to be a 
new court, so that only Republican decisions are 
fully authoritative? Or is a theory of antecedent 
and continuing existence to be applied?"
In an attempt to answer the above queries, Mr. Justice
Ollennu has had this to say:*^
"We may ask: is the term 'previous decisions of the
Supreme Court* to be limited strictly to decisions 
of that Court given after July 1, I960, the date the 
Constitution and the Court3 Act, I960, C.A.9 came 
into effect? In other words, is it only a decision 
of the Supreme Court as established in I960 which 
should be authoritative precedent, and all decisions 
of any other court whatsoever, be only persuasive? To 
answer that question we have to bear in mind that 
the Court's act consolidated and reproduced in sub­
stance the essential features of the Courts Ordinance, 
Cap. 4, and the Court of Appeal Ordinance 1957, which 
itself reproduced the West African Court of Appeal 
Ordinance, Cap. 5; further that by creating the 
Supreme Court a final Court of Appeal, and the simul­
taneous repeal by the Constitution (Consequential 
Provisions; Act, I960, C.A.8, of the Judicial Committee 
Act, 1833, and the revocation of the West African 
Court of Appeal Orders in Council, 1948-1957, and the 
Ghana (Appeal to Privy Council) Order in Council 1957 
(L .N.215), the Supreme Court as established under the 
Constitution stepped into the shoes of and assumed the 
jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeal - the West 
African Court of Appeal and the Privy Council in so far 
as it affected Ghana and no more. That being the case,
35* Speech to Sarbah Society, Supra.
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it is respectfully submitted that the authoritative 
decisions which, under Article 42, Section 4 of the 
Constitution, both the Supreme Court and the High 
Court are bound to follow, comprise and include deci­
sions of the Privy Council in Ghanaian cases given 
prior to I960, those made by the Privy Council under 
and by virtue of Section 16 of the Constitution 
(Consequential Provisions) Act, I960, C..A.8, and it 
also includes decisions of the Court of Appeal, of the 
West African Court of Appeal, as well as decisions 
of the Pormer Pull Court."
It must be recognised, however, that it is one 
thing to contend that the Ghana Supreme Court is absolutely 
bound by its previous decisions, and quite another to 
delimit the scope and content of these previous decisions. 
Thus, even if we accept the learned judge’s contention 
about the meaning of ''previous decisions", it could still 
be validly argued that all these decisions are binding in 
principle only, and the court may decline to follow any 
decision of any of its predecessors in functions if in 
its opinion the said decision no longer represents the law
“3  C
on any particular matter. Neither the Privy CouncilJ
37nor the West African Court of Appeal'" was absolutely 
bound by its previous decisions on points of law. In the
36. It had amply been demonstrated above that this Board 
is not absolutely bound by its previous decisions: 
Mercantile Bank of India v. Central Bank of India 
ltl93«J A.C.287.
37. Re Herbert Macaulay (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 204.
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Nigerian case of Re Macaulay, Re Adadevoh the West African 
Court of Appeal refused to follow its earlier decision in 
re W i l l i a m s The latter decision had held that as against 
a child of a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance, the 
issue of a valid customary carriage had no share in the 
fatherfs property on his death intestate. In refusing to
be bound by this earlier decision, Verity C.J. who read 
the judgment of the Court said:
"I am fully alive to the fact that grave inconvenience 
may arise from a judgment of this court in such a 
matter which reverses a view of the law which has 
been held for Upwards of ten years, but when the 
court is faced with the alternative of perpetuating 
what it is satisfied is an erroneous decision which 
was reached per incuriam and will, if it be 
followed, inflict hardship and injustice upon genera­
tions in the future or of causing temporary dis­
turbance or rights acquired under such a decision,
I do not think we should hesitate to declare the 
law as we find it.M39
In declaring the law as they found it their
lordships refused to be bound by the Somefun decision.^
4-1Also m  Osumanu v. Amadu, the West African Court of
4.2
Appeal declined to be bound by Dompreyi v Marfo.
38. S^W^.C.A. 156.
39. Op.cit. at p.310.
40. Supra. See also Bambbose v. paniel (1952) 14, W.A.C.A.Ill
41. (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 437.
42. (1948) 12, W.A.C.A. 349.
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It was stated that the court was in principle hound by 
its previous decisions. Some exceptions wer e there 
laid down as follows:
"(1) The Court is entitled and bound to decide which of 
two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow.
% (2) The Court is bound to refuse to follow a decision 
of its own which, though not expressly overruled, 
cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or the 
House of Lords.
(3) The Court is not bound to follow a decision of 
its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given 
per incuriam."
As to the practice of the former Pull Court and the
former Court of Appeal in G-hana, there does not appear to
be any authority for saying that they were absolutely bound
43by their previous decisions.
It is cold comfort to draw analogies to the practice
in the House of Lords as laid down in London Tramways Co.
44v. London County Council. There has been m  recent
45years a growing volume of protest to the rigidity of 
precedent in the House as a result of that decision. The
43* But analogies from Nigeria may suggest that these courts 
followed the W.A.C.A. practice in this matter: Pione
v. Oladipo (1934) 11* N.L.R. 168; Maizabo v. Sokoto N.A. 
(1957) N.E.N.L.R.' 133.
44. (1898) A.C.373. (31) Lord Wright (1943) 8 Camb. L.J.
144; Williams, Salmond, Jurisprudence (11th Ed.); 
Denning, from President to Precedent (1959). 
45.. (1960} A.C.459 at p.4 8 9.
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recent observation of Lord Denning in Ostime v. Australian
4.6Mutual Provident Society, that
"The doctrine of precedent does not compel your 
Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall 
over the edge of the cliff. As soon as you 
fi$.d you are going in the wrong direction, you must 
at least be permitted to strike off in the right 
direction, even if you are not allowed to retreat your 
steps",
characterises the general attitude against coercive pre­
cedent inthe House of Lords. Professor G-oodhart has 
also recently said hard things against this practice in the
House. ^  Mr. Justice Ollennu's position, therefore, is 
necessarily a difficult one to justify except one is com­
pelled to do so by the express words of the Constitution.
If the framers of the Constitution wanted the Supreme
Court to be absolutely bound, they would have said so. As
4.8
has been aply stated in the Halsbury's Laws of England,
"It may be presumed: $1) that words are not used in 
a statute without a meaning and so effect must be 
given, if possible, to all the words used, for the 
legislature is deemed not to waste its words or say 
anything in vain,"
46. (l96q5 A.C.459 at p.469.
47. (1963) 79> l.Q.R. 313. Ihe binding nature of judicial 
procedure in the House of Lords has, however, been 
related, as has already been mentioned. That court
is no longer strictly bound by its former decisions 
on points of law, where, in its opinion, the previous 
decision was wrong. See the Times, Wednesday, 27th 
July, 1966.
4 8 . 2nd Edition, Vol. 21 pp.501-2.
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the use of the phrase "in principle" was therefore intended
to empower the Supreme Court to depart from a previous
decision under the circumstances discussed above.
As to whether the Supreme Court created under
Article 41 (1) of the Ghana Constitution was an entirely
new court or only succeeded to the assets and liabilities
of the former court of appeal, Dr. Daniels has adumbrated
the view that it was a new Court. He refers to the Speech^
of Sir Arku Kersah, the then Chief Justice, made on the
4th July, 19^0, which suggested that the Court so
created was a new Court and the judges were the first
judges of the Republic of Ghana. Dr. Daniels further
draws a striking parallel to the position in Ireland as
50laid down in the Irish case of Exham v Beamish  ^ that the 
High Court established under the Irish Constitution was 
a new Court.
As has already been shown, this question i s 
only collateral to the issue of binding precedent in the 
Supreme Court. It is, however, vital as far as precedent 
in the High Court and the Lower Courts go, to know which 
decisions are binding on them.
49. Speech made at the Swearing-in of the Judges.
50. (1939) I.R.336; Cited by Dr. Daniels, op.cit. See 
also Prof. Henchy. 25 M.L.R.544.
Daniels’ contention amounts to this that the Supreme
Couht in Ghana has no predecessor. Only the decisions
that were made after 1st July, I960, by the said Supreme
Court are binding on the Court itself and on the lower
courts. Now, how descriptive of the true position is this
51suggestion? Bennion, one of the draftsmen of the 
Ghana Republican Constitution and allied enactments, has 
explained that the provisions of the former Courts Or­
dinance Cap. 4 (1951) t and the other enactments that 
regulated the Courts ill Ghana had been so dismembered by 
suggested amendments that it became necessary to enact a 
new and comprehensive Courts Act, similar in scope to the 
English Judicature Acts 1C73-5 and 1925> to replace the 
various enactments. This new Act was the Courts Act, I960. 
Under it the Supreme Court became the final Court of Appeal, 
appeals to the Privy Council having been abolished. The 
various divisions of the High Court were unified in a new 
High Court, the Circuit and District Courts replaced the 
former Assizes and Chief Magistrate Courts.
The Local Courts were retained with certain juris­
dictional amendments. It is astonishing in the extreme to 
read anything strikingly novel in this structure. Bennion
51. Constitutional Law of Ghana, p.173 et seq.
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went further to explain that the consequences of clearing
the old judicial authority were thought to be so far-
reaching (it might for instance deter investors if the law
became uncertain), that it was thought wiser to introduce
an element of flexibility in the Supreme Court practice.
It is therefore submitted with respect that Mr. Justice
Ollennu's view about the scope of the 'previous decisions'
52of the Supreme Court, is the better one.
Judicial Precedent in Nigeria:
It will not be necessary here to go over the same 
arguments as we had been in the case of Ghana as to whether 
or not Nigeria received the English doctrine of binding 
judicial precedent. We had sufficiently demonstrated that 
this aspect of the English common law is part of the 
received law of Ghana and this is equally true of Nigeria. 
The next important consideration is to investigate how 
judicial precedent has been applied in the Nigerian 
Courts. As in the case of Ghana we shall begin by looking 
at the history of law reporting in Nigeria and the structure 
of the courts.
52. Ollennu's argument is e^ally valid for the practice in 
the Court of Appeal established under the Courts 
Decree, 1966.
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Like in many other West African countries, law 
Reporting in Nigeria has been a ricketty structure. We 
must be quick to point out, however, that this sombre 
picture has been promptly improved by the timely emer­
gence of the recent Nigerian Monthly Law Reports and the 
All-Nigeria law Reports. More will be said about these 
later.
J.A. Qtunba-Payrie1 s Lagos Almanack (1875-1894) 
could bn said to be the first attempt at any kind of law 
reporting in Nigeria. Here the first Nigerian Registrar 
of the Court in Lagos compiled among other things, some 
reports of what he considered to be important decisions 
of the courts in the Colony of Lagos up to 1894. These 
reports were the learned Registrar’s summaries of such 
cases. Mention has already been made in another place 
of P.A. Renner’s Reports and H.W.H. Redwar’s Comments on 
some Ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony. We may add 
that these works are also relevant for a study of case 
law in Nigeria since the G-old Coast and Lagos Colonies 
were jointly administered between 1874 and 1884. It 
must also be added that the above attempts were neither 
official or quasi-official efforts to keep records of 
decided cases.
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Two curious instances of official law reporting 
can be found in the Old Record Book entitled: ’Lagos:
Reports of Certain Judgments of the Supreme Court, Vice- 
Admiralty Court and Full Court of Appeal (1884-1892)’ - 
Law Reports (Colonial), Nigeria-A; and the ’Trade Mark: 
Judgments' (1901-28) • The judgments contained in each 
of these compilations related exclusively to the geographi­
cal area of the former Lagos Colony,
It was not until 1916 that the Judicial Department 
initiated a series of official law Reports, the Nigerian 
Law Reports, These run to twenty-one volumes, the last 
of which included cases decided in 1963• We must hasten to 
add that the standard of reporting could be considerably 
higher. J Between 1933 and 1955 there were the West 
African Court of Appeal Reports, These included decisions 
on appeals from Nigeria, The Nigerian judiciary was 
regionalised in 1954 and each of the former three regions 
had its own law reports. There w§re also the Lagos High 
Court Reports and the Supreme Court Reports. In 1961 
the Incorporated Council for law Reporting, a semi-official
53. Perhaps, the sketchy nature of most of the reports 
follow from the brief judgments of the bench. It 
may however have been more helpful if the arguments 
of Counsel were included.
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body was formed by the Federal Government of Nigeria under 
the chairmanship of the Federal Attorney-General, Dr. T.O. 
Elias and since 1962 there have been the All Nigeria Law 
Reports. It is a matter of profound regret that this 
initially hopeful venture has so far produced only three 
numbers, the 1961, 1962 and 1963 volumes and even these 
comprise mainly Supreme Court Judgments. It goes to its 
credit however, that the standard of reporting is 
reasonably high and the indexing is very helpful.
In 1964* & group of private legal practitioners 
in Ibadan, Nigeria, inaugurated the new and most up to 
date series of reports in Nigeria. These are the Nigerian 
Monthly Law Reports.
We shall next be looking at the structure of the 
Courts in Nigeria. The Supreme Court established under 
Section III of the Republican Constitution is at the apex
of the country's judicial pyramid. In each of the Regions
54and Lagos^ there is a High Court with both original and 
appellate jurisdiction. Appeals lie from the High Courts 
to the Supreme Court. In all the Regions except the 
Northern Region there are Magistrate Courts with limited 
54* SS.122 and 126 of the Republican Constitution.
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. . 55civil and criminal jurisdiction. The Customary Courts^
in the Eastern, Mid-Western and Western Regions are at
56the base of the judicial system. Appeals lie from
the Customary Courts to the Magistrates or High Courts.
The position in Northern Nigeria is more com-
57plicated. The Native Courts are at the base of the 
judicial pyramid and there are five grades of native 
courts, namely, A, A-limited, B, C and D. Appeals from 
the A and A-limited native courts go to the High Court. 
But if the applicable law is Islamic law, appeals from 
these courts go to the Sharia Court of Appeal. In cases
55* In the Eastern Region these are divided into District 
Courts and County Courts. The County Courts are 
Customary Appeal Courts; Eastern Region Customary 
Courts Law. In the Western and Mid-Western Regions 
there are three grades of Customary Courts. The judges 
for the Grade A Customary Courts are Legal practitioners 
of at least seven years standing. C.f. A decree of 
the Military Government in Nigeria (extra-Ordinary 
Gazette, Western Nigeria, January 26th, 1966) has 
abolished the Customary Courts in the Western Region.
It is not yet clear whether this is intended as a 
temporary measure to insulate the customary courts 
from political control or necessarily increases the 
original jurisdiction of the Magistrate Coutts.
56. See Allott, Judicial and Legal Systems, pp.50 et seq.
57* Northern Nigeria Native Courts Law, Cap.78. See 
also E.A. Keay and S.S. Richardson, The Native and 
Customary Courts of Nigeria, (London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 1966)•
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of any doubt as to the law applicable, the case goes to
the Court of Resolution whose decision on questions of
jurisdiction are binding on the High Court. Appeals from
grades B, C and D native courts go to the Provincial
Courts and thence to the High Court or the Sharia Court of
Appeal. There are Magistrates Courts but their juris-
58diction is limited to criminal matters, their civil
counter-parts are the District Courts* Appeals from the
District and Magistrates Courts go to the High Court. One
5Q
cannot help a feeling of dismay at this complex arrangement. 
The special position of Islamic law in the region is 
obviously a very limited explanation. It is quite possible 
to have a simpler system of courts without derogating from 
the application of Islamic law in appropriate cases.
Before examining which decisions bind which courts 
in Nigeria we must hasten to add that there is an independent 
Bench and Bar in Nigeria. This as we noted aoove is one 
of the pre-requisites of a workable system of judicial 
precedent.
5 8 . Northern Nigeria Criminal Procedure Code Law, No. 11 
of I960.
59. In a broadcast made by the Military Governor of 
Northern Nigeria on 11th February, 1966 it was stated 
that the N.A. courts would be merged with the judiciary.
As the N.A. Courts were considered as part of the 
judicial system even before the broadcast, it is not 
clear what changes are intended.
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As to whether or not the customary or native 
courts are bound by their previous decisions, there is 
no direct statutory or judicial authority either way. 
but as Allen has aptly pointed out,^
"No intelligent system would so crudely paralyse the 
indispensable instruments of analogy and parity 
of reasoning. Hence in ail systems some degree of 
judicial uniformity is certain to exist and even to 
be applauded."
It is therefore likely that the customary courts 
will follow their decisions in previous cases where this 
is reasonable. Ulid observation in Yerenchi v. Akufo, ^  
a Ghana case, that "Native custom generally consists of 
the performance of the reasonable in the special circum­
stances of the case", appears to indicate that customary 
or native courts are not absolutely bound by their 
previous decisions. More willbe said in another place 
about this observation of the former Chief Justice of 
the Gold Coast. It must be pointed out however, that the 
fact that the decisions of the Customary Courts are not 
reported except those thai; go on appeal to the Superior 
Courts, will make a rigid adherence to precedent impracticable.
60. Law in the making (7th ed.) p.161.
61. Ren. 362 at p.367* Per William Brandford Griffith,
C.J.
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The same is true of Magistrates Courts but where as in 
Bentworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd* v. Akinboro & another, 
a Magistrates* Court decision lays an important legal 
principle it has high persuasive force. Both customary 
and Magistrates' Courts are bound by the decisions of the 
High Court.
Precedent in the High Courts of Nigeria has not 
yet been neatly covered by authority. It is of course 
clear that the High Court is bound by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and its successors. In Fago.ji v. Kano Native 
Authority^  where the High Court of Northern Nigeria 
refused to follow the decision of the former Y/est African
6 A
Court of Appeal in G-ana v. Bornu Native Authority, the
Pederal Supreme Court of Nigeria as it then was, had this
6 5to say m  a subsequent case:
"There is no precedent for their (the High Court's) 
refusing to followa previous decision of the West 
African Court of Appeal on the subject matter of the 
enquiry because they considered that the decision
had been reached per incuriam With respect to
the learned Chief Justice and other members of the 
court, it must be pointed out that it is not for an 
inferior court to say that a decision of the higher
62. B49/100, Suit No. 640/63. Lagos, No. 2Court, Saturday, 
6th day of July, 1963; a hire purchase case.
63. (1957) N.R.N.L.R.57•
64. 14 W.A.C.A. 587.
6 5 . Jalo Tsamiua v. Sauchi N.A. (1957) N.R.N.L.R.73 
at pp.S2-S3.
253
court was reached per incuriam; that is a privilege 
of the Higher Court after reconsidering its former 
decision, it is satisfied that the previous decision 
had been reached per incuriam. When the High Court 
found itself in such a position that it could not follow 
a previous decision of a higher court by which, accor­
ding to the comity of courts, they are bound, the 
proper course, it appears was for the High Court to 
have reserved question of Law under Section 20 of 
the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Act (this has 
been repealed), for the consideration of the Federal 
Supreme Court, in order to give that court which 
has taken the place of the West African Court of 
Appeal the opportunity of reconsidering the previous 
decision in the light of the question reserved with 
a view to giving a considered ruling on the ques­
tion of law involved.1*
This attitude of the Supreme Court has been criti- 
cised by a learned author on two grounds, the first of 
which is that the Northern Region High Court law has no 
provision for reservation of points of law in criminal cases. 
As a result the only course open to the accused would be 
by way of appeal and this can be an expensive business. 
Secondly, that if the High Court is free to choose one of 
two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court or any of 
its predecessors, it follows that the High Court could also 
choose to comply with a statutory provision in preference 
to the decision of the Supreme Court where such Supreme 
Court sdecision was made in ignorance of the statute.
66. Nwabueze, Machinery of Justice, p.34 et seq.
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have no reservation provisions in criminal cases, does not 
make it less so* The appropriate remedy will lie in 
amending such High Court Laws to include reservation 
provisions*
The next important consideration is whether or not
the High Court is bound by its previous decisions, and
whether the decisions of the High Court in one Region binds
the High Courts of the other regions including the
deciding court. As we have noted earlier, the High Courts
in Nigeria have both original and appellate jurisdiction.
The decision of Brown, C.J. in the Nortnern Nigeria case
68of Olawoyin v* Attorney-General of Northern Region 
has often’ been cited as authority for two propositions.
The first is that the High Court is not bound by the deci­
sion of a judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction sitting at 
first instance. In his judgment the learned Chief Justice 
after reviewing the authorities had this to say:
"It would therefore appear to be clear that while a 
judge sitting at first instance will accord great 
weight to a previous decision of a judge of co­
ordinate jurisdiction and will only depart from it 
with reluctance and after the most careful considera­
tion, he commits no breach of principle if he does - 
for he is not bound by it."°9
68. (I960) N.R.N.L.R.53. See also Agbalaya v. Bell (1960)L.L.R.
19069. Supra at p. 58. See also ?lione v Oladino  ^
(1934) 11, N.L.B.168.
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The second proposition is that the High Court in
Nigeria has the same powers as the English Divisional
Court, if and when it exercises its appellate jurisdiction.
Since the Divisional Court in England is bound by its
70previous decisions, it follows that the High Court
sitting as an appellate Court, is also bound by its previous
decisions. In course of his judgment in the Olawoyin case
71the learned Chief Justice said in this connection:
"•...I would refer to the judgment of Lord Goddard 
in Nicholas v. Penny' ^  at the top of p.473* Nicholas 
v. Penny applied the principles set out in Young v 
Bristol Aeroplane Company Ltd.?3 to a Divisional 
Court. This seems to me to be important because 
in this Region (Northern Nigeria) the High Court 
sitting in its appellate jurisdiction is, in my 
opinion, analogous to a Divisional Court in 
England.n
It is important to note that the Olawoyin case was affirmed
74on appeal to the Supreme Court, although the said Supreme 
Court maintained discreet silence on the issue of precedent 
as expounded by Brown C.J.
70. Police Authority for Huddersfield v. Watson 
K.B.S42.
71. Supra p.58.
72. d95Q] 2 K.B.466.
73. &944J K.B.718.
74. (W6l) 1 All N.L.R.245.
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7*5Park has argued that the rule in Olawoyin1 s case
can only be valid for the Northern Region since in its
appellate jurisdiction the Northern High Court has a bench
of at least two judges. In the other regions a single judge
could exercise appellate jurisdiction. Another reason
for this restriction is the fact that there are no sections
in the High Court laws of the other regions corresponding
to Section 35 of the Northern Nigeria High Court Law.
The said Section 35 empowers the Northern Nigeria High Court
to adopt English practice and procedure in civil cases.
The learned author further restricts the application of
the rule in Olawoyin*s case to civil causes and matters.
One of his grounds for this is that Young's case on which
Brown C.J. based his analogy, was decided by the English
Court of Appeal which court has no criminal jurisdiction.
7 £5
His other ground is that in Pago ji v. Kano NVA. the
Northern High Court refused to follow its previous ruling
77m  Jalo Tsamiua v. Bauchi N.A. both decisions being on 
criminal matters. The learned author concluded from these 
with approval that in criminal cases the Northern High 
Court even in its appellate jurisdiction is not bound by
75. Sources, pp.57 et seq.
76. (1957) N.R.N.L.R.57.
77. Unreported decision of the Northern Nigeria High Court, 
Kaduna, 28th -May, 1956.
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its previous decisions. Park finally suggests that the 
decisions of the High Court of a region are only of per­
suasive authority in another region but not binding. The 
fact that a particular decision was made by a High Court 
sitting in its appellate jurisdiction will enhance its 
persuasive force and no more.
Now, Park’s reasons for restricting the application 
of the rule in Olawoyin*s case are not at all convincing. 
Having conceded that English practice and procedure was 
introduced into Nigeria as part of the received common 
law, it is strange that the learned author still read so 
much meaning into the absence of provisions for practice 
and procedure in the High Court laws of the other regions.
As to his argument about the number of judges that can 
validly exercise appellate jurisdiction in the North, it 
is respectfully submitted that alegal system does not assess 
the importance of a decision only by counting the heads of 
the judges on the particular bench but also by the number 
of occasions on which a particular issue has been considered 
by the Superior Courts. On this latter principle, High 
Court appellate judgments are of equal judicial authority 
irrespective of the number of judges that decided the case.
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It is submitted therefore that the principle in Olawoyin1s 
case should be of general application in all the High
n u
Courts in Nigeria.
Park's authority for restricting the Olawoyin 
principle to civil cases is not a happy one. In Eagoji
7q
v. Kano N.A. the Northern Nigeria High Court sitting 
in its appellate jurisdiction refused to follow its previous
on
decision in Jalo Tsamiya v. Bauchi N.A. because the
U-|
latter decision was given per incuriam. Brown C.J.,
who read the judgment of the Court made it clear that he
followed one of the exceptions to the rule in Young's
case. This is seen in his dictum,
MI think the matter is covered by a passage from the 
judgment of the master of the Rolls in Young v.
Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited....
As we have stated above the principle in Young's case and
the exceptions thereto were applies by the Divisional Court
O
in England in Nicholas v. Penny, ^ and this principle
78. In Agbalaya v. Bello (I960) L.L.R.190 Sir Clement De 
Lestang C.J. says that the High Court is bound by its 
own appellate decisions (Lagos).
79* Supra.
80. Supra.
81. Sub. S.2 of S.40A of the Native Courts Ordinance was not 
considered by the Court.
82. Supra at p.67*
83. (l950j 2 K.B.466.
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was also said to apply in the Northern Nigeria High Court 
sitting as an appellateCourt in the Olawoyin case. Park's 
limitation is therefore neither supported by the facts 
of the Pagoji case nor the practice of the Courts. It 
is submitted that the rule in Olawoyin's case applies to 
civil as well as to criminal causes and matters.
The authority of the decisions of one regional 
High Court in the courts of another region is not so clear. 
Undoubtedly these High Courts are established by different 
regional High Court laws although they all stem from the 
same constitutional authority and have the Supreme Court 
as the common appeal Court. It seems however, that the 
decisions of one regional High Court will be only of
84persuasive authority in another regional High Court.
Judicial Precedent in the Supreme Court of Nigeria:
The Supreme Court established under Section III
of the Republican Constitution is the final Court of appeal
in the country. Its decisions are binding on all the other
84* This aspect of the question will soon be only of 
academic interest in view of the fact that the 
Military Government in Nigeria have set up a 
commission whose terms of reference among other 
things is the integration of the Nigerian judiciary.
260
courts in Nigeria. There have recently been some 
85speculations as to whether or not the Supreme Court is 
bound by its own previous decisions. As was shown in the
(Sit)
case of Ghana, "previous declarations "/include the 
decisions of such other courts as the former Pull Court, 
the West African Court of Appeal (in Nigerian appeals), and 
the former Federal Supreme Court. They also include 
Privy Council decisions on appeals from Nigeria*
Unlike the position in the Ghana Supreme Court, 
there is no constitutional provision for precedent in the 
Nigerian Constitution. It appears therefore that the 
Court can make up its mind whether or not to follow its 
previous decisions. There is authority for the view that 
the Supreme Court will not be rigidly bound by its previous 
decisions where the life of the subject is affected.
o r
Thus in Maizabo v. Sokoto N.A. a homicide appeal from 
Northern Nigeria, the Federal Suprrme Court as it then was, 
was faced with two of its previous declarations in Jalo
Cjrj
Tsamiya v. Bauchi Native Authority, and Fagoji v.
88Kano Native Authority, in which later decisions it had
85. See B.O. Nwaoueze, Machinery, pp.32 et seq.; Park, 
Sources pp.56 et seq; Brettf Stare decisis in Nigeria 
(1965)N.B.J. 75.
86. (1957) 2 P.S.C.13.
87. (1957) N.R.N.L.R.73.
88. (1957) N.R.N.L.R.84.
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been held that the High Court had no powers to substitute 
a verdict of manslaughter for that of murder where the 
accused has been rightly convicted by a native Court under 
Maliki Law even if the sentence could have been manslaughter 
if the defence of provocation had been considered. In 
remitting the Maizabo case back to the Northern High Court
for a retrial, de Lestang, F.J. who read the judgment of the
89Court had this to say: ^
"Having regard, however, to the great importance of 
this matter and in particular since it affects 
the life of a subject, we felt it right to hear 
fresh arguments with a view to reconsidering, if
necessary, the decisions of this court in the two
cases under refernce."
Later in his judgment he stated that the two previous
90decisions were wrong and were not to be followed.
Unfortunately, precedent at the Supreme Court 
has not been a popular topic in the Supreme Court itself.
It is astonishing that apart from the Maizabo case there 
has been no other direct judicial authority on precedent 
at the Court. The Maizabo case laid down that in cases of 
great importance and those in which the life of a subject 
is involved the court could reconsider a previous decision 
of its own.
89. Supra, at p.14.
90. (1849) 7 Hon. 283, at p.470.
2 6 2
A liberal construction of the phrase "cases of great 
importance" could cast the net so wide as to include all
appeals to the Supreme Court. It might be an abuse of the
Court’s process to take pointless cases there. But if the 
Court intended this to be the effect of its dictum, it 
could have said so in so many words. It is respectfully 
submitted that all that the statement means is that as a 
matter of practice the court is bound by its previous 
decisions, but that the principle could be relaxed in
certain cases. One of such cases is where the life of a
subject is involved. We would also add constitutional cases 
and cases where the court is of the opinion that a previous 
decision was patently wrong.
The reason for the includion of constitutional 
cases in the category of ’very important decisions’ stems 
from the fact that Nigeria operates a written constitution 
the amendment procedure to which is very complicated indeed. 
If therefore the courts feel absolutely bound by a previous 
decision in a constitutional case this will have the tendency 
of making the constitution more rigid than it need be.
To prevent this undesirable result the United States 
Supreme Court has adopted the position that they are free 
to overrule a previous decision of theirs if it is necessary, 
considering all the circumstances. Thus in the
91Passenger Case Chief Justice Taney of the United States
Supreme Court said:
"I am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the 
law of this court, that its opinion upon the con­
struction of the constitution is always open to discu­
ssion when it is supposed to have been in error, and 
that its judicial authority should hereafter depend 
altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it 
is supported."
To the same effect is the opinion of Justice Brandeis in
92Burret v. Coronado Oil and Gas Company, where he said:
"Stare decisis is normally the wise policy, because in 
most matters it is more important that the applicable 
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.. 
...This is commonly true even where the error is a 
matter of serious concern, provided correction can be 
had by legislation. But in cases involving the 
Pederal Constitution, where correction through legis­
lative action is practically impossible, this court 
has often overruled its earlier decisions. The 
Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force 
of better reasoning, recognising that the process of 
trial and error! so fruitful in the physical sciences, 
is appropriate also in the judicial function."
9 \Also in Brown v. Board of Education,  ^the United States
Supreme Court overruled its previous decision on the con­
stitutionality of "separate but equal" educational facilities
94for the negro and white Americans. It might be said
that the Brown case reflected the changed social and political
91. (lo49) 7 Hon 283, at p.470.
92. (1932) 285 U.S. 393 at p.406.
93. (1954) 347 U.S.4 8 3.
94. Ci9473 I.E. 205.
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climate of opinion in the United States in the 20th Century.
This of course, is the precise point we want to emphasise,
that the Supreme Court in Nigeria should not be such a
captive to binding judicial precedent as to be oblivious
toch anged social and other conditions in the country.
As to cases other than criminal and constitutional
cases, it is submitted that the Nigerian Supreme Court
should be able to overrule a previous decision which has
been seen to be patently wrong. It is unnecessary for us
to even short-list the factors that can make a previous
decision wrong. Two of such factors must however, be
mentioned. One is where a previous decision of the Court
was made in reliance on an English authority and the
authority is later ovveruled by the English House of Lords.
In such a case, barring any subsequent changes in English
Statutory law on the issue, the Supreme Court should feel
free to overrule its own previous decisions if ifeed be.
This is quite a different thing to say from the position
that in every such case the Supreme Court most overrule
the previous decision. As was a tly pointed out by G-ravan
95Duffy P. in the Irish case os Re Moore,  ^after observing 
that he was not bound by the House of Lords decision os
95. (1947} 1. R.205.
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Q ^
Perrin v. Morgan,
"I know no reason why I should not welcome a breath of 
fresh air from across the channel, particularly 
when it disturbs cobwebs spun in London and dutifully 
preserved with our borrowed collection of relics ...
Stare decisis cannot mean persisting in error after 
the most authoritative judges of a particular pre­
cedent have demonstrated it to be both mischievous 
and misconceived.1
Thus, faced with a similar situation, the Supreme
Court in Nigeria should not feel bound by a previous decision.
Such a situation was very narrowly averted by a House of
07Lords majority decision in Murdock v. Taylor 1 in which
the principle of the right to cross-examining an accused
on his previous criminal record if he testifies as to
character was upheld by t^e House. This decision stamped
the authority of the House of Lords on the Court of
08Criminal Appeal decision of R. v Ellis and Ellis.
00Meanwhile, in 1963, in the case of R^ v. Anyanwu, J the 
Supreme Court had applied the principle as enunciated by 
the Court of Criminal Appeal in L  v Ellis. I f  the 
majority in the House of Lo^ds had rejected the rule, it
96. (19433 A.C.399.
97. 0.965} 2 W.L.R.425.
98. 0.961J 1 W.L.R. 1064
99. (1963) R.S.C. 54/1963
100. Supra.
266
is not unlikely that their reasons for so doing would
receive the careful attention of the Supreme Court in
a subsequent case. It is submitted that the fact that the
Anyanwu case was a criminal one is not a very important
consideration. The same principle is equally applicable
to a civil cause or matter.
The other factor that should influence the Court
in declining to follow a prev ous decision should be one
of the exceptions to the rule in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane
Company Limited.'*'^' This is where a previous decision was
given per incuriam, or as it has often been interpreted,
in ignorance of a relevant statute.
102Allen described this exception as
“opportune in relaxing the bonds of precedent when 
they threaten to stop the circulation of the lawfs 
life-blood",
and it has been advocated that it be extended to the House 
of Lords. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in Nigeria 
could overrule a previous decision of its own when such 
previous decision was made per incuriam.
101. £1944} K.B.718.
102. Law in the making (7th Ed. 1 9 6 4), p.238.
103- We have not found it desirable to repeat our argument 
about judicial precedent in the Old West African 
Court of Appeal and the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. These were sufficiently discussed 
in the section on the Supreme Court of Ghana, Supra.
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PART IV
VALID AGREEIJEWTSz TWO-PARTY SITUATIONS
2 6 8
SECTION A 
The Nature of Agreement
The term •'agreement'1 can be used to express three 
kinds of situations, namely:
1. The acts which create the relationship between 
the parties. It is used in this sense when B 
’agrees1 to purchase a consignment of goods 
offered by A at a given price. Here A and B 
are said to be in ’agreement’.
2. A writing which if not itself such an act, is 
the evidence of such acts. A memorandum of a 
hire purchase agreement or a letter of accep­
tance of an offer to buy goods are such acts 
of evidence of such acts respectively of 
’agreement’ between the parties.
3. The legal relations resulting from the operative 
acts. In this last sense, agreement is used
to describe the legal consequence of the 
transactions between, the parties. Thus as a 
result of what has transpired between A and B 
as given in our example above, B is under an 
obligation to pay A the agreed price of the con­
signment of goods and A has a duty to supply 
the goods. There is a legally enforceable
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’agreement1 between the parties.
Agreement OR Contract?
Attempts to define agreement can be discussed under -
(a) those who contend that agreement is but an essential 
element of contract i.e. consent and little else, 
and
(b) those who define agreement in terms of the totality 
of our three uses as indicated above.
(a) Agreement defined as but an element of a contract:
The proposition that contract rests on agreement appears 
to begin with St. Germain's Doctor and Student, first 
published in 1523. At the commencement of Chapter 24,
Book II, the student says that contract is the name given 
to bargains and sales ’made by assent of the parties upon 
agreement between them', whereas an agreement containing 
several articles 'is properly called a concord, but is 
also a contract'. In explaining English Law to the Doctor 
the student distinguishes actionable promises i.e. those 
with a 'quid pro quo* and those that are not so actionable 
because there was no 'quid pro quo* . This narrower defi­
nition of contract as agreements with a 'quid pro quo’ 
was adopted in the first edition of 'Termes de la Ley' 
published in 1527. Contract is there defined as a 
'bargain or covenant between two parties, where one thing
270
is given for another which is called ’quid pro quo*
Blackstone also defined contract in terms of
agreement although his exposition of contractual obliga-
2tions was done in terms of forms of actions. He defined
contract as "an agreement, upon sufficient consideration
2
to do or not to do a particular thing.'*
The American Restatement of contracts defines 
agreement as "a manifestation of mutual assent by two or 
more persons to one another".^ it goes further to assert 
that agreement has a wider meaning than contract, bargain 
or promise; that the word contains no implication that 
legal consequences are or are not produced, and that it 
applies to transactions executed on one or both sides, and
4
those that are wholly executory.
To the same effect is tne statement of Holdsworth
4a
m  his History of English Law that "the essence of 
contract is agreement, and the essence of agreement is a 
union of wills." Holdsworth adds that this position was 
recognised by the knglish lawyers of the sixteenth century.
1. See also Hoy’s Maxims (1641) where a similar language 
is adopted.
2. ii Comm. 442
3. (1932) Vol. 1 p.5 S 3. See also Indian Contract Act, 1872.
4# See also R.M. Jackson, "The Scope of the Term ’Contract’" 
in (1937) 53 L.Q.R. 525 at p.534 where he said "Agree­
ment is used in a wide sense to signify an accord" between 
two or more persons. An agreement in this sense is not 
necessarily a contract but it is said to be an essential 
element in every contract." - Ames 2 Harv. L.R. 15; 
Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (6th ed. 1964) 
p.20 and Chitty on Contracts, (^2nu ed.) p.8.
4a. Vol. 8 0.1.
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Judicial authority is not lacking for the approach
that agreement is but an essential element of contract
and little more. fhus in 1553 in the case of Browning v
Beston, it was said of contract "the agreement of the
minds of the parties is the only thing the law respects
in our contracts"; and in 1551* agreement was defined
as the "union, collection, copulation, and conjunction
of two or more minds in anything done or to be done."
In relatively recent years this principle has
been restated by eminent common law judges. Thus Lord
7
Atkin in Balfour V. Balfour has said, "there are agree­
ments between parties which do not result in contracts 
within the meaning of that term in law". Also Bankes L.J. 
in Rose Prank & Co. v Crompton Bros, said: 'there is,
I think, no doubt that it is essential to the' creation of 
a contract, using that word in its legal sense, that the 
parties to an agreement shall not only be ad idem as to
the terms of their agreement, but that they shall have
intended that it shall have legal consequences".
It may be pointed out that the exponents of what 
may rightly be described as a narrow view of agreement 
argue that there are other contracts, e.g. those contracts
5. (1553) Plowden, 140.
6* Reniger v. Pogossa (1551) Plowden, 17.
7. (l919) 2KB. 571 at p.578.
8. Cl9233 2 iv.B. 261. See also Carlill v. Carbolic and 
Smoke Ball Co. 0.893} 1 QB. 265 at p.269 per Bowen L.J.
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implied, by law, where it is difficult to spell out an
agreement between the parties. Where?, they would ask,
can there be agreement in a circumstance as this one:
'A walks into B's bookshop, collects a copy of Cheshire*s
Lav/ of Real Property, raises it for B to see him, and since
he is in a hurry, goes away with the book intending to pay
for it.* A will be compelled to pay a reasonable price
for the book, but where do we find the parties agreeing in
9
the legal sense? Blackstone attempted to answer this by 
arguing that the law implies that A agreed to buy the book at 
the marked price or the usual price or a reasonable price. 
Secondly, the advocates of this view contend that 
fraud and mistake voids contracts even though there has 
been agreement. Chitty and Cheshire and Pifoot would 
prefer the use of the neutral term, 'promise1, s i n c e  
fraud or mistake do not have the same vitiating effect 
on a promise as on contract or agreement.
(b) Agreement defined as an alternative term to contract: 
Attempts to define agreement as an alternative term 
to contract can be said to date as far back as West's 
Symbolaeography, published in 1590, where he says: "A
covenant or agreement which hath cause is termed a contract,
9. iii Comm. 161.
10. Promise is also preferred by many American authors - 
See the Restatement of Contracts; Williston on 
Contracts. See also .Section 2 of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872 which uses the word 'Promise'.
273
which is nothing else but an agreement with a lawful
11cause or consideration.*’ In ohe subsequent section
of the same work he says, "the substance of all contracts
consisteth in consent.*’ This tendency was continued in
the Statute of Frauds, 1677, section 4 of which provides
for the 'form* of "agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year. This was cited as ’contract
not to be performed " in a seventeenth century
12case •
Also in Aain y, Warlters, Lord Ellenborough decided 
that "agreement" was meant "in its proper and correct 
sense, as signifying a mutual contract on consideration 
between two or more parties.*^
14In the important case of Rann v. Hughes
decided in 1778, the Chief Baron delivering the opinion of
the judges in the House of Lords said that, "all contracts
are, by the laws of England, distinguished into agreements
by specialty and agreements by parol". The Chancery
15Court also referred to deeds as agreements. In
1 fiAlderson v. Temple counsel urged "that mutual consent is
11. Book 1, sects. 10 and 11.
12. Anon (1698) Comb. 463, cited by R.id. Jackson, (1937)
53 L.Q.R. 5^5 at p.529. See also Winfield (1939)
L.Q.R. 499.
13. (1805) 5 East, 10.
14. (1778), 7 T.R. 350.
15. See Abddgment of cases in Equity, chap. IV.
16. (1768) 4 Burr. 2235.
274
necessary to all contracts'1 although Lord Mansfield 
decided the case on other grounds.
Leake‘S  following West,*^ Uaine^ and Austin*^
analyzed contracts in terms of agreement. In this he is
21 22 followed by Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir William Anson.
Critics of this approach have pointed to the lack
of any real agreement in cases of acceptance of an offer
by post where the offeror has withdrawn the offer but
after the offeree had posted his letter of acceptance.
In English law a contract has nevertheless been formed.
It is pointed out with respect that this objection is not
a strong one. Every legal system operates within the
confines of certain rules. If English law regards
acceptance by post as creating an agreement between the
parties, the fact that it is called * agreement* instead
22aof ’contract* does not alter the principle involved.
It is further submitted that the word ’agreement* 
has some added advantages. Taking obligations as a genus 
it is more convenient and responsive to better harmony to
17. Law of Contract (1857).
18. Symbolaeography, (1590).
19. Ancient Law, Chapter IX.
20. ’Fragment - Quasi-contract and Quasi-delict’ - printed 
in appendix to Austin’s lectures (1863 ed.).
21. Pollock on Contracts (13th ed. P.H. Winfield, 1950) p.6.
22. Law of Contract (22nd ed., G-uest, 1964) p.4.
22a.I,iore will be said about the historical aspect of this 
question in our section on ’acceptance*, post.
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treat obligations created by agreement as one species and
other obligations imposed by law as another. This approach
will save both academic and judicial opinion from the
futile attempts to imply a contract in order to impose
liability .a., i More will be said on this aspect of the
question in another place.
finally in Ghana and Nigeria where the laws are
complicated by statutory recognitions of customary and
Islamic laws, the term 'agreement1 removed as it apparently
is from the technicalities of the term'contract' in English
law, is obviously a more convenient mode of analyzing
contractual situations. As a learned author has aptly
pointed out, "it is not a question of one view being
correct and the other view being wrong; lawyers move
within definitions of their own creation, and all we have
to consider is consistency and convenience."
In our enquiry the term 'agreement* will be used
in the following three senses, namely, as an act, as a
memorandum or evidence of it, and as a legal consequence of
24what has transpired between the parties.
Agreement, however, for legal purposes is not a 
state of mind but an act, and as an act it is a matter of
23. R.M. Jackson (1937) 53, L.Q.fd. 525* at p.534.
24. Where the word 'contract' is used in our enquiry it is
intended as an alternative to our use of the word
'agreement'. As almost all legislation and case law 
on the subject adopts the term ^contract', it will not
be desirable to substitute 'agreement' wherever the
word contract occurs.
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inference from the conduct of the parties. Some legal 
systems set out to find out what in fact the parties willed 
or intended while some others draw an objective inference 
from the conduct of the parties. The English law of contract, 
deeply rooted as it is in assumpsit is dominated "by the 
concept of bargain. Thus the English courts will find 
an agreement formed if in their opinion this was the 
intention of the parties and the consequences of their 
dealings.
This is clear from Lord Eldon's statement in 
25Kennedy v. Lee,  ^when he said that his tasm was not nto 
see that both parties really meant the same thing (i.e. 
agreed) but only that both gave their assent to that pro­
position which, be it what it may, de facto arises out of 
the terms of their correspondence".
To the same effect is John Austin's position in 
his Lectures, ^  where after saying that "when we speak of 
intention of contracting parties, we mean the intention 
oi the promisor or the intention of the promisee", added 
"or rather, the sense in which it is to be inferred from 
the words used or from the transaction or from both that
25. (1&17) 3, her. 441.
26. Lecture XXI, note 90. This approach to the inter­
pretation of contract often called the objective 
approach is contrasted with the subjective aiJproach. 
which is prevalent in Continental legal systems. More 
will be said about this in a later chapter. On the 
Continental approach, see K.vi/. Ryan, An Introduction 
to the Civil Law, (1962) passim.
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one party gave and the other received it."
In Ghana and Nigeria the picture that emerges from 
an examination of the cases is an attempt to project the 
objective theory into the local laws of voluntary obli­
gations. In accordance with this, if in the opinion of 
the court what has transpired between the parties does not 
satisfy the requirements of agreement under English law,
the courts will not recognise any binding obligation.
27Thus in Savage and others v. Uwechia a Nigerian appeal 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the 
respondent claimed as against the trustees (appellants) 
of the will of one Rotibi, deceased, specific performance 
of an agreement made between himself and the deceased to 
convey certain properties at Onitsha (Eastern Nigeria) 
to him, and he tendered in support of his claim a copy of 
a document in the following terms:
"Promissory Note
I promise to pay to Matthew Uwechia or order three 
months after date tne sum of seven hundred and eighty 
pounds for value received or in default to convey to 
him all those messuages togetner with appurtenances 
thereto situate at No. 6 New Market Road in the town­
ship of Onitsha, to hold the same unto the said 
Matthew Uwechia or order in fee simple.
£780 Oweri
(Sgd.) S.O. Rotibi."
27. (19610 1 V/.L
E.R. 830.
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Both the respondent and the deceased were
natives of Nigeria and prima facie, native law will be
presumed applicable except the parties intended or the
nature of the transaction imported the application of any 
28other law, in this case, English law. Now, the above 
document is in a form that is common among natives as a
29means of charging property or of making conditional sales.
But both the federal Supreme Court of Nigeria (as it then was)
and the Judicial Committee hold that the document was not
a mortgage. The English case of Tapply v. Sheather^0 was
cited as authority for this view. The Judicial Committee
held further, reversing the federal Supreme Court’s finding
in this respect, that there was no agreement to convey
the property. The reason for this decision was said to
be that the parties did not spell out the consideration;
and "value received" was said to be too vague.
31A learned editor has remarked that the decision 
of their lordships may well have been right but for the 
wrong reasons. He suggested that- the respondent ought 
to have relied on native law to prove the native mortgage
28. Eastern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap. 61, Section 28.
29. See Allott, Essays pp.275-282.
30. (1862) L.T. 298.
31. Allott, (1961) 5 J.A.L., 104.
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but that in the absence of evidence in this direction 
English law would then be applicable as in fact it applied 
here.
It is submitted with respect that if the case were 
decided in a jurisdiction where the will of the parties 
to.the transaction is given any emphasis, the Uwechia 
decision may well have gone the other way. To have 
refused the respondent his remedy on the technicality of 
the interpretation of "value received1 was, again with 
respect fanciful in the extreme. The customary courts 
if they had jurisdiction to try the case (the amount 
involved excludes their jurisdiction) would undoubtedly 
have decided the case differently, Regard would have 
been given to what the parties set out to achieve.
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SECTION B 
Creation of Valid Agreements
(i) OFFER:
An agreement results from an accord of the wills 
of the parties either actually entertained or imputed as a 
matter of inference from xheir conduct. The common law 
system requires the exchange of declarations of will 
directed towards the same object and this is couched in 
the language of "offer'1 and ’acceptance' or as some authors 
prefer to call it, ’proposal’ and acceptance.' An offer 
has been defined as the "unilateral communication by one 
party to the other of his desire to conclude a contract
p
(agreement) with that other. An offer must be definite 
and unambiguous. Thus in the Ghana case of Anglo-Guinea 
Produce Co. Ltd. v, George, where a definite offer to sell
1. See Pollock on Contracts, (13th ed.) 1950. Chitty on 
Contracts, 22nd edf 19 ST P»19» Restatement Contracts 
SS 3-12; Winfield, "Some aspects of offer and Accep­
tance", (1939) 55 L.Q.H. 499; Nussbaum, "Comparative 
Aspects of the Anglo-American offer and Acceptance doc­
trine" (1936) 3S Colum. L.R. 290; Stimson, "Effective 
Time of an Acceptance" (1939) 23 Minn. L.R. 776 S.b of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1672; Halsbury Laws, (3rd edf) 
Vol. 6 p.69• See also P . M .  Evans, "The Anglo-American 
Mailing Rule" (1966) 15, I.C.L.Q. 553*
2 . K. V/. Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil Law, (1962) p. 42 .
3. Gold Coast, Div. ct. (1921-25) p.143. See also Attorney- 
General v. Otchere (1957) 2 V/.A.L.R. 23b, where the 
plaintiff’s letter giving an ex-civil servant a choice of 
returning a government-supplied vehicle or its value was 
construed to be an offer capable of acceptance by the
defendant.
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cocoa had been accepted by the plaintiffs, it was held that 
subsequent negotiations introduced by the plaintiif did 
not affect the terms of the agreement. The facts of the 
case were as follows; on 9th February, 1924, the defendant 
sent the plaintiff the following telegram:- "Offer you 
550 bags cocoa now in store Nsawaiy delivered Accra 15/6 
reply immediately". The plaintiff replied the next day 
by telegram as follows: "vVe accept your offer 550 bags,
subject immediate delivery". On the 11th February, the 
defendant rang up the plaintiffs and confirmed the agreement 
by telephone. On the same day the plaintiff wrote the 
defendant saying "we confirm having accepted from you 550 
bags of cocoa delivered Accra, subject to quality and 
weights satisfactory to us." On 13th February, the 
plaintiff received the following telegram from the defen­
dant:- "Regret owin^ to present position of the market, 
have decided not to sell forward" but the plaintiffs in their 
reply both by telegram and letter intimated that they were 
holding the defendant to his agreement. In a claim by 
the plaintiffs for £80:4:2d. damages for breach of the 
agreement the defendant contended that the delivery of the 
cocoa would constitute the offer and the payment of the 
price was an acceptance. Since there had been none of these 
in the negotiations xhere was no agreement between the
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parties. This argument was firmly rejected by Logan,
Ag. G.J. who said at p.145 that,
"When once there is a definite acceptance of the terms 
of an offer, further negotiations between the parties 
cannot, without the consent of both, get rid of the 
contract which has been made, though the subsequent 
correspondence may be used to show that the contract 
was not then completed."4
Also in the Nigerian case of Arbuckle, Smith &
5
Go. Ltd. v. Attorney-General, an appeal to the Nigerian 
Supreme Court from the judgment of Magistrate L.G. Lucas 
awarding damages to the respondents in an action for 
breach of agreement, the Commissioner for Lands (Lagos) 
wrote to the appellants offering them a choice of one of 
60 years and 99 years leases, each term with conditions 
attached. Both terms were subject to the execution of a 
formal lease. The appellants in reply chose the 99 years 
lease and enclosed a cheque covering the consideration for 
it. A draft lease to the appellants was not returned to 
the Commissioner and the appellants* request for an exten­
sion of time to build was refused. In an action for 
damages for breach of the agreement the appellants took the 
point that the Commissioner’s letter giving t£iem the
4* The learned judge relied on the authority of two
English cases: Lewis v. Nicholson, 21 L.J.Q.B. 311,
per Wightman, J at p.316 and Bellamy v. Debenham 
Q.&S1) Ich. 412.
5. (1952) 20 N.L.R. 68.
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choice of one of two leases was not an offer and that 
there was no enforceable agreement. Both the court 
of first instance and tne Supreme Court were not persuaded 
by this argument. It was held that there was an enforceable 
agreement and that the Commissioner’s letter was a definite 
offer.
An offer may be made to a person, a specified or 
specifiable group of persons or to tne public at large.
Local judicial authority is very thin in this aspect of
the law but the familiar bnglish of Carlill v.
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. decided by the Bnglish Court of 
Appeal in 1B93 has often been cited in both Ghana and
Nigeria as authority for the theory that an offer to the
public at large if definite can be the basis of an enfor­
ceable agreement. The Carlill case was followed in Wood
7
Letrik Ltd. In the latter case the defendants m
an advertisement of their electric comb stated: "What is
your trouble? Is it grey hair? In ten days not a grey 
hair left. £500 guarantee", the plaintiff claimed he had 
bought a comb and used it as directed, the only result 
being that the comb scratched his head and made him feel 
uncomfortable. He sued for and recovered the £500.
6. £^933 1 Q.B. 256. Bee particularly the judgment of
Bindley, L.J. in the Court of Appeal.
7. The limes, January 13, 1932.
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Rowlatt, J. followed the Carlill case.
The Carlill decision has come to be accepted by 
the American and Commonwealth Courts as the leading 
authority on offers by advertisements to the general public.
Q
Goldthorpe v. Logan decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in 1943 represents the general trend in this direction.
In that case the female appellant hasd some hairs 
on her face and wanted to have them removed. She saw an 
advertisement published in a newspaper by the defendant 
Anne Graham Logan in these terms: "Hairs . . . .  removed
safely and permanently by Electrolysis . . .  No marks,
No scars - Results Guaranteed11. She went to the place 
of business stated in the advertisement and consulted the 
defendants nurse, Kathleen Fitzpatrick who assured her 
that her face would definitely be cleared and that the 
hair would be removed permanently and that the result was 
guaranteed. She then submitted to a number of treatments 
by electrolysis for the purpose of removing the hairs but 
the result was not satisfactory. Hairs continued to
8. In the Ghana case of Chikezie v. Elliefs Pools & anor 
(1965) c.c. 137; Eoison referred to the Carlill case 
with approval.
9. (1943) 2 D.L.R. 519* bee also the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court case of Bishop v. Eaton 1894, 37 N.R. 6 6 5, 
(Massachusetts Supreme Court).
2 8 5
grow on her face in the same way as before, and in spite 
of the efforts of the defendants to remedy the condition.
An action for breach of contract against the defendants 
was held to succeed. In course of his judgment Laidlaw, 
J.A. asked himself the questions; "vVhat is the time, 
nature and construction of this advertisement?1’, and in 
answer had this to say:
"It is a distinct communication by the defendant Logan 
to each and every member of the public, what 
intention did she possess and convey to such persons 
by the words she used? To ascertain that intention we 
may in this instance look at the surrounding circums­
tances. She was carrying on a business in which dre 
appealed for public support and patronage. She 
required customers to buy services she desired to sell. 
She was a vendor seeking a purchaser. Y/hat she meant 
to say, and the sensible interpretation of her words 
is this; 'If you will submit yourself to my treat­
ment and pay me (certain charges) I undertake to 
remove hairs safely and permanently by electrolysis 
and I promise to obtain a satisfactory result'.
The effect in law of such a statement is to create 
an offer from the person by whom it is maae to every 
person who is willing to accept the terms of con­
ditions of it."1^
It is submitted that the Logan case goes further
11thqn Carlill v. Carbolic and Smoke Ball Co. What the 
latter case decided was that the deposit of £3,000 with 
a bank gave business efficacy to the promise to pay £100 
for use of the Smoke Ball, 'Without the deposit the promise
10. See J.B. Idilner, Cases and Materials on Contracts 
(1963) p.366.
11. fob93j 1 256.
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could have been a mere puff. This is evident from the
judgment of Lindley, L.J. where he said "Y/e must first
consider whether this was intended to be a promise at all,
or whether it was a mere puff which meant nothing. was
it a mere puff? LIy answer to that question is NO, and 1
base my answer upon this passage: '£1,000 is deposited
with the Alliance Bank, shewing our sincerity in the
matter' . Thus what the Carlill case added to the 'reward'
cases dating from the old English case of Williams v.
12Carwardine decided by the ning's bench in 1833 was
that where there was a specific amount as a guarantee the
13plaintiff will succeed. G-oldthorpe v. Logan  ^ goes 
further to make the defendant liable even if no specific 
circumstance lead to tne conclusion that the parties meant
12. (1633) 4 B & Ad. 621; 110 E.N. 590. bee also LocKhart
v * Barnard, (1845) 15 M and W. 674; 153 E.R. 6^6, a "case
of joint reward for two persons who gave the information, 
and G-ibbons v. Proctor (1891) 64 L.T. 594** a case of a 
police officer giving information as part of his duty.
Bitch v. Snedaker (1868) 38 N.Y. 246 (New York Court 
of Appeals) where it was held that the plaintiff could 
not recover because he did not see the offer of the 
reward when he gave his information. It is submitted 
with respect that this restriction based as it is on 
assumpsit is undesirable.
13. (1943) 2 D.L.R. 519
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business. This, it is again submitted is a healthy 
development. It is a bold judicial attempt to solve the 
problems posed by the age of automation where the public 
are invaded by door-to-door canvassers, by expanding 
business. It is the kind of solution that should appeal 
to the courts in Ghana and Nigeria if and when the question 
comes to be decided in a case.
Offers and invitations to do business distinguished:
The Logan decision did not set out to and there­
fore could not resolve all the unanswered questions on 
offers to the public. There is still the familiar dis­
tinction between offers and invitations to do business.
Thus although a railway time-table has been held to be 
an offer to all intending travellers and where a train 
service was permanently withdrawn without the necessary 
changes on the time-table within a reasonable time, a
plaintiff who relied on it to his detriment recovered 
14damages, yet goods displayed and priced at shop windows
lbhave been held to be mere invitations to treat. ^
As has often been pointed out, the test of an offer is
14. Denton v. Great Northern Railway Go. (1856) 5 E and B 
bE0] 119 E.H. 701.
15. Fisher v. Bell [1961'] 1 Q.B. 394.
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whether the offeror has completed his share of the 
formation of an agreement by finally declaring his 
readiness to undertake an obligation upon certain con­
ditions, leaving to the offeree the option of acceptance 
or refusal.^ Invitations to treat lack this finality 
in the offeror's declaration of readiness to be bound.
familiar instances of invitations to treat are 
auction sales and goods priced at shop-windows or in a 
self-service store. Here again there are no local 
authorities in Ghana and Nigeria, There is however,
the English case of Pharmaceutical Society of Great
17Britain v. Boots Gash Chemists (Southern Ltd. decided
by the English Court of Appeal in 1953 in which it was
held that articles in a self-service store are not offers
but mere invitations to treat. There is also the
"1 P>
Transvaal case of Crawley v R the facts of which were 
as follows:
A tradesman advertised goods at a specified price.
X entered the shop and persisted in demanding the goods at 
that price. The tradesman refused to deliver them and 
at last told X to leave the shop. X would not do so.
16. Cheshire and Eifoot, Law of Contract, (6th ed. 1964) p.26
17. tl953} 1 y.3. 401.
18. (1909) T.3. 1105; L.L.R, 347 cited by Winfield 55
L.Q.R. 517.
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He was prosecuted for, and convicted of unlawfully 
remaining on premises after being requested to leave them 
(an offence according to Transvaal law). Smith, J. who 
decided the case said that extraordinary consequences 
would follow if every such advertisement was said to be 
an offer capable of acceptance by everybody who got into 
the shop. Sir Percy Winfield has suggested that the 
natural interpretation of the display of goods in a shop 
with a marked price upon them is that the shopkeeper impli­
citly reserves to himself a right of selecting his 
customer. A shop, he said, is a place for bargaining, 
not for compulsory sales. The personality of the custo­
mer cannot be entirely eliminated. "If the display of 
such goods were an offer, then the shopkeeper might be 
forced to contract with his worst enemy, his greatest 
trade rival, a reeling drunkard, or a ragged and verminous
tramp. That would be a result scarcely likely to be
19countenanced by the law".
With regard to auction sales the distinction 
between offers and invitations to do business has arisen 
in three different respects. firstly there is the 
question whether an advertisement that an auction sale 
will take place is an offer to the general public or a
19. See Winfield 55* L.^.R. p.518
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mere declaration of intention to hold the sale. In
20Harris v. Nickerson an auctioneer advertised that 
certain goods, including office furniture, would be sold 
at a certain place on certain days. The plaintiff went 
to the sale but all the lots of office furniture in which 
he was interested were withdrawn and he sued the auctioneer 
to recover damages for his loss of time and expenses.
It was held that the plaintiff’s claim must fail as the 
advertising of the sale was a mere declaration of intention 
to hold a sale and not an offer which could be accepted 
to form a binding agreement. if the sale was not held 
the auctioneer was not bound to indemnify those who 
attended.
Secondly is the auctioneer’s request for bids an
offer and a customer's bid an acceptance? This was
answered in thenegative in the English case of Payne v.
21Gave where the defendant was the highest bidder at an 
auction sale but before the fall of the hammer had re­
tracted his bid. It was held that he was entitled to do 
so as it is his bid which is the offer and not the auc­
tioneers invitation to bid. Now both Harris v. Nickerson
20. (1673) L.R. 8 Q.B. 286.
21. (1789) 3 Term Rep. 148.
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and Payne v. Gave are pre-1874 decisions of English 
courts. We have already argued that pre-1874 decisions 
of English courts (in the case of Ghana) and pre-1900 
decisions (in the case of Nigeria) were received into 
the two countries respectively. Both the Harris and Payne 
decisions are therefore part of the laws of Ghana and
22Nigeria. The position has been made statutory in Ghana.
The third question is whether an advertisement
that a sale will be without reserve constitutes an offer
to the highest bidder. In Ghana, since the Sale of Goods 
2 3Act, 1962, the question has been answered in the affir­
mative. Section 4 (1) (d) states as follows:
"Where the sale is expressed to be without reserve 
the highest bona fide bidder shall be entitled to 
buy the goods at the price bid notwithstanding that 
the auctioneer refuses to accept his bid or to 
complete the sale11.
The use of the words "bona fide" is very significant. It
is meant to take care of situations where the seller aids
in contravention of the conditions of sale e.g. where the
sale is without reserve. This happened in the English case
24of War low v. Harrison. ^ In that case an auctioneer had
22. Section 4 (l) (cl): "Until such announcement is made any 
bidder may retract his bid . . . See also S . 58 (2) 
of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893•
23-. Act 137 (1962).
24. (1859) 1 EL and EL.309; 120 E.R. 925. See also
Spencer v. Harding (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 563.
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advertised that he would sell certain horses without
reserve. Warlow bid 60 guineas for one of the horses
whereupon the seller bid 61 guineas but V/arlow refused
to add anything. On the horse being knocked down to the
owner, V/arlow tendered the amount he bid and claimed the
horse as the highest bona fide bidder. Although he was
non-suited on other grounds there are dicta in the case
which support the position as enacted in the Ghana Sale
of Goods Act. The position as in V/arlow v. Harrison
has been described as curious by two learned authors and
has further been the topic of some academic controversy
2 6in relatively recent years. There is little doubt
however that uhe arrangement is not as inconsistent as it 
appears. Thus while there is no obligation on an auc­
tioneer to hold a sale according to an advertisement (barring 
fraudent misrepresentation), when a sale has been held the 
auctioneer should be bound by his undertaking to sell to 
the highest bidder or to pay damages for the breach of 
guarantee.
25- Cheshire and i'ifoot, The law of Contract (1964) p«29.
26. C. Slade, "Auction Sales of Goods without Reserve1
(1952) 68 L.Q.R. 238; Also L.C. Gower (1952) 68 L.Q.R. 
457; and C. Slade (1953) 69 L.Q.R. 21.
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The Western Nigeria Auctioneers Law (Cap. 9, 1959)
is on similar terms to the Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962.
Section 22 (5) has the following provision:
1 If the seller or any person employed by him or in 
his behalf shall bid at any sale contrary to any 
of the provisions of this section (i.e. without 
• stating that he would so bid in the conditions of 
sale) any purchaser may refuse to fulfil his 
purchase, but the highest bona fide bidder shall 
be entitled, if he so elect, to have the land 
or goods at the price offered by him".
There are similar provisions in the Eastern and
Northern Regions of Nigeria as well as in the federal
27bales by Auction Act which applies to Lagos. These
provisions have cleared any doubts created by the dicta
2 6in the decisions of English Courts about the rights of
the highest bona fide bidder at an auction sale without
reserve to claim the property bid for, thus in both Ghana
and Nigeria the fall of the auctioneer’s hammer is no longer
a vital element in the formation of the agreement as
long as the statutory conditions are fulfilled. This, it
is submitted is a better position to adopt than the one
27* S. 22 (5) Auctioneers Law Cap. Laws of Eastern Nigeria: 
S. 22 (5) Auctioneers Law Cap. 10, Laws of Northern 
Nigeria and S. 22 (5) bales by Auction Act, Cap. 187, 
Laws of the federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1956).
28. V/arlow v. Harrison (1859) 120 E.R. 925; Spencer v.
Harding (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 563; Re Agra and masterman 
Bank (1867) 2 Ch. App.391; Johnson vV Boyes, (1899)
2 Ch. 73- See also Adebaje v. Conde 8c ors Cl938)
14 N.L.R. 57.
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taken in the Scottish courts where it has been held
that no agreement is complete unless and until the
auctioneer acknowledges the acceptance of the bid by the
fall of his hammer even in cases of sales without 
29reserve.
As to the communication of an offer, the simple 
rule is that an offer is communicated when the offeree 
knows of it. This appears to be the universal practice.^ 
There is no direct authority as to the legal effect of a 
communication of an offer to an agent. It has been 
suggested that in such a case the communication will 
be deemed to be communication to his principal only when 
the agent knows of the offer and has full authority to 
deal with the matters to which it refers.^
29* fenwick v. IJacdonald, Fraser & Co. (1904) 6 ff
(Co. of Seas"! b5Q) Of. Restatement of Contracts, SS 27.
30. Restatement of Contracts S 23 states the position in 
American Law Cf. Williston, Contracts 3rd ed. § 34.
In German law S. 130 of the jj.G.B. is to the same effect 
and in french law the balance of the authorities support 
this view. Planiol has in S. 9b6 the followings 
"la majorite des auteurs et les arrets decide q_ue la 
volonte transmise au loin produit son effet seulement 
lorsqu’elle parvient a la connaissance du destinataire.n 
(formation des contrats consensus), cited by Winfield,
55 L.Q.R. p.503.
31. Winfield, "Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance", (1939) 
55 L.Q.R. at p.504.
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(ii) ACCEPTANCE:
The acceptance of an offer is the act which com-
32pletes the formation of the agreement. There are of 
course two vital aspects of acceptance, namely, the fact 
of acceptance and the communication of acceptance to the 
offeror. The fact of acceptance need not detain us here. 
In English law the courts decide from the nature of the 
correspondence or other dealings between the parties 
whether or not there has been an acceptance of the offer.
If in the court’s opinion there has been a precise and 
unconditional adoption by the offeree of the terms of an 
offer, it will rule that there has been an acceptance.
This attitude to acceptance of offers has also been 
adopted in the courts of Ghana and Nigeria. Thus in 
Arbuckle, Smith & Go. Ltd. v. Attorney-General^  referred 
to above the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled that the choice 
of a 99 years lease and an enclosed cheque sent to the 
Commissioner for Lands, (Lagos) constituted an acceptance 
of the offer to take a lease. Where the nature of the
32. See P.S. Atiyah, Introduction to the law of Contract, 
Oxford, 1962, p.35.
33. (1952) 20 H.L.R. 68.
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correspondence leads to the only conclusion that the
offeree meant to accept an offer made to him, the addition
of superfluous words will not affect the agreement which
results from the acceptance. This was the decision in
the G-hana case of Anglo-G-uinea Produce Go. Ltd. v.
G-eorge^  the facts of which were given above. Silence
alone does not constitute an acceptance of an offer even
35if it is imposed by the offeree. The authority of this
3 6rule in English law has been doubted by a learned author.
On the communication of acceptance the general
rule is that the offeror must know of the offeree’s 
37acceptance. Thus in negotiations inter praesentes
i.e. face to face negotiations (which include acceptance 
by telephone) the offeror must hear the offeree’s
34. Gold Coast, Div. Ct. (1921-25) 143.
35. elthouse v. Bindley (1862), 11 C.B.N.S. 8 6 9. In the 
United States silence in some cases is deemed to be 
an acceptance of an offer. See Restatement of Con­
tracts (1932) S.29. comment (a) "Even silence may 
sometimes be effective as a mode of acceptance."
See also S. 72 (l).
36. Atiyah, op.cit. p.37.
37. The reward cases and other unilateral agreements are 
excepted. Here the communication of acceptance
is not necessary.
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acceptance. In "Che English case of Brogden v. Metropolitan 
Railway Co. decided by the House of Lords in 1877 both 
Brian G.J. and Lord Blackburn stated that for a proposal 
to enter into an agreement to be enforceable there should 
be a communication of that acceptance to the proposer 
(i.e. the offeror). This principle was by inference 
restated by the House of Lords in the often discussed
39decision of Entores Ltd. v. Miles Ear East Corporation.
It must be observed, however, ihat while the Brogden 
decision is part of the law of Nigeria being a pre-1900 
decision of the House of Lords, it is of high persuasive 
force in Ghana. But the later case of Entores Ltd. v. 
Miles Far East Corporation is not binding on the Nigerian 
Or Ghanaian courts though it is highly unlikely that it 
will not be followed in the courts of these countries -
38. (1877) 2 App. Cas. 666 (House of Lords). See also 
S. 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1672 which states:
MThe communication of a proposal is complete when it 
comes to the knowledge of the person it is made. The 
communication of acceptance is complete: as against
the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission 
to the person to whom it is made, so as to be out of 
the power of the acceptor, when it comes to the know­
ledge of the proposer.." On the American system see 
Restatement, Contracts S. 72; Williston, Contracts, 3rd 
ed. 1937 S. 70; Corbin, Contracts, (1950) SB. 67 
and 73* See also Art. 130 (l) of the n.G.B.
39. (l955j 2 Q.B. 327.
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based as it is on expediency and the requirements of 
commerce.
Communication of acceptance by post either by 
letter or telegram presents a more difficult problem.
The issue has been between those who contend that an 
acceptance is complete when the letter embodying the said 
acceptance is dropped into a post oox (or in the case 
of telegrams when it has been sent to the post office), 
and those who argue that there has been no valid accep-
/ A
tance until the letter reaches the offeror. The
position in English law and in fact in the laws of G-hana
41and Nigeria is that stated in Adams v. Lmdsell.
In that case the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs to 
offer to sell some wool and asked for a reply "in course 
of post”. The letter containing the offer was wrongly 
addressed and because of ihls the letter of reply was posted 
and received two days later than it would have been reason-
40. See Winfield, "Some aspects of offer and Acceptance" 
(1939) 55 L. O.R. 499; Nussbaum, "Comparative aspects 
of the Anglo-American offer and acceptance doctrine"
(1936) 3b Colurn. L. Rev. 920; Stimson "Effective
Time of an acceptance" (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 776; 
Uniform Law on the Formation of contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, (196 4) I.C.L.Q. 553•
On the application of the rule to telegrams, see the 
U.S. case of Watson v. Paschall (1913) 93 S.C. 537.
41. (1818) 1 B & Aid. 681.
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able for the defendants to expect. On the day previous 
to the receipt of the letter of acceptance the defendants 
sold the wool to a third person but the letter of;^accep­
tance had been posted the day before the day on which the 
wool was sold, fhe plaintiff sued for the breach of the 
agreement. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover as the agreement was concluded when the 
letter of acceptance was posted. This decision was
42followed by the English Court of Appeal in a later case, 
but has been criticised in a recent article.^ Without 
getting involved in the jurisprudence of the communication 
of acceptances by post, one takes leave to doubt the con­
sistency of the rule in Adams v. Linasell with the 
statute law relating to parcels by post in G-hana and 
Nigeria. Section 3 of the Post Office Act, (Cap. 156,
Laws of the federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 195b) which is
44in the same terms as the corresponding Ghana Ordinance 
has the following provisions:
42. Household fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co. Ltd. 
v . Grant^ (1679) 4 Ex. L. 216.
43* L.M. Evans, Supra.
44. Post Office Ordinance, Gap. 214, Laws of the Gold 
Coast, (1951), 6. 3; Re-enacted in Post Office Act, 
1963, (Act 194) S. 44 (2).
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" (a) a postal article shall be deemed to be in
course ox transmission by post from the time ox 
its oeing posted at or delivered to, or taken 
delivery of by, the addressee or its being- 
returned to the sender or otherwise disposed 
of under the rjrovisions of this ordinairee;
M(d) the delivery of a postal article at the house 
or office of the addressee or to the addressee 
(or to his servant or agent or other person 
considered to be authorised to receive the 
article according to the usual manner of deli­
vering postal articles to the addressee), and 
where the addressee is a guest or is resident 
at a hotel delivery to the proprietor or 
manager thereof, or to his agent, shall be 
deemed to be delivery to the addressee."
The combined effect of sub-sections (a) and (a) is that a
postal packet is in transmission until it is delivered
to the addressee or his agent (cases of return to the
sender are excepted). It might be argued that this rule
is for the purposes of liability in the event of the loss o
a postal packet. But this contingency is provided for in
section 10 of the Act which exempts the Government from
liability howsoever caused. Postal Officers and postal
departments are also exempted under this section except in
cases of fraud or wilful default. Even if the argument
for liability in the event of loss is valid, it does not
invalidate our objection to the rule as laid down in
Adams v, Lindseil to the effect that the addressee is
deemed to have been communicated when the sender posts a
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letter of acceptance. If the legislatures in Ghana and
Nigeria intended this to be the position they could have
45adopted the wording of the Canadian Statute which 
provides as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regu­
lations respecting undeliverable mail, mailable 
matter becomes the property of the person to whom 
it is addressed when it is deposited in a post 
office."
This, it is contended is a re-enactment of the position
in Adams v. Lindsell but not the provisions in Ghana and
Nigeria. It is submitted that an acceptance by post in
Ghana and Nigeria is not communicated to the offeror
until the letter of acceptance is delivered to the offeror 
4 6or his agent. In this respect it is different from the 
English position.
45. Post Office Act, S. 39 (devised btatues of Canada, 
1952, Cap. 212.
46. We are not here concerned with the merits or demerits 
of what have been called "complete on posting" and 
"complete on delivery" rules. We agree with Ryan 
that the criterion shoula be commercial efficiency. 
Although German, Scottish and Prench writers have 
made much of the correctness of their solution, i.e. 
’complete on delivery* there is no evidence that
the English rule has occasioned any injustice, 
bee Ryan op.cit. p.44.
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(iii) TERMINATION OP OPPER OR ACCEPTANCE:
Termination of Offer;
An offeror can of course change his mind and
withdraw his offer. In English law such a revocation is
only valid if there has been no acceptance of the offer
47 . . .in the meantime. The position is simple enough m  face
to face negotiations. But in transactions conducted by
corresxjondence as most are, the English courts take the
view that an offer is revoked when the offeree has known
or ought to have known of the revocation. Where,
however, a letter of acceptance was posted before the
offeree learnt of the revocation, it was held that an
enforceable agreement had been formed and the revocation
was of no legal effect.^
The question that arises is whether the Post office
provisions in Ghana and Nigeria have affected this
principle of English law, and if so, to what extent?
It has already been argued that the mere posting of a
letter of acceptance does not in Ghana and Nigerian laws
constitute communication to the offeror and consequently
47. (1769) 3 T.E. 146.
46. (1626) 4 Bing 653 Options to keep offers open for a 
given period will be discussed under f,Porm and 
Consideration" infra.
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no acceptance is valid until communicated. Thus as far
as the offeror is concerned there has "been no acceptance
until the offeree’s letter has been delivered to him or to
his agent. Consistently with this view it is further
contended that a revocation of an offer will terminate
the offer even if the offeree’s letter of acceptance
has been posted, provided that the said letter has not
been delivered to the offeror or his agent before the
revocation. Thus while Payne v. Cave applies in G-hana
and Nigeria (negotiations inter praesentes), Routledge
v. G-rant does not. (Letter of acceptance posted before
letter of revocation was received).
Apart from revocation, an offer can also be
49terminated by the death of either or the parties,
50by lapse of time or by the failure of a condition
precedent. In the Cjhana case of Pickard v. Innes &
51anor decided by the Pull Court (as it then was) at
Cape Coast in 1919, the defendants had offered to engage
the services of the plaintiff as a mining surveyor in
their mine provided that the plaintiff left his former
49* Dickenson v. Dodds (3.876) 2 Ch. D. 463*
50. Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co. v. Kiontefiore (1866)
L.R. 1 Lx. 109*
51. Gold Coast, P. Ct. (1919) 12.
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employers on such terms as not to give offence to his 
general manager. The defendant’s reason was that they 
were so dependent upon the graces of the general manager 
for the success of their own business that they dare not 
offend him. when the plaintiff sued for damages for 
breach of this agreement to employ him it was held that 
his failure to fulfil the condition precedent operated to 
terminate the offer of the defendants and that his action 
could not succeed. The Pickard case is of course, not 
binding on the Nigerian courts but has very high persuasive 
force.^
It may be added that an offer can also be
terminated by acceptance or rejection by the offeree.
Termination of acceptance:
There is no direct judicial authority either way
on whether or not an acceptance once given can be with-
5 3drawn in English law. A learned author has suggested 
that such withdrawal is of no legal effect and he is
52. This is especially so since the judges of the then 
Gold Coast Colony were ex-officio members of the Pull 
Court of Nigeria. This was equally true of the 
Nigerian judges vis—a— vis the' Gold Coast Pull Court, 
bee Van Berkel & Co. v. Netherlands Distilleries,
Gold Coast P.O. 91926-29) p.400.
53. Benjamin on Sale, 8th ed., p.83.
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54supported in this view Dy a New Zealand decision.
The Scottish courts have however taken the view that 
such a withdrawal is only possible if it is received
by the offeror either before the acceptance or contempor-
5 5aneous with it, but not afterwards. It is suomitted
that the Scottili solution is more consistent with the 
local laws of Ghana and Nigeria on acceptances and re­
vocation by correspondence. The position is stronger 
still in cases of face to face negotiations. There is no 
reason, however, why the offeree should not be entitled to 
change his mind before the offeror has had time to do any­
thing about the acceptance to his detriment, if one of 
the aims of the law of contracts is the fulfilment of the 
parties* reasonable expectations, it is not easy to see 
how this could be achieved by the proposed English and 
hew Zealand solution of forcing obligations on reluctant, 
in fact, unwilling parties.
As to the death of either of the parties as 
terminating an acceptance there is no authority in 
English law for this view. In purely personal contracts
54. Dunmore (Countess) v. Alexander (1630), 3 sh. (Ct. of 
6ess.) 1§0. Although the facts of this case reveal 
that two letters, and not a letter and a subsequent 
telegram were involved, it is submitted that the same 
principle is applicable provided the letter or tele­
gram of revocation is received before or contempor­
aneous with the letter of acceptance.
55. V/enckheiin v. Arndt (N.Z.) 1 J.K. 73 cited by Cheshire
& i'ifoot - p.44.
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such as marriage or concert performance, it is difficult 
to see how death could not effectively terminate any 
acceptance. The same is true of acceptances to write 
a book.
(iv) OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN CUSTOMARY LAWS:
The case for the existence of agreements as a 
distinct branch of customary law (which includes Islamic 
law) has already been argued. The next question that 
arises is whether customary law has any notion of offer 
and acceptance. In this as in many other aspects of the 
law there is a total lack of judicial or academic 
authority. Even in the native or customary courts an 
examination of the cases does not reveal any interest-in 
these courts in the abstract concept of offer and accep­
tance, at least in the English or other extraneous law 
sense of the terms, Maine*s editor has suggested in an 
analogous situation that this, like many similar 
embarrassments has been occasioned by the error of 
"ascribing to the mental condition of an unformed society 
a faculty which pre-eminently belongs to an advanced 
stage of intellectual development, the faculty of 
distinguishing in speculation, ideas which are blended
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56in practice." Without joining issue with the
learned editor, it is observed with respect that his
suggestion over-simplifies the process. Surely in every
system of law in which agreements are recognised and
enforced, certain criteria are adopted in determining
(l) whether there has been an agreement, and (2) what
its legal effect is. A society is not any the less
"formed" because it is not burdened with the minutiae of
the extraneous law theory of offer and acceptance. In the
57Grhana case of iiaidoo v. noricor & Anor, decided by the 
Kado Akwatia Local Court, the plaintiff claimed £50 damages 
for breach of marriage agreement from the defendants.
The facts were that the plaintiff had given drinks and 
money to both the second defendant (the mother of the 
first defendant) and her relations for the purpose of 
taking their daughter as wife. ' The defendants had accepted 
both the drink and the money but had given the girl to 
another man in marriage having refused the plaintiff the 
girl’s hand in marriage. The plaintiff’s claim was dis­
missed with £20 costsj
56. Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (ed. Firth), 1963, p.305.
57. Ghana, Eastern Region Local Court Returns for 1963 >
Suit No. 469/63.
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Now, if this case had been decided in a court
administering extraneous law and that law was intended
by the parties to govern their obligations, there had
obviously been an offer and an acceptance of the drinks
and the money, for tne object of taking the girl in
marriage. If no specific performance could be ordered,
at least damages could have been awarded, as was done in
5bthe Nigerian case of Ugbomah v. Morah. The defendant
would not have been allowed to accept the plaintiff’s
drinks and money, and then deny him tho girl’s hand in
marriage. But customary law does not leave such emphasis
on offer and acceptance for the purposes of the formation
59of agreements. ^
Islamic law:^
Maliki law recognises the concept of offer and 
acceptance. A contract, it is said, is a bilateral 
transaction and requires an offer (ijab) and an acceptance 
(kabul), and both are normally made in the same meeting
56. (1940) 15 N.L.R. 76.
59. The importance of form in customary agreements is 
discussed below.
60. See J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1964, pp.145 et seq. ; Abdur Rahion, 
Ivluhammedan Jurisprudence (1910) p.61; L. Milliot,
Broit du Musulman, S.641. Se generally J.N.D. Anderson, 
"The Future of Islamic law in British Commonwealth 
Territories", (1962) 27, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
617.
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or session (majilis) of the contracting parties. It is 
permissible to withdraw (ruju1) the offer before there 
has been an acceptance.
Offer and acceptance can be expressed in the form 
of compliance with an order, such as, "sell me" and ’I 
sell you herewith". In certain categories of transactions, 
no acceptance is necessary to create an obligation. 
Unilateral dispositions with immediate legal effect, such 
as the acquittance of a debtor are examples of these.
(v) Form and Consideration:
In this sub-section we shall be attempting to 
answer the question, what parts do form and consideration 
play in the creation of legally enforceable agreements 
in Ghana and Nigeria? We shall first of all look at the 
position in English law which, it has been suggested in 
some quarters,^ is the same as the lav; in Nigeria, and 
finally, the actual state of the law in Ghana and 
Nigeria.
61. See IvIcNeil & Rains, Nigerian Cases and Statutes on 
Contract and Tort, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1965) 
p • 15 •
** Agreements that must be in writing will be discussed 
under "Defective Agreements" infra.
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Form:
In English, law an agreement must either be executed in 
a certain form or there must be present some consideration 
moving from the promisee to the promisor. ^  The most 
common form has been the use of the seal, and when this 
is present the law does not stop to ask if there has been 
consideration. Consideration is presumed. The origin 
and history of the seal in English law need not detain
fi A
us here. It is enough to mention that when its use was
imported into England from the courts of the Prannish
kings, only few persons in high positions had a seal.
In the course of ixs development, however, the seal has
changed its character. from a piece of wax impressed
with a device of an elaborate kind and individual to the
owner of the device it has become a paper disc stuck to
or printed on a document opposite the square reserved for
signature. In the words of Pollock and Maitland, "the
f) slaw of the great has become the law of all."
It has been suggested that use of a seal of 
this description has lost its value and that its abolition 
as a privileged category of agreements is long
62. Rann v.Hughes (1776) 4 Bro. Pari. Cas. 27.
63. See no. (2) supra.
64. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, vol.
11 2nd ed. passim.
65. Op.cit. p.216.
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overdue.^ In fact in 1937 the English law Revision
t~\~l
committee in their 6th Interim Report suggested that 
any written agreement not providing for consideration 
should be valid even without a seal. The English Law 
Commission set up under the Law Commissions Act, 1965
has 'contracts under seal1 as one of its subjects for
. i: 
69
68re-examination. The seal has also been abolished n
many jurisdictions in the United States of America.
Nov/, there is no doubt that Rann v. Hughes which
stamped the authority of the House of Lords on the
division of agreements into those under seal and those by
parol is part of the law of Ghana and Nigeria, being a
pre-1874 decision of the English House of Lords. It must
be pointed out however, that the statement about the
division of agreements in that case was obiter and was
70not necessary for the decision. It is suggested that
the distinction in many American jurisdictions between 
business transaction and gifts is more in keeping with
66. 8ee Walter Stern "Consideration and Gift" (1965) 14 
I.C.L.o. 675• In Kenya the Law of Contract Ordinance, 
(No. 43 of I960) provides that no contract shall be 
void or unenforceable by reason only that it is not 
under seal.
67. (1937) Cmd. 5449, cf. (1937) I M.L.R. p.*f^
68. Hirst Programme of the Law Commission, 1965, p*7*
69. See William J. Lloyd, "Consideration and the Seal in 
New York, 46 Col. L.R.I. See also Restatement, Con­
tracts, S. 116.
70. Eor the facts of this case see infra, p*3|Lj.
312
the needs of commerce than that between agreements
with seal and those without.
Consideration:
Consideration is necessary in all agreements
except those under seal. Various theories have been put
71forward as to its origin. Holmes thought that it arose
from the quid pro quo of the action of debt; Fifoot found
72it in the bargain theory of agreements m  English law, 
and Holdsworth has suggested that it arose from' the 
tortuous nature of the action of assumpsit, the detriment
being the damage resulting from the breach of the obliga-
7^ 74 ,tion. J Lord Mansfield*s attempt to approach considera­
tion on moral grounds has not been accepted in English law. 
Pollock* s definition in terras of "am act or forbearance 
or the promise thereof, which is offered by one party to
an agreement and accepted by the other, as an inducement
75to that other*s act or promise1*, has been more generally 
followed. English law has come to accept the position
71. Common Law, Chapter 7.
72 • History and Sources of the Common Law (Contract & Tort) 
p.39b.
73. History of English Law, vol. Ill p.3*
74. Pillars v. Van Microp (1765) 3 Burr. 1663. See also 
Hawkes v. Saunders' (1762), 1 cowp. 289.
75. Pollock on Contracts (13th ed. 1950) p.8.
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that, an informal agreement not supported by consideration
eannot be enforced by the courts. It has generally
77been assumed that this is also the lav/ in Nigeria and
rj n
to some extent in Ghana. bo much protest has
nowever been raised to the continued existence of this 
requirement as an element of enforceable informal agree­
ments that it becomes vital to look again at the juristic 
basis of its application in Ghana and Nigeria. borne of 
the relevant questions to be answered are: (i) is con­
sideration part of the received lav/s of Ghana and 
Nigeria? (ii) if so, has it been changed or modified in 
any way or ways?, and finally (lii) does the doctrine 
require any further changes or modification. We shall 
attempt the answers seriatim.
(i) Is the doctrine of consideration part of the received 
laws of Ghana and Nigeria?
In order to answer the question we have to look
79at the facts of the familiar case of Haim v. Hughes  ^ in
77. McNeil and Rains, Nigerian Gases and btatutes on 
Contract and Tort pp.15 &t seq.
78. Walk den and Co. v. K warn in (1923-25) Niv. ct. 24 
Hamilton v. I.Ipoley (1921) P.C. 78.
79. (177&) 4 Bro. Pari. Cas. 27.
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which the English House of Lords have been said to have
laid down the doctrine as part of the law of England.
In that case:
John Hughes owed £938 to a creditor, but before 
paying it he died, leaving an estate of over 
£3,000. His widow Isabella Hughes took out 
letters of administration to his estate, and took 
possession of his assets. She promised to 
pay to the creditor the sum of £938 which her 
late husband owed; but she did not say that she 
would pay it personally out of her own money nor 
was this promise put in writing to satisfy the 
Statute of frauds. Presumably she meant to pay 
it from her late husband’s estate. She failed 
to keep her promise and the creditor sued her 
not as an administratrix but against her 
personally.
Lord liansfield, following his previous decision in
Ho
Pillars v. Van kierop in 1769, held that she was per­
sonally liable. Hut the Exchequer Chamber and the House 
of Lords held that she was not. How, there weie three 
possible bases for the decision of the House of Lords, 
namely, (a) that it was never alleged nor proved that the 
defendant promised to pay personally; (b) that any such 
promise would have vo oe in writing to satisfy the statute 
of frauds, 1677, but none was alleged nor proved from the 
evidence; and finally, (c) that there was no consideration 
to support the promise. All these three points were argued 
before the House. The judges who advised the House on the
80. (1765) 3 Burr. 1663
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case said that su.cn a promise was unenforceable because 
there was no consideration to support it, but according 
to the reporter, the House held the promise to be unenfor­
ceable because it was not alleged nor proved to be in 
writing. It is remarkable that both judicial and
academic opinions have proceeded on the basis that the 
opinion of the judges was accepted by the House. It is 
very respectfully submitted that there is no evidence to 
support this assumption. It may be argued, however, that 
in English .lavy this objection cannot be a strong one since
the House of Lords have in subsequent cases reaffirmed
o 2the doctrine in unambiguous terms. It may be argued
further that these subsequent cases, some of which were 
pre-1674 decisions are parts of the laws of Ghana and 
Higeria. Our answer to this is that if the doctrine is 
supposed to be based on the decision in Rann v. Hughes and 
the House of Lords have purported to follow it because of 
binding precedent, then the Ghanaian and Nigerian Courts 
should feel free to interpret the Hughes Lecision in a 
different way. This position is made stronger still by 
cases where injustice would result from following the
81. See 4 Bro. Pari. Cas., headnote p.27.
^2. Eastwood v. Kenyon (1840) 11 Ad. d El. 438; Bman v. 
Guy ~(1503) 4, East, 190.
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interpretation placed on that case by the House of Lords.
84The fact that the Ghanaian and Nigerian courts have 
hitherto felt bound by these decisions does not alter 
the principle one bit. Our answer to the question posed 
above, i.e. is consideration part of the received laws of 
Ghana and Nigeria is a doubtful ’yes'.
(ii) Has the doctrine of consideration been changed or 
modified in any way or ways in Ghana and Nigeria?
V/e are not concerned here with the attempts of 
Lnglish law through the laws of agency and trusts to 
neutralise some of the worst excesses of the doctrine of 
consideration. It is enough to mention these casually and 
to add that the law of bailment belongs to a different 
dategory from that of agreements, solely because of the 
absence of consideration in the former (however, some cases 
of bailment arise from an existing contractual situation 
e.g. Hire-purchase). In order to answer the aoove 
question effectively we shall take a look at some of the 
more important facets of consideration. Six of them have 
been commonly recognised by the courts, namely:
8 3 . See Mue v. Nyumutei (1926-29) Div. ct. 93; Colonial 
Bank v. Bellon (1923-25) f. Ct. 176.
8 4 . See Savage & ora, v. bwechia [I961JI 1 vV.L.H. 455*
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(a) An informal agreement must be supported by a considera-
+ • 85tion;
(b) The consideration must move from the promisee and not 
otherwise0^;
o V(c) Consideration must not be past;
(d) Options to keep offers open are not enforceable
oo
except they are supported by consideration;
(e) A promise to forgo part of a debt is not enforceable 
except it is supported by consideration;^ and
(f) Performance of an act or the promise to perform an
act is not sufficient consideration if the act is
90already enjoined by some legal duty. vVe shall
examine the local authorities on each of these in turn to 
determine if there have been any modifications of the 
doctrine in Ghana and Nigeria.
(a) An informal agreement must be supported by considera­
tion:
In spite of the doubts we expressed on the authority of
91the English case of Rann v. Hughes, the courts in both
8b# Eastwood v. Kenyon, supra.
86. Dunlop v. Eelfridge, supra.
67. Eastwood v. Kenyon, supra, c.f. cases of negotiable 
instruments.
bo. Routledge v. Grant (1828) 4 Bing, 653*
o9* Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. cas. 605.
90* Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 2 camp. 317.
91. (1778) 4 Bro. Pari. cas. 27.
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G-hana and Nigeria have adopted the English law attitude
of looking for consideration in every informal agreement*
92In the Ghana case of Hamilton v. Idpoley, decided by the
G-hana Null Court (as it then was) in 1921, the plaintiff
claimed a refund of a loss of £ll8:10s. from the defendant.
The transaction was evidenced by what was called a ’note
of hand* and one of the points argued for the defendant
was the absence of consideration to support the loan.
This argument was upheld both by the Court of first
instance and the Null court. The three judges who
decided the appeal were unanimous that the absence of
consideration was fatal to the plaintiff’s claim. To the
93same effect is the judgment in the Cclonal Bank v. Bellon
where their Lordships of the then Gold Coast Null Court
dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal also on the ground of
absence of consideration. The plea of estoppel based
on section 55 of the English Conveyancing Act, lbbl did
not avail the plaintiff. It is remarkable that the Ghana
/- 94-Contract Act, I960 , which has been acclaimed as progressive
g £  Lid'j(Toaastfl923 -25) N. ct. 176. Gee also Aryeh v.
Thompson, (1926-29) N. ct. 354; Hue v. Myumtei,
^1926-29) Liv. Ct. 93 c.f. the recent case of Ad jab eng
v. nwabia (i9 6 0) G.L.N. 37 where the Ghana Supreme
Court held that inadequacy of consideration was no 
ground for avoiding a sale.
94. Act 25.
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by some learned authors,  ^has done nothing about this
aspect of the doctrine of consideration, Ix is submitted,
! however, 011 xhe oasis of our earlier contention on the
authority of Rann v, hushes, that xhe Supreme Court of
G-hana is free to enforce agreements intended by the
parties to have legal effect even without the requirement
; of a consideration.
The Nigerian Courts have adopted a similar
attitude to that of the courts in Ghana. The Privy
Q B
Council Appeal of Savage & ors. v. Uwechia, turned on
the absence of consideration. In the case of Akenzue XI
07
v. Benin District Council,' Thomas, J., after holding
thax the evidence disclosed no consideration whatsoever
moving from the plaintiff added:
"It is rather odd, in these circumstances that the 
plaintiff could imagine xhat he could become the 
licensee in perpetuity of a very vast area of land 
within which to exploit timber by the passing of  ^
the council's resolution simplicitar, and without 
giving any consideration whatsoever".^0
The facts of this case were that the plaintiff had
as President of the Benin District Council played some
95. Bee Daniels, Common Law in ’west Africa (1964) p.Read, 
(1961) 5, J.A.L. 4b.
96. h96lj 1 V/.L.R. 455.
97- (1959) W.R.R.L.R. 1.
98. See op.cit. at p.5«
part in recovering five pieces of forest areas from a 
timber exploiting company. The plaintiff later appealed 
to the council to allow him exploit one of the five areas 
in order to augment his poor salary and this permission 
was granted by a resolution of the council, later signed 
by the plaintiff as chairman. The resolution was 
subsequently revoked by the council in accordance with ixs 
standing orders and the plaintiff sued for the breach of 
the agreement as per the resolution. The court held, 
among other grounds, that there was no consideration to 
support the council’s original promise and the action was
Q Q
dismissed.
Thus in Nigeria as in Ghana the courts have always 
VU-ky i_U v r-q
been to refuse tio enforce agreements not supported
by consideration.
(b) Consideration must move from the promisee and not 
otherwise:
It is a cardinal rule of the English law of
contract that consideration must move from the promisee
99* See also S. 3 of the Llercantile Lav; (Amendment) Act, 
1856, (19 & 20 Viet. Cap. 97) which provides that 
consideration should appear upon the face of the docu­
ment by which it is to be proved. (Amended in Ghana 
by Act 25)• See per Tindal, C.J. in Laythorpe v.
Bryant (1 8 3 6) 2 Bing. (N.C.) 735.
100. Dunlop v. Selfridge ( 1 9 1 5 J A.c.8 4 7.
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Thus where A writes a book for B and askes B to... pay C,
C cannot enforce the payment since he has given no 
consideration. The fact that he may have been a party
101'co the agreement does not affect the general principle.
This aspect of the doctrine of consiueration has been adop­
ted by the higerian courts without question. In Cardoso
102v. The Bxecutors of Doherty the plaintiff had assisted
the deceased testator m  obtaining some loans which were 
secured with mortgages on several lanaed properties. ■ The 
testator had expressed the wish that the plaintiff should 
reside in one of the houses so secured without any payment 
of rent. On the strength of this wish the executors had 
written to the plaintiff a letter m  these terms:
"Dear Sir,
I am directed by the Board of Bxecutors to inform 
you that the Board has decided to dispose of all 
the properties mortgaged b,y you, excepting your 
property No. 23, Bamgbose Street, which the Board 
has decided to reserve for your occupation, to 
remain in, all your life time.
Yours faithfully,
Signed Albert B. Carrena, 
Secretary to the Board"
101. See Cheshire and Bifoot, Law of Contract, (6th ed.1964) 
p.65.
102. (1936) 4 V/.A.C.A. 78.
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On the strength of this letter the court below 
granted the plaintiff an injunction as against the execu­
tors, against his eviction during his life-time, by reali­
sing the mortgage on the property. A strong V/est African 
Court of Appeal consisting of Aingdon, Petrides C.J.J. 
and Graham Paul, J. allowed the appeal of the executors on 
the ground among others, that there was no consideration 
moving from the plaintiff to the executors to support the 
promise made in the letter and that the wish of the testate 
was not such consideration. The court said (at page 80) 
of the judgment:
"It is clear upon the plaintiff's statement of claim 
that his case before the court oelow was not based 
on any valuable consideration having passed from him 
in regard to the letter of 10th August, 1935. In 
paragraph 5 he specifically states that it was in 
consideration of the wishes of the deceased that the 
executors wrote the letter on vvhich he founds. That 
is not in law a valuable consideration.1
It is submitted with respect uhat this is a clear 
instance of the doctrine of consideration being used to 
frustrate the intentions of the parties. Surely the lette 
of 10th August from the board of executors was intended as 
a business transaction binding on the Board. To deny 
the plaintiff his remedy on such tenuous technicality, 
leaves the ^ doctrine very daiius&alLe jr&6Le&d.
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In Ghana this aspect of the doctrine has been 
abolished by statute. Section 10 of the Contracts Act,
I960 provides as follows:
"No promise shall be invalid as a contract by reason 
only that the consideration therefor is supplied by 
someone other than the promisee.1
There has not been any local post-1960 decision
on this section of the Act but it is clear from the wording
that if the Cardoso decision were before the Ghana courts
today, the judgment might well go the other way.
(c) Consideration must not be past:
This was laid down in the hnglish case of Rose or la
v. T h o m a s , a n d  was argued on behalf of the defendants
in the Nigerian case of Akenzua II v. benin District Council
to which reference has already been made. We are not
concerned here with the quasi-contractual action of
q uanturn meruit or quantum valebant in cases where "request”
105can be proved. It is enough to mention that the Roscorla
decision was followed in the vVest African Court of Appeal
106decision from Ghana of b .T .C . v. Hauri. The latter
decision has been cited by two learned authors as part
103. (1642.) 3 Q.3. 234.
104- (1959) W.R.H.L.R. 1.
105. bee Lampleigh v. brathwaite (1615 ) Hob. 105.
106. (1 940) 6 W • A • 0 • A • 14b .
104
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107of the lav/ of Nigeria.
Commercial practice and convenience has however, 
forced the hands of the legislatures in both Ghana and 
Nigeria to create exceptions to this rather undesirable 
doctrine. Thus section 27 (I) of the Nigerian Bills of
-i
Exchange Act, .which is in similar terms .to the ghana 
statute on the same subject, provided that:
”27 '(1) Valuable consideration for a bill may be 
constituted by (a) any consideration sufficient to 
support any simple contract; (b) an antecedent debt 
or liability. Such a debt or liability is deemed 
valuable consideration whether the bill is payable on 
demand or at a future ti.me.n
Thus in cases of negotiable instruments, even past
consideration will be considered good or valuable
109consideration.
107* McNeil and Bains, Nigerian Oases and Btatutes on
Contract and Tort, p.21. It has already oeen pointed 
out that (ihana decisions, though tney are of nigh 
persuasive force in Nigeria, are not binding on the 
Nigerian courts.
108. Cap. 21 (Laws, 1958) Bee, also 8. 25 (1) of the Ghana 
Bills of Exchange Act, 1961 (Act 55) repeating and 
substantially re-enacting the Gold Coast Bills of 
Exchange ordinance (Cap. 195) Laws of the Gold Coast 
-1951. An acknowledgement of a statute-barred debt 
which revives the original debt without further 
consideration could be taken as another exception to 
the rule, but Pollock has argued that this is only a 
procedural device. Bince the infancy Relief Act,
1874-, is not a statute of general application in Ghana 
(it came into force on 7th August, 1874, i.e. after 
24th July, 1874, the effective date of the reception 
of English law in Ghana) it could oe argued with some 
force that an acknowledgement of a liability by an 
infant after the age of 21 will be enforceable against 
him and that this is another exception to the rule in 
Ghana. This will of course not be true of Nigeria.
109. Bor cases on this statute see: for Ghana Yoboah v. Adane 
(1921-25) Div. ct. 75; Colonial Bank v. BeTlo n'T192^-251 
B.C. 176. on Nigeria see Bay age v. uwechia, Supra.
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(d) An option to keep an offer open is not enforceable 
against the offeror except in is supported by 
consideration:
The decision in Rout ledge v, G-rant^  ^ has often 
been said to have laid down this principle. In that 
case the defendant offered to purchase the plaintiffs 
house and gnve him six weeks to decide whether to accept 
or reject the offer. The defendant purported to withdraw 
his offer before the six weexs had expired and in an action 
for breach of agreement by the plaintiff who accepted after 
the withdrawal of the offer but within the six weeks period, 
it was held that there was no consideration for the option. 
This state of the law has been heavily criticised and
111its abolition had been recommended in 1937 m  England.
It has in fact been abolished in Ghana by Section b (l) 
of the Contract Act, I960:
M8 (l) A promise to keep an offer open for acceptance 
for a specified time shall not be invalid as a 
contract by reason only of the absence of any con­
sideration therefor.“ll^
No similar provision exists in Nigeria and although
110. (1026) 4 Bing, 653> see also Cooke v. Oxley (1790)
3 T.R. 653.
111. Sixth interim Report of the Law revision Committee,
(1937), Grnd. 5449 iuj.23-24 and p.31.
112. Act 25. It is not unlikely that the Ghana Legislature 
were influenced by the American example as found in the 
Restatement, Contracts, S.45- Bee also Beetion 3 of 
the Bwiss federal Code of Obligations: “v/here a person 
'offers to anotner to enter into a contract and fixes a 
time limit for acceptance of the offer the person is 
bound by his offer until the expiration of the time limit.*
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local Judicial authority on this aspect of the law is
rather thin, it is not unlikely that the Nigerian courts
will prefer to follow the rule in Grant's case.
(e) A promise to forgo part of a deot or any liability is
not enforceable except it ns supported by. consideration:
This facet of the doctrine covers situations where
a creditor agrees to accept part of a debt as discharge
for the whole and where an obligor agrees to waive any
other legal right. The orthodox theory as far as this
goes in English law is that there must be a consideration
to support the waiver if it is to be legally enforceable.
Thus, if X agrees to accept £800 from Y out of a debt of
£1,000 on the same day and place as stipulated in the
original agreement, the waiver is not enforceable except
113there is consideration for it. Also if A agrees to
deliver goods to B within eight weeks and later requests
for extension of time to deliver, B could still sue for
breach of the agreement unless the waiver of the time of
114delivery was supported by valuable consideration.
This rule was restated by the Court of Exchequer in
113. Pinnel's case, (1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117a.
114. Bee Lord Denning nThe way of an iconoclast" (1959-63) 
J. of 8oc. of Public Teachers of Law, at p.78.
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115in Sibree v. gripp, in which case Baron Alderson, m
re-examining the whole position, laid bare the fanciful 
and tenuous nature of its practical application. the 
House of Lords nevertheless, gave their approval to the
116doctrine in 18c>4 in the curious case of Doakes v. Beer.
The severe impact of this role in Lnglish law has however
been diminished by what Lord Cairns described as the
1 broad rule of justice" in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway 
117££. applied and extended by Bowen L.J. in Birmingham
110Land Co. v. London and north-Western Hailway and
expounded into a general doctrine by Denning J. (as he then
was in the famous case of Central London Property Trust Ltd.
119v. High frees House Ltd. In the Hughes case the
appellants gave the respondents six month1s notice to 
repair but before the notice expired opened negotiations
115. (1o46) 15 M and W. 23.
116. (1864) 9 App. Cas. 605.
117. (1077) 2 App. Cas. 439.
118. (1885) 40 Ch. D. 268.
119. £19473 h.B. 130; (l956J[ 1 A 11 E.R. 256. This
position was achieved through the equitable doctrine
of quasi-estoppel, sometimes called promissory estoppel. 
It extends the common law doctrine by including as 
binning, representations of intention meant to create 
or alter legal relations. The scope of the rule was 
delimited by the House of Loras in Tool Metal Manu- 
facturing C o. v . Tungston Electric Co. Ltd. (1955] 2 
Ail. E.R. 657*
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for the purchase of their lease. these negotiations 
were broken off and when six months had. passed from the 
service of the notice, the appellant brought an action of 
ejectment. The House of Lords held that the respondents 
were entitled to relief in equity as the negotiations had 
the effect of suspending notice, which would not expire 
until six months had passed from the time when the nego­
tiations were discontinued. In the High Trees case it 
was laid down that when parties enter into an arrangement 
which is intended to create legal relations and in pur­
suance of such ari'angernent one party makes a promise to the 
other which he knows will be acted on and when is in fact 
acted on by the promisee, the promise is binding on the 
promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act 
inconsistently with it, although the promise may not be 
supported by consideration in the strict sense. The High
Trees principle, however, is only valid as a defence and
120uoes not create any new right of action.
This position has been substantially adopted as
the state of the law in Kigeria. in tne recent case of
121A jayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd. the defendant by
120. £L9dO  ^k.b. 215. See particularly the judgment of 
Denning L.J. (as he then was)•
121. C m 64} 3 All E.H. 556.
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two hire-purchase agreements, hired eleven lorries from 
the plaintiffs on the terms that the balance of the purchas 
price after payment of deposits, was to be paid by stated 
instalments ending on January 30th, 1957* On July 12th, 
1957  ^ the hirer wrote the plaintiffs (owners) complaining 
about inadequate repair facilities for the lorries and 
requesting a suspension of the payment of instalments 
until the lorries were back in active service after repairs 
The plaintiffs granted this request in their letter dated 
22nd July, 1957, in these terms:
1 Dear Sirs,
Y/e are in receipt of your letters of July 5 
and 12 and are indeed very sorry to hear about 
the troubles you have had with your fleet of 
Deddon Tippers. Y/e hope very soon to be able to 
put at your disposal, the service of our engineer 
and on completion of our workshop in Apapa we 
should be able to give you proper service for 
your Seddon vehicles in the time to come.
flease rest assured that we do regret the 
inconvenience and loss you have been put to and 
we confirm herewith that we are agreeable to 
your withholding instalments due on the Seddon 
Tippers as long as they are withdrawn from active 
service.
Yours faithfully,
Signed b.A. Heidemann,
A/g Manager.,f 
The defendant having sent in eight of the lorries, 
these were repaired by the plaintiffs who thereafter,tried 
to advise him to collect them and resume payment of the 
instalments. All efforts in this direction having failed,
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the plaintiffs sued him for tne arrears of instalments 
in November, 1957. The defence of fraud, on which the 
defendant relied was dismissed by Gnyeama J. who heard 
the case at the High Court. On appeal to the Nigerian 
Supreme Court, the defendant relied on the plaintiffs* 
letter as raising an estoppel against their insisting on 
the terms of the agreements. This defence was also 
dismissed by the Court and this decision was affirmed by 
the Judicial Committee. Their lordships went further 
to delimit the scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
as follows:
(a) that the party relying on the estoppel must have altered
his position; (b) that the promisor can resile from his
promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be 
formal, giving the promissee a reasonable opportunity of 
resuming his position, and (c) that the promise only becomes 
final and irrevocable if the promisee cannot resume his 
position. Since there was no evidence to show that the 
defendant had re-organised his transport system on the 
basis of three instead of eleven lorries, but on the con­
trary the could have resumed his original position on the 
notice he was deemed to have received, the doctrine did 
not avail him. The plea therefore failed.
In Ghana, however, this rule which had its
origin in Pinnel*s case has been abolished by statute.
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Section 8 (2) of the Contract Act, I960 provides that:
"8 (2) A promise to waive the payment of a debt or 
part of a debt or the performance of some other 
c ont rac tual or legal obligation snail not be invalid 
as a contract by reason only of the absence of any 
consideration therefor.*'
It could be argued that this subsection is only
a statutory recognition of the existing position of the
law in England, and that it does not create any new rights
of action that did not exist before the enactment of the
statute, its logical limits would then be the rule in
122Combe v. Combe, but this approach to the interpreta­
tion of the provision is open to serious objections.
Firstly the volume of academic and judicial dissent from the 
rule in Pinnel1s case has been quite considerable. The 
Ghana Legislature could hardly have intended to perpetuate 
such a position in statutory form. Secondly, the whole 
tenor of Part III of the contract Act leads to the only 
conclusion that the legislature in Ghana intended to modify 
various aspects of the doctrine of consideration. The 
preceding section (i.e. subsection 6 (1 )) made options to 
leave offers open for acceptance, enforceable even without 
being supported by consideration. Finally, but not with 
any emphasis, the sidenotes to section 8 has the follow­
ing: "Certain contracts to be valid despite lack of
122. Supra c.f. I) & 0 Builders v. Pees CL966") 2 V/.L.H. 288.
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c onsideration.1
it is therefore submitted with respect that the
subsection creates a new right of action and that Gombe
12 iv. Combe could well be differently decided m  Ghana.
(f) Performance of an act or the promise to perform an
act is not sufficient consideration if the act or the
promise is already enjoined some legal duty :
This rule covers situations where the plaintiff’s
performance or promise to perform an act is already imposed
by a previous agreement12^ or a public ciuty.12^ It is
distinguished from cases where the act or promise is already
imposed by an agreement previously made not between him
and the defendant but between himself and a third party .
In the latter case, English law finds sufficient considera-
12 6tion in the plaintiff's act or promise but in the former,
enforcement is denied the plaintiff on the basis of the
127absence of consideration. An attempt to reconcile
123. No decision in the G-iiana courts has been based on this 
subsection.
124* Collins v. G-odefroy (1631) 1 B and Ad. 950.
125* Stilk v. luyrick (I8O9) 2, Camp. 317*
126. Shadwell v. bhadwell (1809) 9 C.B.b. 159. bee also
A.G. Davis, "promise to perform an existing duty" (1937)
6 Camb. L. Journal 203; Kamson, "The reform of con­
sideration" (193d) 54 L.Q.Pi., 233; Shatwell, "The doc­
trine of consideration in the modern law" 1 Syd. Law. 
hev. 324.
127* Stilk v. Eyriek - supra, c.f. Hartley v. Ponsonby (1857)
7 E. and D. 072 where the plaintiff succeeded because 
he had performed on request more than he was legally 
bound to do.
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the two conflicting streams of authority has been made on 
the basis that the tnird party might aerive some benefit 
or satisfaction from the plaintiff's performance or 
promise, while a party to the agreement could legally 
enforce it against the plaintiff thereby making his even­
tual performance nothing more than what he is legally 
bound to do. It is submitted with respect that this 
distinction is more ingenuous than practical. It is 
difficult to see the difference in A promising that he 
will perform his agreement with j3, and his making the 
same promise to d himself. Here again the Ghana 
Contract Act, has improved on the state of the law. 
beetion 9 of the net provides that:
"9. The performance of an act or the promise to 
perform an act may be sufficient consideration for 
another promise notwithstanding that the performance 
of that act may already oe enjoined oy some legal 
duty, whether enforceable oy the other party or not.1
The above section should thus be a welcome relief 
to the Ghana courts who will be spared the unpleasant task 
of looking for tenuous distinguishing features in order to 
hold a defendant liable, as was done in the English deci-
7
sion of Hartley v. Ponsonby. There is, however, no 
similar provision in Nigeria but it is hoped that the 
situation will noc be in its present unsatisfactory state 
much longer.
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Our answer to the question posed at the beginning 
of this subsection i.e. has the doctrine of consideration 
been changed or modified in any way in Ghana and Nigeria?
is in the affirmative in the case of Ghana. In the 
case of Nigeria all xhe existing evidence points to a 
too-ready desire to follow English authority.
(iii) Does the doctrine of consideration require any 
further changes or modification?
The pros and cons of the doctrine of considera­
tion has engaged the attention of judicial and academic
opinion for upwards of tv^ o c e n t u r i e s G o m e  have
129advocated its total abolition,  ^ some feel that any legal
system without it should invent something line it,^"^
others are satisfied with the removal of some of its more
131objectionaoie rnanifestations. We do not consider it
12b. See among others, Sir Fredrick Pollock, 6 Harv. L.R.
3^9; Lord Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses, passim; 
A.L. Goodhart, "Blackmail and consideration (192b") 44 
L.G.R. 436; Holdsworth, History of English Law vol. ill 
p.4o; Ames, "Two theories of Consideration’1 (T899)
12 Harv. L. Rev. 29; N. Newman, "Doctrine of Cause" 
(1952) 30 Can. E.R. 662.
129. Lord Wright op.cit. especially at p.375; See also E.G. 
Nwabueze, "Integration of the law of contracts" (1964) 
and Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, "The adax^xation of impor­
ted law in Africa" (I960) 4 J.A.L. 66.
130. See Walter Stern "Consideration and gift" (1965) 14
l.C.L.Q, 675.
131. Law Revision Committee, 6th Interim Report, Cmd. 5449 
(1937); Harnson, (1938) 54 L.q.R. 233; A.L. Denning, 
"The Way of an fonoclast" (1959-63) Journal of Soc. of 
rubl Teachers of Law, 77; Cheshire and fifoot, Law
of Contract (6th ed. 1964) pp.57-92.
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desirable for our purpose here to add to so heavily docu­
mented a topic. We do however associate our views with those 
of the latter groupJot thinkers for the vital reason that 
the doctrine is so much part of the law, not only of con­
tracts but of property and trusts, that its total abolition 
will be tantamount to burning down a house in order to 
roast a particular pig. If the doctrine is abolished, the 
law will still have to cater for such situations as total 
failure of consideration, the test of reasonableness in 
agreements in restraint of trade, the differences in 
treatment between purchases for value and volunteers, the 
meaning of holders for value in bills of exchange, and the
important distinction between gifts and business trans- 
132actions. u It is not enough to accept ready-made answers
to some of these problems from the civil lav/ or Roman-
Dutch law systems without accepting the whole basis of their
own concept of agreement. The latter course would for
instance mean the importation of the notarial form in gifts
133as in French law.
132. See J.F. Wilson, "The problem of the enforcement of 
promises in Anglo-American law" (1958) 32 Tul. L. Rev. 
371; D.E. Allen, "An equity to perfect a gift" (1963) 
69, L.R.R. 236.
133. Walter Stern, op.cit. p.677.
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What we propose to do here is to spotlight such
aspects of the doctrine of consideration as we feel are
unsuitable in Ghana and Nigeria, having regard to the
existence of laws other than English law.
As has been pointed out by a learned author, in
a recent article, “customary law defies the kelsenite
dichotomy between the realm-.-of ought and the domain of 'is’".
The doctrine of consideration on the other hand has, as
one of its tenets the rule that moral consideration is no
1^5consideration.  ^ it is easy to see "Che glaring injustice
that will result from a rigid application of this rule.
in the Nigerian case of Odufunade v. Rossek, d e c i d e d
by the dupreme Court in I960, the defendant undertook to
pay the plaintiff ten per cent commission on tne purchase
price of his lease if the plaintiff would introduce anybody
that would eventually taxe an assignment of the lease.
The plaintiff brought the property to the attention of the
Chief federal Lands Officer (Lagos), who later arranged for
a compulsory acquisition of the land and the defendant was
134. S.K.B. Asante, "interests in land in the customary law 
of Ghana - A new appraisal" (1965) 74 Yale. L.J.648.
135* Eastwood v. Kenyon (1840) 11 Ad. & El. 430 C.f. Lord 
Mansfield in rillars v. Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr. 1663 
who thought that consideration should merely be 
evidentiary which would include moral consideration.
136, (I960) f .0.0. 350.
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adequately compensated for his interest. He however
refused to pay the agreed 10>* commission to the plaintiff
who therefore sued for it. The learned trial jUuge relied
1 ^ 7on Lord Watson’s statement in Toulnin v. Miller that
"in order to found a legal claim for commission, there must 
be a contractual relation;, between the introduction and the 
ultimate transaction on sale" and decided that a compul­
sory acquisition was a negation of contract and therefore 
no commission was payable to the plaintiff. The judgment 
was affirmed by the Nigerian bupreme Court. The statement 
of their Lordships of the bupreme court emphasizes the 
point we are trying to male here. bairamian F.J. who 
read the judgment after discussing the bullish authorities 
on the subject added:
"A commission of 10 per cent is high. it shows how 
anxious the defendant was ro get rid of his interest 
and it was the wit of the plaintiff in speaking to 
the federal Lands officer which led to his getting 
the property off his hands at what was no doubt a 
fair price. A little generosity on his part would 
have been welcome, but that must be left to him."136
137- (1687) 56 L.i. 96.
136. bee McNeil and Mains, p.29 c.f. The Ghana case of 
Addagnay v. African Association (1910) Ren. 566 
where the plaintiff was denied his agency commission 
because of fraud.
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There is little doubt that unis decision is rather 
hard on the plaintiff. It is curious that in this case
'9
neither the plaintiff nor the court considered the applica­
bility of customary lav; to the transaction. It is con­
tended that in cases such as this, miscarriages of justice 
could be averted by emphasising the intention of the 
parties. Here they clearly intended that the plaintiff 
would be entitled to commission on a disposition of the 
defendant’s interest in the property. To have denied 
this to the plaintiff on a technical rule is, it is sub­
mitted with respect, patently unfair. If the stipulated 
commission was too high, the Court could impose a reasonable 
sum.
As we have already pointed out, we have no 
serious objection to the continued requirement of considera­
tion as an element of a valid agreement. we contend, 
however, that the doctrine must shed its technical nature
and be but evidentiary of a transaction* The payment of
139’aseda’ or ’ntrama’ in Ghana customary laws or ’oji* in
139* On ’ntrama’ and ’guana1 see the decision of Ollennu J. 
in the Ghana case of Donkor v. Asare, (19©) C.L.H.187; 
also the Ghana Court of Appeal decision in Angmor & Co. v. 
Yiadom 111 & anor (1959) G.L . H. 157; ongifts see Amo v. 
ntwiaah (1965T“P.O. 172; bemua v. fforiwaa (I960) G.L.A. 
25?; On aseda, see Allott, Assays, pp.231 and. 256;
J.Li. Sarbaii, Eanti Customary law, pp.74-75*
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Ibo customary law, is not burdened with the same tech­
nicalities as we find in the English doctrine. These are 
but evidence of the fact that the parties meant business.
It is submitted that this should be the role of considera­
tion in an integrated law of agreements in G-hana and
• 141 Nigeria.
(vij form and consideration in customary law:
Customary agreements are not entirely destitute of
certain forms. The sale or other disposition of land in
the respective tribes in Ghana and Nigeria is attended with
142elaoorate formalities, the absence of some of which would
140. See S.N.G. Obi, Ibo haw of Property, (London, 1963) 
p. 113; ivi. Green, ibo village aihairs, London, 1947, 
chapter 4. On the Yoifflbas, see r.G. ^loyd, Yomba Land 
law pp.60-69.
141. Lee also The future of lav; in Africa, Allott (ed.) 
I960, p.40.
1-1-2. In Ghana: J.N. bar bah: Panti customary lav;, pp. 42;
74-75* R.b. Rattray, nshanti law and constitution, 
London, 1956, p.356; J.n. Lanquah, ARan Laws and 
Customs, p. ; N.A. Oll&nnu, Customary land law; in 
Ghana, London, 1962, pp.109-110; Adai v."DhKuj (1905) 
Ren. 417; Adjuah v. Wilson (1926-29) F.ct. 261; 
Norquaye v. halm (1959) G.L.R. 366. In Nigeria:
J.O. field, "bales of land in an Ibo community"
(1945) han, vol. XLV. I\To. 47; C.N. Meeh, Land law 
and custom in the colonies, (1946) p.162; P.O. Lloyd, 
Yoruba land' law (Lonaon) 1962. p.60; S.N.C. Obi,
Ibo law of property, (1963) p.114.
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be fatal to the validity of the transaction. Marriage also
143must conform to certain set forms. Money-lending
144 145 ■transactions and bailments m  customary law have
been said to require certain given forms to be valid and
146enforceable. A learned author has justified these formal 
requirements in land and marriage transactions on the basis 
of the jjeculiarities of property and family laws.
Nwabueze would dispense with formalities in other cus- 
t omary agr e ement s.
While agreeing with his latei' suggestion, one would, 
however, add that the aim of the law shoulu. be to simplify 
property transactions and that the requirements of rigid 
form is hardly a step towards this goal. There is of course, 
the need for certainty,. As has already seen suggested 
in connection with agreements under seal, we feel that 
’form* should not go to the ’essential validity' of an 
enforceable agreement in customary law.
There is still the question whether or not cus-
147tomary law knows anything like the doctrine of consideration.
143. In re dapara (1911) hen. 605; Kofi v. Agbote (1959)
G.L.K. 305•
144. Hughes v. navies (1909) hen. 550.
145. Ansa v. dacney (1923-25) f.ct. 113.
146. b.0. Nwabueze, "integration of the law of contract" 
p.14.
147. On form in Islamic law, see J.N.h. Anderson, (1959)
3 J.A.L. 152. On Islamic agreements generally, see 
(195b) 33 New York University L. Nev. 917.
341
Nwabueze has deduced from the dearth of evidence on the 
enforcement of executory agreements in customary law, the 
conclusion that there was no such thing as consideration 
in the law. The learned author however concedes that the 
issue as to the existence or otherwise of executory agree­
ments in customary law is by no means resolved. The recent 
149judgment of Ollennu J. in the G-hana Land Court, to the 
effect that specific performance is a recognised customary 
remedy, stresses the inconclusive nature of the argument, 
row, although it is correct to assert that consideration 
in its imported technical sense was unknown to traditional 
customary agreements, it is equally true to say that in 
all systems of customary law there was a type of 1 earnest1 
which gave customary transactions business efficacy.
150Althougn these went by different names in different places 
the role they played were strixiifgly similar. It is 
submitted with respect that it is futile to search for the 
attributes of the English doctrine of consideration m  
a customary transaction. The role of the ’earnest* is 
to validate and give business touch to a
148. Op.cit. p.14.
149. Kwarne v. Eio, I960, May 9th High ct. (Lands Division).
(I9 6 0) G.L.a. 1 1 9.
150. On the terms used in the Ghana systems, see Allot,
Essays, pp.243, 256; In Nigeria, see Obi, op.cit. 
p.114; Lloyd, op.cit. p.220.
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151transaction.  ^ It also facilitates the proof of the 
existence of an obligation. This later function is the 
precise role that we prescribed for any doctrine of con­
sideration in our preceding sub-head. It may be added that 
in Islamic law the conclusion of a contract is essentially 
informal. Only the literalmeanings of certain technical 
terms such as safka (striking hand upon hand) reflect 
former symbolic acts.
(vii) Intention to create legal relations:
In English law the consensus of the parties and
the presence of consideration do not exhaust the essential
152requirements of an enforceable agreement. The parties
151* See the G-hana cases of Poku v. Ntow (1965) c.c. 165,
where it was held that *aseda* gives business efficacy 
to native transactions; Angmor v. Yiadom (1959) G-.L.R. 
157 where *guaha* was said to be indispensable to the 
validity of customary sales of land and ’ntrama* in 
transactions over personalty; hramo v. Kuma (1965) 
c.c. 21 where *aseda* gives and shared by the family 
was held to validate the appointment of a successor.
152. In the United States Professor Williston of Harvard has 
felt that a third requirement is superfluous. He has 
argued that the courts enforce an agreement if there is 
consideration, that the common law does not require any 
positive intention to create a legal obligation as an 
element of contract, see Williston, Contracts, (L(57) 
s.21; p.39 c.f. Cheshire & Piffot Contract, p.93.
See also R. Tuck, "Intent to contract and mutuality of 
assent" (1943) 21 can. B. Rev. 123. c.f. Lord Stowell 
in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hagg. Con. 54 at 
p.105.
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must also nave intended to create or to alter any existing 
legal relations. it' from the nature of the transaction or 
the wording of the agreement the courts are of the opinion 
that the parties intended to be bouna in honour only, they 
will not enforce the obligation. Ihe decided cases in 
the English courts tend to indicate the existence of a dual 
standard in this aspect of the law. In domestic trans­
actions the courts go on the presumption that the parties
15 ^
did not intend to create legal relations out this can
154be rebutted by tne actual dealings between them. in
commercial transactions the presumption is that the parties
15 5intended to create legal relations  ^ but this can be
156rebutted by the actual insertion of an 'honour clause'.
153. Balfour vi halfour £l91Sp 2 n.B. 571, see also the 
court of Appeal (England) decision of Bpeliman v.
Bpeliman Q.961) 2 All S.It. 498 where the Balfour 
principle was applied. Bee particularly the judgment 
ox Bcrutton, L.J. in Rose and frank v. Crompton £192 
2 h.h. 261 at p.2ob.
154. IvicGregor v. I5cGregor (l8bb) 21 Q.B.l). 424 a case of 
cross-assaults between husband and wife; Simpkins v.
Pay's (ClS55l 3 All E.R. 10; and Parmer v. Clarx /(Y9607 
1 All E.R. 93.
155. Carlill v. Carbolic Bmoke Ball Co. (£Lb9!0 1 Q.B. 256; 
see particularly the Lord Phillimore in Rose and Prank
v, Crompton in the House of Lords 0:9 2^J A.0.445 at p.455
156. Jones v. Vernon's Pools, Ltd. £l93jJ 2 All.E.R. 626; 
Appleson v. hittlewood, Ltd. Q-93JJ 1 All. E.R.464. 
i'he rule in these group of cases has been criticised
by the learned editors of Law Reform Now, London, I963,
p. 64.
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fhe courts in Ghana and Nigeria have not yet worked 
out any set of applicable rules in this sub-branch of
157the lav/. It is clear that only Dalrymple v. Dalrymple
and the McGregor decisions form part of the imported law 
157of Nigeria, and that only the former is part of the law
15bof Ghana. Jones v. Vernon* s fools Ltd. has been
followed in the Ghana case of Chikezie v. Bilie1 s fools
"1 R CD& Anor. J11 may however, be argued that this decision was
based on a local stature. Regulation 3 of the football fools
Regulations 1964 (L.I. 35b) made unuer section 11 of the
160
football fools Authority Act 1961 (act 7b), provides as 
followss-
lf3. It is a basic condition of the sending in and the
acceptance of every coupon that it is intended and
agreed -
(a) that the conduct of the football fools and every­
thing done in connection therewith and all arrange­
ments relating thereto (whether mentioned in these 
regulations or to be implied), and
(b) that any coupon and any agreement or transaction 
entered into or payment made by or under it,
shall not be attached by, or give rise to any legal 
relationship, rights, duties or consequences whatso­
ever or be legally enforceable or the object of
157- Both are pre-1900 decisions of Bnglish courts.
15b. Being the only pre-lb74 decision in this group of cases.
159. (1965) C.c. 137.
160. No similar regulations have been made under the 
Nigerian fool Betting Control Act, 1961, (No. 69 
of 1961)
litigation; but that all such arrangements, 
agreements, or transactions are binding in 
honour only on all parties."
In the Chikezie case the plaintiff alleged that in 
April 1963, he won £2,660:11:6d. on a football coupon 
ho. 9747bu, which he filled in duplicate and presented to 
the defendants who were sub-agents of Betters International 
Pools Ltd. for transmission to London through the Ghana 
Pools Authority, third parties to the action. The plain­
tiff alleged that the defendants negligently failed to send 
the original of his coupon to Lonaon, and were therefore 
liable to him for the amount claimed which represented his 
winning if the coupon had been sent in. It was held by 
Jdoison J. at Accra that the handing in and the acceptance 
of the coupon did not create any enforceable legal relation­
ships and that the transaction was binding m  honour only. 
The court relied on Regulation 3 of the football Pools 
Authority Regulations.
This decision raises afresh the issue of the value 
of ’honour clauses* whether statutory or otherwise in 
agreements that are otherwise legally enforceable. . The 
position in Ghana is further complicated bj the provision 
in Section 2 (4) of the parent enactment (the football 
Pools n uthority XiC ~fc )
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1 6 1H2 (P) The authority may enter into agreement with 
any person for the operation of football pools and 
the agreement shall provide for the retention of a 
share of the profits accruing to that person from 
the operation of the football pools:
Provided mat no agreement executed by the authority 
shall be valid unless the same shall have been 
executed with the consent in writing of the minister 
first hau and obtained.'1
There is no doubt that any agreement that is valid 
under the above sub-section will be enforceable in the 
courts. There is no provision to the contrary in the 
Act itself. It is curious tuerefore that while the 
authority or any of their agents can enforce their obli­
gations against each other, an investor is denied this right 
under the regulations. It is respectfully submitted that 
such a situation is oound to produce absurd results. If the 
courts will assist the authority or any agent, mere is 
no logic or justice in their refusing the same assistance to 
the clients on whose investments the others depend for their 
continued existence as going concerns. It is further sub­
mitted that the ’honour clause* in agreements should be 
treated no differently from other provisions that are 
against public policy. This argument is given greater 
weight by the actual sums involved in many of these trans­
actions. An agreement that involved upwards of £2,000
161. That is, the authority established by the Act to
provide for the organisation and control of football 
pools transactions in Ghana.
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in countries like Ghana and Nigeria should invite the 
scrutiny of the courts rather than their present judicial 
abstinenc e.
As regards domestic agreements the attitude of
the courts in G-hana does not seem to be very clear. The
lb2case of hliza horns v. John Iuonrovia appears to
indicate a willingness on the part of the courts to apply 
any existing customary rule where the parties are natives.
In that case the plaintiff and tne deceased John v/eatu, 
were both hroos from Liberia. They had cohabited for some 
years but were not actually raarriea. The plaintiff’s action 
was against the administrator of the estate of John weatu, 
claiming a house which she alleged was built on their 
joint contributions, or £94 being the son she had contri­
buted. The trial judge found the contribution proved and 
allowed the claim for £94* This was reversed by the 
G-hana Court of Appeal on the ground among others, that the 
plaintiff had not established her case - for an intention 
to create a loan transaction rather than an outright gift.
In course of his judgment Sawrey - Cookson J. referred with 
approval to the 'sarwie* custom described by Sarbah in his
162. (1930) 1 ri . A • C • A • 70. In this case the courts applied 
the imported law requirement of intention to create 
legal relations. bee also Odum v. Banson (1965)
C.C. 1 7 7.
348
*1 £
book and. added that if the parties were Pant is, he
would have allied this c u s t o m . T h e  custom, however,
does not cover cases wnere the parties are validly married.
It is possible to argue that in the latxer case such an
1 d 5
agreement would be enforced. There does not appear to be
any local Nigerian decision on.tnis aspect of the law. It 
is hoped that the English rule in domestic transactions 
will be aaopted. The nature of the agreement should 
determine its binding nature or otherwise.
163. Eanti customary law, p.42 lias the following:
"A woman living m  concuoinage cannot sue tiie man with 
whom she is so living for any maintenance, nor can 
her family or parents sue the man for any satisfaction 
or maintenance. Whatever is given or entrusted by a 
man or woman, to the person with whom he or she is 
living in concubinage cannot be reclaimed on any con­
sideration whatsoever . . . .  if a man therefore will
not be properly and honourably ma,rried to a woman but 
will for his own purpose keep her and live upon her 
labour, she is at liberty to terminate the immoral 
relation at any time she pleases, and she shall not 
be liable to return to him anything whatsoever ne may 
have given or entrusted to her for safe meeping, sale, 
or any purpose whatsoever.” cf. Ansa v. Sacney 
(1923-25) tf.Ot. 113 where a refund of trading uebts 
was ordered where the transactions took place after 
termination of the concubinage.
164. The result of the case would have been the same, anyway.
165. See Ayer v. Lumordzie (1965) C.C. 45.
PART V.
VALID AGREEMENTS:
NORA THAN TWO PARTIES
3 5 0
In the preceding part we dealt with the 
creation of valid agreements where two parties are 
involved. In this section we- we shall be
looking at agreements with more than two parties.
These will be treated in three sections namely;
(i) agreements between two parties where a third party 
is affected. Privity of agreements will be discussed 
under this subheading;
(ii) agreements between two parties where one or both 
are represented by a third. This has often been treated
under the heading of agency; and finally,
(iii) agreements between two parties where one or both 
subsequently transfer to a third. These are of course 
the familiar topics of assignments and negotiability.
1. See Prof. Corbin, ’Contracts for the benefit of 
third parties” (1930) 46 L.Q.R; 12; G-lanville 
Williams, ’’Contracts for the benefit of third 
parties” (1944) 7 M.L.R. 123; P.E.Dowrick,
”A jus quaesifcum tertio by way of contract in English 
law” (1956) 19 M.L.R. 374; M.P.Purmstin, "Return 
to Dunlop v Selfridge?” (i960) 23 M.L.R. 373; S. 
Chaffee Jnr. "Equitable servitudes on chattels” 
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945-1013; E.C.S. Wade, 
"Restrictions on User” (1928) 44, L.Q.R. 51; Lord 
Denning, "The Way of an iconoclast, (1959-63)
Journal of The Society of Public Teachers of Law, 
p. 77. see also the Interim Report of the Law Reform 
Committee, Comnd, 5449 (1937).
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SECTION 1 - 
PRIVITY:
It is a general rule of English law that a 
contract affects only those who are parties to it. 
Nobody can obtain the benefit or bear the burden of 
an agreement to which he is a stranger. The injustice 
that would result and has in fact resulted from the 
rigid application of this rule has driven English
judicial and academic opinion to invent exceptions to
2
its operation.
There are also several statutory exceptions.' 
Two aspects of the rule, namely, attempts to 
confer benefits on a third party and attempts to im­
pose the burden of an agreement on a stranger have been
recognised. The two facets of the rule constitute the
4
English doctrine of privity of agreements.
2. e.g. where equity imputes the creation of a trust - 
Dutton v. Poole (1678) 3, Lev. 210; Banker*s 
Commercial Credit cases, see De ning, supra at p.81; 
guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannary & Co. 1918
2. K7B7 1)23; Kalas v. British Imex Industries Ltd. ,
1958 1 ALL E.R. 262; cases of agency axe sulcgeneris
3. S. II of the married women Property Act, 1882; S. 29 
of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882; S. 14 (2) of the 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906; SS.47 and 56(1) of the law 
of Property Act, 1925; S.36 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930
4. In French law this was formulated as the doctrine of 
relativity; Buchland and McNair, Roman law and common 
lav/, 2nd ed. pp. 214-217.
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Like the doctrine of consideration to which 
reference has already been made, the critics of the 
rigid application of the doctrine of privity have been 
so vocal and its impact has so besmeared all notions 
of justice that one takes another look at the authorities 
to satisfy oneself that it is or not part of the received 
laws of Ghana and Nigeria. The recent decision of 
the Nigerian Supreme Court in Chuba Ikpeazu v. African 
Continental Bank Ltd. and its general impact on the law 
of third party rights in Nigeria, underlines not only 
the need but the urgency of such exercise.
Benefit:
The old but leading case of Crow v Rogers 
decided in 1724 has often been said to lay down the 
rule that no stranger to an agreement can enforce any 
right under it, even if the agreement was made for 
his benefit.
In that case John Hardy owed the plaintiff 
£70 in return for a promise by Hardy that he would 
convey his house to the defendant. The plaintiff was 
a stranger to the agreement and could not enforce it.
On the other hand where a father intended to cut down
5. (1965) N.M.L.R. 374, for the fac s, see infra.
6. (1724) I Stra. 592.
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some oak trees to make provision for his children, 
(including) the plaintiff), and the defendant promised 
his father that if he spared the trees, he (the defendant) 
would give his sister (the plaintiff), £1000, it was
questioned in the later case of Tweddle v Atkinson, 
and in 1915 the House of Lords restated the rule that 
no stranger to an agreement can enforce any benefit
position as their Lordships saw it then. He said:
"In the law of England certain principles are 
fundamental. One is that only a person who 
is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our 
law knows nothing of a jus quesitum tertio arising 
by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred 
by way of property, as for example, unde# a trust, 
but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a 
contract as a right to enforce the contract in 
personam" 9
7. Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev. 210. It has often been 
thought that Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) I. B.E.S. 
595, overruled Dutton v. Poole, but this is doubtful 
in view of the fact that Dutton v. Poole is the 
decision of the court of Exchequer Chamber. The 
objection is not however a strong one for purposes 
of English law since the House of Lords decision of 
Dunlop v Selfridge supports the Atkinson decision.
7
held that the plaintiff could enforce this promise.
The authority of Dutton v Poole was seriously
o
under it, in rather strong terms.
Lord HaldaneTs words represent the true
at p. 855.
See the judgment of Lord Haldane
9. Supra at p. 855.
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Since Dunlop v. Selfridge, there has been 
a fierce jostle for exceptions and the line of reasoning 
which has its genesis in the Exchequer Chamber decision 
of Dutton v. Poole is still very much alive. A recent 
decision of the (English) Court of Appeal, restates 
the absurd results that will follow from a rigid 
adherence to the rule of privity. In the words of 
Salmon, L.J., "no system of jurisprudence should permit 
what was manifestly such a monstrous injustice"
In the Beswick case, the deceased had 
conveyed his coal business to his nephew, in consideration 
for his promising to pay him £6. 10/- weekly for the 
rest of his life and after his death, to pay his widow 
£5. weekly for her life. The nephew (defendant) kept 
to the terms of the agreement during his uncle1 s life 
but on his death refused to pay the widow as specified 
in the agreement or at all. Arrears of £175 accrued.
The widow (plaintiff) then sued personally and as an 
administratix of her late husband!s estate, for the 
arrears and for future regular weekly payments of £5. 
as provided for in the agreement. Vice Chancellor
BO* Be swi ck v. Be swi ck C.A; The Times, 25rd June, 1966;
See also the comment on this case that "The common 
law of England stands alone among modern systems of 
law in its rigid adherence to the view that a contract 
should not confer any rights on a stranger to the 
contract, even though the sole object may be to 
benefit him." w  ^  TiW»
Burgess in the Chancery Court of the County Palatine
of Lancaster decided in favour of the defendant, relying
on the judgement of Wynn-Parry, J. in re Miller*s Agreement.
But a strong Court of Appeal reversed this
decision. In a penetrating review of the authorities
Lord Denning (M.R.) reaffirmed his views on the subjast
as revealed in Smith and Snipes Ball Barm v. River
12Douglas Catchment Board, and Drive Yourself Hire
13Company (London) Ltd., v. Strutt,' to the effect that 
third parties could sue if the agreement was made for 
their benefit. Dankwerts L.J. added that section 56(1) 
of the law of Property Act, 1925 has "dealt Tweddle v.
Atkin son'1'fee mortal wound it well deserves
11. 0.947) ch. 615
12. C.949)2 KB. 515
13. (19543 I Q B. 250; 275
14. Supra.
15. It is remarkable that no reference was made in this 
case to the House of Lords decision in Dunlop v.
Selfridge, (1915) A.C. 847 which is the leading case 
on third party rights. It could be argued however, 
that the volume of protest against the rigid app­
lication of privity might dissuade their Lordships 
of the House of Lords feeling bound by the later 
case. See The Times 27th July, 1966.
A leader in "The Times" described the Beswick decision
as a "belated triumph of jus quaesitum tertio."
Although leve to appeal to the house of Lords was
refused, it is likely that Dunlop v. Selfridge may
no longer represent the true English law position
on Privity.
Position in Nigeria:
Now, what is the position in Nigeria? It
is clear that the post-1900 decisions of the English
Courts are not part of the imported law of Nigeria.
On this principle we are left with the two lines of
l6authority namely, the Crow v. Rogers, and Tweddle 
v* Atkinson^feeory, and the Dutton v. Poole‘S  theory
of third party rights. 'The former appears to have
no place for the enforcement of theird party rights
while the latter makes substantial concessions where
there is a clear case of intended benefit for the
stranger. The trend of local judicial authority,
19however, supports the former theory of privity.
15a. This is more so since the House of Lords have now
relaxed their practice of rigid adherence to
precedent on points of law.
16. (1724) I. Stra. 592.
17. (1861) I B L S. 393.
18. (1678) 2 Lev. 210.
19. See John Holt & Co. Ltd., v. Alhaji Jafa*aru (1958)
N.R.N.L.R. 29.
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In Chuba Ikpeazu v. African Continental Bank Ltd.,
the appellant, a leading legal practitioner in Nigeria, 
was the second defendant in a claim for £28,013. 19. lOd. 
by the respondent bank. The first defendants, Emodi 
Brothers, had admitted liability and were no longer 
taking part in the action. The two grounds of claim 
against the defendant (appellant) were (i) that he was 
a partner in the said Emodi Brothers; and (ii) that 
he guaranteed the loan to the partnership. Our 
concern here is with the second ground of claim. This 
was based on a deed between the appelland and William 
Emodi. By this deed William Emodi transferred the 
business of Emodi Brothers to the appellant in 
consideration for the appellant!s promise to guarantee 
his overdraft from the respondent bank. The deed 
was deposited with the respondent bank. The appellant1s 
defence, among others, was that the bank were strangers 
to the deed and could not sue on it. The trial judge 
at Onitsha (Eastern Nigeria) treated the deed as a 
guarantee and allowed the claim against the appellant.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that:
(i) generally a contract cannot be enforced by a 
person who is not a party, even if the contract is
20. (1965) N.M.L.R. 374.
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made for his benefit and purports to give him the 
right to sue upon it;
(ii) the possition is stronger with regard to contracts 
under seal; unless a person is named as a party to 
the deed, he cannot maintain an action upon it. The 
only exception to this rule relates to indentures 
made about land which was introduced by Section 5 of 
the Real Property Act, 1845, to enable a stranger to 
a deed to take advantage of a benefit to him in 
the deed.
The 4th and 5th grounds do not concern
us here. The Supreme Court thus allowed the appeal;
relying as their Lordships admitted they were, on the
21authority of Dunlop v. Selfridge.
Three aspects of the Ikpeazu decision
deserve some £e+?examination. Pirstly, although
their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed with
22approval, the rule in Tweddle v. Atkinson, as seen 
in the first ground of their decision, the other line 
of authorities stemming from Dutton v. Poole were 
never cited nor argued.
It is there ore still open to argument 
whether the Ikpeazu case has said the last word on
21. A.C. 847 Tweddle v. Atkinson was also 
discussed at lenth and the rule in that case was 
approved of by their Lordships.
22. Supra.
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third party benefits in the Nigerian Law of agreements.
It is respectfully submitted that it has not.
Secondly, their Lordships noted Section 5,
23of the Real Property Act, 1845 as the only exception
to the rule that no stranger to an agreement can
enforce its terms. There are of course, other
statutory exceptions to the rule. Section II of
the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act ^
empowers third parties under certain circumstances to enforce
insurance provisions made in their favour. Section 2
O  {T
of the Third Parties (Rights against insurers) Act, 
has similar provisions. Section II of the Married 
Women Property Act, 1882, an Act of general application,
r\ r
and Section 29 of the Bills of Exchange Act are other 
instances of exceptions to the rule of privity. It is 
clear therefore that as far as statutory exceptions go, 
their Lordship!s specific mention of Section 5 of the 
Real Property Act, 1845 is but representative of the 
others.
23. 8 & 9 Viet. C. V/o
24. Cap. 126, Laws of Nigeria (1958)
25. Cap. 196, Laws of Nigeria (1958)
26. Cap. 21, Laws of Nigeria (1958).
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Thirdly there are other recognised exceptions 
to the rule of privity which are part of the received 
law in Nigeria. One of them is where there was an 
intention to create a trust in favour of the stranger. 
This concept of the trust as an exception to the rule 
was recognised by Lords Haldand and Dunedin in the 
Dunlop v. Selfridge decision on which their OLordships 
of the Supreme Court of Nigerial heavily relied.
Its history, however is much older than the Denlop 
decision.
In Tomlinson v. Gill, 27
J.G. died intestate. The defendant, Robert 
Gill, promised the deceased*s widow, Catherine, that 
if she would allow him to be joined with her in letters 
of administration to be issued in respect of her 
husband*s estate, he would make good any deficiencies 
of assets to psy debts. Accordingly joint adminis­
tration was taken out, and action was taken by the 
deceased’s creditors to enforce the undertaking which 
the defendant had given. It was held that the 
creditors were entitled to the benefit of the contract 
made, since the widow had entered into it as trustee
27. (1756) Amb. 330, see also Re Flavell (1883) 25 
Cj. D 89, where the sqmie rule was applied. But 
see Re Schebsman £19443 Ch. 83 where it was refused.
361 •
for themvl
This principle was later applied by the
28English Hteuse of Lords in Walford’s case, an action
9 Q
on a charter party. Lloyd* s v. Harper, an action 
on behalf of third parties is also to the same effect. 
Now, both the Tomlinson and Lloyd * s cases are Pre- 
1900 decisions of English Courts and therefore part 
of Nigerian law. It is therefore remarkable that 
Ademola C.J.N, in the Ikpeazu decision rejected 
counsels *s submission for the bank in these terms: 
Counsel for the bank agreed that the bank 
was nnot a party to the document (i.e. the agreement) 
and cannot sue on it, but he said that this so at 
common law. In equity, he submitted that as the 
document is a compromise document prepared for the 
benefit of the bank, it (the bank) can sue on it on 
the theory of trusteeship. Counsel has not referred 
to any case for likening thebank to a cestui que trust, 
nor explained how the recital of a representation 
made by the appellant to William Emodi, that he had 
guaranteed the debt, can be read as the contract of
28. Les Affreteurs Beunis Sogiete Anonyme v. Leopold 
Walford (London) Ltd., £L9l2J A". C. 801
29. (1880) 16 Ch. D. 290.
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guarantee given by the appellant to the bank; and 
we do not know of any decided case which supports 
his submission*..1 ^
It is very respectfully submitted that 
there is no lack of judicial authority for the 
theory of trust as an.exception to the rule of privity.
It is sad that these cases were not cited or argued
*51
before their Lordships.
Finally, neither counsel for the bank
32nor a strong Supreme Court^ %&&&&& cyfi
protesir against the unjust results that will follow 
any rigid application of privity. Their Lordships 
were unanimous in accepting the doctrine as enunciated 
by the House of Lords in Dunlop v. Selfridge. It is 
curious however, that the massive literature of dissent 
against privity could not persuade the Supreme Court 
to the contrary. Neither the American approach as
30. Op. cit. at p. 379
31. Apart from the etheory of trust, other recognised 
exceptions to the privity rule are banker*s 
commercial creditors - see C.V.Brown, The Nigerian 
Banking System, Glasgow, 1966 passim; agency - 
will be discussed in a subsequent section.
32. Composed of Ademola C.J.N. Brett, Bairamian, 
Onyeama and Ajegbo JJ. S.C.
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33contained in section 133 of the Restatement of Contracts ,
34nor the Ghana solution, held out any attraction to 
their Lordships. Perhaps the court relied on 
Parliament to abolish privity if it wanted to. it 
is however, observed with respect that it was not by 
reliance on Parliament that Lord Hardwicke, Lord 
Mansfield and Lord Atkin made their reputations as 
judges. If the heroic age of judicial exploits is 
past in English law (Lord Penning1 s]- judgements 
suggest the contrary), it is by no means so in Nigeria.
Position in Ghana:
The position in Ghana is now governed by 
Section 5 (i) of the Contract Act, I960 (Act. 25) 
which is as follows:
"5(i). Any provision in a contract made after 
the commencement of this Act which purports 
to confer a benefit on a person who is not 
a party to the contract, whether as a designated 
person or as a member of a class of persons, 
may, subject to the provisions of this part 
(i.e. part ii), be enforced or relied upon by that ^  
person as though he were a party to the contract'1
33. See also Article 1029 of the Quebec Civil Code 
which is to the same effect. Even the Civil Code
of the USSR has a similar provision in Article 167 - 
see translation by Kiralfy, 1966.
34. See infra. See particularly Section 6 of the Ghana 
Contract Act.
35. The exceptions to this provision will be discussed 
later.
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No local decision has been based on this provision 
but it is clear that a similar provision in Nigeria 
could have covered the Ikpeazu decision.
36Burden
The other leg ofthe doctrine of privity
is that nobody shall be liable under an agreement
to which he is a stranger. On the face of it, this
appears a salutory rule, for life would be rather
unbearable if liabilities were imposed on persons
not party to an agreement. English law, has however
made special concessions here to land matters. A
restrictive covenant runs with the land and can be
enforced against a third party who has knowledge of the 
37restriction.
Outside land matters, two kinds of cases 
under this leg of privity have been recognised by 
the courts. The first is the attempt to impose 
restrictions on the sale of goods, and the second is
36. See particularly E.G. S. Wade, "Restrictions on User" 
(1928) 44 L.Q .R. 51;rpn the privy council decision in 
the Strathcona case A.C. 108; and Z. Chaffee,
Jnr; "EquiTable servitudes on chattels" (1928)
41, Harv. L. Rev. 945.
57. Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph. 774. The scope of the 
rule in this case has been restricted to instances
where the plaintiff retains some land that will be 
affected by the breach of the covenant.
36b
the attempt to restrict the use of chattels.
Restrictions on the sale of goods:
In English law this has taken the form of 
manufacturers or vendors restricting the sale or 
retail prices of goods supplied to their dealers.
Any provision in an agreement to this effect is not 
enforceable by the courts. An exception to this 
rule was made by Section 25 of the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1956, which permitted the individual 
(but not collective) enforcement of such terms against 
persons who acquired such goods for purposes of resale 
in the course of business and with notice of the 
conditions.
Section I of the Restrictive and Resale Prices Act,
1964 has made void contractual provisions between a 
supplier and a dealer so far as they purport to estab­
lish, or provide for the establishment, of minimum 
prices to be charged on resale of the goods in the United 
Kingdom.
It is interesting to contrast the position 
in English law with the law in Ghana on this subject.
38. Taddy v. Sterious (1904.) I Ch. 354 i.e. against 
a stranger to the agreement. The Taddycase was 
on restrictions on tobacco prices.
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Section 5 (2) (a) of the Ghana Contract Act, I960 ^
provides as follows:
"5 (2) Subsection (I) (i.e. rights of third parties 
to sue) does not apply to -
(a) a provision in a contract designed for the 
purpose of resale price maintenance, that is to say, 
a provision whereby a party agrees to pay money or 
otherwise render some valuable consideration to a 
person who is not a party to the contract in the event 
of the first mentioned party selling or otherwise 
disposing of any goods, the subject matter of the 
contract, at prices lower than those determined by 
or under the contract:”
Thus in '.Ghana the common law position has 
been given statutory form. It is doubtful however, 
if this represents any major improvement of the law 
on the subject, rather than an attempt to project 
the arm of the state into agreements between private 
persons. Neither the courts nor the legislatures 
in Nigeria have applied their mindstto the problem 
of restrictions on sale of goods. In Nigeria, there­
fore, the courts are still free to make up their minds.
39. Act. 25
40. Since the Taddy decision is a post - 1900 English 
decision, it is submitted that the courts in Nigeri 
are still free to enforce resale prices on third 
parties; but the Ikpeazu case suggests a negative
answer.
Restrictionson the use of chattels:
"Reason and justice seem to prescribe that, at least 
as a general rule, where a man, by gift or purchase, 
acquires property from another, with knowledge of a 
previous contract, lawfully and for valuable'consid­
eration made by him with a third person, to use and 
employ the property for a particular purpose in a 
specified manner, the acquirer shall not, to the 
material damage of the third person, in opposition to 
the contract and inconsistently with it, use and 
employ the property in manner not allowable to the 
giver or seller".
41This dictum of Knight-Bruce in Be Mattos v. G-ibson,
based on the extension to chattels of the rule in
42Tulk v. Moxhay,' has been very much discredited in
43English law. It was, however, followed by the
* •
Privy Council in the Canadian appeal of Lord Strathcona
41. (1858) 4 De G-. & J. 276 at p. 282.
42. (1848) 2 Ph. 774.
43. See Port Line Ltd. v. Ben Line Steamer Ltd. 1958 
2 Q.B. 146, at p. 166, per Biplock, J. see also
E.C.S. Wade (1928) 44 L.Q.R. 51 C.E. Cheshire and
Fifoot, Law of Contract, (6th Ed. 1964) p. 396.
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Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Dominion Coal Co. Ltd,,^  It
is submitted that the De Mattos decision and not the
Port Line variation of it, is part of the laws of
4 5
Nigeria and Ghana.  ^ The position in Ghana is made 
clearer by the fact that this is not one of the 
exceptions to third party rights as provided for in 
Section 5 (I) of the Contract Act, I960.
44. \±926\ A .C. 108.
45. See also Kessagenes Imperiaales Co. v. Baines 
(1865) 7, L.T. 763. These are all pre-l~8?4 
decisions of English courts. The Port Line case 
was decided in 1958.
SECTION 2. 370
(ii) Agreements between two parties where one or both 
is represented by a third; i.e. Agency
Although a person cannot by an agreement
with another confer rights or impose liabilities upon
a third, yet he may represent another, as being
employed or otherwise authorised by him, for the
purpose of bringing him into legal relations with a
third. As v/as stated by Tindal, G.J. in the old
2
case of Wilson v. Tufiian:
"That an act, done for another, by a person not 
assuming to act for himself, but for such other 
people, though without any precedent authority 
whatever, becomes the act of the principal, if 
subsequently ratified by him, is the known and 
well established rule of law. In that case the 
principal is bound by the act, whether it be for 
his detriment or his advantage, and whether it 
be founded on a tort or a contract"
Bowstead has defined agency as the relation­
ship that exists between two persons one of whom, the
1. See Bowstead on Agency, 12th ed. by E.J.Griew, 
(195$) passim; HalsburyTs laws, 3rd ed. pp. 145- 
246; W. Muller-Freienfels, "The undisclosed 
principal" (1953) 16 M.L.R. 299 F.E.Dowrick,
"The relationship of principal and agent" (1954) 
M.L.R. 24. See also G-.H.L. Fridman, The law of 
Agency (i960) Stotjar, The lav/ of Agency (1961)
2. (1843) 6 M.C.G-. 236, at p. 242.
principal, expressly or impliedly cnnsents that the 
other, the agent, similarly consenting, should represent 
him or act on his behalf. One of the unique advan­
tages of the doctrine of agency is of course, that it
tempers the rigidity of the doctrine of privity of 
4
contracts. Agency is of especial significance in 
the laws of Ghana and Nigeria for two reasons. Firstly, 
after the abolition of the slave trade in the 19th 
century, the primary interest of Europeans in the 
West African coast was other forms of trade. Several 
European companies extended their operations to West 
Africa and local personnel were recruited either as 
servants or as agents. This explains the relative 
wealth of local case law on the subjects of master and
3. op. cit. p. I. See also American Restatement, Contracts, 
S.I. In the Indian Contract Act, 18?2., ST 182 an 
agent is defined as ”a person employed to do any act 
for another or to represent another in dealings with 
third persons".
4. Cf. Sir Fredrick Pollock* s comments on the case of 
Cooke v. Eshalby (1887) 12 App. Cas. 271, in (1888)
3 L.Q.R. 359. Pollock regretted the impact of the 
doctrine of the undisclosed principal on the theory 
of privity of contracts.
5. See J.D. Fage, An Introduction to the History of West 
Africa, Cambridge 3rd ed. 1962, p. ll7 K.O.Dike,
Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, (Oxford, 1956) 
pp. 9? et seq. Wilson v. Tuman supra being a pre- 
1874 English decision is part of the imported laws
of Ghana and Nigeria.
servant, guaranteed, and agency. For our purpose 
here, it emphasises the need for an examination of 
the concept of agency in the two territories. The 
second reason is that family property is still very 
much part of the laws of Ghana and Nigeria. . The 
language of agency has been used in examining the 
position of the family head in relation to family 
property. Agency is of course a comprehensive word 
used to describe both the relationship between the 
principal and the agent on the one hand, and the 
rights and liabilities of third parties on the other. 
While we are concerned with both these aspects of 
the subject, our emphasis will be on the latter for 
the obvious reason that it is this facet of the 
probleip that has mostly exercised the courts in 
Ghana and Nigeria.
A: CREATION:
Five modes of creating the relationship
of principal and agent have been recognised in English
law namely (i) by an actual or implied authority to
7
contract given by the principal to the agent.
6. See Allott, "Family Property in West Africa: its 
juristic basis, control and enjoyment." See also
S.K.B. Asante, (1965), 14 I.C.L.Q. 1144.
7. Pollock v. Stables (1948} |2 Q.B. 765.
(ii) by the principal’s ratification of an agreement 
entered into by the agent on his own behalf but
o
without his authority: (iii) by an ostensible
authority conferred by the principal on the agent
Q
even though no actual authority has been given:
(iv) by a legal preamption in the case of a married 
woman cohabiting with her husband:10 and finally
(v) by an implication of law in cases of necessity.11
Only the first three modes of the formation 
of agency have been the subjects of local judicial
decision in Ghana and Nigeria. We shall be examining
12these seriatim.
8* Bolton Partners v. Lambert (1888) 41 Ch. D. 295^
See also KeighTy, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant £j-901j A.C.240
9. This is the same as agency by estoppel. Pickering v.
Busk (1812), 15 East, 38. See also Partnership Act,
1890, s.5 (England).
10.Debenham v. Mellon (1880) 5 Q.B.B. 394.
11.Harrison v. Grady (1865) 13, L.T. 369. The question
of capacity will be discussed under defective agreements* 
infra.
12.It is likely, however, that in the 4th and 5th modes 
of formation the courts in Chana and Nigeria will 
follow English authority. This will be particularly 
true in Ordinance Marriages.
(i) Actual or implied authority:
Generally, no special form is necessary for 
the creation of agency. It has been suggested that 
professional agents e.g. Solicitors, should insist 
on a written appointment to clear them from any
13
suspicion of champerty. There is however, no
direct judicial authority for this view.^ An
authority to execute a sealed document must also be
by deed. In the Nigerian case of Abina & two others
15v. Albert Farhat, the plaintiffs were landlords and 
the defendant was their tenant, paying rent on monthly 
basis on the premises let to him by the plaintiff1s 
father (deceased). On being given notice to quit, 
the defendant alleged that the terms of his lease 
with the plaintiffs had not expired. It turned out 
that the lease relied on by the defendant was granted 
by one Ogunala, an agent of the deceased father of 
the plaintiffs but who had authority to collect rents 
and not to grant leases. The deed was executed by
13. See Bowstead on Agency, p. 32
14. See however, Lord v. Kellett (1833) 2 Myl & K.I.; 
Allen v. Bone (T841) 4 Beav. 493.
15. (1938) 14 N.L.R. 17.
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Ogunala. Relying on Berkeley v. Hardy,^  Carey J.
held that the plaintiffs were not hound by the lease
and awarded judgment against the defendant. On the
17other hand, in the Ghana case of Cole v. Jead, 
a lease executed under seal by an agent who was not 
authorised to execute documats under seal, was held 
valid for the reason that the lease being for a term 
of less than three years could have been made in writing 
not under seal. The fanciful nature of the require­
ment of the seal for appointmnnts to execute sealed 
documents, is demonstrated very clearly by the fact 
that where the deed is executed by the agent in the
presence of the principal, the authority could be by
"i ft
mete wotds ot even signs. ° The logical inference
from this state of affairs is that the law strives
to fulfil the intentions of tte;parties and in this
case, words and signs go to portray the intention on
the part of the principal to be bound. It is re-
19markable therefore that in Berkeley v. Hardy a
16. (1325) 8 D & R. 102. In this case there was hinting
but not under seal.
17. (139) 5, W.A.C.A. 92
18. R.V. Longnor (1833) 4 B & AD. 647.
19. Supra Section 53 (i) of the lav/ of Property Act, 1925,
(England) which requires a lease for more than three 
years to be in writing provides that an agent who signs 
for a principal in these cases must also be appointed 
in writing.
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document not under seal did not avail the agent. It
is respectfully submitted that the continued ensistence
on the seal as the only alternative to words and signs
is too restricted a view and causes hardship in
individual cases. It obviously did cause hardship
in the Farhat and Berkeley cases.
Authority could also be implied from the
circumstances of the individual employed. It has
been said that every agent has implied authority to
act in accordance with the reasonable customs and
usages of the particular place, trade, or market where
20he is employed. ' In Real and Personal Advance Go.
21v. Phalempin it was held that a hospital matron
has implied authority to pledge the credit of the
hospital committee for meat supplied to the hospital.
The latter case is of course, not part of the law of
Ghana, but there is little doubt that it will be
22followed by the Ghana courts.
20. Ansons law of Contract, 22nd ed; 1964 p. 526. 
(1895) 9 T.L.R, 569.
21 . ( l ^ S ) ^ T L ^  St'?
22. e.g. s. 18 (i) of the Ghana Auction Sales Ordinance 
cap. 196, empowers auctioneers to sue for the price 
of goods sold. It is obvious that an auctioneer 
who so sues will be entitled to a refundof the cost 
the action reasonably incurred.
(ii) By Ratification: 377
The relationship of principal and agent is also created
where A adopts the act of B who purported to contract on his
behald either without any authority whatsoever or in excess
of any existing given authority. In such a case the principal
is said to have ratified the act of the agent and he is as
liable under the agreement as if the agent had his authority
in the first instance. Thus in the G-hana case of Bank of
23British West Africa Ltd., v. Adams,
The Yasarnet Cocoa Company Limited appointed one Briscoe 
its Attorney to mortgage its premises to the Bank of 
British West Africa Limited in security for a loan of 
£7,5Q§). The Mortgage, however, was executed (in 1920)not 
in the form of a mere security for the repayment of 
£7,500, but in the form of a continuing security covering 
the Accra overdraft. The £7*500 was repaid. In 1922 the 
company gave the defendant Barnett a debenture and, in 
1923 a mortgage over the company’s premises, subject to 
any subsisting mortgages in favour of the bank. In 1924 
the bank obtained judgment against the company for 
£9 ,105 .2 .lid. and costs in respect of the Accra overdraft, 
but this judgment was not satisfied. The company having 
gone into liquidation, and Barnett and Adams (the receiver 
and manager appointed under the debenture) being in occu­
pation of the premises, the bank sued them for possession 
under its mortgage and obtained judgment in the Divisional 
Court. On Appeal to the Pull Court, it was argued for the 
defendants that since Briscoe’s authority was limited to 
mortgaging the property for an overdraft of £7,500 and, 
this amount had been paid off, the company was no longer 
liable to the bank under the deed. Michelin,J. who read 
the judgment of the Pull Court easily dismissed this argu­
ment, holding among other things, that there was evidence 
that the company had ratified the execution of the mort­
gage to the bank, and that, as the judgment for the amount 
of the overdraft had not been satisfied, the mortgage 
subsisted not withstanding the repayment of the £7,500,
The operation of the principle of ratification is however 
confined to certain defined limits. Pirstly, the agent must
have contracted as an agent and not as principal, The recent
24case of Poloshade v. Duroshola, decided by the Nigerian
23. (1926-29) P. Ct. 215. On Nigeria, see Polo shade v. 
Duroshola (1961) All N.L.R. 87.
24. Supra,
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Supreme Court is authority for this view. In that case 
the plaintiff sued the defendant for recovery of 
possession of a certain piece of land. It happened 
that in 1926 and 1927 someone whom the plaintiff 
alleged was the agent of the vendors who later sold 
to the defendant, sold the land to one Alfa from whose 
next of kin the plaintiff purchased the property in 
1949. There was in 2L955 a purported ratification 
of the 1926-27 transaction and this was said to have 
been recited in the 1949 deed. But in 1952 the owner 
had sold and conveyed the said land to the defendant 
who went into possession in 1956. The court found 
as a fact that the landlord did not authorise the 
1926-27 transaction and consequently found for the 
defendant. On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, 
it was argued into alia on behalf of the plaintiff 
that the 1955 deed of ratification by the owner dated 
back to the sales of 1926^27 which therefore preceded 
the 1952 transaction. On this submission, Ademola, 
C.J.F. had this to say:
"I will deal with the first submission that the 
ratification dates back to 1927 and 1926. We 
were referred to the definition of ratification 
at page 1476 in the Dictionary of English law by 
Lord Jowitt. It is defined thus: ’Ratification:
Confirmation: agency may be created by ratifi­
cation where A purports to act as agent for B 
either having no authority at all or having no 
authority to do that particular act, the subsequent
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adoption by B of A fs act has the same legal 
consequences as if B had originally authorised 
the act. But there can be no ratification 
unless A purporded to act as agent, and to act 
for B, and in such a case B alone can sue.* The 
definition cannot by any stretch of the imagination, 
in my view, apply to the present situation.. 2 5
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment
of the court of first instance and the plaintiff's
p CL
appeal was dismissed.^
The second requirement is that the alleged 
agent must have contracted for an existing and 
ascertainable, though not necessarily a named principal. 
In English law pre-incorporation contracts of companies 
have been avoided on the basis that the promoters
27contracted as agents of a non-existent principal.
There has been some doubt as to the effect of contracts 
made conditional on the registration of the company 
on a specified date. One view has been that such 
contracts are binding on the company when eventually 
incorporated.^
25. Op. Cit at p. But see the G-hana case of Lokko v. 
Konklofi (1907) Ren. 450. where a chief1s acquies­
cence was taken to be ratification.
26. Apparently the plaintiff could sue the vendor for 
damages on a total failure of consideration. Any 
tort action might be statute-barred.
27. Kolner v. Baxter (1866) L.R. 2 c.p.174 see especially 
Erle,C.J. at p. 185, where he said"There miist be two 
parties to a contract, and the rights and obligations 
which it creates cannot be transferred by one of them 
to a third person"
28. See Cheshire and Eifoot, Law of Contract.6thed. 1964$i406
380
In Nigeria the law on the subject of non­
existent principals with regard to companies, was
stated by Sowemimo, J. in the recent case of Galigara
29v. Sartori & Co. Ltd,, as follows:
nThe law is that a company is not bound by its 
contracts purported to be entered into on its 
behalf by its promoters or other persons before 
its incorporation. The company cannot, after 
incorporation, ratify or adopt any such contract 
because there is in such cases no agency, and 
the contract is that of the parties making it.1
In that case an action against a company for the sui#
of £800 raised by its promoter before its incorporation
50was dismissed by the court. In the Ghana case of
51Panagiotopoulos v. Plastico Ltd., it was also held 
that a company is not bound by contracts purporting 
to be made on its behalf by its promoters or other 
persons, before its incorporation. It is clear, 
however, that this decision no longer represents the 
law on the subject. Section 13 of the Companies 
Code, 1963 (Act 179), provides as follows:
29. Il96l|I AIIN.L.R. 534 see also Newborne v.
Sensolid etc. £195^1 AII2S.R. 708
30. The Nigerian ^Companies Act, Cap. 37, laws of 
Nigeria (1958), appears to be silent on pre­
incorporation contracts.
31. (1965) C.C. 96, decided by Apaloo J.S.C. at 
Accra, High Ct. 5th March, 1965, unreported.
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"13 (i) Any contract or other transaction purporting tobe 
entered into by a company prior to its formation 
or by any person on behalf of the company prior 
to its formation may be ratified by the company 
after its formation; and thereupon the company 
shall become bound by and entitled to the benefit 
thereof as if it had been in existence at the date 
of such contract or other transaction and had 
been a party thereto♦ "
M(2) Prior to ratification by a company the person 
or persons who purported to act in the name or on 
behalf of the company shall, in the absence of 
express agreement to the contrary, be personally 
bound by the contract or other transaction and 
shall be entitled to the benefit thereof."
In this respect, therefore, Ghana law diverges from
the Nigerian and English lav/ on the subject. It is
submitted that the Ghana provision is productive of
fairer results than the principle as re-stated by
Sowemimo, J. in the Caligara case. The third
essential of the principle of ratification is that
the principal must be competent to make the agreement
both at the time the agent purported to act on his
behalf and at the time of the ratification. Again
in the case of companies, it has been held that a
company cannot ratify an agreement that is ultra vires
32its Articles of Association; There has been some 
doubt as to the effect on this doctrine oh Section 5
32. (1875) l.R. 7 H.L. 653.
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33of the English Companies Act, 1948.  ^ The latter 
Act is not a statute of general application and 
therefore not part of Nigerian law. There is no 
corresponding provision in the English Companies Act, 
1929 on which the Nigerian Companies Act, (cap. 37, laws 
of Nigeria, I 958) was substantially based. It 
appears therefore that the principle laid down in 
Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche is 
still very much part of Nigerian law on the subject.
In that case the directors of the appellant company 
agreed to purchase a concession for making a railway 
in Belgium. This company had no powers to do so 
under their memorandum of association. It was 
held that such an agreement was ultra vires and void 
as it was of a nature not included in the memorandum 
and as such could not be ratified even by the whole 
body of shareholders.
In Ghana the combined effect of Section 25 
of the companies Code, 1963, is that a company 
incorporated under it can make any agreement it likes, 
subject to the rights of certain specified persons to 
apply for a court order to set aside such agreements 
on several given grounds. The court has a discretion
33. See W.B.P. Holt (150) 66 L.Q.R. 493; L.C.B. Gower
(1951) 67, l.Q.R, 41
34-in the matter of setting aside an agreement.
Thus, although Section 25 (i) prohibits the making 
of 'agreements that are ultra vires the regulations 
of a company, Section 25 (3) provides as follows:
"25(3) Notwithstanding subsection (i) of this 
section, no act of a company and no conveyance 
or transfer of property to or by a company shall 
be invalid by reason of the fact that such act, 
conveyance or transfer was not done or made for 
the furtherance of any of the authorised businesses 
of the company or that the company was otherwise 
exceeding its objects or powers."
It appears therefore that an ultra vires agreement
could be ratified by a company in Ghana, subject to
the safeguards contained in Sections 25^4)210,^
218, 'jl and 247.'’
39The case of Adjaye v. Kufuor was an
34. S. 25(4) of the Companies Code, 1963.
35. Application to the court by any member of the 
company, or the holder of any debenture secured 
by a floating charge over all or any of the 
company’s property, or by the trustee of the 
holders of any such debentures.
36. Legal liability of directors for exceeding their 
powers.
37. Application by certain members for remedy against 
oppression. Here the oppression is the ultra vires 
act.
38. Application for winding up.
39. (1926-29) P. Ct. 147.
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instance of a principal purporting to ratify the
act of his agent when he lacked competence at the
time of such ratification* The facts of that case
were that one G-harbin, the flinguist1 of Omamhere
Kofi Adjaye was authorised to give evidence on behalf
of his Omanhere. G-harbin did give the evidence, but
at the end of the trial, he further executed a bond
for an appeal on behalf of his principal. It
appears from the facts that he had no authority to
execute a bond of appeal. The Omanhere purported
but
to ratify the execution of the bond/at the time of 
the alleged ratification the statutory period allowed 
for the bringing of appeals had expired. It was 
held that he had no capacity to ratify and that 
the appeal was out of time without leave and there­
fore null and void.^
(iii) Ostensible authority, or agency by estoppel: 
Where any person, by words or conduct, 
represents or permits it to be represented that 
another person has authority to act on his behalf,
40. It is remarkable that in this case an authority 
to execute an appeal bond was not implied from a 
general authority to represent the Omanhere at 
the trial. If the role of the linguist in 
customary law is similar to that of counsel in 
the imported lav/, it is difficult to justify, 
this limitation of his authority. On the implied 
authority of barristers and solicitors, see Bov/stead 
on Agency, pp. 65-66.
he is bound by the acts of such other person with 
respect to anyone dealing with him as an agent on 
the faith of such representation, to the same extent 
as if such other person had the authority which he 
was represented to have.^ Thus in the law of 
agency, appearance is equated to reality. The 
Privy Council has restated this principle in the 
following words in connection with the sale of goods:
MTo permit goods to go into the full possession 
of another, with all the insignia of possession 
thereof and of apparent title, and to leave it 
open to go behind that permission so given and 
accompanied, and upset a purchase of the goods 
made for full value and in good faith, would 
bring confusion into mercantile transactions 
and would be inconsistent with law and with 
the principles so frequently affirmed, 
following Ljkbarrow v. liason (1787) 2 T.R.63"
This was in the leading case of Akotey v. Commonwealth 
4-2Trust & anor. Here the plaintiff (respondent)
had consigned some cocoa to the second defendant 
but there was no agreement as to the price of the 
goods. The second defendant having got hold of 
the delivery documents, consigned the goods to the 
appellants to pay off an antecedent debt. There 
was no fraud on the part of the appellants. In an
41. See Bowstead, op. cit. p.10.
42. (1923-25) P. Ct. 78. See also Nanka-Bruce v. 
Laing and the Commonwealth TrustT Ltd. (19^3-25) 
P.Ct. 89. (Ghana). of the Nigerian case of Abina 
& ors Barhat (1938) 14 N.L.R. 17, where the 
plea failed.
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action for the price of the cocoa or their return, 
the trial court found for the defendants hut this 
was reversed by the Full Court. On a further 
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
the judgment of the Full Court was setaaside and it 
was held that the plaintiff (respondent) was bound 
by the dealings of his ostensible agent.
B, Rights and Liabilities of the parties:
Having discussed the various modes o:f 
creating agency as recognised by the courts in Ghana 
and Nigeria, we diall next examine the rights and 
liabilities of the parties involved in any given 
transaction. Nov/, agency has both internal and 
external aspects. The internal aspect is the relat­
ionship between the principal and the agent, while 
the external facet is the rights and liabilities of 
third parties. A third party for our purpose here 
is of course, anyone other than the principal and the 
agent, with whom the said agent contracts on behalf 
of the said principal and with his authority.
43. Other aspects of this case will be discussed under 
’defective agreements’ infra. Bee also the Nigerian 
case of Raccah v. Standard Co. of Nigeria (1922) 4 
N.L.R. 4$ where apparent authority was successfully 
pleaded.
(i) The Internal aspect of agency:
We are not here concerned with the rights
and duties of the various categories of general and
44special agents. Fascinating as this aspect of
the problem is, we feel that it is outside the scope 
of a general discussion of agreements. It is rather 
an aspect of the contractual and fiduciary nature of 
the relationship that we propose to explore. Re­
muneration of the agent by the principal and the 
liability of the agent to faccountI will be here 
discussed. Firstly, remuneration.^
The right of an agent to be remunerated 
for his services is founded upon an express or
implied agreement between the parties. We are here
concerned with express provisions in such agreements.
44. On this see Bowstead on Agency, pp. 48-108; R. 
Powell, The haw of Agency, Sna ed. London, 1961, 
pp. 295-377; S.J. StoYJar, The Law of Agency, 
London, 1961, pp. 267-326.
45. In both G-hana and Nigeria certain enactments 
make provisions for the remuneration of agents.
See among others for G-hana: Legal Profession
Act, I960. (Act. 32) ss 30-42; Auctions Ordinance 
(cap. 196;; s.140 of the Companies Co dee, 1963 
For Nigeria, see Legal Practitioners Act, 1962
ss 10 and II; Auctioneers Law, (cap. 9) Western 
Region, 1959; Pawnbrokers law, cap. 165, laws 
of Nigeria (1948).
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Most of such provisions take the form of commissions.
In English law the payment of commission depends on
the express terms of the agreement,^ and such
47terms are strictly construed by the courts. It 
is an implied term of the agreement that the agent
will not wrongfully be deprived of his commission
48by the principal.‘ A fraudulent agent loses his
commission in relation to the same transaction.^"
Judicial authority in both Ghana and
Nigeria tend to indicate a total adoption of the
English position. Thus in the Nigerian case of
goOdufunade v. Rossek, to which reference has been 
made in another connection, the agent lost in his
46. Biggs v. Gordon (i860) 8 G.B. (N.S.), 638, cited 
by'lowstead, op. cit. at p. 123.
47. Toubmin v. Killer (1887) 58.1.1. 96; see also 
Ackroyd and Sons v. Hasan [196(5] 2 W.L.R. 810
48. Turner v. Goldsmith ^189i3 I Q.B. 544; see also 
Warren & Go. v. Agdeshman [1922] 38 T.L.R. 588.
But c.f. Rhodes v. Forwood 1187o) I app. Cas. 356,
where the House of lords refused the agents 
(apellants) any remedy for loss of business.
49. Hippisley v. Knee jl905]]l.K.B. I. In this cade 
it was stated that the auctioneers would have 
lost their commission if there had been fraud.
50. (I960) F.S.G. 358.
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action for 10 per cent commission against the 
principal because the event stipulated in the 
agreement did not occur. In that case instead of 
an assignment of the lease, which was stipulated 
in the agency agreement, the property was com­
pulsorily acquired by the Nigerian Federal Government. 
It has already been shown that this v/as a very 
narrow construction of the provision in the agree­
ment. An attempt to justify this approach has been 
made by the analogy of agency commission agreements 
to insurance contracts, where the insurers are only 
liable for the specific risks insured against. It 
is submitted, however, that such analogy is rather 
improper for two reasons. Firstly, while insurance 
contracts are uberimmae fidei,agency agreements 
are not. Secondly, while in certain cases the 
assured could reclaim his premiums on a void policy, 
no such consideration is extended to the agent in 
cases of commission agreements.
The Ghana case of Mercer v. Anglo-Guinea
gl
Produce Co. is authority for the view that it
51. (1922) F. Ct. 114, c.f. Ankrah v. The German West 
African Trading Co. Ltd.7 ("1905) Ren. 400, where
the court was not prepared to imply the payment of 
commission. See also the Nigerian case of Nigerian 
Sweet & Confectionary Co. Ltd. v. Tate & Lyle 
(Nigeria) Ltd. 380/1964 - S.Ct. - Unreported.
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is an implied term of the agreement that the principal 
will not wrongfully deprive the agent of his commission.
In that !;case the Plaintiff (appellant) entered 
into an agreement with the defendants (respondent) 
company to be their cocoa purchasing agent. The 
company was to advance sums up to £1500 from time 
to time to enable the plaintiff purchase the cocoa 
and there was provision for the payment of commission 
on the purchases. The transaction was secured with 
a mortgage of the plaintiff’s landed property. In 
fact no such advances were made and no commission 
was paid. The plaintiff later had his property 
reconveyed to him. The defendants blamed this on 
the state of the market. In an action for the breach 
of the agreement, the trial judge decided in favour 
of the defendants. On appeal, the Full Court reversed 
the decision, thus deciding in favour of the plaintiff 
(appellant). After a review of the authorities,
Sir Phillip Crampton, C.J. who read the judgment
of the court, stated the law as follows:
go"These cases lay down the principle that the 
courts will not imply conditions not expressed
52. The cases referred to were: Taylor v. Caldwell- (1863)3
B.& S. 826; Oriental S.S. Co. v. Taylor'0-59;,J 2 Q.B. 
518; Rhodes v. Forwood (1876)1 App cas. 276; and 
Holford v. Acton Urban District Council,<(1898) 2 ch. 240
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in the contract. In the present case there is 
an express agreement to give employment; there 
are clear admissions that the employment was not 
given, from which it follows the plaintiff was 
deprived of the opportunity of earning commission, 
and by the retention of his title deeds by the 
defendants that he was deprived of the means of 
entering into contracts with other firms". 53
■The court relied for their decision, on the authority
54of Turner v. Goldsmith.
Finally, in Addaquay v. African Association^  
the point that arose was the circumstances under 
which an agent would lose his right to commission.
The plaintiff in that case was an agent of the defendants 
both for the purchase and shipping of produce, and 
the sale of other goods. He was to be paid commission 
on both transactions. It was a term of the agreement 
that the plaintiff should not sell goods on credit
53. op. eit. at p.117.
54. In that case an agreement to pay commission for 
five years was enforced by the court despite the 
fact that the factory where the goods were to be 
manufactured had been burnt down.
55. (1910) Ren. 586.
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without substantial security. The plaintiff had made 
substantial profits in the produce business but had also 
sold goods on credit without security. In an action 
for the payment of his commission, the defendants 
counterclaimed for the sales on credit and on the 
alternative pleaded that the breach of the clause of 
the agreement disentitled the plaintiff to any commission. 
The two problems posed by this case were
(i) Under what circumstances will provisions in an 
agreement containing several clauses be severed?; and 
(ii) What factors will deprive the agent of his 
commission? The answers to the two questions as
jr C
provided by Kennedy.,, J. in Hippisley v. Knee were
adopted by their Lordships of the G-hana Court of Appeal
(as it then was). In the Hippisley case, Kennedy, J. said
"I agree with my Lord that this is not one of the 
cases in which it would be just to deprive the 
agent of his agreed remuneration as well as his 
secret profit. I feel it is difficult to lay down 
any definite rule upon the subject with amnfidence, 
but I would venture to suggest the following, that 
where the agent1 s remuneration is to be paid for in 
the performance of several inseparable duties, if 
the agent is unfaithful in the performance of any 
one of those duties by reason of his receiving a 
secret profit in connection with it - and here I 
use the word !unfaithful’ as including a breach of 
obligation without moral turpitude - it may be that
he will forfeit his remuneration but where the
several duties to be performed are separable<as to my 
mind they are in the present case, the receipt of 
a secret profit in connection with one of those 
duties would not, in the absence of fraud, involve 
the loss of remuneration which had been fairly earned 
in the proper discharge of the other duties.”
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Accordingly their Lordships held that the plaintiff was
entitled to his commission in respect of the produce
transactions. It was made sufficiently clear that
fraud would have disentitled him to any such commission.
We shall next examine the fiduciary nature of
the relationship. Oiir discussion here will he centred
on the agent1s obligation to render accounts to his
principal. Our choice here has been determined by the
divergence of the customary law position in Ghana from
the English and in fact Nigerian law on the subject.
In an investigation such as this, the familiar but
unresolved issue of the duty of the family head to
render accounts to his members, assumes new importance.
The family head in relation to family property has been
discussed in the language of agency by some writers.
In a recent lecture, Allott has stated: "The English law
of agency is also relevant and some of its principles
have infiltrated into modern analysis of the powers
57
and responsibilities of the head of the family."
It may be observed that this is particularly 
true of the agent who is also a principal for certain 
purposes. Most v/riters on African laws are agreed on 
the fiduciary nature of the position of the family head. 
Sarbah in his Fanti Customary law has said: "In this
country the head of the family hold , family possessions.
57. "Family Property in West Africa: Its juristic basis, 
control and enjoyment" Lecture delivered at the School
of Oriental and African Studies, Univ. of London, 
during the^l965~66 academic session. See also S.K.B. 
Asaute (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q.1144 at p.1146.
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m  trust for himself and the members of his family, 
while Danquah has also said: "The highest English term 
which describes the office of an Akan patriarch is 1 trustee
a trustee, however, who is himself one of the cestui que
59trust".' To the same effect is Elias* position in
his Nigerian land law and customs as follows: "The heqd
of the family is, like the chief, a trustee-beneficiary
of family lands" In this, both G o k e r ^  and Ollenu^
are also in agreement.
Now, a fiduciary in English law is under a duty
to keep accurate accounts in respect of the transaction
for which he is appointed. He has to furnish periodical
♦
information on the state of the accounts to his benefi-
63ciaries and in any case, must do so on demand. We 
shall be looking at the positions in the customary 
laws of G-hana and Nigeria.
Ghana:
The often quoted statement of Sarbah^ on the 
powers of the family head, like the dead and buried 
forms of action in the common lav/, has haunted the
58. (2nd ed. 1904) p. 89 See also pp. 65-66.
59. Akan laws and customs (1928) p. 205.
60. ('3rd"ed. T 9F0I p. 143.
61. Eamily Property Among the Yorubas (1st ed. 1958) 
p.154.
62. Principles of Customary Land lav/s in G-hana (162) p.46. 
See also Bensi-Enchil Ghana land lav/. (London.
1964). and 116© Lloyd "Family Property among the 
Yorubas" in (1959) 3 J.A.L. 105 at p.110.
63. See Prof. Hanbury, Modern Equity (6th ed. 1952) p.343.
64. J.M.Sarbah, Fanti Customary law (2nd ed. 1904) p.90.
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G-hana Courts on the accountability of the family head.
In dealing with his powers of disposition of family
property, the learned author emphasised the immunity
65of the head from any action for account. It is
remarkable that this incidental statement on a general 
discussion of the powers of the family head, has been 
accepted and acted upon by the G-hana courts since 1924. 
Thus in the case of Pappoe v. Kweku, it was laid down 
by the Pull Court that no junior member of the family 
can claim an account from the head. This was a case 
where the brother of the deceased sued for an account 
of his late brother1s estate, letters of administration 
of which estate had been granted to the family head.
The court having ruled that the grant of letters of 
administration does not necessarily oust the application 
of native law, proceeded to lay down that the plaintiff 
had no right to sue the head for account. The language 
of G-ardner Smith J. who read the judgment of the court 
left little doubt on the matter.
65. On this question there is divergence of views 
between Sarbah and Danquah. The latter feels that 
the head is liable to account to the elders of
the family. See J.B.Danquah, Akan laws and Customs. 
Judicial support is, however, on Sarbah*s side.
66. (1923-25) P. Ct. 158.
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"In my opinion',1 he said, "the learned Chief 
Justice was justified in finding that native law 
applies and that it is a general principle of native 
law that the personal property of a deceased head 
passes to his successor (subject to certain obligations 
to support the other members of the family) and that
an action for an account is unknown to native law"
68In Abude v. Onanor ° the West African Court of Appeal
extended the scope of the head's immunity from account
from an action by a single member of the family to
even a group of family elders. In that case an
action for account by the elders of the Labadi Stool
against the G-a Mantse was held not to lie. It was
restated by the court that neither a chief nor the
head of a family can be sued for account either of
state or of family funds.
In 1953, the West African Court of Appeal
had yet another opportunity of re-considering the
justice of the immunity of the family head from account.
69This was in the case of Pynn v. Gardiner . The facts
were that one R.A.Harrison had made a valid gift of
his land to three of his maternal relations on whose
70death the land became family property. The plaintiffs
67. Ibid. at p.l6l. See also Villars v. Baffoe (1909)
Ren. 549. It is hard however, to see how the support 
referred to by his Lordship in the Pappoe case can
be enforced short of action for account.
68.(1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102
69. (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260. , /0  ^ ^
70. Por this view of the law, see Sarbah,(2nd ed.1904) p.90
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(appellants) were the grandchildren of the said R.A. 
Harrison and they sued the family head, (i) for a 
declaration that they were joint-tenants with the 
other members of the family of the said property left 
by their late father; and (ii) for an account of 
the proceeds from dealings with the land. The Native 
Court decided both issues in their favour, but both 
the Land Court and the West African Court of Appeal 
reversed this ruling of the Native Court, holding in 
favour of the defendants. Poster-Sutton,P; who read 
the court*s judgment restated the position in these 
words:
"We indicated, during the course of the arguments, 
that in our opinion, the Native Counrt erred in 
ordering an account. It is a well settled 
principle of native lav/ and custom that junior 
members of a family cannot call upon the head of 
the family for an account. Their remedy is to 
depose him and appoint another head instead". 7-1
Perhaps their Lordships v/ere rather influenced by the
vital fact that among the Akans, children are not
members of their fathers family, and do not inherit
his property on intestacy. It is nevertheless, curious
that the opinion of a Native court on the matter was
71. A+- ip-
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72lightly disregarded by the appeal court.
• It must be mentioned, however, that the 
Ghana Courts have allowed actions for account in cases 
where the agent was only a care-taker of the family 
property and not the family head. Thus in Nelson v. 
Nelson,where some of the children of a deceased native 
brought an action for account against a brother of 
tneirs who had been appointed by the deceased, on 
his death-bed, to look after their interests in his 
estate, it was held that an action for an account 
lay against him. The court emphasised the fact that 
the defendant was only a care-taker and not the family 
head. A later decision of the West African court of
72. Two views to rationalise the headfs immunity from 
account have been put forward. One is that the chief 
or head of the family cannot be sued in his own court 
and that it would detract from the dignity of the head 
to be called to account. This view has been based on 
the religious background of the office of the head.
For this see R.S.Rattray, Ashanti law and Consti­
tution, (London,1936) Ch. XXV; and, S.K.B.Asante, 
(I9fc5) 14 I.C.lTJ7 p/ 1151. It is submitted, however, 
that the whole tenor of the modern economic rise in 
the value of land militates against this privilege 
and that it has outlived its usefulness. The other 
view, that of Ollennu in his Principles of Customary 
land law in Ghana (1962) p. 137, has been based on 
the procedural difficulties of bringing a represen­
tative action against the family head, since he is 
the only person allowed to sue on behalf of the 
family. For the opposite view on this see, Asante, 
op. cit. pp. 1170-71; See also G.R.Woodman "The 
alienation of family land in Ghana" (1964) Univ. of 
Ghana L.J. 23. Woodman is of the opinion that the 
rise in the economic value of land calls for a re­
appraisal of the headTs immunity to account.
73. (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215
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Appeal restated this principle in unambiguous terms
In that case, Kingdon C.J. had this to say:
’’Turning now to the calirn for an account, the 
appellant has protested that the office of care­
taker cannot be thrust ex post facto upon a person 
in the way the judgment thrusts it upon the appellant 
and his brother Louis before him. Perhaps the term 
"Caretaker” is, strictly speaking, a misnomer, but 
it is a term which is commonly used in this country 
to mean the member of the family, not necessarily 
the head, who acts as agent for the family in 
conducting its affairs. The trial judge found, and 
I see no reason to differ, that the defendant and 
his brother, Louis, before him were caretakers in 
the sense I have indicated, though not heads of the 
family. They as the literate members of the family, 
naturally managed the family’s affairs rather than 
the illiterate plaintiffs, who entrusted the family 
affairs to members most capable of managing them.
It would, I think, be in-equitable and contrary to 
well-recognised native custom to deprive the 
illiterates of their claim to enforce their rights 
even after a period of years". 75
Nigeria:
In Nigeria, the trend of academic and judicial 
opinion is that the family head is liable to account.
n r  n n
Among the Yorubas, both Coker and Lloyd are of 
the opinion that the Yoruba family head is but primus 
inter pares, and that the courts will interfere to re-
no
store the rights of any member who acts in good time
74. Ruttmern & ors. v. Ruttmern (1937) 3 V/.A.C.A. 179
75. Op. cit. at p. 180. Is this equally applicable to a 
literate family head?
76. Family Property among the Yorubas, (1st ed. 1958)
p.1497 '.......
77. "Family Property Among the Yoruba" (159) 3 J.A.L.
105, at p.110.
78. Thus where a member waited for 40 years before bring­
ing the action, the court refused to entertain it: 
Kosoko v. Kosoko (1937) 13 N.L.R. 131
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79and in good faith. Thus in Mariana Lopez v.
80Domingo Lopez and Others,0 Combe, C.J. ruled that 
where there has been a persistent refusal by the head 
of a family, or by some members of the family, to 
allow other members of the family to enjoy their rights 
under native law in family land, the court has exercised, 
and will continue to exercise, its undoubted right 
to make such order as will ensure that members of 
the family shall enjoy their rights. Although it could 
be argued that this principle may only be applicable 
to Yoruba lav/ for which the case is authority, there
is support for the view that it also applies among
81 82the Efiks of Eastern Nigeria and among the Ibos.
79. Where the action is brought with a view to embar­
rassing the occupant of the family head, the courts 
will refuse to lend their aid - Kosoko v. Kosoko, 
supra.
80. (1924) 5 N.L.R. 47 at p.50.
81. Archibong v. Archibong (1947) 18 N.L.R. 117.
Apart from the present writer*s discovery of this 
fact during his field work, the whole structure
of the Ibo political organisation militates against 
status and privilege which immunity symbolises.
82. See M.I.Jegede, "The position of head of a family 
in relation to family property; is he a trustee 
in the English sense?" (1966) 7 Nigerian Bar 
Journal, p.21.
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(ii) External aspects of agency:
This is of course the rights and liabilities 
of third parties. An agreement made by an agent on 
behalf of a principal creates rights and duties be­
tween the principal and the third party, and in some 
cases, between the a pent and the third party. We 
shall be examining these situations and in the above 
order.
Principal and third party:
The principal is bound to the third party 
by the terms of an agreement made by his agent on 
his behalf and with his actual or apparent authority.
This position appears to have been accepted by the
#
courts in Ghana and Nigeria as the true state of the 
imported law of agency. Raceah v. Standard Company
O
of Nigeria was an action against the defendant 
company by the plaintiff for the cost of produce 
bought by the defendants throug their agent. It 
happened! that by the time the transaction was 
entered into, the agentTs authority had been terminated 
by the defendants but this fact was not made known to 
the plaintiffs who therefore acted in the belief 
that the agent had authority to contract. The
83* (1922) 4, N.L.R. 48. Eor powers of family head to 
bind the family, see infra, p^. ^
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defendants were held liable. Also, in Cole v. Jeadf^
a lease granted by an agent was held binding on his
85principal, and in Abban v. Appiah, an> execution 
s&le of the plaintiff’s property with the connivance 
of his agent was held binding on him. The fact that 
the agent did not act in good faith did not, in the 
court’s opinion, affect the rights of third parties.
But the principal is not liable where the agent acted 
outside the scope of his authority. In the Raccah 
case, the purchase of produce was within the scope 
of the agentss authority. The fact that the authority 
had been terminated without the third party’s know­
ledge, did not make the matter less so. But in the
recent Nigerian case of Obaseki v. African Continental
86Bank & ors.J the plaintiff brought' an action against 
the defendant bank for the specific performance of an 
agreement to purchase land. The alleged purchase was 
at an auction sale, one of the conditions of which was 
that ’’the highest bidder shall be the purchaser subject
84. (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 92
85. (1926-29) Div. ct. (Ghana) 175. See also the 
recent Nigerian case of Onwuegbu & anon v. African 
Insurance Co. Ltd., ; (1965) N.K.L.R. ?4-8 where
it was held that the principal was liable even 
where the agent misappropriated premiums collected 
on behalf of the said principal. See KacGfllivra 
on Insurance, 5th ed; vol. I p.295
86. (T9615) N .1- .L.R. 35. See also Wiaboh v. Woodin (1896) 
Ren. 124, and King v. Freres (1926-29) F.Ct. I.
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to the approval of the mortgagee” i.e. the approval 
of the hank. The branch manager of the bank had 
purported to approve the sale. In fact he had no 
authority to do so under the Articles of Association 
of the bank and the Articles were registered in the 
usual way under the local Companies Act.8  ^ Under 
the Articles, only the Board of directors had the 
power to approve such a transaction. It was held 
by the Nigerian Supreme Court, affirming the decision 
of the trial court, that the defendants were not 
liable on the ground that the act was outside the
oo
scope of the authority of the defendant1 s agent.
Similarly, the third party’s liability on the
agreement is to the principal and he alone can sue
the third party. This was the decision in the
89G-hana case of Nyamfe v. Amoako & Another. In this 
case, one Wilson supplied the plaintiff with money 
for the purchase of cocoa. Consignments were made 
to Wilson in a lorry owned by the first defendant
87. Cap. 37, laws of Nigeria (1958).
88. It is arguable on behalf of the plaintiff that this 
provision in the conditionsoof sale (i.e. for the 
approval of a third party) where the auction sale 
was without reserve, is inconsistent with the provi­
sion of theSales by Auction Act, Cap. 187, s. 22 of 
which empowers the highest bidder to sue for the 
article offered for sale. On the other hand the prt 
parties could besaid to be in pari dllicto since they 
contracted in the knowledge of the provisions of the 
Act. See K. Chellaram & Srirns Ltd. v. Messrs. Costain 
(West Africay~Ltd. (1957) 2 ~D~.N.L.R. 10; where the 
principal was "neld not liable for the agent’s forgery.
89. (1926-29) Div. ct. 87.
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and driven by the second defendant. One of the 
consignments got lost and in an action by the agent 
(plaintiff) for the price of the cocoa, the court 
held that the plaintiff was a mere agent and could 
not sue since he had no property in the goods consigned. 
It was added that the property in the goods vested in 
Wilson immediately they were delivered to the carrier.
The trial judge, Howes, J; quoting Lord Alvanley, C.J.
90in Dutton v. Solomonson, stated at page 88 as follows:
1 If a tradesman order goods to be sent by a 
carrier, though he does not name any particular 
carrier, the moment the goods are delivered to 
the carrier, it operates as a delivery to the 
purchaser; the whole property immediately vests 
in him; he alone can bring an action for any
injury done to the goods; and if any accident
happen to the goods, it is at his risk.”
The agent must however, have contracted as an agent,
91otherwise the third party is not liable. When
the agent has b o contracted on behalf of a principal,
92even an undisclosed principal can sue the third party.
Agent and third party:
Although the principal is normally liable 
to the third party under an agreement made by the
agent, there are instances where the agent himself can
sue and be sued by the third party under the agreement.
f  - j -  q . r  O  ^  • ... r y
90. (l803) 3 Eos. & Pul. at p. 584.
91• hakanjtiola v. Olupitan (1958) W.R.N.L.R. 165.
92. Sam v. Cape Coast Boating Go.(1904) Ren. 306.
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The instance of an agent who contracts as a principal 
has already been mentioned. In such a case he and
The agent is also liable if this was the intention of 
the parties. This is particularly true of agents 
representing foreign principals. In this a&pect 
of the law, the Ghana Courts have moved from the
position as recognised in the English case of Armstrong
94v. Stokes and followed in the Ghana case of Essien
In the Essien decision, the Divisional court at Cape
Coast ruled that,
"the court is always prepared to hold (in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary) that in 
a contract between a native producer and a 
shipping agent, there is always an implied 
contract that the agent shall pay in case the 
principal abrosd fails to pay”
This presumption of the agent!s liability in cases
of foreign principals has been said to be no longer 
97good lav/.
Between 1959 and I960 the Ghana Court of Appeal
had two opportunities of ruling on the matter of
the agent's liability where foreign principals are
93. Makanjatola v. Olupitan, supra
94. T W T 2 ) ~ R .  7 QN 598, see page 605,
95 (1911) Ren. 614.
96. (U917J 2 K.B. 141.
97. ~ * ' "r"'' ‘ ion's law
not the principal is liable to the third party.^
v. Boy an to the current position in English law as 
represented by Miller, Gibb & Co. v. Smith & Tyre Ltd.,^
of Contract {ZZna ed. 19P4J 
(19577 3T"Can B. Rev. 336;
But cr. tiuTson
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involved, and on the two occasions, decidedly resolved 
the matter in favour of the intention of the parties.
Pirstly, British West Africa Insurance Services v .
98Abdilmasil^  In that case the plaintiffs were the
Ghana agents of Gresham Fire and Accident Insurance
Society, a company registered in the United Kingdom,
and under a power of attorney from the latter company
had wide powers of representation in these terms:
"to appear and represent the Society in any court Qq 
or courts of law or equity in the said territories 
aforesaid and there to sue or be sued and to answer, 
defend and reply to all matters and causes touching 
and concerning the premises, or any action or actions, 
suit or suits, matter or thing that may be sued or 
prosecuted by or against the society touching or 
concerning the premises, and, for that purpose or 
any other purpose, to accept on behalf of the 
society service or process and notices required to 
be served on the society, and to submit on behalf 
of the aforesa.id and also to do, say, pursue, 
implead, seize, sequester, arrest, attach and 
imprison and out of prison again to deliver."
The defendant had obtained judgment for £8,154. 3. 5d.
against the Gresham Insurance Society, and this amount
was still unpaid. Relying on the agent!s power of
attorney, the defendant obtained a writ of fi.fa.
against the plaintiff1s stores for this sum, and
although the plaintiffs later paid this amount by
cheque, their stores had in the meantime, been sealed
98. (1959) G.L.R. 188; affirmed (I960) G.L.R. 107.
99. In this case, Ghana.
off by the defendants agents for four days. In 
an action for trespass by the plaintiffs based on fi.fa 
the point that arose was whether or not the execution 
of the process on the plaintiff1s property was proper. 
On this, the court of Appeal, affirming the judgment 
of Smith J. held:
"that where agents in this country of a firm in 
the United Kingdom are virtually identified with their 
principal, where full and wide powers are given 
to the former by the latter’s power of attorney, 
where the whole business is in the hands of the 
local agents, and where the latter own property 
in this country, it would bw wrong and unjust 
that the agents should be permitted to tell a 
judgement-creditor in this country tocollect the 
debt in London".
The second case was Sackey v. ffattal'j'^'*" Here, the 
fact that the plaintiff had got into direct communi­
cation with Japanese principals of the defendants 
(agents) did not in the opinion of the court, affect 
the personal liability of the Ghana agent to the
plaintiff. Relying on the authority of the English
102case of Lramburg and Another v. Pollitzer, Ollennu, 
J. (as he then was), held that there was a clear 
intention to make the local agent liable. After a 
review of the authorities, the learned Judge continued:
100. op. cit. at p. 189
101. (1959) G.L.R. 169, affirmed (159) G.L.R. 176.
102. (1873) 28 T.L.R. (N.S.) 470 cited by Ollennu, J.
in the Fattal case, supra.
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,fCounsel’s final submission was that, by her act 
in writing to the defendant’s principals to com­
plain about the goods, the plaintiff elected to 
treat the principals as the persons liable on the 
contract, if any, ceased. But this is also shown, 
by the book to which he referred in support, to be 
a question of fact depending on each case”
103”In Lramburg and anor v. Pollitzer, it was held
that an order placed with, and accepted by, an 
agent of foreign manufacturers formed a contract 
between the customer and the agent. It was further 
held that a letter written by the customer to the 
foreign manufacturers after a breach of that contract 
had been committed, did not constitute an election 
by the customer to treat the manufacturers as 
principals. In my opinion, that case is very 
similar to the present one in many respects. 104
The Fattal decision was affirmed on appeal by
103the G-hana Court of Appeal.
1 0 5 ,0 ^ ^  T
104 Op. cit. p.175
105.(1959) G.L.R. 176.
Although this aspect of agency has not agitated the 
Nigerian courts as much as the courts in Ghana, 
it is likely, however, that the trend in the courts 
of the latter territory will be followed in Nigeria 
if and when the matter arises for decision.
SECTION III. 410
Agreements between two parties where one or both 
subsequently transfer to a third:
The parties to an agreement may under certain 
circumstances drop out and others take their place.
In this bisection we shall be examining the circum­
stances under which contractual rights and liabilities 
can be transferred to third parties. These will be 
discussed under the sub-headings of assignments and 
negotiability.1
p
(a) Assignments:
This is the transfer of contractual rights 
and liabilities to a third party with or without the 
concurrence of the other party to the agreement. Such 
transfer could be by the acts of the parties to the contract 
or by operation of law. It is by operation of law 
in cases of the death or bankruptcy of one or both of 
the contracting parties. In English law, certain 
rights are not assignable, namely, a mere right to sue
1. The allied topic of novation, i.e. the elimination 
of one agreement and a substitution by another, has 
often been distinguished from both assignments
and negotiability. Novation is a substitution by 
mutual agreement of the parties, while an assignment 
is a unilateral substitution of a stranger for one of 
the parties. Eor novation in Nigerian law, see G-.B. 
Ollivant & Co. v. Effioms Transport & anor.(19341 
2 W.A.C.A. 91
2. See harshall, The Assignment of choses in Action (1950);
S.J.Bailey, "Assignment of Debts in England" (1931) 47,
L.Q.R. 516; I (32) 48 L.Q.R. 248; 547, Puller, Basic
Contract pp. 580-2; On Islamic law, See J. Schactrtr, 
"Introduction to Islamic Law Oxford (Clarendon Press Ch.20.
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%  A
for damages, a bare right of action, 1 salaries of
5
public officers paid out of public funds the alimony
g
granted to a wife, and the benefits under social
7
security legislation. Some rights in action have 
been made assignable by statute. Examples are legion,
Q
but specific mention could be made of bills of lading,
o 10
policies of life and Marine Insurance, shares in a
-i-i - i p  "j "Z
company, negotiable instruments, patents and 
14copyright.
15Similar statutory provision have bet.n made in Ghana and
1 r
Nigeria for the transfer of the benefits over things in 
action.
3. Ma^ v. Lane 0-8964 Q.B. 236
4* Peffries v. Milne CL913J I Ch. 98
5. Wells v. Foster~Tl84l) 8 M & W. 149
6. Re Robinson (l5"84) 27 Ch. D.160.
7. National Insurance Act, 1946, s.52
8. Bills of Lading Act, 1855, si.
9. Policies of Assurance Act, TS67, si.
10.Marine Insurance Act, 1906, s.50(2j»
11. Companies Act, 1948, s.75.
12. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882
15. Patents Act, s.74(4).
14. Copyright Act, 1956, s.56.
15. For Ghana see Bills of Exchange Act, 1961, (Act 55) 
ss ”25 and 27”, Bills of Lading Act, 1961 (Act -42) 
s.7 (i); Copyright Act, 1961 (Act 85) s.10; Companies 
Code, 1965 (Act 179) Part J. ss 95-102; merchant 
shipping Act, 1965, (Act 185) s.20;Insurance Act, 1965 
(Act 288) s.50 and social security Act, 1965 (Act 279) 
s. 26.
16. For Nigeria, see Marine Insurance Act, No. 54 of 1961 
g.51(i). But s.77(i)(b) of the merchant shipping 
Act, (No. 50 of 1962) prohibits the assignment of
wages before they have been earned. See also the 
companies Ordinance (Cap. 57, laws 1958) ss.50-51; 
Exchange Control Act, (Cap. 65, laws, 1958) ss. 18
and 28.
What we propose to do here is to focus our 
attention on the different v/ays of effecting a valid 
assignment, for this purpose we shall he examining 
the voluntary transfer of contractual rights, then the 
the transfer of contractual liabilities, and lastly, 
assignments by operation of law.
I. Voluntary transfer of contractual rights:
Before 1875 English law adopted the view
(consistent with its theory of privity of contracts)
17that a chose in action was not assignable at common
1 o
lav/. ° The courts of chancery, however, did recognise
and enforce the rights of an assignee, provided the
right assigned was an equitable right. A legacy or a
share in a trust fund are examples of such equitable
rights. An equitable assignee could sue the debtor
without joining the assignor. An equitable assignment
of allegal right, however, could only be enforced against
the debtor, if the assignor was joined, and the chancery
courts would compel the assignor to lend his name to the
19assignee for purposes of an action against the debtor.
17. We v/ould prefer the use of the phrase "things in 
action” to the common but inelegant phrase "Chose in 
Action".
18. The Common law, however, adopted the device of "powers 
of attorney", novation, and suing the debtor in the 
assignor’s name and with his eonsent, in order to 
effect valid transfers of contractual rights.
19. See Row v. Dawson (1749) I Ves. Sr. 331, 27 E.R. 1064 
per Lord Hardwi'cke, L.C. "....and although the law 
does not admit an assignment of a chose in action, 
this court does."
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This was the position in England until the enactment 
of the Judicature Act, 1873, which came into force on 
1st November, 1875.
Section 25(6) of this Act provides as follows:
"Any absolute assignment by writing under the hands 
of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of 
charge only) of any debt or other legal chose in 
action of which express notice in writing shall
have been given to the debtor shall be and
be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject 
to all equities which would have been entitled to 
priority over the right of the assignee if this 
Act had not passed) to pass and transfer the legal 
right to such debt or chose in action from the date 
of such notice".
The effect of this provision was to empower the assignee
of any thing in action to sue the debtor in his own name
without joining the assignor, subject of course to the
fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the section.
It did not, however make assignable such other things
as were not transferable before the passing of the Act,
nor did it replace equitable assignments. It rather
20supplemented the latter. The present position in
English law is governed by Section 136 of the Law of 
Property Act, 1925, which is a substantial re-enactment 
of the older provision.
The position in Ghana:
Now, the Judicature Act, 1873 is not a statute
20. See Pollock’s Principles of Contract, (6th ed, 1896) 
pp. 204-213.
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21of general application in Ghana. Consequently the
imported law of G-hana is the pre-1875 English law on 
the subject. Accordingly G-hana law did not recog­
nise legal assignments, and there must be- a consideration 
to support an equitable assignment since equity will 
not aid a volunteer.
The anomalous nature of this sta;te of the
22law was very obvious. The Contract Act, I960, has
however, effected some necessary changes.
Section 7 of this Act provides as follows:
7(i) Subject to any rule of law, and subject to any
contrary intention appearing from any transaction
giving rise to any legal rights, a person may,
after the commencement of this Act, assign a legal
23right to another person as hereinafter specified. 
7(ii) An assignment, whether given for consider­
ation or not, of a vested legal right, transfers 
the full right and interest therein to the assignee 
and extinguishes the right and interest therein of
21. The Act was not in force till 1st Nov. 1875. See 
the G-hana case of Colonial Bank v. Bellon (1923-25)
F.Ct. 173, where the Ghana Null Ct. held that the
Act was not applicable in Ghana.
22. Act 25.
23. This subsection is peculiar to the Ghana enactment.
There are no corresponding provisions in either the
English Law of Property Act, 1925 or the Western 
Nigeria Property and Conveyancing law, Cap. 100
(laws, 1959) s.150. It is submitted that this
saving for customary assignments is a welcome variation.
the assignor if -
(a) it is absolute and not by way of charge only; 
and
(b) it is in writing and is signed by the 
assignor or his agent; and
(c) written notice thereof is given to the debtor 
or other person against whom the right is
enforceable.
The significance of dection 7(i) of the Act is to 
exclude from the application of the section, cases in 
which the parties intended the application of any other 
law. Thus it could be argued that an assignment under 
customary law need not comply with the provisions of 
section 7(ii). So far no local judicial decision has 
turned on the interpretation of section 7(i). It is 
contended, however, that customary law assignments are 
outside its scope.
Section 7(ii) is a substantial re-enactment of the 
provisions of Section 136 of the English Law of Property Ghana 
Act, 1925 which hitherto was not applicable to Ghana.
Under the subsection, a valid assignment must be ab­
solute, must be in writipg, and the debtor must have 
been notified in writing. A purported assignment of a
conditional right operates as a promise to assign the
24right if and when the condition occurs.
24. Section 7(iii).
416
In the recent case of C.F.C. Construction Co.
2R
v* &. N . C. C. and Anor decided by Apaloo , J.S.C. at 
Accra, the High Court had to consider the inter­
pretation of Section 7(ii) and (iii) of the Contract 
Act. In that case, the plaintiff obtained judgment 
against a certain Presec Ltd. ofor £11,247. 4. 5d. 
with costs. Presec arranged to pay this debt at 
the rate of £1000 per month but defaulted after paying 
three instalments. The Ghana Division of Public 
Construction (hereafter called L.P.C.) owed the Presec 
Ltd. some money as a result of some building contract 
carried out by the latter company for the former.
The debt under the contract was to become due six 
months after October 10th, 1961 (the date of the 
making of the building contract). Certain deductions 
were to be made by the D.P.C. for repairs. The 
defendants were the successors of the D.P.C. i.e. as 
creditors of Presec Ltd. In May, 1962, (i.e. after 
the contract debt had become due), Presec Ltd. wrote 
to the defendants purporting to assign any amount 
due to them (Presec) to the plaintiffs. A copy of 
this letter was given to the plaintiffs. In September, 
1962, Presec Ltd., went into liquidation and in October, 
1962, the defendants paid £6,227 to the provisional
25. (1965) C.C. 15.
Iliquidator, the assignment of May, 1962, notwithstanding, 
The plaintiffs sued for the sum of £10,227 being money 
due to Presec Ltd. which had been validly assigned 
to them; basing their claim on section 7(ii) of the 
Contract Act I960.
On behalf of the defendants it was argued
(a) that the purported assignment of May, 1962 was 
only a conditional assignment and therefore was not 
enforceable under Section 7(ii) of the Contract Act;
(b) that the defendants as debtors had not given their 
consent to the said assignment and therefore were not 
bound by its terms; and finally
(c) that no sum certain was assigned since the amount 
owed was subject to deductions for repairs and defects. 
The court lightly rejected all these arguments, holding 
firstly, that the May assignment was an unconditional 
transfer of Presec LtdTs interest in the contract debt. 
Secondly, (and it is curious that it was ever argued 
for the defendants), that the consent of the debtor 
was not necessary for a valid assignment under the 
subsection. Thirdly, that there was sufficient 
certainty about the said assignment, being the whole 
amount due to Presec Ltd. The fact that the sum 
might be diminished by valid counterclaim or set-off 
did not operate to make the sum any less certain.
Finally, since the assignment was unconditional, and
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of a right vested in interest, it did not operate as
a promise to assign under section 7(iii) of the Act.
English judicial authority based on the 1873 legis-
2 6lation was cited with approval."'
Under Section 7(iv):
"An assignment, whether given for consideration 
or not is valid notwithstanding that it does not 
comply with all or any of the requirements of sub­
section (ii) but -
(a) no right so assigned shall be enforced or relied 
upon against the debtor or other party against 
whom the right is enforceable unless the assignor 
is a party to any proceedings in which it is 
sought to be enforced or relied upon, or unless 
the court is satisfied that it would be impossible 
or '
(b) no such assignment shall prejudice the debtor or 
other person against whom the right is enforceable 
unless he has written notice thereof",
Uhat the above sub-section has done has been to elevate 
to the status of a statutory provision the English rules 
relating to equitable assignments. The assignee can sue
26. On the first argument for the defendants, see Brice v 
Bannister (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 569; Buck v. Robson~Cl878) 
3 Q.B.D. 686. On the second, see Brandt" v. Dunlop 
Rubber Co.Cl905j A.C. 454 see also Accra Perfumery Co 
Ltd. v. Thomas (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 160 where the 
assignor had to be joined in an action by the assigne 
of part of a debt.
419
the debtor but the assignor must be made a party to
the action. It is submitted that this statutory
fiision of law and equity is a step in the right direction.
It is curious in the extreme that although equity and
law are administered in the same courts since 1875,
the dichotomy has remained in English law. The G-hana
provision, again in this respect, is an improvement
on the English position.
27Section 7(v) of the SAct makes provision for
the priority of assignments. It states as follows:
"Where there are two or more assignments in 
respect of the same debt or right, a later 
assignee shall have priority over an earlier 
assignee if the debtor or other person liable 
had not received written notice of the earlier 
assignment at the time when the latter assign­
ment was made"
It must be observed that if this provision was intended
O Q
to be tne rule in Dearie v. Hall ( in statutory form, 
then there is room for considerable improvement in the 
drafting. If however, it means what it says, then 
its merits are very highly questionable. Dearie v.
Hall decided that where there are two or more assign­
ments in respect of the same debt or right, priority 
dates from the date of notice to the debtor. How, 
the date of such notice need not be that on which the
27. See J.S.Read (1961) 5 J.A.L. 48
28. (1828) Russ I.
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assignment was made. The G-hana provision, however, 
tends to suggest that a later assignment takes priority 
over an earlier one if the earlier assignee had not given 
notice to the debtor on the date the subsequent assign­
ment was made. It is the making of the subsequent 
assignment not notice to the debtor that gives it 
priority over the first. The absurd results that
follow from a literal interpretation of the provision
29have been emphasised by a learned commentator.
Finally, Section 7(vi) of the Act provides 
that the assignee takes subject to equitable defences 
at the time when the debtor received notice of the 
assignment.
/
The position in Nigeria:
It has already been noted that in Nigeria 
there are five separate jurisdictions namely, Federal, 
Northern Regiop, Eastern Region, Western and Mid-Western 
Regions. The English Judicature Act, 1873 is a statute
of general application in all but the Western and Mid-
30Western Regions, where all the relevant statutes of 
general application within the regions' legislative 
competence have been substantially re-enabted as part 
of their statutory laws.
29. See Read op. cit. p. 49.
30. On its creation in 1963, the Mid-Western Region
inherited the laws of Western Nigeria. Perhaps this
may be described as a secondary reception of law in the
region, the primary one being on January 1st,1900, the 
date oi reception for the whole country.
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Thus although Section 25(vi) of the Judicature Act, 1873,
regulates assignments in the Federal,Territoryf Northern and
Eastern Regions, this is not the case in the Western
and Mid-Western Regions. In the two latter regions
31the Property and Conveyancing Law, makes similar
provisions to Section 136 of the English Law of Property
32Act, 1925. It must be added that unlike the Ghana
enactment, priority of successive assignments under the
Western Nigeria Legislation dates from notice and not 
from the time the assignment was made. Policies of
34insurance are excluded from the provisions of the section.
2. Voluntary transfer of Contractual liabilities:
It is trite assertion in English legal parlance 
that a promisor cannot assign his liabilities under an 
agreement, and conversely, that a promisee cannot be 
compelled by the promisor or by a third party, to
accept any but the promisor as the person liable to him
35under an agreement. This general statement is, however, 
subject to some exceptions. The method of novation has 
already been mentioned. Mention has also been made of 
the transfer of the burden of restrictive covenants
31. S.15(i), Cap. 100, Laws of Western Nigeria, (1959) 
Revision.
32. *5 w .  10 6<^ v- C •
33. S.150(i) of the Property and Conveyancing Law, supra.
34. S. 150 (ii) of the Property and Conveyancing lav/, supra.
35. Robson & Sharpe v. Drummond (1831) 2 B.& Ad. 303;
1 0 9 , " ' 1 1 5  b.
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36in land matters." Here we are concerned with a
situation where B can validly transfer his liability
to C under an agreement with A in such a way that A
would look to C for the performance of the obligation,
and such performance discharges B. This has often
been called the doctrine of vicarious performance and
there have neen doubts as to its being an aspect of
31assignments at all. The Latin maxim, qui facit per
alium facit per se has often been prayed in aid of the 
doctrine.
The limits of the doctrine in English law
38were laid down by Lord G-reene in Davies v. Collins,
in these words:
"Whether or not in any given contract performance 
can properly be carried out by the employment of 
a sub-contractor, must depend on the proper 
inference to be drawn from the contract itself, 
the subject matter of it and other material 
surrounding circumstances"
In both Ghana and Nigeria.' there is a dearth of local
judicial or statutory authority on this branch of the
law. The Ghana contract legislation is silent on the
assignment of contractual liabilities, providing rather
36. Tulk v. Noxhay (1848) 2 Ph. 774; see p supra.
37. See Cheshire & Fifoot, Law of Contract, (6th ed. 1964)
pp. 451-452. The argument has been that since B is 
still liable to A under the agreement until performance 
by C, all that the doctrine of vicarious performance
entails is the delegation of performance and not its
outright assignment. There is of course, a lot of 
force in this point of view. (22) [1945] I All E.R.
247 at p.250.
38. (19453 1 All E.R. 246 at p. 250.
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for the transfer of contractual rights. It is likely 
however, that the courts in both countries will follow 
the decisions of English courts on the subject.
3. Assignments by operation of law:
This is the transfer of contractual rights 
and liabilities to a third party as a result of the 
death or bankruptcy of any of the contracting parties.
The position in English law is regulated by The Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934^ in cases 
of death, and the Bankruptcy Act, 1914^° in cases of 
insolvency. Neither of these Acts is of general app­
lication in either G-hana or Nigeria.^ The former Act
has, however, been substantially re-enacted in Ghana and
42and some jurisdictions in Nigeria. ' Thus sections 22-34 
of the Ghana Civil Liability Act (Act 176) provide for 
the survival of causes of action vested in or subsisting
39. 24 & 25 Geo. 5 41 S.I See particularly S.l(i)
(b) on actions for breach of promise to marry. The
general rule is that rights and liabilities under 
a contract pass, on the death of a party to the 
agreement, to his personal representatives.
40. As amended by the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act, 1926,
(16 & 17 Geo. 5 C.7.
41. But see S.205 of the Nigerian Companies Act> Cap.
37, Laws (1958) which provides for the application 
of English Bankruptcy rules in winding up of insol­
vent companies. See also Halliday v. Alapatira 
(1881) N.L.R.I; and S.99 of the Ghana Companies Code.
42. The federal Territory and the Northern Region. See also 
S.44 of the Eastern Nigeria Co-operative Societies Law, 
Cap. 28 Lav/ of the Eastern Region (1963) consolidation.
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against a deceased person in the same terms and subject
4 Dto the same conditions as the English statute on the 
same subject. To the same effect are Sections 3-5 of 
the Nigerian (Federation) Civil Liability (Miscellaneous 
Provision) Act (No. 33 of 1961) and Section 3 of the 
Northern Nigeria Civil Liability (Survival of Actions 
Tort feasors and contributory Negligence) Law (N.R.
No. 20 of 1957A 4
The position on the bankruptcy of one of the 
parties to an agreement is regulated in Ghana by the
Insolvency Act, 1962 (Act 153), and the Companies Code,1963
at- 45
(Act,179)in the case of registered companies. The 
Insolvency Act provides for the passing of the assets 
of an insolvent to an official Trustee(Section 37), the 
dilligent administration of the business of the insol­
vent by the said official trustee (Section 45) and the 
disclaimer within a given period, of any onerous assets 
(Section 51).
43. e.g. where a cause of action survives for the benefit 
of a deceased person’s estate, the damages recover­
able are not to include any exemplary damages, and in 
the case of a breach of promise to marry, they are to 
be limited to such damage if any, to the estate of the 
deceased as flows from the breach of promise to marry.
44. Since there are no corresponding statutory provisions 
in both the Eastern and Western Regions ofNigeria, it 
could be argued with some force that the common law 
position i.e. contractual rights andliabilities 
vesting in the personal representatives of the deceased 
with exceptions as to personal contracts, as laid down 
in Stubbs v. Holywell Railway Co.(1867) L.R. 2 Ex.
311, applies in the two jurisdictions.
45. See part U, ss 246-261 of the Companies Code (Ghana).
How, in Nigeria the English statute of 1914 
or its subsequent amendments do not apply, and 
there is judicial authority for the view that even 
the Pull Court of Nigeria had no Bankruptcy jurisdiction 
It is not clear from the Mclver case whether or not the 
English Bankruptcy Act, 1883, a pre-1900 English statute 
is of general application in Nigeria, The better view 
seems to be that it is. It is submitted however, that 
the Nigerian Law on this subject is most uncertain.
In view of the importance of the topic in the supply 
tof credit and other aspects of economic development 
it is further contended that sv/ift legislative action
47along the lines of the Ghana statute is long overdue.
4. Negotiable Instruments:
These are specialised kinds of assignments 
and are easily distinguishable from other types of
46. This was stated by speed Ag. C.J. in the case of 
Bairley, Ltd., v. HeTver (1900) I.N.L.R. 47 at
p.48, see also Callendar Sykes & Co. v. Colonial 
Secretary of Lagos (1891) app. Cas. X60 where it 
was held that colonial courts having no bankruptcy 
jurisdiction cannot act as auxiliaries to the court 
of Bankruptcy in England.
47. See the arguments of Allott in "Legal Development 
and Economic Growth in Africa” in Changing Law in 
Developing Countries (ed. J.N.D. Anderson; (London, 
1963) p. 194, particularly pp. 201-207.
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assignable contracts. ° An instrument is said to be
negotiable when any person who has acquired it in good
faith and for value can enforce the contract contained
in it or the right of property of which it is evidence,
against the person originally liable on it, although
the person frar. whan he acquired it may have a defective
49title or none at all. Quite apart from the importance
of negotiable instruments in commercial transactions 
generally, they are particularly vital in an investigation 
of the law of obligations in Ghana and Nigeria because 
of their impact on native customary notions of credit.
In this as in some other aspects of the lav/ the conflict 
between customary and imported laws is most apparent.
48. Negotiable instruments differ from other assignable 
contracts in the following respects:
(i) They are transferable by delivery, i.e. the
contract contained in them is;
(ii) No notice need be given to the debtor of the 
transfer;
(iii) The right or contract embodied in them cannot 
he transferred without the instrument itself;
(iv) A bona fide transferee for value will get a 
good title even though the title of his transferor
was defective - see 8S 29 and 38 of the English 
Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.
49. See Earl Jowitt, The Dictionary of English haw . 
(London, 1959) p." 1216. See also Crouch v.Credit 
Eoncier (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 374, and Goodwin v. 
Roberts (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 337 at p. 346.
Origin and history:^  42?
The origin and history of negotiable 
instruments in English lav/ need not detain us here.
It suffices to mention that they arose from a custom 
of the merchants responding to a need for the simpli­
fication of the giving of credit. Originally part 
of the law merchant, negotiable instruments are now
mainly regulated by the English Bills of Exchange Act,
51 521882 and allied enactments. Cheques, Bills of
55 54Exchange, and promissory notes have been recognised
by statute as categories of these instruments. But
these have been said not to be exhaustive. The
55categories are not closed."
Negotiable instruments in Ghana and Nigeria:
In both Ghana and Nigeria statutory 
provisions similar to those contained in the English 
Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, have been made with regard
50. See the judgments jof Blackburn J. in Crouch v Credit 
Eoncier (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 344; Cockburn C.J. in 
Goodwin v. Roberts (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 337 at p. 346; 
Kennedy J. in Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v.
London Trading Bank CL898X 2 Q.B. 658 at p. 678.
51. These enactments which date from the Bills of 
Exchange Act (1697) 9 will 3 C. 17, were con­
solidated in the 1882 legislation. See also the 
cheques Act, 1957, and the Currency and Bank Notes 
Act, 1954.
52. 5 & 6 Eliz II, c. 36
53. 45 & 46 JVict; c.6l
54. 45 & 46 Viet. c.6l
55. But the category of negotiable instruments in English 
law is nob closed, see London Joint Stock Bank v. 
Simmons (l892) A.C. 201.
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to certain negotiable instruments. Section 1 of the 
Ghana Bills of Exchange Act, 1961 (Act 55) which repeals 
and substantially re-enacts Section 3 of the former
jr C
Bills of Exchange Ordinance^ (of the then Gold Coast), 
defines, a bill of exchange as "an unconditional order 
in v/riting addressed by one person to another, signed 
by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom 
it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or 
determinable future time a sum certain in money to or 
to the order of a specified person, or to bearer"•
Provisions about netotiability of bills are made in
57 58sections 6 and 29. Cheques and promissory notes
are also regulated in the same enactment. A promissory 
note is there defined as "an unconditional promise 
in v/riting made by one person to another signed by the 
maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or 
determinable future time, a sum certain in money, to 
or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer."
56. Cap. 195, Laws of the Gold Coast (1951). See 
also S.3 of the Nigerian bills of Exchange Act 
, Cap. 21 of the Laws (1958); which is in the 
same terms as the Ghana provision.
57. S.72. See also S.73 of the Nigerian enactment, 
supra.
58. s.82 of the Ghana Act and S. 83 in Nigeria.
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Other statutory provisions for negotiability in 
Ghana and Nigeria have been made in relation to share 
certificates and share warrants,^ bank notes^0 and 
to a very limited extent, bills of lading.""
It is in relation to promissory notes and 
allied documents that the conflict betwen the 
customary and imported laws has been most apparent 
and it is this conflict that we propose to examine 
here.
Promissory notes are of course an imported
law device for the convenience of commerce. Thus
if A wants to raise a loan from B, this could be
achieved by Aigiving B a promissory note undertaking
to repay the amount which must be certain, at a
definite or determinable future time. In the
62Nigerian case of Savage v. Uwehia to which ref-
63erence was made in an earlier part, a document in
59. In Ghana, see S. 54 of the Companies Code, 1963 
(Act 179) subject to the provisions of S.95 of 
the same Act. Por Nigeria, see S. 39 (2) i
of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 37 (1958) laws.
60. Por Ghana, see Ss. 14 and 17 of the Bank of Ghana 
Act (Act. 182) and for Nigeria see ss. 17 and 21 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance, Cap.
30 (1958) laws.
61. Por Nigeria, see S.4 of the Carriage of Goods 
by sea Ordinance, Cap. (1958) laws.
62. 15 a (1961) I.W.L.R. 455. P.O.
63. p« Supra.
in the following terms:
M - Promissory Note.
£780; Owerri
I promise to pay Matthew Uv/echia or order three 
months after date, the sum of seven hundred and 
eighty pounds for value received or in default 
to convey to his all those messuages together 
with appurtenances thereto situate at No. 6,
New Market Road, in the township of Onitsha to 
hold the dame unto the said Matthew Uwechia or 
order in fee simple -
Signed S.O.Rotibi" 
was said by the Nigerian Supreme Court and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be a 
promissory note v/ithin the definition of Section 3 
of the Nigerian Bills of Exchange Act.
Such a note could be transferred by B to C by an 
endorsement in blank^ or by a special endorsement,^ 
and in any such case A is then liable to C on the 
note. It is this idea of negotiability that under­
lines the commercial importance of the promissory 
note or any other negotiable instrument.
Traditional customay law, on the other 
hand, knew of no writing. In fact the absence of
g
writing has been said to be one of its ba-sic features. 
The later decades of the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
however, witnessed the introduction of writing as
64. i.e. writing the name of the transferor and deliver­
ing the note to the transferor.
65. i.e. writing the name of a special transferee and 
delivering the note to the said transferee.
66. See Allott, Essays p. 62
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evidence of customary law transactions. The decided 
cases on this head in both Ghana and Nigeria are
rj
legion. But v/riting, although it helped solve
the problem of proof in customary law transactions, 
created the equally difficult problem of a confusion 
betv/een customary lawjunlike the imported law, was 
not burdened with too many technicalities and 
refinements intensified rather than alleviated the 
conflict between the two. The attempts made by the
law in Ghana and Nigeria to resolve this conflict
68will be examined in another Part. Here
we are concerned with the existence or otherwise of 
negotiability in customary lav/, with special reference 
to promissory notes. It is of course clear from 
the existing statutory and judicial authorities that 
no specific provision is made for the recognition of 
negotiability in the customary laws of either Ghana 
or Nigeria. It could however, be argued that no
67. Por a comprehensive study of this problem in 
relation to land matters, see Allott, Essays,
Chapter 10, and the Appendix at pp. 275-282.
For cases on the law of obligations in particular 
see Benson v. Hortons (1926-29) Div. ct. 75 (Ghana)-
I.O.U. and promissory notes distinguished in certain 
cases; Hughes v. Davies & anor.(l909) Ren. 550. - 
loan transacfion between reputed concubines; Renner 
v. Thensu & ors. (1926-29) F*C. 498 (Ghana) - promissory 
note and I.O.U. discussedl Aradzie v. Yandor & anor. 
(1922) P.O. 91 - promissory note between native chiefs; 
Hamilton v. Mpoley (1921) P.O. 78 - note of hand distin­
guished from negotiable instruments.
68. See Part 7.
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specific enactment on this head is necessary in 
view of the fact that customary law is already statu­
torily recognised in hoth countries, and customary 
promissory notes, if proved to exist, will come 
under this umbrella. This latter view however, 
militates against the tenor of the Bills of Exchange 
Acts in Ghana and Nigeria both of which define bills 
of exchange (which include promissory notes) in more 
or less exhaustive terms. The definition restricts 
their operation to the conditions specified in the Acts,
” I (2) An instrument which does not comply with these 
conditions or which orders any act to be done in
addition to the payment of money, is not a bill of 
69exchange.”
No saving was made for customary law tran­
sactions. This could have been inserted if it was
70intended by the legislatures of the two countries.
71Thus in the Ghana case of Hamilton v Mpoley, a custo­
mary '’note of hand” written for the parties by a local 
catechist was held not to be a promissory note because
no consideration for the note was proved. Also in
72Renner v. Thensu an I.O.U. between natives was held 
not to be a promissory note. In the latter case
69. Ghana Bills of exchange Act, 1961 S.l; see S.3 of
the Nigerian Bills of Exchange Ordinance, cap.37 (1958.
70. As was done in S.14 (i) of the Ghana Contract Act,
I960, on contracts of guarantee.
71. (1921) B.C.78.
72. (1926-29) B.C. 498.
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Gardner Smith J. the appeal judge, relied on the
authority of the English case of Gould v. Coo^be
where the distinction between an I.O.U. and a promissory
note was laid down. The intention of the parties as
to the law applicable was never argued before his
Lordship in the Thensu case. The decision appears
to have been based on the assumption that the parties
intended their obligations to be governed by English
law. This of course, was a curious assumption to
make in view of the fact that both parties were natives
and there was nothing in the nature of the transaction
to suggest the automatic application of English law.
Customary law (in this case, Fanti Customary law;
the parties from their names being presumably Fantis)
74recognise the giving of loans and the fact that this 
transaction was put into v/riting does not make it less
73. (1845) 135 E.R. 653. Some of the distinctions
are that a party may recover the amount of an
I.O.U. upon the action of account stated - Payne 
v. Jenkins (1830) U C & P. (Nisi Prius) 32.4; 
that t e consideration for an I.O.U. is examinable - 
Rainsford v. Eager (1853) 3 I.C.L.R. 120 cited 
in Renner v. Thensu supra.
74. See Fynn v. Quassie (1873) Ren. I. where it was 
held that interest is chargeable on customary 
loans. Prof. Schapera records similar trends 
among the T swan a in his "Concepts and Procedures 
in African law” Jan. 1966 as follows: As early 
as 1915 Ngwaketse courts were accepting promissory 
notes as confirmation of debt, and in 1937 relatively 
complex written agreements were being made among
the Kgatla by small groups of men for sharing the 
cost and use of boreholes in grazing areas - p.6.
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so. Four points must be emphasised here. Firstly, 
that the restricted definition allowed by the Bills 
of Exchange Acts in Ghana and Nigeria has driven the 
courts to look for imported lav/ characteristics in 
transactions that would otherwise be governed by 
customary lav/. The result of the Thensu case where 
the plaintiff had to forfeit £250 out of a loan of 
£400 emphasises the hardship that has befallen liti­
gants as a result of this statutory shortcoming.
Secondly, that any statutory regulation 
of commercial matters (in this case promissory notes) 
should necessarily take into account the practice that 
has been recognised in native customary lav/ tran­
sactions which form the dominant sector in numerical, 
though not in economic force.
Thirdly, that customary transactions are 
not burdened with the minutiae of technicalities 
and distinctions as exist in the imported law. This 
simplicity is not a shortcoming but a. virtue that 
could well improve the general law in the interest 
of harmony in any future attempt at the integration 
of the law on the subject. Finally, that such an 
integration is vital to the uniformity - of the law 
on commercial matters both in Ghana and in Nigeria.
It is remarkable that no decided case in 
the courts of Ghana or Nigeria has dealt with the
4 3 5
negotiability of customary promissory notes. The
existing authorities are confined to suits on such
notes by either the creditors themselves or their
representatives. An examination of the records of
7Sseveral customary courts in Ghana and Nigeria  ^has 
revealed that the bulk of the documents involved in 
commercial dealings among natives are either receipts 
or other forms of acknowledgment of indebtedness.
The I.O.U. is in regular use. No special form is 
adhered to but the intention to be bound is often 
clear on the face of the document. No instances were 
found of negotiability in the imported law sense, but 
a creditor could transfer an I.O.U. or a receipt to 
a third party, say a son or a nephew and such a son 
or nephew could proceed to collect the amount involved 
from the debtor. Such a transfer does not, however, 
unlike the position in the imported law, cure any 
defect on the face of the I.O.U. or receipt. In 
fact the transferee of the note does not sue in his 
own right but in that of the original creditor and 
if the debtor (or acceptor) refuses to pay, he has no 
means of compelling him to do so. This reluctance of
75. This was the personal experience of the writer 
when he conducted researches into the customary 
court records in Eastern Nigeria in 1961, and 
during his field work in customary and superior 
court records in Ghana and Nigeria in 1965.
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the courts to recognise the negotiability of customary 
notes is assignable to two causes. In the inferior 
or customary courts this is because this idea is 
entirely alien to all customary notions of credit, 
and in the superior courts, most of the notes involved 
do not conform to the existing statutory requirements 
on bills of exchange. The inadequacy of these 
provisions has been sufficiently argued ahove.
Assignments and Negotiability in Islamic law.^
The Islamic institution of the Hawala, 
has functional similarities to the imported law 
concept of assignment. Literally, Iiawala means 
1 transfer1 or a mandate to pay; that is, X who owes 
something to Ai, charges B to pay the debt. It could 
also be an assumption of X !s debt by B. It is a 
condition for a valid Hawala that X has a claim against 
B which is equal to or higher than his liability to A. The 
cQflinr do uld be for/the return of an object which has been 
improperly taken by B. Also, there need not be any 
liability owed by X to A. The essence of the Hawala 
is that X mandates A to collect a debt or other
76. The information on this aspect of Islamic law
is substantially based on Professor Schacht1 s very 
informative work - The Introduction to Islamic Law, 
(Oxford, 1964) pp. 148 et seq. ’
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liability from B, and this creates an obligation on 
B towards A. The acceptance by A of the Hawala 
extinguishes any obligation that X may have owed 
to A in respect of which the Hawala was made. The 
obligation can only be revived if B died bankrupt or 
denied the existence of the Hawala.
Performance by B towards A, extinguishes 
X Ts claim against B only if the hawala was concluded 
with specific reference to the obligation in issue.
It is not extinguished if the Hawala was conditional. 
It is obvious from the above role of the Hawala that 
it is s much less complicated method of extinguishing 
or transferring an obligation than the common lav/ 
theory of assignments.
Another Islamic institution, the suftaja, 
has been said to be the predecessor ofbiHsof exchange.
It has been defined as "aloan of money in order to 
avoid the risk of transport'1. The difference between 
the Hawala and the Suftaja in our example above, is 
that the obligation of B towards X, which in the case 
of hawala, is normally supposed as already existing, 
is, in the case of the suftaja, created on purpose by 
a payment which X makes to B. This is of course, 
construed as a loan of money from which the donor 
derives no counter-value, which against the principle 
of the sharia. The sufta.ja is, however, reprehensible 
but not fasid (invalid).
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PAST VI DEFECTIVE AGREEMENTS:
43S
As we pointed out in the introductory chapter, one of our 
chief considerations in this thesis is to lay clown a basic 
structural mould into which any detailed materials on 
obligations created by agreement may be poured* In further­
ance of this we have given separate treatment to valid agree­
ments involving (l) two parties'1’ and (2) more than two 
2parties • These are agreements in which there are no defects, 
initial or supervening other than breach itself* In this 
chapter we shall be looking at defective agreements* This 
is of course, the whole question of the differing effects of 
defective contracts, i*e* void, voidable, unenforceable and 
illegal agreements* One advantage of this treatment is 
that it enables one to deal with normal contractual situations 
unencumbered and undistracted by considerations of defects* 
This, it is submitted produces a cohesion denied the law of 
agreements under the conventional treatment. The other ad­
vantage lies in the field of remedies* 3y separating valid 
from defective agreements it will be appreciated that the 
only remedies generally given for defective contracts are 
restitutionary remedies.
A third advantage is that the term "defective" has the 
added merit of encompassing all agreements containing some
1
2
supra
supra*
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vitiating element without resorting to the confusing defin­
itions of void, voidable, unenforceable and illegal as is 
done in the orthodox treatment of the subject* These four 
terms are intended to describe the various legal effects of 
holding an agreement to be defective*
Three facets of this category of agreements will be 
investigated * Firstly we shall be looking at situations
in which there are defects in reaching an agreement* This 
will mainly be concerned with cases of inadequate consent 
(more usually called mistake), misrepresentation and non­
disclosure, and duress and undue influence*
The second group of cases are those on defects in the 
validity of an agreement. The problem of incapacity, in­
formality, illegality and infringement of public policy will 
be examined under this subhead* Finally there are defects 
due to impossibility of performance* Here we shall be 
reviewing cases of initial impossibility and supervening 
impossibility*
1. Defects in reaching an agreement. 4 4 1
(a) Inadequate consent:
The English law of contracts is riddled with massive 
literature^ on the effects of what is often called 'mistake1 
on the formation of agreements. The doctrine of mistake 
is bedevilled with imprecise terms such as common, mutual 
and unilateral mistakes. It is said to be common when 
both parties to an agreement make the same mistake about a 
subject matter e.g. an agreement to buy and sell goods 
which, unknown to the parties have already perished. It is 
mutual when the parties misunderstand each other's intentions 
about the subject matter. An example is where A intends 
to sell a 10 horse-powered engine while B is offering to 
buy an 8 h.p. engine^.
In unilateral mistake, only one of the paities is under 
any misapprehension about the subject matter. The other
5
is not • A close study of the authorities has revealed,
3* See among others: J.P.Wilson "Identity in contract and 
the Pothier fallacy" (1954) 17 M.L.R. 515-5295 J.Unger 
"Identity in contract ana Mr. Wilson's fallacy" (1955)
18 II.L.R. pp. 259-270; G-.Williams "Mistake as - to party
in the law of contract" (1945) 23 Oan. Bar. Rev. pp.
271 and 380; O.J.Slade "The myth of mistake in the 
English law of contract" (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 385; P.S.
Atiya & P.A.R.Bennion "Mistake in the construction of 
contracts" (1961) 24 LI.L.R. 421; K.O.Shatwell "The 
supposed doctrine of mistake in contract: A comedy of 
errors" (1955) 33 Oan. Bar. Rev. 164; G.Williams 
"Mistake and rectification in contract" (iy54) 17 M.L.R. 
154.
4. See Cheshire & Eifoot, Law of Contract (6th ed.1964) p.188
5« See Hartog v Colin and Shields '19391 3 All EH 566.
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however, that most of the cases on the doctrine of mistake 
could have been decided on the basis of inadequate consent . 
Thus where the plaintiff and the defendant contracted to buy 
and sell a consignment of cotton arriving in a ship called 
'The Peerless1, the plaintiff intending the .December ship 
and the defendant, the September ship, what the courts have 
to decide is whether or not there has been adequate consent 
to support an agreement^. In determining whether or not 
there has been adequate consent, the courts will have regard 
to the intentions of the parties as evidenced in the dealings 
between them. It is unnecessary for this purpose to
resort to the jurisprudential distinctions between mutual and 
unilateral mistakes#
There is a dearth of local judicial authority in Ghana
g
and Nigeria on cases of inadequate consent# Tav v Williams 
was an action by the plaintiff for the specific performance 
of an agreement to sell a piece of land to him by the defen­
dant. The plaintiff had offerdd to buy the whole piece of 
land while the defendant accepted the offer on the under­
standing that he was selling only part of the land. It was
6. In cases of res extincta and res sua the agreement is no
effect since one cannot contract to purchase what does
not exist or what already belongs to him#
7# Raffles v V/ichelhaus (1864) 2 H & C 906#
8. (1912) Ren. 691.
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held by the Ghana Full Court, affirming the judgment of the 
Divisional Court! that the plaintiff could not enforce the 
agreement since there was no real consent on the part of the 
defendant to sell the whole land# In U# T. C# v Tetteh &
q
2 ors^ the Ghana Divisional Court at Sekondi wa3 to decide 
whether the defendant's (1) illiteracy and (2) ignorance of 
the nature of the document to which he appended his signature, 
absolved him from liability under a guarantee bond. It was 
found as a fact that the said signature had been obtained 
on the pretext that the defendant was signing merely as a 
witness to the principal debtor's signature# In fact the 
defendant had signed a guarantee bond and had been sued on 
it by the plaintiff# It was argued on behalf of the said 
plaintiff that the defendant was negligent in that he did not 
acquaint himself with the contents of the document before he 
signed it; and secondly, that the document was read over 
to the defendant before his signature was obtained (words 
which appeared at the foot of the document before the space 
for signature)#
The court was to decide whether there had been adequate 
consent to form the basis of an agreement between the parties# 
If the plaintiff's allegation (of the document being read
9° (1965) Current Cases (Ghana) No. 92# See also Ansah
v Amalgamated Banket Areas (1938) 4 V/.A.C.A. 81.
! 
i
i
| to the defendant) was proved, this would be a strong evidence
I
I in favour of the defendant fs consent. On this aspect of
I the case, his lordship relied on a long series of authority
! to the effect that where an illiterate person executes a
! document any other party to the document who relies upon it
must prove that it was read over and interpreted to the
illiterate party anu that he fully appreciated the meaning
10and effect of the said document before he signed it 
On this test it was held that the plaintiff had failed to 
prove that the guarantee Was both read to the defendant and 
that he fully appreciated its meaning before he signed it.
On the question of negligence, his Lordship relied on the
English decision of Carlisle & Cumberland Banking Co. v
11 ✓Bragg , where it was held on similar facts that the neglig­
ence of the defendant signing a document without enquiry 
would only involve him in liability in cases of negotiable 
instruments.
Since the Tetteh case was an action on a guarantee bond, 
the defendant was held not liable.
10* Baga.y v Toku (1894) Sarbah’s F.L.R. 89; G-raves v
Ampimah (1905) Hen. 318; Fisher v Hammond (1926-29) 
Liv. ct. 217; ‘faya v Byrouyhy (195BT 3 W.A.L.R. 413; 
Yiadorn v Angmor, (L959) GLH7 157 at p. 160; Ladzie v 
Kokofu, Sup. ct. 13/2/61 unreported; Maftidu v Aban & 
anor. (1965) current cases, 10 See also U.A.C. v Apan 
H936) 3 V/.A.C.A. 114. ~
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On the other hand, in another case where the defendant
pleaded that he signed a promissory note on the understanding
that it was a bail bond, it was held by the Ghana Full Court
that he was liable on the promissory note. The Court argued
that a bail bond is normally signed in a court room and not
in a bed room where the promissory note was found to have
been signed. The court ruled that this was not a case of
12inadequate consent ♦
The Nigerian case of Abraham v Chief Oluwa^  raised the 
issue of the plaintiff !s right to recover some money paid for 
the purchase of a piece of land which already belonged to 
the said plaintiffs before the purported sale. The facts 
were that the plaintiffs (the Grand United Order of Oddfellows, 
Faith Lodge No. 4198, Lagos) had in 1917 purchased a piece 
of land in the then colony of Lagos from a vendor who himself 
purchased from a holder of a crown grant. There was no 
conveyance deed executed in pursuance of the 191Y transaction. 
In 1943 the defendant, believing that the land belonged to 
Chief Oloto, attached it under a writ of fieri facias, and 
its sale was advertised. The plaintiff put up a caution 
notice warning all persons against purchasing the land. He 
also informed the defendant that the land belonged to the
12. Hamilton & anor. v Ad flu (1923*25) F. ct. 47* Stake <0w$
13* (1944) 17, LLR.. 123.
tI
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; LODGE. $he sale was nevertheless carried out and the
i
j plaintiffs purchased it in the belief that their former title
was defective. In this action they sought to recover the
sum paid in the execution sale on the ground that there
could be no agreement to purchase what was already one*s own
property"^. In other words there was no consent to pay the
purchase price in the execution sale.
Baker J. who decided the case, quoted with approval the
16following passage from Kerr*3 Fraud and mistake :
*'If two parties enter into an agreement with reference 
to a supposed state of things and it turns out by mutual 
mistake of the parties, the supposed actual state of 
things does not in fact subsist, the consideration for 
the agreement fails, and the agreement is subsequently 
void.16"
It was held that the plaintiff could recover the £68
he had paid towards the execution sale since the agreement
on which the payment was based, was defective.
Inadequate consent could also be brought about by a
mistake in the identity of one of the contracting parties.
In K. Chellaram £ Sons Ltd. v Messrs. Gostain (v/est Africa)
17Ltd. the defendants were accustomed to obtaining goods
14. The plaintiffs relied on the old English decision of 
Cooper v Bhibbs (1867) L.Ii. 2 H.L. 149* a decision on 
similar facts.
15* 6th ed. pp. 623-624*
16. See also Stap.ylton v Scott (1807) 13 Ves. J. 417;
Robinson v Dickenson ( M )  3 Hus s. 399«
17. (1957) 2 E.ii.L.H. 10.
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from the plaintiffs on credit. An unidentified person 
fraudulently obtained goods from the plaintiff company by 
using some of the defendants' order forms, which he had some­
how acquired, and by forging the signature of the defendants' 
accountant. The rogue had made away with the goods and the 
plaintiffs sued the defendants for the price. It was argued 
for the plaintiffs that they had relied on the defendants ' 
order forms and not on the forged signature of the rogue, 
to their detriment. It is curious however, that so much 
weight should have been left on this argument in view of
the fact that the plaintiffs were suing in contract and not 
8for deceit • The argument was lightly dismissed by the
Enugu High Court (Eastern Nigeria). The defendants had, on
the other hand, pleaded that they never ordered any goods
from the plaintiffs, and in any case, had not received the
goods, the subject matter of the action. It was held
that there was no agreement between the plaintiffs and
19the defendants and that the action could not succeed.
18. Even if the action had been framed on deceit the plaint 
iffs would still have had to establish and prove a duty 
of care owed them by the defendants.
19* The English authorities of Hardman v Booth (1863) I H 
£ C. 803; and Gundy v Li rid s'ay "(l376) 3 A.C. 459, 
were freely cited by the court.
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On its facts, the Chellarsm decision can be said to be
a logical though a hard one on the plaintiffs. It is
doubtful if a contractual action could succeed even against
a bona fide purchaser for v&\we without notice, of the goods.
Presumably in such a case, the plaintiffs could sue in tort
for the return of the goods or their value.
Y/e can now attempt a general principle in cases of
inadequate consent. The rationale of these cases is that
where the dealing between the parties does not provide any
basis for erecting an agreement between them, the courts
will hold that there is no contract and any remedy that the
plaintiff might have will lie in tort or in restitution.
(b) Misrepresentation and non-disclosure:
Statements made by one party to an agreement may induce
20the other to contract, thus negativing full consent 
Such a statement might be fraudulent, negligent or innocent. 
If it is false end induces the contract, it operates as a 
misrepresentation. Silence or non-disclosure might in 
certain circumstances constitute a misrepresentation. These 
circumstances include
(i) Where the silence distorts a positive representation:
(ii) Where the contract requires the utmost good faith or
20. We are not here concerned with statements which have 
become terms of the contract. The construction of 
contractual terms will be discussed in the next 
phrf. ' * See infra, p.
as it is more often called, uberrimae fidei; and
(iii) Where a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
contracting parties*
In this sub-section we shall be examining cases of inadequate 
consent brought about by the misrepresentation of one of 
the parties to an agreement. In English law certain 
conditions must be satisfied before a representation will 
operate as a misrepresentation. These are that there must
/\ "I
be a false representation;^ it .must be a representation of
22fact and not merely of opinion; • it raust be intended to be
23acted upon by the other party to the agreement; and finally,
the representation must induce the contract.2** These
25conditions have also been accepted in both Ghana and
n £
Nigeria. It is however, in the nature of remedies avail­
able to the victim of a misrepresentation that the lav/ is
27not so clear both in. England and in Ghana and Nigeria.
21. Ideates v Lord Caflogorn (1851) 10 C.B.591*
22. Anderson v Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (1872) 
L.R.7 C.P.65
23. Peek v Gurney (1873) 6 H.L. 377*
24. Horsfall v Thomas (1862) 1 II £ C.91.
25* Manka-Bruce v laing £ Anor. (1923-25) F.Ct. 89 P.O.
26. Joseohine Jola Martin v Adenugba (1946) 18 N.L.R. 63
27. See The English Law Reform Committee 10th Report,
Cuind. 1782 (196-2)» See also the Representation Act, 
1966.
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V/here the misrepresentation is fraudulent:
The general effect of an operative misrepresentation is to 
make the agreement voidable at the suit of the party misled* 
V/here the misrepresentation is coupled with a fraudulent 
intent, the victim of the fraud has an additional remedy 
in an action for deceit against the party guilty of the fraud. 
In many cases, however, the party committing the fraud is 
not always in a position to make good the defendant's loss, 
having in the meantime resold the goods to a third party.
V/here such subsequent purchaser is also guilty of the frqud, 
the plaintiff can still avoid the transaction. But where 
the subsequent purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of the defect in the title to the goods, and 
purchases before the plaintiff disaffirmed the contract, 
the subsequent purchaser has good title. The issues involved 
in a case of fraudulent misrepresentation were fully dis­
cussed in the Privy Council appeal from Ghana of flanka-Bruce
28v Laing & Anor. the facts were that
The first defendant, Laing, had obtained 300 bags of 
cocoa from the plaintiff (appellant) on the represent­
ation that he was purchasing for a company called the 
Tin Areas Ltd. In fact Laing had no intention to 
resell to the said company. On receiving the way 
bills for the cocoa he transferred them to the second 
defendants to whom he was indebted on a previous trans­
action. Laing had purported to buy from the'plaintiff 
(appellant) at the cost of 53 shillings a bag, but sold 
to the second defendants at 42 shillings a bag, who 
subsequently sold at 45 shillings a bag. In the present 
action the plaintiff sued for the return of the goods 
or their value.
28. (1923-25) S’. Gt. 89 P.C.
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Three issues were to be resolved by the court* Firstly,
whether or not there was adequate consent on the part of
the plaintiff (appellant) to transfer the title in the goods
to Laing in pursuance of a contract of sale. In resolving
this the court had to consider the past business dealings
between the plaintiff and the first defendant. It was
found as a fact that on past occasions tne first defendant
had obtained goods on credit from the plaintiff. The
court therefore ruled th;;t there we.: sufficient intention
to conclude a contract of sa.le although such consent was
29induced by iiaing's fraudulent misrepresentation. ^
Secondly, whether or not the plaintiff had elected to
affirm or disaffirm the contract before the subsequent
transfer to the second defendants. On this the court quoted
with approval the following passage from Addison on Contracts.
"If a vendor has parted with the possession of goods in 
fulfilment of a contract of sale, obtained by fraud on 
the part of the purchaser, the contract is voidable, 
but he cannot, after the goods have been resold and 
passed into the hands of a bona fide sub-purchaser, 
disaffirm the contract, and annul the title of the 
latter to the property (White v Garden).31 But, if 
the relation of the vendor and the vendee does not 
subsist between the original owner and the person who 
commits the fraud, and the goods have been obtained by
29. Thus if it had been found „hat there -was no such int­
ention to pass the property in the goods, there would 
have been no contract* See Fowler v Hollins (1872) 
L.H.7 Q.B. 616.
30.. 11th ed. p. 594.
31. (1851) 30 L-J. C.P. 166
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false pretences, in such a way as not to transfer the 
property in them, and have been afterwards disposed 
of to a bona fide purchaser by sale not in market 
overt, the latter does not acquire a title to the goods 
as against the person who has been defrauded#
(Kingsford v lieny) ;u 32
It was found that the plaintiff had affirmed the contract
after the transfer to the second defendants. It was therefore
too late for him to avoid its terms.
finally, whether or not the second defendants were party
to the fraud of the first deiendant who had aiready been
convicted. The court determined this final question in the
negative. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover
the goods or their value from the second defendants who were
innocent purchasers for value without any notice of the fraud.
This decision was affirmed both by the Ghana lull Court and
33the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Their
Lordships came to a similar conclusion in the earlier decision 
of Akotey v The Commonwealth Trust Ltd., & Laing.^  On whom 
the onus of establishing fraud lies, the Divisional Court at 
Sekondi (Ghana), held in Dr, Masters v Ifaclean^  that the 
burden lies on the party who says that he was indueed by
32. 26 I-J. Dr. 83; see also Henderson v Williams
0-895] 1 Q.B.D# 521
33* At p. 101 of the report#
34. (1923-25) 1. Ct. 78.
35. (1921-25) Div. Ct. 110.
4: '
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fraud to enter into a contract, to prove the fraud; that
the representee must show that at the time when he entered
into the contract, he was deceived by the false representations.
If, when he enters into the contract, he knows the real facts,
he is not deceived. finally it was also held that it is not
enough to show that the representee had the means of knowledge,
even though the means were supplied to him by the representor;
it must be shown that he actually knew.
In the Masters case the defendants * counterclaim for
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation w^s dismissed since
he had not discharged the onus of proving fraud as set out 
3 fiabove. The fact that the plaintiff's means of knowledge
could have discovered the fraud cannot avail a fraudulent
37defendant. In the Nigerian case of Sule v Arornire, the 
defendant had fraudulently represented to the plaintiff that 
he was the rightful owner of certain premises and had pur­
ported to convey the said premises to him. The plaintiff 
could have discovered the true facts if he had examined.a 
High Court Judgment in respect of the land which was in fact 
the property of a third party. In an action to set aside
36. This was an action for the arrears of instalments on the 
sale of a medical practice. The defendants counterclaim 
for damages of for rescission on grounds of fraudulent 
misrepresentation was dismissed. C.f. Ankramah v Kitcher 
(1926-29) f5. Ct. 366 where the plaintiffs were not 
allowed to plead their own fraud to defeat a conveyance.
37o (1951) 20 N.L.E. 20. See also Sackey v Ashong (1956)
I . a  . L . i f . 1 0  8 •
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the conveyance and recover the price paid on grounds of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, it was argued for the defendant 
that the plaintiff could have discovered the true facts 
if he had made enquiries; since he had waived such enquiries, 
his action did not lie. This submission was overruled by 
the Nigerian Supreme Court. It was held, among other things, 
that as the plaintiff was misled by the defendant's fraud­
ulent misrepresentation, it was no defence for the latter 
that the plaintiff might have found out the truth if he had 
made enquiry, and the plaintiff was entitled to annulment 
of the sale and a refund of the purchase price.
The victim of a fraudulent misrepresentation is also
entitled to an action for damages as an alternative to
rescission or annulment. The curious case of Josephine Jola
3 8
Martins v Adenugba w^ .s a claim for damages against the 
defendant for fraudulently misrepresenting to the plaintiff 
that they were legally married and thereby inducing her to 
live with him as wife for three years. The facts were that 
the plaintiff had agreed to marry the defendant, and on an 
appointed day they had both gone to a Marriage .registry for 
the marriage. The defendant alone went in to see the
38. (1946) 18 N.L.H. 63
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Registrar and on coining out, made the plaintiff believe
that the marriage was concluded and showed her a marriage
certificate which he claimed to have obtained from the
Registrar# In fact the whole affair was staged and the
plaintiff had only gone into the Registrar fs office to have
a chat with a friend. Three years afterwards the plaintiff
discovered the hoax and in the ensuing action claimed £150
damages for the fraud. Brooke, Ag* C.J. awarded her £50
damages for the deceit.
A plea of fraudulent misrepresentation can also be a
defence to an action for specific performance of an agreement
39induced by the misrepresnatation. In Sacke.y v Ashong, 
the court refused to sustain the plea because it was found as 
a fact that there had been no such fraudulent misrepresentat­
ion.
V/here the misrepresentation is negligent:
The test of liability for negligence in English law is 
whether or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of
39« (1956) I V/.A.L.R. 108. C.f. Henderson v Jolaosho & Ors.
(1926) 6 N.L.H. 19, where the Nigerian Full Court also 
refused a plea of misrepresentation on the ground 
that the respondent was not induced;.by it to enter 
into the agreement, in this case, as a co-surety.
40. Nocton v Lord Ashburton £l9l|3 A.C. 932.
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care, that the duty has been breached and that the plaintiff 
has suffered damage. For purposes of liability for neg­
ligent misstatements the House of Lords has held that such 
a duty exists in cases of fiduciary relationships. Attempts
to extend the scope of the liability under the rule in
41Donoghue v Stevenson did not meet with much success. But
in the recent decision of liedley Byrne & Go. Ltd. v Heller
4 2 •& Partners Ltd., liability for negligent misstatements
has been said to lie
uwhere it is pl&LEii that the party seeking information 
or advice was trusting the other to exercise such a 
degree of care as the circumstances required, v/here it 
was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other 
gave the information or advice when he knew or ought 
to have known that the inquirer was relying on him.1143
In the lucid words of Lord Pearce,
"There is also, in my opinion, a duty of care created 
by special relationships which, though not fiduciary, 
give rise to an assumption that care as well as honesty 
is demanded."44
Thus it can be said that the modern basis for liability for 
negligent misstatements in English Law is the existence of
41. 562.
42. (i960 A.O. 465*
43* Per Lord He id at p. 486.
44. Op. Git. at p. 539
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a fiduciary relationship between the parties and the extension 
of that relationship as laid down in the Hedley Byrne 
decision. The remedies available to the victim of a neg­
ligent misstatement are similar to those obtainable by the 
plaintiff in an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation, 
except that in the former, an action for deceit may not lie* 
There are no local judicial authority in this aspect 
of the law in Ghana and Nigeria* It is likely however,
that the Courts in the two countries will follow the rule
45in Hedley Byrne when the matter arises for decision*
V/here the misrepresnetation is innocent:
A false representation may be neither fraudulent nor
negligent* In such a case the misrepresentation is said
to be innocent* The Common Law accorded no relief to a
victim of an innocent misrepresentation unless such a mis-
46representation had become a term of the contract* In
47equity, however, such a victim could obtain a rescission
of the agreement or set up the misrepresentation as a defence
L R
to any action for specific performance of the agreement*
45* In the Nigerian case of Sodino v Coker & Qrs (1932)
II N.L.R. 138, the Divisional Court allowed a claim for 
the rescission of a sale on the ground of the auction­
eer^ misdescription of the area*
46* Kennedy v Panama, etc. Royal Mail Co.Ltd*(1867) L*R*2 
Q.B. 5o0.
47* Lamare v Dixon (1873) L.R* 6 H*L. 414* 
48. See (47) supra.
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Ho damages are obtainable in an action for misrepresent-
49ation unless there was fraud or negligence*
Pour limits to the £ight to rescind have been recognised 
in English Law* Firstly, the victim of an operative mis­
representation has a choice between affirming the contract
and repudiating it* If he affirms the contract, the right
50of rescission is lost* Secondly restitutio in integrum
51must be possible* That is, that it must be possible to
restore the pre-contract position ;6f the parties. Thirdly,
where third parties have acquired bona fide rights under
52the agreement the right to rescind is lost. Finally under
5 }the rule in Wilde v Gibson  ^for land and Seddon v North
54Eastern Salt Co* Ltd* for other contracts, the right to 
rescission is lost when the contract is executed. The rule 
in the latter decision has been very heavily criticised and
it is doubtful if it will be followed in the Courts of
49. See the Ghana case of Dr.Masters v Maclean (1921-25) 
Div. Ct. 110.
50. long v lloyd (19581 1 W.l.R. 753*
51. Armstrong v Jackson (19173 2 K.B. 822.
52. Babcock v lawson (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 284.
53. (1848) 1 H.l.C. 605.
54. (19053 1 Ch. 326.
rf;
Ghana and Nigeria.
Non-disclosure:
The circumstances under which silence or non-disclosure
can operate as a misrepresentation, have already been men-
tioned. In English law, instances where non-disclosure
is a ground for relief can be found in contracts of insurance
agreements for the sale of land, contracts preliminary to
family settlements; agreements for the allotment of shares
in a company, suretyships and partnerships, and finally,
b7cases involving parties in a fiduciary relationship.
In Ghana and Nigeria, however, most of the cases under
this sub-head have been; concerned with suretyships. The
principle established by the cases is that there must be a
full disclosure of all facts likely to affect the judgment
of the intending surety. Thus in the Nigerian case of John
5 8Holt & Co. Ltd. v Cl ad un Joyce, the dependant as surety
55* See II. A.Hammeliraann, "Seddon v North Eastern Salt Co.!1
(1939) 55 L.Q.B. 90$ II.Howard 1 The rule in Seddon's case 
(1963) 26 LI.L.N. 272; Tenth Report of the Law Reform 
Committee, 19)6:2 Cmnd. 1782, 3.6. The decision in the 
Nigerian case of Sule v Aromire (1951) 20 N.L.k .20, 
tends to support the view that the rule in Seddon's 
case is part of the Law of Nigeria.
56. See p. supra.
57. For7the position in English Law, see Cheshire & Fifoot, 
Law of Contract (6th ed. 1964) pp.230-234; Anson fs
Law of Contract (2kind ed. 1964) pp. 232-240.
58. (1936) 13 N.L.IU 1.
460executed a bond guaranteeing up to £400 the fidelity of an
employee of the plaintiffs under his contract of service.
Before this the employee had been employed in the same sort of
job (i.e. produce-buying) by the plaintiffs and as a result
of his previous work he had defaulted to the amount of £600.
It was in order to recoup themselves for this loss of £600
that the plaintiffs proposed to finance him in further work
of the same kind under the safeguard of the defendant 's
indemnity bond. The plaintiffs' agent told the defendant
that the employee had worked for them before and w$s a good
produce-buyer• It was,not disclosed that the employee had
defaulted in his previous dealings with the plaintiffs. In
a claim against the defendant for the sum of £304.19*6.
being the shortage in the employee's account, the defendant
set up the non-disclosure of the existing liability of £600
as his defence. It was argued for the plaintiff company
that there was no obligation upon them to disclose the
employee's state of accounts without enquiry from the
defendant, and that unless the concealment was fraudulent
the surety could not escape liability under the bond. On
this submission by the plaintiffs, Graham Paul, J. who decided
the case had this to say:
"I have considered the authorities quoted and my view 
upon them is that the contract of suretyship is in 
general not a contract where uberrima fides is demanded 
of the person in whose favour the guarantee is given, 
as it is demanded for instance of the assured in 
contracts of assurance. But it is a fidelity guarantee,
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as distinct from a guarantee of a bank overdraft, 
it comes very near what I may term the uberrima fides 
class of contract. As it is put in the judgment of 
Foy, J. in the case of Davis v London & Provincial 
Iiafine Insurance Co.,59 "very little said which ought 
not to have been said, and very little not said which 
ought to have been said, would be sufficient to prevent 
the contract being valid" . . . • . Upon this point 
after considering the facts of this case and the 
authorities, I am of opinion that for the plaintiffs' 
agent to represent to a prospective surety that the 
principal was a good produce-buyer was inconsistent 
with the fact that as a result of his buying for the 
firm with the firm's money or goods there was a balance 
of £600 for which he could not deliver produce and which 
he could not pay except by being launched on a fresh 
enterprise with fresh credit by the plaintiffs."60
It was held that the plaintiff could not recover.
61On the other hand in U.A.C. v J a z z ar where the defendant 
guaranteed the principal's account with the plaintiffs for 
up to £200, without being informed of a debit balance of £12 
in the said principal's account, it was held that the plaint­
iffs were under no obligation to disclose the principal's 
indebtedness in the absence of inquiry. The non-disclosure 
was held not to amount to a misrepresentation such as would 
entitle the defendant to avoid the contract. It is remarkable 
that the John Holt case decided three years earlier, was 
neither cited nor argued before his Lordship. An attempt 
to distinguish the former from the latter decision can be 
made on the basis that in the U.A.0. case there was no
59. (1878) 8 Ch. D. at p. 475.
60. Op. Cit. at pp. 3-4*
61. (1939( 15 N.L.R. 67. affirmed (1940) 6 W.a .0.A.208.
suggestion that the principal was unable to meet his indebt­
edness or had in any way committed default, both of which 
circumstances were present in the John Holt case.
The U.A.C. decision also lays down that the nature
of a particular transaction determines whether a fact not
disclosed is such that it is impliedly represented not to
exist. This aspect of the matter was elaborated on in Ode
62v J»F«Sick & Co. and ors. In this case the first defendants 
employed the plaintiff's brother.::a3 an unsecured salesman, 
and, having found him to be short in his stock to the amount 
of £650, closed the shop and declined to open it or continue 
his employment without security. The plaintiff was the 
principal debtor's sister and had. agreed to secure the 
brother in the defendant's employment by a mortgage of her 
premises. No notice was given of the previous indebtedness 
nor did the defendant make any inquiries. The amount of 
the security was not limited. A few months later the 
principal's stock was short by £68 and the plaintiff having 
refused to make good the shortage, the defendants purported 
to exercise their right of sale under the mortgage. In the 
ensuing action the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain 
the sale. It was argued on her behalf that the non-disclosure 
of the existing liability of her brother to the defendants
62. (1939) 15 N.L.I1.4 . C.f. Pettiford v l^r (1937) 13 N.L.H.
138, v/here the non-disclosure oi' the interest due on a
promissory note absolved the surety from liability.
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absolved her from her obligation under the guarantee. The 
Court found as a fact that the plaintiff knew of the defendants 1 
closure of the brotherfs shop and the non-continuance of 
his employment in the absence of security. In the Court’s 
view, these should have put the plaintiff on her enquiry but 
this she did not do* It was therefore held that in the cir­
cumstances the first defendants were not under any obligation 
to inform the surety of the existence of the indebtedness of 
the employee at the time of the guarantee and that the surety 
was liable for his past and subsequent indebtedness to the 
defendants. The injunction was therefore refused.
But in another case where the subsisting indebtedness 
was recited in the guarantee deed and the sureties undertook 
to guarantee any subsequent losses in the account, an action 
based on the past debit balance of the employee was held not 
to lie against the sureties.
(c) Duress and undue influence:
In the two preceding sub-sections we have been examining 
instances of defects in reaching an agreement, brought about 
by inadequate consent and misrepresentation. )Je shall next 
be discussing cases where the consent of one of the parties 
is not a free consent because of the presence of some form 
of compulsion. This is of course, the whole problem of
63* J.D.Sick & Co. v IIo & Anor. (1939) 15 N.L.E. 34*
duress and undue influence.
Duress:
It is a trite statement that a party cannot be held to 
an agreement unless he is a free agent. He is not free 
when the consent has been extracted by some compulsion. This 
compulsion has often been called duress. Legal duress, 
however, is a narrow concept in the Common Law. It has been
defined to mean actual violence to the person.^ It is not
65enough to plead that the duress was of a person’s goods. 
Although there is as yet no local judicial authority in Ghana 
and Nigeria on the scope of duress, it is hoped that the 
Courts will not confine its operation to actual violence or 
threats of violence to the person. A p}.ea of duress of 
goods ought to be a ground for avoiding an agreement.
Undue influence:
The scope of this equitable doctrine was restated by
Lindley L.J. in Allcard v Skinner as follows:
”In a Court of equity if A obtains any benefit from B, 
whether under a contract or a gift, by exercising an 
influence over B which in the opinion of the Court, 
prevents B from exercising an independent judgment in
64. Seear v Cohen (1881) 45 L.T. 5 8 9.
6 5. Skeate v Beale (1840) 11 Ad. & El. 983.
66. (1887) 36 Ch.D. 145*
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i; the matter in Question, B can set aside the contract 
or recover the gift. Iforeover in certain cases the 
relation between A and- B nay be such that A has 
peculiar opportunities of exercising influence over B.
If under such circumstances A enters into a contract 
with B, or receives a gift from B, a Court of equity 
imposes upon A the burden, if he wishes to maintain 
the contract or gift, of proving that in fact he 
exerted no influence for the purpose of obtaining it.”67
Thus there are two facets of the doctrine namely where the
circumstances point to the fact that the mind of one of the
parties dominated that of the other so as to affect his
independent judgment; and where the relationships between
the parties is such as to raise the presumption of undue
influence. In the former case the onus is on the party
alleging that there has been an undue influence to prove 
6 8it, while in the latter, undue influence is presumed until 
rebutted.
The latter category of decisions are concerned with 
cases where the party alleging the undue influence reposes 
confidence in the other party to the transaction as a result 
of the relationship between them. In English law such
gq
relationships have been recognised between parent and child, ^
70 71solicitor and client, medical man and patient, trustee
67# Op. cit. pp. 101, 183•
68. filljams v 3 ayley (1866) l.R.l H •L • 200
69« B a i n brigge v Browne ( 1 8 8 1 ) 1 8  Ch.B. 188.
70. fright v Carter 0-303} 1 Oh. 27.
71. Bitch ell v Homf r ay (1381) 8 f. B . 13 • 5 87
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72 7 3nd cestui que trust, , spiritual reviser and bis flock,
74and fiance and fiancee. The pres.iu iron of undue influence
is rebutted when it is proved tint the party in whom con­
fidence is reposed (often called a fiduciary), has not con­
cealed any material fact from the party affected, and that
7
the latter was in a positron to tame an independent decision.
7 6In Victoria Williams ^ Ore v franklin A Crsy' the 
lli^erian Supreme Court was to rule on the validity of a sale 
to a solicitor by his client. The respondent was a solicitor 
practising in Lagos. In 1929 Cole purchased lands in Lagos 
and the respondent acted as his solicitor in that transaction 
and in other collateral transactions concerning those lands 
up to 1956. In i^ju Cole experienced certain financial 
difficulties and tried to sell the land by public auction for 
£150 subject to an existing mortgage (to the value of £130) 
but did not succeed. The respondent then offered to buy 
tine land subject to the mortgage for £150 and Cole sold it 
to him. ihen in 1930 Cole died, the respondent acted for
72* Beni rf i<: li v in ...ter (1886) 12 fas. 167
73. Jill card v ikinner (1887) 36 Ch. L. 145*
74• he Lo-o, ds hank, Ltd. Q 9313 1 Ch. 289.
75* Before the Privy Council decision of madias ter v Byrne
(1952) 1 -all B.k. 1362, it used to be thought thet the 
weaker party :.ust have obtained and acted on an independ­
ent legal advice. That requirement is not part of the 
law of Vigeria. Sec infra.
7 6. (1961) j. All V.L.f. 218.
vj
n
his family (the appellants) in obtaining letters of 
administration of his estate. The respondent was in poss­
ession of the land in issue and exercised absolute ownership 
over it for twenty years and the appellants raised no ob­
jection. In 194b when the Lagos Executive Development Board 
acquired the land and proposed to pay the necessary compen­
sation to the respondent, the appellants brought an action to 
set aside the sale of the lands, and for 9 declaration that 
any compensation on the land was payable to them and not to 
Franklin. It was argued on their behalf that the relation­
ship of solicitor and client existed between the deceased 
Cole and the respondent; that this raised a presumption of 
undue influence; that the respondent had mot rebutted the 
presumption; and that the purported sale was voidable at 
their instance.
The learned trial judge found against them on all the 
above points, holding that
(a) there was a sele by Cole to the respondent in 1938;
(b) at the time of the sale the relationship of 
solicitor and client dia not exist between the 
parties; and that
r-r rj
(c) a fair price had been paid fo»r the land.'
77. The learned judge's fourth and final reason for the 
decision is not relevant to the (discussion on undue 
influenc e.
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On appeal to the federal Supreme Court, the appellants* con­
tention that a relationship of solicitor and client existed 
between franklin and the deceased Cole at the time of the 
transaction, was upheld. Unsworth, P.J. who read the
Court’s judgment referred to the English case of Allison v 
7 R
Playbills with approval and continued:
**In considering whether in any particular transaction 
any duty exists such as to bring the ordinary rule into 
operation, all the circumstances of the individual 
case must be weighed and examined. Thus, a solicitor 
may by virtue of his employment acquire a personal 
ascendancy over a client and this ascendancy may last 
long after the employment has ceased, and the duty 
towards the client which arises out of any such ascend­
ancy will last as long as the ascendancy itself can 
operate. Again, a solicitor may by virtue of his 
employment acquire special knowledge, and the knowledge 
so obtained may impose upon him the duty of giving 
advice or making a full and proper disclosure in any 
transaction between himself and his client, though such 
transaction may take place long after the relationship 
of solicitor and client in its stricter sense had 
ceased to exist. And there may be other circumstances 
which may impose a duty on a solicitor, which duty 
may continue to exist after the relationship of solicitor 
and client in the strict sense has ceased#u79
The Court found that the present case came within the res­
idual category of "other circumstances which may impose a
duty". It was held further, following the Privy Council
80decision of Madiaster v Byrne, that independent legal advice 
is not in such circumstances an absolute pre-requisite to
78. [1907] 97 L.T. 709.
79* At p. 222.
80. Q.952] 1 All E.R. 1362.
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such a transaction. In this case the fact that two members 
of the Cole family were present when the transaction was 
completed, was sufficient to fulfil the requirement of 
independent advice.
On the question of the reasonableness of the price, the
£Court found, after examining all the surrounding circumstances,
that £150 was a reasonable price for the property. It was
also found that the respondent disclosed to Cole all the
relevant information about the property, which was all the
duty imposed on him by the Law as a fiduciary. The appeal
was dismissed.
V/hat the Franklin decision has achieved is the laying
down of a sounder basis for rebutting any allegation of undue
influence without the former rigid requirement of independent
le&al advice as laid down m  the earlier English authorities.
It is hoped that this test will be applied in the G-hana
82Courts when the question arises for decision.
81* e.g. the value of the property at the time of the trans­
action and the fact that at an auction sale the property 
had been withdrawn because all the offers made were 
less than £1 5 0.
8 2. See also the Privy Council appeal from Sierra Leone of
Patience Johnson v Williams (1935) 2 V/.A.C.A. 24-8, which
was concerned with the relationship cfid medical man 
and his patient. Here also the presumption of undue 
influence was successfully rebutted by evidence. The 
result of a successful plea of undue influence is to 
make the agreement voidable at the instance of the weaker 
party. But delay is fatal the plea* The rights of bona 
fide third parties may defeat a belated claim.
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2. Defects in the validity of an agreement
Although the consent of the parties might be present, 
some other factors may still operate to render the agreement 
defective. These include incapacity, informatlity, ill­
egality and the infringement of public policy* In this 
section we shall be investigating these factazsand in the 
above order*
(i) Incapacitys
So far we have been discussing agreements the parties 
to which are under no disability to conclude a valid con­
tract. The defect in the validity of an agreement may, 
however, be due to the fact that legal policy has not recog­
nised in one or both parties the capacity to make a binding 
agreement. Obvious instances of incapacity in English law 
are infants, lunatics and drunkards, corporations, and to 
some extent, the Crown. Since the enactment of the Married 
Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act, 1949, there are 
no longer any contractual restraints on married women in 
English law#
In Ghana and Nigeria two aspects of the subject are of 
striking importance. The first is the capacity of infants 
to make agreements and the second is the vital question of
1* For the current position in English law on contracutal 
capacity, see Cheshire & Eifoot, Law of Contract 
(6th ed. 1964) pp. 347-374: Anson’s Law of Contract 
(22nd ed. 1964) pp*173-206: Halsbury's Laws (3rd edition)
pp vols. 9 p.4; 29, 374-384; 34, 24-25, 439-440.
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the capacity to make a valid alienation of family property* 
Infancy:
The Common Law has recognised twenty-one as the age
2of contractual capacity. Anyone under that age is desig­
nated as infant and is in general exempted^ from liability 
for his contracts. The exceptions to this rule were infants1 
contracts for necessaries. These have been defined to 
include food, clothing, lodging, apprenticeship (and education) 
and service. Two categories of infants contracts not for 
necessaries, were recognised by the common law. The first 
were those in which the infant acquired an interest of a 
permanent or continuous nature. Examples are shares in a 
company or interest in land*. These were binding on the in­
fant until he avoided them either during infancy or within a 
reasonable time after attaining his majority. The other 
category of agreements were those not of a continuous or 
permanent nature. These were not binding on the infant 
unless he ratified them within a reasonable time after majority
2. In Islamic law the capacity of the parties is an import­
ant factor in determining the validity of an agreement. 
The law requires the parties to have attained the age 
of discretion in order to enter into a vilid contract*
In gratuitous acts, the immaturity of the donor is fatal 
to the validity of the gift. See Milliot, Obligations, 
s.792.
3- i*e. a plea of infancy would avoid the contract. Such 
an agreement was therefore voidable.
This was the position before the enactment of the Infants 
Relief Act, 1874*^ the provision of which rendered 
absolutely void the latter category of agreements made by 
infants. Mention must also be made of Section 2 of the 
Sale of Goods Act, 1893 which provides that where necessaries 
are sold and delivered to an infant or to a person who by 
reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent 
to contract, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. In 
other words, if in the opinion of the court the contract price 
was not a reasonable price, the court will substitute their 
price for that of the parties.
Two facets of the above position deserve some comment.
Firstly the age of majority as accepted by the common law
is arbitrary and bears no relation to the realities of actual
life or the requirements of commerce. It has occasioned
so much injustice in the English law of contract that a large
volume of protest has developed against the plea of infancy 
5based on it. Two cases typical of the point we want to
4. 37 & 38 Viet. Cap. 62 see also the Betting and Loans
(Infants) Act, 1892 (England) which renders void any 
negotiable instrument given in respect of a void loan. 
Such an instrument cannot be enforced against an infant 
even after majority.
5. See P. Winfield "Necessaries under the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1893n (1942) 58 L.Q.R. 82;P.S,A$iyah f,The Liability 
of infants in Fraud and Restitution" (1959) 22 M.L.R. 
270; Treitel "The Infants Relief Act, 1874" (1957)*
473
6illustrate will be discussed. Cowern v Nield, was an 
action against an infant who was a hay and a straw merchant* 
The plaintiff had ordered some clover and hay from him and 
had paid £35*19*0. to cover the price* The defendant del­
ivered the clover but as this was not fit for the purpose for 
which it wqs required, the plaintiff rejected it. The infant 
took back the clover. He did not deliver any other goods 
to the plaintiff nor did he refund the <£35*19.0. (or any part 
of it) already paid for the goods. An action for damages 
for the breach of contract or alternatively for the £35*19*0. 
as money had and received on a total failure of consideration, 
was defeated by the defence of infancy. The County Court 
Judge who tiied the action at first instance had rejected 
the plea of infancy, but this was overruled on appeal by the 
Court of king's Bench. In effect the defendant kept both 
the money and the clover.
Also in llercantile Union Guarantee-Corporation ltd, v
7
Ball, the infant defendant aged 20 was a haulage contractor. 
He bought a lorry on hire purchase from the plaintiffs for 
£666 and this was found to have been used in his business.
He paid his instalments regularly until when his business 
was adversely affected by increased taoc he could not keep 
up with the payments. The plaintiffs sued for the arrears
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of instlments but a plea of infancy was upheld by the court
as a defence to the action. A learned author has had this
to say on the Cowern and Ball decisions:
"If we imagine that in these two cases the infant 
defendants had a wife and children, the absurdity of the 
rule becomes perhaps ever more glaring. To regard a 
person who has the responsibility of providing food, 
clothing and shelter for a family of four of five as 
an infant lacking capacity to enter into traciing con­
tract has hardly anything in reason to commend it.
If he orders food for himself and his family, the 
law will hold him liable to pay a reasonable price 
therefor, but the same law will refuse to enforce a 
trading contract from which he derives the wherewithal 
to pay for the food."8
Ve are respectfully in agreement with the comments of the 
learned author. It may be added that neither customary nor
Islamic lav; requires the age of twenty-one for contractual
g
capacity. Both systems regard puberty as the age of 
contractual capacity.^ Also section 29 of the Eastern 
Nigerian Co-operative Societies Law^  restricts contractual 
#AEapacity for infants to those made by people under 18 years
8. B.O.Nwabueze, "Integration of the law of Contracts"
paper presented to Institute of African Studies, Univer­
sity of Ife August, 1964- - at p. 8.
9* Labin.joh v Abake (1924) 5,N.L.I1. 33*
10. The ages of 15 and-16 have been freely mentioned. It
may be remarked that Eafawa v Kano N.A. (1958) N.L.E. 64 > 
which Hr. Nwabueze cited as the authority for this 
proposition in Islamic law, was concerned with infancy 
for the purposes of criminal evidence. Milliot uses 
maturity without defining it in terms of years. See 
s.792 of his Obligations.
11. Cap.28, laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963)*
of age* ;/e do of course accept the position that a limit
must be imposed on the capacity of people of tender years
to make valid agreements* But it is submitted that the
common law position of twenty-one is unrealistic in English
law and totally unsuitable to the Ghana and Nigerian Societies
It is suggested that instead of the common law requirement,
18 years should be substituted with a proviso that if the
infant is between the ages of 16 and 18, married and/or is
in any business, he should be treated for purposes of con-
12tractual capacity a3 if he had attained his majority*
The second facet of the English position that deserves 
comment is the effect of infants contracts. It is clear 
from the authorities that all the infants contracts rnadw 
absolutely void by the Infants Belief Act, 1874* were mere iy 
voidable before the enactment of the statute* Now, this 
enactment is not a statute of general application in Ghana 
since it was not in force in England until 7th August, 1874} 
a fortnight after 24th July 1874*
13The Ghana case of Sey v Abadoo J was decided on the 
common law position oh infants contract. Secondly, the
12* see also the Uganda Contract.(Amendment) Act, 1964} 
where a minor or infant is defined as any person 
under 18 years of age.
13. (1885) Hen. 65.
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Sale of Goods Act, 1893 is not applicable to Ghana, being 
a post-1874 statute of the United Kingdom Parliament not 
made expressly applicable to Ghana. Section 2(2) of the 
Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137) however provides as 
follows;
"2(2) where necessaries are delivered to a person 
under an agreement which is void because of that 
person's incapacity to contract he shall be bound 
to pay a reasonable price therefor."
Since infants contracts are not void but voidable in Ghana, 
it is submitted that the above provision does not cover con­
tracts by infants. It lb still arguable therefore that in 
cases where necessaries are sold to infants they will be
expected to pay the contract (as opposed to a reasonable)
14price*
15In Nigeria, the case of Labin.ioh v Abake is authority 
for the view that the Infants Helief Act, 1874, is an Act of 
general application in force in Nigeria. This makes the 
effect of infants contracts in Nigeria similar to what it is 
in current English law. The injustice of this position has
14. In the Sey case it was however, found as a fact that the 
defendant was already reasonably well supplied and the 
plaintiff could not recover the price.of the goods.
15. (1942) 5 33.
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already been observed# Here it nay be added that section
29 of the Eastern Nigerian Co-operative Societies law provides
that the minority or under-age of any person duly admitted
as a member of any registered society shall not debar that
person from executing any instrument or giving any acquittance
necessary to be executed or given under that law or the
regulations made thereunder. It further provides that it
shall not be a ground for invalidating or avoiding any such
contract entered into by any such person with the society,
and any such contract entered into by any such person with
the society either as principal debtor or as surety, shall
be enforceable by or against such person notwithstanding his
minority or unaer-age. There are similar provisions in the
16Western and Northern Nigeria Co-operative societies laws.
Thus in cases covered by the co-operative societies laws, 
the provisions of the Infants Belief Act, 1874, as to the 
effect of certain infants contracts, do not apply in Nigeria 
except perhaps, in the federal territory of Lagos.
17Capacity to make a valid alienation of family property:
16. See s.27 of the Western Nigeria Co-operative Societies 
Law, Cap. 26 of 1959; and s.29 of the Northern Nigeria 
Co-operative Societies Lav; No. 9 of 1956.
17* See particularly K.Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, an 
Exposition, Analysis and Critique (London, 1964) pp* 
41-79; S.K.B.Asante, "Interests in Land in the Cust­
omary Lav; of'”Ghana11 (1965) Tale Law Journal, 848;
A.N.Allott,, The Ashanti Law of Proptery (1966) T.O.
El 1 ias, Nigerian Land Lav; and. Custom T1953) pp.l73‘et 
seo±; S.N.Obi. modern family Lav; in Southern Nigeria 
(London,I960); Coker, family Property among the
Yorubss (2nd ed.195b) pp.94 e£ seq.
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A thesis on obligation created by agreement is hardly
the proper place to explore the vast and complicated subject
of the lav; of property generally, or its special branch, the
laws governing family property even if one were qualified to 
18undertake it* On the other hand any discussion of the
law of agreements in Ghana and Nigeria that does not contend 
with the perennial problem of who has capacity to alienate 
or otherwise deal with what property, and the legal effect 
of any purported alienation, is so much the poorer for it.
In this sub-section, therefore, we shall be taking a brief 
look at the question of capacity to alienate family property. 
This will be followed by a more detailed discussion of the 
legal effect of any dealing m  family property by its members. 
Two preliminary points must, however, be made. firstly, that 
although the above sub-title might indicate a discussion on 
the capacity to alienate family property generally, our 
discussion here will be centered on land and land natters.
This treatment does not detract from the importance of forms 
of family property other than land* It rather underlines 
the interminable nature of the argument on who has capacity 
to deal with what land. Secondly, that the exclusion of
lb. There are several works in. Ghana and Nigeria on this
aspect of the law. mee among others: C.il.Heek, Law and 
Authority in a Ni:erian Tribe, (Lond o n, 19 37) ; S. N.G.Obi ; 
Ibo Law of Property: G a s e l.y-li ay ford, Gold Coast barive 
Institutions (1903j; J•f•La '.nquah, Akan Law and Customs 
TT9 2 87; A. b. Bat tray, Ashanti Lav; and jC o nst i t ution,
(1929) ; A. ]T. Allot t, Ess ay a"' In If r i c a n~Law T 1 9 6 Q) ; Lolly
Kill, migrant Cocor-f arme.rs oftoouthern Ghana( 1961)
K. A. QirLTrmrr~yLst^
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other forms of pro pert; e.g. individual and stool or state
property is deliberate. v/hile the former are governed by
the rules on eneral contractual capacity which we have
19already discussed, '' the latter is in many respects similar 
to family property except where, as is the case in present- 
day Ghana, there are new statutory regulations. Such pro­
visions will of course be mentioned at the appropriate place. 
Capacity to alienate family land:
"The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in 
order to understand the nativeland law is that the 
notion of individual ownershi > is quite foreign to native 
idejs. Lt nd uelongs to toe community, the village or 
the family, never ,o the individual. All the members 
of the community, village or family have equal right to 
the land, but in ever^  case the chief or headman of the 
communit or village, or head of t ie family has charge 
of the land, and in loose mode of speech is sometimes 
called owner. He is to some extent in the position of 
a trustee, and as such nolds the land for the use of 
the community or family. He has control of it and any 
member who wants a piece of it to cultivate or build a 
house upon, goes to him for it. Hut the land so given 
still remains the property of t..:e community or family, 
lie cannot make any important disposition of the land 
without consulting the elders of the community or family
19* There has been some doubt as to the ambit of the recent 
Ghana Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123). 3.8 
provides as follows: (i) "Any disposal of any land
which involves the payment of any valuable consideration 
or which would, by reason of its being to a person not 
entitled by customary law to the free use of land in­
volved the payment of any such consideration, and which 
is made (a) by a stool (b) by any person who, by reason 
of his beinw so entitled under customary law, has 
acquired possession of such land either without payment 
of any consideration or in exchange for a nominal 
consideration”. It does seem that the alienation of any 
possessory title b^  a native would require presidential 
consent to be valid. This result would be anomalous
in view of the exclusion of family land.
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and their consent must in all cases be given before 
a grant can be made to a stranger-”
This passage quoted from Chief Justice Aayner's report on
20West Africa land Tenure was fully endorsed by the Judicial 
Committee of The Privy Council in the leading Nigeria appeal
Pl
of Amodu f ija.ni v Secretary, Southern Nigeria, but it has
pp
of course been overtaken by events in many vital respects*
Individual 'Ownership* for instance, is no longer as foreign
as it used to be. The question of Ownership even if this
was a convenient word for the discussion of African land law,
2 hneed not detain us here.  ^ It is enough to say that as
far as control and alienation of family property goes, liayner*s
20. {x39f£J
21. 0-9211 2 A.C. 399, per Viscount Haldane at pp.404-405*
22. This was recognised in the recent Privy Council decision
of Note v As ere Stool, Privy Council Appeal No. 31
of 1959 ( unreported) where Lord Penning discussed the 
modern trends in rights and interests in land. C.P. 
Allott in (1961) 5*J*A.L. 180. Asante in the article 
to which reference has already been made, supra, 
attributes the changes to (a) the growth of commercial 
agriculture (b) the emergence of revolutionary 
attitudes towards the alienation of land (3) the 
influence of English juristic ideas and (d) the 
decline of traditional authority.
23* On this see the interesting dialogue between Allott
and 3.A.Simpson on the definition of absolute owner­
ship in (1961) 5 J.A.L. pp.99; 145-150. On 
ownership in English law, see H. Honore, "Ownership" 
in "Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence" (ed.Guest, 19 61) 
p.107.
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24statement is still substantially the current legal position*
That is to say that it is only the family that has competence
to deal with its property in any way that the law permits.
No single individual has capacity to alienate family land.
Sarbah has said that:
"Neither the head of the family acting alone nor the 
senior members of the family acting alone, can make 
any valid alienation or give title to any family 
property whatsoever."25
24. A distinction must be made between the absence of any 
incentives to sell land (which is a matter of opinion) 
and the inalienability of land (which is factu al). 
Conventional discussion of the alienation of land has 
often confused the former with incapacity to alienate* 
See for instance T.0.Elias,"Nigerian Land Law and 
Custom" (1953) p. 172'. "There is perhaps no other 
principle more fundamental to the indigenous land 
tenure system throughout Nigeria than the theory of 
inalienability of land." But at 178 he notes the buying 
and selling of land in the Chad areal G-.B.A.Coker,
Family Property among the Yorubas, (1st ed.1958) p.40, 
"Strict and orthodox native lav; and custom does not 
recognise the sale of land and the literature on this 
point is abundant." See also the same effect p.94 
(2nd ed. Coker); IC.A.Busia, The Position of the Chief in 
the Modern Political System of Ashanti 0-952} p.43 
"The idea that the land belonged to the ancestors made 
the Ashanti unwilling to sell his land". J. B.Dancjuah, 
Akan Laws and Customs p.212 "Tradition has'it .that 
absolute alienation of land was until recent times not
genera n y  practised by the Alcan people ....  An absolute
sale of land by an Akan was therefore not simply a 
question of alienating realty; notoriously it was a 
case of selling a spiritual heritage for a mess of 
pottage, a veritable betrayal of ancestral trust, an 
undoing of the hope of posterity". C.F.C.E.Meek,
Land Law and Custom in the Colonies;' and Law and Author­
ity in a Nigerian TribeTwhere instances of sale of land 
among the Akwapim (Chana and Ibos Nigeria) were des­
cribed by the author.
25* Fanti Customary Law p.79*
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This position has been found to be of general application
26in both Ghana and Nigeria#
The logical conelusion from the above position would
seem to be that every member of the family would be consulted
27in any dealing with family property. But such a require­
ment would be absurd even if it were possible to bring to­
gether under one roof all the members of any given family 
at any given time# There would still be the complication 
created by the impossibility of ascertaining the views of 
infants and patients - mental and physical. Needless to 
mention the paper work involved in having to provide places 
for the signatures of upwards of 300 famiiy-members in order 
to validate a particular conveyance for, say, a plot to build 
a house on. Common sense therefore suggests, and the law 
has long accepted the principle of representation for purposes
of alienating or otherwise dealing with family land.
28 29''management committee" "family council" family land
26. See N.A.Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in 
Ghana (1962) p.126; K.Bentsi-Bnchill, Ghana land law, 
T i m )  p.44; A.N. Allott , Ashanti Law of Property (I960) 
p.1465 G.R.Woodman, "The Alienation_of Family Land in 
Ghana (1964) p*5; 1 Univ. of Ghana ii. Journal, p.23; 
P.C.Eloyd, Yoruba Land Law (1962) p.82; G.B.A.Coker, 
Family Property among the Yorubas (1966) p. 66; A#B.\7. 
Park, "A Dual" System of Land Tenure, the Experience of 
Southern Nigeria" (1965) J.A.L. p.
27. In fact Obi suggests that this was a strict requirement 
in traditional family law. op.cit. p.66.
28. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit. p.44#
29. Foko v Foko & Ors. (1965) Nig.'M.L.H. 3.
committee'*^ have variously been accepted as competent 
authorities for the purpose of dealing with family land.
A regular feature of these bodies is that each of them is 
made up of the family-head, his elders and the principal 
members of the family. The criteria for determining who is 
a principal member varies from one society to the other, but 
in general, these are the sub heads of the different branches 
of the family. It is this Dody that has the capacity to 
alienate family land. Neither the head alone nor the prin­
cipal members alone can effect a valid alienation of family 
land. There are scores of judicial ana academic authority 
in both Ghana and Nigeria to support this assertion.-'
Nome exceptions to the general rule have, however, been
recognised. firstly, among the Gas (Accra, Ghana) Vander-
3 3puye v JSotchwa.Y decided that the consent of the children
30. Obi, op. cit. p.66.
31. Among the Yorubas, he is called the ‘Mogajif and among
the Ibos, the "Okpala” or ”Okpara".
32. In Ghana see Agb'loe v Sappar (1947) 12 /.A.C.A. 187; 
Nelson v Nelson (1961) 13 W.A.C.A. 248; Owireau v 
Moshie ( 1952) 14 W,A.C.A. II; Monger v Bassil (19 54)
14 W. A.C.A. 569, Nasraku v Navid (1959) 5.L.R. 7. In 
Nigeria: foko v foko & ors (1965) N.M.L.Y. 3; Adebubu 
v Makanjuola (1944) 10 ..'.A.C.A. 33; Adewuvin v Ishola
( 1958) W.R7S.L.R. 110; Mss an v faro IT947) 12 /.A.C.A.
135; Onasanya v Shiwoniku (I960) ./.R.N.L.k. 166.
In each of the;.e cases what was in issue was the valid' 
ity of the authorised body acting for and on behalf 
of the family.
33* (1951) 13 V/.A.C.A. 164 ct. p. 168, reversed by Privy
Council (1956) 2 V/.A.L.R. 16.
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of a Ga six-cloth marriage was vital to the validity of any 
alienation of the property owned by their deceased father 
which on his death had become family property. Thus in 
tiiis category of family property the management committee 
would seem to include such six-cloth marriage children for 
purposes of valid alienation.
A second exception has been suggested by a learned author
to the effect that if a member of a family has a personal
right in family property distinct from the communal interest
of the family, no alienation of the said property without his
34consent would be valid.
o C O (Z
Thirdly, Woodman has cited Kwan v Nyieni to support 
the view that the court would allow any member of a family 
to sue to preserve the family character of property "where 
the head and principal members are deliberately disposing 
of family property in their personal interest, to the detriment 
of the family as a whole." This latter exception is not so
34* Allott, Assays, pp.305-306. cf. G.R.Woodman, infra,
who although he accepts the principle guiding Allott'a 
exception, rejects Allott !s authority in Lawani v 
Tadeve (1944) 10 ./.A.C.A. 37, describing the latter 
case as an unusual decision. See also T.O.Elias, 
Nigerian Land Law and Custom, (1953) p.2l3> where the 
Lawani decision was described as a case of some diff­
iculty. There is no doubt that Beyeden v Bekoe, un­
reported judgment of Jackson,J. Land Court Accra 31/3/52 
and Agbloe v Sappar (1947) 12 W.A.C.A: 187, support 
Allott !s general thesis.
35* "The alienation of family land in Ghana" (1964) Univ. 
of Ghana L.Journal 23 at p.28.
36. (1959) G.L.H. 67 at p.73.
much a question of the management committee lacking capacity
to alienate family land as that of their misusing their
37capacity to so alienate.
A contrast could be drawn between the position of the 
family head on the one hand and the sole trustee in English 
lav; on the ot.ier. Thus while a trustee has the legal 
estate vested in him and can transfer a valid title to the
5 O
purchaser without joining the beneficiary, the family 
head has no such powers of alienation over family land.
Also, an analogy of the family's managing committee to the 
board of directors of an incorporated association, is equally 
inapposite since the latter can transact business in the 
absence of (and even in opposition to) its managing
37* There has been some doubt as to whether a management 
committee must be unanimous to effect a valid alien­
ation of family land or whether a majority decision 
was enough. Allotey v Abranams (1957; 3 W. A.L.K.klbO 
supports the view that a majority decision will validate 
the sale. Ollennu adds thjtt such a majority must in­
clude the family head (Customary Land Law in Ghana, 
p.l2S). On the other hand, Bassil v Honger (1954)14 
W.A.C.A., 569; Kwan v Nyieni (1959) G.I.R. 67, and the 
Nigerian cases of Fsan v Faro (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 135 
and Foiio v Foko & or s. (19 65) Nig. L.R. 3> tend to 
suggest that the decision must be unanimous.
38* See Snell's Principles of fruity (25th ed. I960) p.228 
But in Appiah v Bansoa (1954) Accra Land ct. 12/10/54 - 
Mayo Plange, J. decided that the family head nas capa­
city to effect a valid transfer without obtaining any­
body's consent provided that such transfers lapse after 
nis death. This decision appears, however, to stand 
alone and is unlikely to be widely followed.
39director.
The legal effect of a purported alienation of family 
land without the necessary authority:
It is now necessary for us to advert to the effect in 
law of a purported alienation of family land. There has 
of course been a considerable divergence of judicial and 
academic opinion on wnetner a purported sale or other 
form of alienation without the necessary consents is a 
nullity from its inception or valid until avoided by one of 
the parties. This is the whole question of the agreement 
being void or voidable. In the former case no title 
passes to the purchaser while in the latter the transaction 
passes a defeasible title. According to Bentsi-Encnill, 
any alienation without the necessary consents is void ab 
initio and no title passes to the purchaser since nobody 
can convey to another what he himself has not got. He 
states in his book:
39* See L. C.B.G-ower, The Principles of Company Law 
(2nd ed. 1957) pp. 129 et seq. See also Allott, 
•’Family Property in West Africa: its juristic 
basis, control and enjoyment” 1966, p.9, where 
similar analogies were drawn by the learned author, 
cf. Harrigan C.J. in Agbloe v Sappor (1947) 12 
W.A.C.A. 187, where the learned Chief Justice likened 
the family head in Ewe law to a trustee in fhglish 
lew for purposes of determining where the legal 
estate vests.
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"There are two seemingly conflicting lines of 
decision on this point. It is submitted here, 
however, that the sounder view is that contained in 
the line of decisions which hold that title does not 
pass, i.e. that a purported alienation is void or 
invalid where the transfer is not the act of the 
‘management committee* and that the principle of the 
seemingly conflicting line of cases can be reconciled 
with this position on satisfactory grounds."40
And Ollennu has said, to the same effect that
"Any conveyance made by the occupant of the stool 
alone, or the head of the family alone, is null and 
void ab. initio, and any alienation made by the prin­
cipal members alone without the occupant of the 
stool or head of the family is likewise null and void 
ab initio.4l
In Nigeria Elias has also subscribed to the theory that such
42sales are void. He has said in his book, referring to
the effect of such sales among the Yorubas:
"But if a family member purports to alienate any 
portion of the family land without the consent or 
approval of the others, the purported alienation is 
a nullity and the purchaser from him has a void and 
not merely a voidable title. It is on this principle 
that all the cases of attempted sale or mortgage of 
family land by an unauthorised member thereof have 
been held to be void transactions."
40. Ghana Land Law, p.50
41• Customary Land Law in Ghana, p.128.
42. Nigerian Land Law and Custom (2nd ed. London, 1953)
p.196• Elias however, discussed Aganras v Clushi 
(1907) 1, N.L.R. 66, Oshodi v Balogun [1935T1>
All E.B. 1632 where similar agreements were said to 
be voidable.
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Lloyd came to the same conclusion about the legal effect of
sales without the concurrence of the family among the
Ijebus (Yoruba)*^
44On the other hand while Asante holds the view that
such sales are voidable, Allott,^ Woodman,^ Obi^ and
4 8Coker ‘ have argued that such a sale could be either void 
or voidable depending on the circumstances of each trans­
action. Coker fs mode of distinguishing between void and 
voidable sales, (that this depends on what the vendor 
purports to be selling) tends to stand alone.
Before going on to discussing the cases, one must want
43* P.C.Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law (London C.U.P. 1962) d .169.
.*
44* S.K.B. Asante, “Interests in Land in the Customary
Law of Ghana - A New Appraisal” (1964-65) 74 Yale 
Law Journal, 848*
45* Essays, pp. 304 et seq.
46. G.R.Y/oodman, “Alienation of Family Land in Ghana”
(1964) I University of Ghana Law Journal, p.23« The 
learned author discussed four types of agreements for 
sale or other alienation of family land. These are 
sales by the head alone, sale with consent of majority 
of principal members; sale with consent:’.of minority of 
family members; sale by members without headfs consent. 
Only the last example was said to be void ab initio*
The others were voidable.
47* S.N.C.Obi, Modern Baldly Law in Southern Nigeria (London,
1966) p.66. ----
48. G.B.A.Coker, Family Property among the Yorubas (2nd ed. 
1966) pp. 96 et seq. See also p.323«
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to know what difference it makes to the purchaser's title 
whether the alienation is void or voidable. If A sells 
family land to B without the necessary consents, what 
difference does it make to him that the court adjudges 
his title void or voidable? There is of coure the theor­
etical difference that in the first instance no title 
passes to him while in the latter he acquires a title which 
can be defeated. But for practical purposes B will keep
the land if in the former case the family are guilty of 
49acquiescence and in the latter if they did not act
sotimeously." Another theoretical distinction between the
49* Abbey v Qllennu (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 567*
50. In Bavaidee v Mens ah (1878) Sarbah B.C.L. 171, the Gold
Coast Pull Court had had this to sayJ "Now although 
it may be, and we believe it is the law, that the 
concurrence of the members of the family ought to 
be given in order to constitute an unimpeachable 
sale of family land, the sale is not in itself 
void, but is capable of being opened up at the 
instance of the family, provided they avail them­
selves of their right timeously and under circum­
stances in which, upon rescinding the bargain, the 
purchaser can be fully restored to the position 
in which he stood before the sale. This is obviously 
not the case where, as here, the purchaser has 
possessed for a series of years (14 years) an un­
disputed ownership, has cultivated and improved the 
land and established a house upon it. We are of
opinion that whatever right of impeaching the sale
the family possessed is barred by their acquiescence 
and the plaintiff's continued course of undisturbed 
possession".
See also Insilea v Simons (1899) Sarbah P.L.R. 
at p.105*
49G
two instances is that in the former the intervention of the 
right of a third party does not affect the validity or 
otherwise of the title under the maxim nemo dat quod not 
habet, while in the latter the agreement cannot be avoided 
if in the meantime a third party has acquired a bona fide 
interest in the subject matter. Again, for practical pur­
poses no local judicial authority in either Ghana or Nigeria 
appears to have beenjsuggested by a learned author that in
such a case notice, actual or constructive, might defeat
51the family's claim to set the transaction aside. where,
on the other hand, B in our example above knew of the family's 
interest in the land but nevertheless proceeded to purchasing 
from A without further inquiries, the family can recover.
52This was the decision in the Ghana case of Insilhea v Simons.
It may well be that the onus of establishing acquiescence
in void transactions is heavier than in cases where the
5 3agreement is merely voidable. In Abbey v Qllenu where the
defendant had purchased land from a vendor who subsequently
had no title to convey, Foster-Sutton P, quoted with approval
the following passage from the judgment of Fry J. in V/illmott 
54v Barber.
51. Allott, Fssays, p*305 of the Nigerian case of Ajose v
Ilarworth
52. (1899) Sar. F.L.H. 104.
53- (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 567.
54- 15 Ch. D. at p.105*
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"It has been said that the acquiescence which will 
deprive a man of his legal rights must amount to 
fraud, and in my view that is an abbreviated state­
ment of a very true proposition. A man is not to be 
deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in 
such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set 
up those rights. What then are the elements or 
requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that 
description? In the first place the plaintiff must 
have made a-mistake as to his legal rights. Secondly, 
the plaintiff must have expended some money or must 
have done some act (not necessarily upon the defendant's 
land) on the faith of his mistaken belief. Thirdly 
the defendant, the possessor of tne legal right, must 
know of the existence of his own right which is in­
consistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff.
If he does not know of it he i3 in the same position 
as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of acquiescence is 
founded upon conduct with a knowledge of your legal 
rights. Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of 
the legal right, must know of the plaintiff's mistaken
belief of his rights. If he does not, there is
nothing which calls upon him to assad; his own rights. 
Lastly, 'the defendant the possessor of the legal right, 
must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure 
of money or in other acts which he has done, either 
directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal 
rights. Where all these elements exist, there is 
fraud of such a nature as will entitle the court to 
restrain the possessor of the legal right from 
exercising it, but in my judgment nothing short of 
this will^do."55
Thus in void transactions only acquiescence which amounts
to fraud could defeat the title of the family to the land
while in voidable agreements fraud is not a necessary element.
Ordinary lapse of time would operate to defeat the family's
5 6right to set the deal aside.^
55- At p.568.
56. Assraidu v Ladzie (1890) Sar. F.C.L. 174* See also
Qshodi v Balogun & ors (1936) 4 W.A.C.A. I where the 
court refused a plea of acquiescence to defeat the 
title of tue family to certain lands.
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We shall now look t the trend of judicial opinion 
>n the legal effect of an alienation of family land without 
the necessary consents. A study of the cases in both Ghana 
and Nigeria has revealed a neater division into two streams 
of authority than has often been recognised. The courts 
appear xo o erate on the basis that where the family head 
either alone or with the consent of a majority or minority 
of the members of the 'management committee' alienates 
family land, the transaction is voidable at the instance 
of any member of the family; but any alierntion without 
the consent of tne head of the family is void ab inltiq*
It will be aeon below that what Bentsi-Snchill describes 
Qf3 apparently conflicting streams of authority are recon­
cilable ou the principle we have enunciated aoove. This 
is as true of Nigeria as it is of the coition in Ihana.
-e shall be discussing the cases under two headings, namely, 
where the family head is a party to the alienation, and 
where he is not a party to the transaction.
Where the family head is party to the transaction*
Here the trr nsaction is voidable but not void. Thus 
in the Nigerian case of A/.anraty v Plus hi ft ors ; a case 
about the sale of family land at Badagry (Nigeria)» the 
si -id sale had been carried jut by the family head, Chief
57* (1907) I, N.L.a. 66. Bee also Of ondu v Orra oh a (1964)
Nig. monthly L.il. 120.
Ajope without the concurrence of a key member of the 
family. in an action to set aside the sale by the said 
member of tue family, the Fall court held (Pennington, J*
dissenting) that the sale of family land without the consent
Ox ail necessary members thereof is i.iV;jli& under local law
and custom, but it is voidable and not void. The claim was
refused on the ground of the plaintiff's delay in bringing
58the actxon. Also in Adeniji & a nor, v .-isu & ora; the 
plaintiff sought to set aside a sale of fa.ii rj land on the 
ground that his concurrence was not obtained rhea the 
alienation v*ay carried rat. It; appears crotn the report 
that tne family head was p £ r ty to the transaction. The 
Nigerian Fede:c al Supreme Court, affirmirp the judgment cf 
Jobbing, J. (at the ^agos High Court) held that the 3ale 
was voidable and not void. The effect of a purported 
alienation of family property by the head but without all 
the necessary consents, was also in i sue in the recent 
decision of the High Court of Wes ern Nigeria* In that 
case^ the iamily head (Mogaji) had sold a portion of the
58. (1957) 3 F.S.C. 104.
59 • Foko v l uko & orb (1965) Hi g . m o a I kiy I i v f Rep or’ ts 3*
See also Ha.ii ocu.a v Asiatu . 3 ,p. Ct. Suit Ho. 479/1950,
uoreported where tie Nigerian Supreme Court came to a
iimil r conclusion. See Bani^o v Baniro ( )8 ..A.C.A.
148} ^nor. v Abirlba Cli-nJouncil & ors (1956) '
1 B.K.W.L.H. lr/. in the latter cose the fact tuat the 
plaintiffs descended from slaves did not affect the 
issue of their consent to the sale of family land.
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family land with the concurrence of only three out of 
sixteen branches of the family* The plaintiffs sought to 
set aside the sale on the ground that their consent had 
not been obtained. It was argued for the defendants that 
they had been constituted the family council and could 
alienate family land with ut consulting the other members of 
the family* The granting of such powers to the defendants 
was stoutly denied by the plaintiffs* It was held "that 
under native law and custom, family land can only be validly 
alienated by the head and principal ne ibers of the family, 
otherwise 3uch alienation will cither be void or voidable $ 
that if the principal or other members of the family alienate 
iVmiiy land without the consent of the head, such alienation 
ia void ab initio, but if the head alienates it either alone
or with the conoent of merbers / o are iot a11 the principal
me mbers such alienation is void?, ole•M
In Ghana there Is a long :ine of judicial authorities 
to support the view that an alienation of family land by
he nead out without all the necessary consents, is voidable.
60
Bayaidfee v fie as ah the family head had sold family land
witaout the consent of the family members, in fact against
the opposition of those memoers* In an action to set aside
60. (1878) 3g t. F.C.L. 171.
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the sale after fourteen years, the full Court held that 
the transaction was voidable but that the plaintiffs were 
uilty of delay and could n t impugn the sale. Hutchinson,
0.J . came to a similar conclusion in ;< srr.'idu v Dadzie
where the family head had given out family lend to the
defendant ithouu the consent o~ tie plaintiff. The fest 
Afrioaa Court of Appeal also considered the efieot of such 
sales in H anbo ora v aLmao 1 Ors V Here he head of 
the family u&u si>ld a House belonging to toe family 
without the concurrence of the principal members. In an 
action to set usiue the sale their Lordships quoted with 
approval the following passage from Bayaidee v Kensah?
How although it may be, end we believe it is, the law
th&t tne concurrence of the t era Hern of the family ought
to be given x.n 01 der to constitute an unimpeachable sals 
of family land, the sale is not itself void, but is 
capable of being opened up at the 3. not a nee of the 
family, provided they avail them elves of their right 
timeously and under circumstances in vn.ich, upon the 
rescinding of tue bargain, the purchaser can be fully 
restored to the position in which he stood before the 
sale. 1164
61. (Id90) j • vj • J j « L ( 4 •
62. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A* o2#
63. Supra.
64. Op. cit.
X • lj • 'v «
at p. 6j. 
40; AWou
dee 
A.i oke
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Accordingly it was held that the sale w$s voidable and not 
void but the plaintiff's claim was dismissed on grounds 
of delay*^
Where family head is not a party to the alienations 
In such a case the transaction is void ab initio* In 
the Nigerian case of Chief Obanlteoro v ^hief ouemu & Qrs.66 
the plaintiff's action was for the setting aside of the 
lease of family property given without his consent. The 
plaintiff was the family head. It was held by the 
Divisional Court at Lagos that the lease was void ab initio.
65* The oases of Nelson v Nelson (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 248|
Qwiredu v ilosiiie (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 11# Honker v Bassll 
(l 3 m *  C aTcTa . 569 and Ewan v Nyieni (1§5§) G.L.fc.
67 have been cited as instances where the courts held 
alienations of family land without the necessary 
consents to be void irrespective of the fact that the 
family head was a party to each of the transactions.
An examination of the cases# however# reveals that 
they could well have been decided on the basis that 
the agreements were voidable and that the plaintiffs 
had acted timeously. In the Nelson case# the sale 
w&8 said to be invalid and was set aside because the 
plaintiffs did not acquiesce in the alien&tionf in the 
Jwiredu decision the family head was in fact not a 
party to the transection! in Honj er v liaosil. the 
plaintiffs although they were said to be the descendants 
of slaves had acted timeously to protect their rights 
to avoid the lease; and also in the Nyieni case the 
plaintiffs had acted in time. It must be conceded how­
ever# that the courts in some cases confuse the terms 
void and voidable while many others prefer the term 
•invalid' to describe the legal effect of the trans­
actions. cf. G.B.a.Coker# Family Property among the 
Yorubas (2nd ed.X966) p.323* it is submitted that the 
references to 'recitals' and 'parcels' are only rele­
vant if English form of conveyancing is used.
E6. ( 1925) 6 N.L.R. 87.
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ivLso in Oshodi v .aremu a case about the person entitled to 
receive compensation on a piece of land being compulsorily 
acquired by the Lagos Executive Development board, the 
first claimant relied on an execution sale in which he 
purchased tne land as the property of the Oloto family. The 
second claimant relied on a conveyance made to him by a 
member of the Oloto family who in turn had been given the 
said land as an outright gift by the then family head. It 
was found as a fact that the said gift was not made with the 
consent and concurrence of the members of the Oloto family 
and that the sale on which the second claimant relied was 
carried out without the necessary consents. Two issues were 
to be resolved by tne court, firstly, whether the family 
head could validly make a gift of family land without the 
consent of the principal members of the family, and secondly, 
the legal effect of the purported sale to the second claimant. 
On the first question, the trial court held that the second 
claimant had not discharged the onus of proving any native 
custom that permits family heads to make an outright gift 
of family land without the consent of the principal members 
of the family#^
Such a kift was therefore invalid. If the gift was
67* (19 52)14 vV.A.C.A. 83. See also Elpendu & ors. v Erika
& or3 (1959)4 I.3.C. 79.
68. Of. the Ghana case of A p pi ah v Lansoah (1954) Unreported 
judgment of Mayo Plange J. CAccra Land Court, 12-10-54)
where it was held that such estate will be valid 
during tne life of the family he;, d.
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invalid the land retained its family character- Accordingly, 
on the second question it was held that the purported sale 
of the land without the consent of the head was void and of 
no effect. The first claimant had a better title. This
decision was affirmed on appeal by the West African Court
of Appeal.
The G-hana Courts have also accepted the position that
any alienation of family land without the consent of the
69head of t he family is void. Agbloe v Sappor was a 
conveyance b; four out of the six principal members of the 
family, to the purchaser. The family head was one of the
members left out. xhe alienation was held to be void ab
initio. This principle was also applied in the latter 
case of Owiredu v i oshie1^  where it was held by the West 
African Court of Appeal that a lease of family land that 
was given without the consent of tne family head was not 
binding on the family.
The position in Ghana since I960:
After independence in 1957 the Government of Ghana
69. (1947)12 W.A.C.A. 187.
70. (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 11. See also Insilhea v Simons
(1899) Sar. i'.L.A. 104; mary .Barnes v Chief Quasie Atta 
(1871) Sar. T.C.L. 169; Ailotey v Abrahams (19577 3
.. A. L.. .i. 2 80; .Aiinwumi v Sappor (19l8) Unrep or t e d judg­
ment delivered in the Land Court, Accra, lecember 5
1958; Hunekpeku v Ametene, cited by Ollennu in Customary
Land Law in Ghana (1962)
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pledged itself to a rapid industrialisation of the country
71and the advancement of agriculture. Security of title
72to land was considered vital to each of these objectives.'
. ccordingly in I960, i'he Land Development_ (Protection of
7 ^Purchss.ms; Act " was passed, the object of which was to give 
the Courts some discretion in any actions seeking to set 
aside any alienations of .land where some building or other 
development had taken place on the said land.
Section (i) of the Act provides:
151. (i) Where
(a) a person (in this section referred to as "the 
purchaser"; has taken a conveyance of land in a pre­
scribed area at any time after 31st December 1944 
(whether before or after the date on which the area 
became a prescribed area), and
(b) the purchaser or a person claiming through him 
has in good faith erected a building on the land, and.
(c) proceedings are brought to obtain a possession 
order in rel- tion to the land on the ground that a 
person other than the purchaser or a person claiming 
through him is entitled to the land,
the court, where it considers that if this Act had not 
been passed the possession order would fall to be made 
by reason that the conveyance taken by the purchaser 
did not operate to confer on him the title to the land,
71. .t.larvey, Daw and Social Change in dhana, (Princeton 
university fress^ l§6b) Chapters 6 and 7.
72. See also Allott, "Le^al Development and economic frowth 
in Afrlea", in Changing Daw in h-evel oping Countries 
(ed. J. .P. Anderson, 19^2) p.194.
73. (Act 2) I960.
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but that to make the order would cause hardship and 
injustice to the person against whom it would fall to 
be made, may, instead of making the possession order, 
make an order providin. that the conveyance taken by 
the purchaser shall be deemed for all purposes to have 
operated to confer on him the title to the land."
Section I (2) also empowers the court to order tne payment
oa any additional sum to the vendor where an order under
Section I (i) would occasion any hardship on the said vendor
74or anybody claiming throuaa him. Conveyance in the
interpretation section of t he Act incl-.xles transfer* under 
customary law.
./hat Section (i) of the Act has achieved has been to add
a link to the existing chain of defences of the purchaser
in an action to set aside any dealings in land. Thus apart
from delay and acquiescence the purchaser could also plead
that he has set up some buildings on the land in order to
defeat a plaintiff's claim. The effect of this provision
75would seem to be that if a case like kelson v Nelson1 
were to be retried in the Ghana courts after I9 60, the 
decision (as far as possession of the land in dispute is 
concerned) might well go the other way.
It must be conceded that this provision is a progressive 
step in the direction of securing titles to land. It is
74* Provided that the additional sum to be paid by the
said purchaser does not exceed twice the price of the 
land at the time the original conveyance was executed.
75. (1951)13 W.A.C.A. 248
obviously a necessary remedy to the situation vividly
described by the lest African Court of Appeal in a Nigerian
case as follows:
‘'The case is indeed in this respect like many which 
come before the court; one in which the Oloto family 
either bj inadvertence or design sell or purport to 
sell the same piece of land at different times to 
different persons. It passes my comprehension how 
in these days, when sucn disputes have come before 
this court over and over again, any person will pur­
chase land from this family without the most careful 
investigation, for more often than not they purchase
a law suit, and very often that is all they get."76
.tut with respect, one takes leave to doubt whether the Ghana
enactment strikes sufficient balance between the needs of
the society for security of tenure on the one hand and
the prevention of fraudulent dealings in I.and on the other.
The effect of the first section of the Act appears to be
that if A without authority alienates family land to B and
B has set up some building on the said land, A's family,
0 cannot 'annul the transaction. It is not enough to argue
that Section 34^ of the Land registry Act, 1962 (Act 122)
76. Ogunbamibi v Abowaba (1951) 13 V/.a .C.A. 222, per Verity
Ag. P. at p.223* See also Olowu v Qshinubi (1958)L.L.K.21
77* Section 34 of the Land Registry Act, 1962, (Act.122) 
provides as follows: "Any person who knowingly -
(a) purports to make a grant of a piece of land to which 
he has no title: or
(b) purports to make a grant of a piece of land without 
authority: or
(c) makes conflicting grants in respect of the same 
piece of land to more than one person, shall be guilty 
of an offence which shall be a second degree felony and 
may, in addition to any other punishment that may be im­
posed upon him, be liable to pay an amount of twice the 
value of the aggregate consideration received by him."
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makes the alienation by A an offence under the Act, since
7
the effect of section 32 of the same enactment (Land 
registry Act, 1962) makes savings for proceedings under the 
Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, I960 (i.e. 
the Act under reference). Much will depend on how the 
courts will use their discretion under section I of the 
I960 enactment.
Section 2 of the I960 enactment provides as follows:
” 2( i) /here
(a) a person (in this section referred to as ”the pur­
chaser) took a conveyance of land in a prescribed area 
at some time after 31st December, 1944 and before the 
date on which the area became a prescribed area, and
(b) the purchaser, or a person claiming through him, 
in good faith erected a buildin_ on the land, and
(c) a possession order was made in relation to the land 
in proceedings finally disposed of before the date on 
which the area became a prescribed area, and w§s so 
made by reason that the conveyance taken by the pur­
chaser did not operate to confer on him the title to 
the land, the person against wh in the possession order 
was made may, at any time within twelve months after 
the date on which the area became a prescribed area, 
apply to the High Court for an order under this section.
2(2)
If the court considers that the making of Ihe possession 
order caused hardship and injustice to the person 
against whom it was made, the court may make an order set 
ting aside the possession order and providing that 
tne conveyance taken by the purchaser shall be deemed
78. This section provides as follows:
”(i) where proceedings to which the Land Development 
(Protection) Act, (of Purchasers) Act, I960, and the 
farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 apply ore instituted 
in any court, tne .registrar of the court s^all give 
notice of the proceedings to the Chief '.registrar who 
shall adjourn consideration of any matter affecting 
the land which is the subject of the proceedings until 
tne conclusion of the proceedings.”
Subsection (2) empowers the Chief registrar to amend 
the register accordingly.
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for all purposes to have operated to confer on him 
the title to the land:
Provided that an order under this subsection shall not 
be taken to render unlawful anything done in the period 
before tne making ofthe order or to found a claim for 
mesne profits or other compensation in respect of 
occupation during that period*M
79It is further provided  ^ that if the making of the court's 
order would in itself occasion hardship to anybody who 
in the meantime had obtained possession before the passing 
of the enactment, the court may order the payment of compen­
sation by the purchaser as a condition to his obtaining 
a reconveyance, provided that such compensation shall not 
exceed the aggregate of twice the price of the land at the 
time the.original conveyance was made and the value of the 
development that had taken place on the land since the 
original possession order* /here, however, the rights of 
third parties have intervened between the making of the 
possession order and the application under the I960 enact­
ment, the court map order the third party to pay such compen-
80sation to the original purchaser as they may deem just. w
section 3 of the Act makes provision for payment by instalments
It would appear that the recent Ghana Court of Appeal
8ldecision of Kwan v Nyieni" is covered by section 2(2) of the
79* 3*2(3) of the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers)
Act, I960, (Act.2).
80. section 2(9) of the Act.
81. (1959) C-.L.R. 67.
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I960 enactment. It will be recalled that in that case 
the defendant had to surrender possession of the family land 
sold to him without the necessary consents and that the 
court ordered tne payment of £900 from he land to reimburse 
the purchaser for t^e original price he paid for the land.
O 2
Bentsi-Enchill has suggested that a better way of 
securing the title of the purchaser of family land is a 
system of registering all family heads and any subsequent 
successors with the Probate Registry and also registering 
the names of the members of a management committee with 
the Registrar of titles to land. It will be the duty of 
tne family to keep the list of the members registered at 
the Land .egistry, up to date. Any purchaser or prospective 
purchaser snould satisfy nimself of The rightful owners of 
any piece of land by searching the Land registry for the 
members of the managing committee (thereby being in a better 
position to obtain their consents), and ascertaining who the 
family head is at tne Probate Registry. »Vhen a purchaser 
has fulfilled these two conditions any alienation can hardly 
be avjided on grounds of lack of the necessary consents and 
a better balance will be struck between the needs for
82. rfhe farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962 (Act 10'7) makes 
similar provisions in respect of agricultural lands. 
There are no enactments in any of the Nigerian juris­
diction corresponding to the provisions in Ghana*
83* Liana Land Law (1964) pp. 57 et seq.
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security of title and the protection of the family. Apart
from the obvious problem of having to register managing
committees in respect of eacn bit of family property in
Ghana, it is submitted that tne learned author's proposal
is a better solution than the enactments already discussed.
In this respect mention must be made of the Nigerian
85Re0istered Land Act, 1964" whicn has some provisions not
found in the Ghana Registered Land Act (Act. 22). Under
the Nigerian Act the Registrar may register the names of
all the members of the family as being proprietors of the
property together with the size of their shares therein, and
if the number of those entitled to the property is more
than twenty, he may register the names of such of them as
8 6are put forward as their representatives. 0
84* In respect of Stool lands and lands in the Northern
Territories of Ghana, see the Administration of Lands 
Act, 1962, which consolidated the provision of the 
Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act, i958: Ashanti Stool 
Lands Act 1958, Stool lands Control Act, 1959, and 
the Stool Lands Act, I960. The 1962 enactment vests 
title to all such lands in the President; transfers 
without the consent of the minister (to whom the 
President delegates his functions) is void and any­
body entering into such an agreement commits an offence 
under the Act. On who has the right to grant concess­
ions see the Concessions Act. 1962 (Act.124) and the 
i~ineral3 Act, 1962 (Act. 126).
85. No. Ill of 1964* This repeals the registration of 
Titles Act, cap.181 but its operation is confined to 
the Federal Territory.
86. 8.11(3)(a) of the 1964 enactment.
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Section 12 of the Act provides for the settling of names
of the members of the family as well as their shares* In
cases of disagreement as to the size of the shares the land
will be registered as family land.
Thus Section 12(4) provides:
"If no agreement is reached, the adjudication officer 
shall record the land as family land, and when so 
recorded it shall have the effect of a caveat under 
this Act and no dealing with the land may be registered 
until such time as the family representatives are 
ascertained.M
Under Section 4(3) of the Registration of Titles Act, (flap. 
181), the federal Public Service Commission has power to 
appoint assistant iegistrars of Titles who will be res^on-
Q rj
sible for the register of Titles.0
87. This power was exercised in the Assistant registrars of
Titles ,lotice (Appointment), of 31st JenuaryV 1964 by the 
Public Service Commission:- See Laws of the federal 
republic Ox Nigeria (1964 annual supplement) p.B. 33*
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3• Agreements affected by Informality:^
In this section we shall be examining agreements the 
defects in which havebeen occasioned by the failure of the 
parties to comply with certain formal requirements. The 
importance of this category of agreements in Ghana and Nigeria 
can hardly he overenphasied. Quite apart from the cleavage 
between the provisions of the general law and the various 
customary laws with regard to the requirements of writing 
for certain agreements, there is also the differences in the 
general laws of the various jurisdictions m  the two count­
ries brought about oy local legislative action. Another 
unique feature of this category of agreements is that while 
the defects in the contracts we have already treated go to 
nullify or modify the consent of the contracting parties 
(by making the contract void ab initio/or voidable), agree­
ments affected by informality are perfectly valid but are
2
unenforceable through the agency of the courts#
v/e shall be investigating the positions in both the 
customary and imported laws#
1. See O.JNwabueze, "The Integration of the Law of Con­
tracts", Paper prepared for the Conference on the Inte­
gration of Customary and Kodern Legal Systems, Ibadan, 
24-29 August, 1964*
2. C.f. Blacksfone iii, 157-s who felt that such agreements 
are void. But see Leroux v Brown (1852)12 C.B. 001.
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The position in customary law:
Discussion on the formal requirements of enforceable 
agreements has often been centred on the importance of 
writing* On this assumption it has always been asserted 
that customary law knows no formal requirements in the 
making of agreementz* It must be admitted that traditional 
customary law knew no writing and it would be preposterous 
if writing was considered a vital element in agreements 
concluded 'under any of its systems.
In fact suretyship and land agreements both of which 
required writing in the imported law, were perfectly en­
forceable in customary law in the absence of any form of 
writing. In the Ghana case of Kwesi Johnson v Effie 
it was aptly remarked by Eoster-Sutton, P. that 11 a conveyance 
forms no part of a sale by native law and custom"* It would 
also be curious if customary law which regulates the trans­
actions of predominantly illiterate populations should
' 4
require writing to make their agreements enforceable.
3* (1953)14 W.A.C.A. 254 at p.256. Also in Alake v Awawu
(1932) II N.L.R."39 it held that an oral gift of land 
under customary^law was effective to pass the title 
thereto to the donee. See also Halomo v Olusola (1954) 
21 N.L.R. I; Griffin v Talabi (194~8) 12 W.A.C.A. 371, 
and Nelson v Nelson (1951)13 W.A.C.A. 248.
4 . The prevalent use of writing in modern customary law
transactions with particular reference to land matters 
is fully investigated by Allott, see Essays, "Writing 
and Title to Land in Ghana", pp. 242 et seq. See also 
our discussion on the place of writing in determining 
the parties 1 intention as to the low applicable to 
their transactions - post p.
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Having said this, the fact that no system of customary 
law in either G-hana or Nigeria has been found to be entirely 
devoid of certain formal requirements, has got to be faced* 
Marriage contracts, suretyship agreements and agreements 
for the sale of or other dealing in land are attended by
elaborate formalities. This aspect of the subject has
5been fully discussed above.
7.7here writing is used in customary law transactions it
does not go to make the agreement enforceable but facilitates
proof of the existence of the obligation. Although the
distinction between evidence of the existence of an agreement
and the enforceability of the said agreement is a fine one
g
in customary law terms, it is clear that the absence of 
writing would not make the agreement any less enforceable 
to the court. In this respect the gap between customary 
law and the imported law is apparent since in the latter, 
with the possible exception of the equitable doctrine of 
part performance, any agreement which is required by law to
5# See form and consideration, supra; p.Bc^
6. Under the Illiterates Protection legislation in Ghana 
and Nigeria an illiterate can adduce evidence to prove 
wh^t actually transpired between him and the third 
party even if this contradicts the document on which 
a third party relies. This privilege is not open 
to a literate third party dealing with an illiterate 
person. See U.A.C. of Nigeria Ltd. v Edems & A,ia.vi 
(158) N.E.N.L.K. 33; S.0.0.A. Zsria v Okon (I960)
N.H.H.I.E. 36.
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be in writing is unenforceable except it.was in written
form*
Position in the imported law:
At common law writing was not an essential requisite
for the validity or enforceability of agreements. This
position was however altered by statute in 1677 when the
statute of frauds required certain types of agreements to
be in writing or evidenced by a memorandum* The relevant
sections of the statute in this respect are sections 4 and
17» Section 4 provides as follows:
1 Ho action shall be brought whereby to charge any 
executor or administrator on any special promise to 
answer damages out of his own estate; or whereby to 
charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person; 
or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon 
consideration of marriage; or upon any contract or 
sale of.lands, tenements or hereditaments or any 
interest in or concerning them; or upon any agreement 
that is not to be performed in the space of one year 
from the making hereof; unless the agreement upon 
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum 
or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged therewith or some other person 
thereunto by him lawfully authorised.n
The section therefore required writing for five categories
of agreements, namely,
(i) a promise by an executor or administrator;
(ii) a promise to answer for the debt, default or mis­
carriage of another person, i.e. a contract of 
guarantee or suretyship;
(iii) an agreement made upon consideration-of marriage;
5 1 1
(iv) an agreement for the sale of land or any 
interest in land; and
(v) an agreement that is not to be performed within 
one year from the making thereof. Section 17,as subsequently 
amended by the Sale of Goods Act (England) 1893^ added a
6th category to the above list. These are agreements for 
the sale of goods of up to or above ten pounds, provided the 
buyer has not in the meantime accepted the goods or part 
thereof, or given something in earnest or in part payment
o
of tne price. now, this enactment (i.e. the Statute of 
frauds) is of course a pre-1874 statute of general application 
in England and is therefore part of the imported lav/s of
Ghana and Nigeria. It has been found to be in force in
9the two latter countries.
But the provisions of section 4 of the Act and section 
17 (as amended by section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
(England) ) had been the subject of considerable academic
7. S.4.
8. Other types of agreement that require writing to be
enforceable include moneylencling transactions under the
moneylenders Acts; Hire-purchase agreements; marine 
insurance agreements.
9* for Ghana, see Johnson & Anor. v Oolightly (1923-25^ 
Div. ct. 88; George v Afari^A Anor.■(19 26-29) biv. 
ct. 195> Hamid Arab v horyah (1965) Current Cases, ■
138; mowba.r a.k v Duke Bans on 1*1965) Current Cases,' 68. 
for Nigeria, see Alake v Awawu. (1932) II N.L.il. 39.
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and judicial criticism in England The current English
law position with regard to those, categories of agreement 
covered by,the two enactments, are contained in section 40 
of the Law of Property Act 1925 and sections 1 and 2 of the 
L aw Kef orm (Lnf or c eme nt of C o nt r a c t s ) Ac t, 1954* Whi 1 e 
the former enactment retains writing for land agreements, 
the latter retains agreements of guarantee or suretyship 
among those agreements that will be unenforceable except 
they are in writing.
The Position in Ghana*
The position in Ghana and the various jurisdictions
in Nigeria appear to be more complex. Section II of the
Ghana Contracts Act, I9 60 (Act 25) provides as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of any enactment, and to 
the provisions of this Act, no contract whether made 
before or after the commencement of this ret, shall 
be void or unenforceable by reason only that it is 
not in writing or that there is no memorandum or note 
thereof in writing.”
What this section has achieved•has been the restoration of
the position in English coiamon law before the enactment of
the statute of frauds in 1677. The saving for the provisions
of any enactment is intended to remove any doubts there might
well be in cases of moneylending transactions, hire-purchase
10. See Lord Y/right, Legal Essays and Addresses, p. 226;
Holdsworth, History of English Lav/, vol. vi pp.369-97; 
Law Reform Committee Report, April, 1953 Cmd. 8809*
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agreements and insurance contracts all of which are governed 
by different enactments.
The Ghana legislation goes further to provide as follows:
’Section 4(i)
Any agreement made before or after the commencement of 
this Act whereby a person (hereinafter in this part 
called 'the guarantor1) guarantees the due payment of 
a debt or the due performance of any other obligation 
by a third party shall be void unless it is in writing 
and is, signed by the guarantor or his agent, or is 
entered into in a form recognised by customary law."
"Section 14 (2)
-Any promise or representation made after the commencement 
of this Act, relating to the character or credit of any 
third person with the inrent that that third person 
may obtain credit, money or goods, from the person 
to whom the promise or representation is made, shall be 
void unless it is in writing and is signed by the 
party to be charged therewith or his agent."
Sections 4 and 17 of the Statute of frauds (except land
11contracts) are expressly repealed.
Thus as far as agreements concerning land are concerned,
Section 4 of the Statute of frauds, 1677, is still part
of the law of Ghana* This section was in issue in the recent
12case of . -oubarak v Duke Banson. This was an indemnity 
action for £1,700 from the defendant who counter claimed for
(a) £1,200, representing his 10$ commission for negotiating
the sale of plaintiff’s premises for £12,000 in 1954* The
11. S.19 of the Contract Act, I960 (Act.25)* The Sale of
Goods Act, 1893 (Dngland) was never a statute of general 
application in Ghana.
12. (1965) Ghana Current Cases, No.68.
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prospective purchaser had made a gart-payment of £2,000;
(b) £200 being expenses incurred by the defendant in
connection with the negotiation for the sale of another 
premise of the plaintiff. This expenditure was proved; 
and
(c) £42.19 • 6. which was a debt due to the defendant from
one 0 • li. • Ghana, payment of which the plaintiff had guaranteed, 
but which, the defendant claimed, had not in fact been paid.
'the guarantee was not in writing# On the first head of 
counter-claim fjebphor, J * who fried the case at Cape Coast 
(Ghana) held that the agreement was unenforceable since there 
was no memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 1677#
the payment of the £2000 by the prospective purchaser was 
not considered to constitute sufficient act of part-perfornance 
to take the ca e out of the statute. 'inis holding also 
disposed of the defendant *s second head of counter-claim.
On the third head of counter-claim the court ruled that the 
guarantee was unenforceable since there was no writing to 
satisfy the provisions of section 4 of the Statute of frauds*
It is curious, however, that the learned judge preferred 
to base his ruling on the third head of counter-claim, under 
the statute of frauds when the position is neatly covered 
by Section I4(i) of the Contracts Act, I960 and the provisions 
of this section of the Contract Act apply to agreements made
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before or after the commencement of the Act. It is
submitted with respect that the counter-claim under head
(c) above is not unenforceable but void and that the
relevant provision governing the transaction is Section 14(i)
of the Contracts Act I960 (Act. 25)> and not Section 4 of
the Statute of frauds 1677? which had been repealed by the
said Section I4(i) of the later enactment.
Having said this, some comment will be made on two
peculiar facets of Section 14 of the Ohana legislation.
The first is the saving for customary law transactions.
this recognition of the duality of legal rules (according -
each its validity within its proper lav/) is a progressive
step in the harmonisation of these rules with a view to
perhaps eventual unification. As was pointed out by Boison,
13-J • in the recent case of Hr mid Arab v dor rah,  ^ 1 it will
be most unreasonable, inequitable, and productive of hardship 
if the provisions of the Statute of frauds were applied to 
transactions between illiterates#*^
The second facet of the provision is the legal effect 
of non-compliance with the section. Under the Statute of 
frauds, such an agreement would be perfectly valid but could
13. (1965) G-hana Current Cases No. 138. This was a horse-
selling transaction and the defendant had argued that 
as the price was higher than A10 the agreement was un­
enforceable since there was no writing.
14* The courts had long recognised this principle in land 
matters see Nelson v Nelson (1951)13 >/ • A.C.A.24-8.
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not be enforced by the courts as a result of its informality*
But it coCild still be used as a defence to an action for
the return of money or other property that passed under the 
15contract* The dhana provision, however, makes the
agreement absolutely void in default of compliance* This 
view is of course, consistent with those of Blackstone as 
contained in the third Book of his Commentaries (Comm, iii,
1 6157-8) and was adopted by Lord Abin0er in Carrington v Bootes
in the foliowing v/ords :
"The meaning of the Statute is, not that the contract
shall stand for all purposes except that of being en­
forced by action, nut it means that the contract shall 
be altogether void.1
But this view of the provisions of the Statute of frauds
17had been questioned in tne later case of Leroux v Brown
and specifically overruled by the Bouse of Lords in Li ad di so n 
18v Alderson in lo83* The effect of the Onana provision is
however different. Thus if A gives an oral guarantee to B 
on behalf of C, and t;ives his car as security for the gaain n-
tee, 3 will not be allowed to set up the oral guarantee in
any cation by A for the return of the car or its value. It
15# But cf. the case of Carrington v Bootes (1837)2 If & \7, 
24-8, where it was held that a plaintiff could not rely 
on an agreement that did not comply with the provisions 
of the Statute of frauds, in an action for trespass.
16. (1837) 2 II 248 et p.255.
17. (1852) 12 C.B. 801.
18. (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467; see particularly p.483.
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can be argued that the intention oi the legislature in 
making the provision is the protection of inexperienced 
people from being led into undertaking obligations which they 
did not fully understand; z nd also to avoid the contingency 
of unscrupulous persons asserting that credit had been given 
on the faith, of a uerantee which the surety had no real 
intention of cgivinw. On the other hand, the whole object 
of the requirement of writing is the evidenciary value of 
the document in proving that there was such a guarantee 
(havin ha; regard to all the •,uri? .m tiding circumstances).
Thou, h it did not cor. ply with the requirement of the enact­
ment with regard to writing, it will be anomalous not to 
recognise such an agreement for purposes of a defence to an 
action based on it. for instance if A in our example above, 
gwe his land as security for the oral guarantee, there is 
no reison why B cannot set up the guarantee as & defence to 
an action for trespass brought zu inst B by A. The effect 
of the C-h&na provision, however, is to render the transaction 
absolutely void thus invoking the maxim ex turpi causa non 
orit ;r actio> It is submitted that the better rule is that 
which denies informal agreement the agency of the courts 
for purposes of enforcement, leaving them valid for other 
pur pose-•
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federal territory of Lagos, estern Nigeria and Ifid-Nester n 
Nigeria!
The position in Ghana with regard to the legal effect 
of non-compliance with statutory requirements as to writing, 
is in marked contrast to the state of the law in the Federal 
Territory of ~.a^ oo, Zest rn and 1 id- - stern Nigeria. Part 
two of the navv deform (Contracts) Net, 1961^ (which applies 
only to the Federal Territory of legos), has repealed 
section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 and also Section 4 of 
the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 with respect to agreements made 
after the commencement of the operation of the enactment. 
Section 5 of the Act provides as follows
"5(f) This section applies to -
(a) ev ry contract for tne sale of land;
(b) every contract to enter into any disposition of land 
being a disposition that is required by any enactment
to be made by deed or instrument in writing or to be 
proved in writing;
(c) every contract to enter into any mortgage or charge 
on land; and
(d) every contract by any person to answer to another 
person for the debt, default or liability of a third 
person.
S.5 (2): ho contract to which this section applies
snail be enforceable by action unless the contract or 
some memorandum or note in respect therefor is in 
writing and is signed by t_.e party to be charged there­
with or by some other person lawfully authorised by him."
Thus, although writing is still required for land agreements
19* No. 64 ox 1961. S3. 9(6) and 7 ,1)
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and contracts of guarantee, non compliance with these
formalities will only render the agreement unenforceable
and not void.' Also while the Ghana enactment applies to
contracts made before or after the coming into force of the
Act, the Lav/ deform (Contracts) Act, 1961, applies only to
20agreements made sixer the passing of the statute* On
the other hand, both the Ghana and the Algerian Acts (i.e. 
federal territory) male savings for agreements concluded 
under customary law* these will be valid according to' 
their proper law irrespective of non-compliance with the 
requirement of writing.
the '/estern Algeria Contracts Law,**’ which is also in 
force in the Hid-'.Lstern legion, has similar provisions 
to the Law deform (Contracts) Act 1961, with regard to 
the categories of agreements that require writing:, and the 
legal effect of non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Act. there are, however, two vital points of departure 
from the federal legislation. the first is that the Western 
Algeria Contracts law, like the Ghana enactment ofi the 
subject, applies to agreements made before or after the 
commencement of the operation of the Act.
20. S.7(3)
21* No.25 of 1959* See also S. 5 of the Sale of Goods Lew,
Cap. 115* laws of '/estern Aigeria, wrich repeals S.4-
of the Sale of Goods Act ,169 3 (inland) in respect of
agreements for the sale of goods whose value is up to
or above ten pounds*
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Seconly, the ./estern Nigeria enactment has no saving 
for customary law agreements. Apparently these have to 
be in writing if the courts are to enforce their terms.
It is not clear, nowever, if such a radical alteration of 
the customar„ position can be inferred from the draftin*. 
omission. It can be argued of course, that as statutory 
provisions take precedence over customary law rules, all 
agreements that come within the ambit of the contracts law 
must comply with its provisions, customary or imported lav/ 
transactions notwithstanding. The position may well be 
anolmalous if the provisions were rigidly applied by the 
courts.
The position in Eastern and Northern Nigeria:
In both these two regions Section 4 of the Statute of 
frauds, 1677 and Section 4 of the Sale of (roods Act, 1893 
are still in force. One is startled at the vast difference it 
makes to the enforceability of an agreement to conclude a 
contract in one region of Nigeria rather than in another.
The effect of the continued operation of the two statutes of 
general application in the two regions of Nigeria, is that 
the following categories of agreement still require writing 
for their enforceability:
(a)' s promise by an executor or administrator;
(b) a promise to answer for the debt, default or
5 21
miscarriage of another person;
(c) an agreement mace upon consideration of marriage;
(d) a contract for the sale of land or any interest 
in land;
(e) an agreement that is not to be performed within 
one year from the making thereof; and
(f) a contract for the sale of goods of the value
of ten pounds or upwards - unless the buyer has
accepted and actually received part of the goods
so sold or has given something in earnest to bring
22the contract or in part-paynent.
Agreements that do not comply with these formalities are 
unenforceable but are not void. Customary agreements are 
excluded. are still enforceable in the absence of
writing in view of the provisions in the High Court laws 
of the two regions empowering the courts to observe and 
enforce the observance of customary laws in appropriate 
cases. The distinction between this position and the state 
of the law in 7/estern Nigeria lies in the fact that while 
customary law rules take precedence over a corresponding 
stipulation in a statute of general applications this is 
not true of local enactments. These supersede any
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inconsistent rule of customary lav/ in the absence of any 
specific saving for the latter.
It needs hardly be argued that the state of the law in 
Eastern and Northern Nigeria could do with prompt legis­
lative attention, .any legislation in the two regions or 
any of them should avoid the Ghana provision as to the 
legal effect of non-compliance with the stipulations, and 
the Western Nigeria omission to include savings for cust­
omary law transactions. It is submitted that there is
23* Nwabueze has argued that any requirement of writing 
in an integrat' d law of countract in Nigeria should 
not apply to illiterates. /e would agree with the 
author that writing should not be imposed as a necessary 
element in customary law transactions* As long as 
the duality between custom; ry and imported law trans­
actions continues to operate, an illiterate who chooses 
to contract under the rules of the imported law ought 
to be subject to its doctrinal implications. Illiter­
acy shoild not be made to ;ssume the posture of a 
privileged status. Any cases of hardship to an illit­
erate party to a transaction will be taken care of 
by the Illiterate Protection legislation which have 
been re-enacted in all the jurisdictions in Ghana and 
hi eria. Ihe suggestion that writing should be 
abandoned as a necessary element of a limited category 
of agreements in an integrated law of contract, is 
a startling proposition and runs against the modern 
customary law trend which is fast adopting the use 
of writing, particularly for purposes of facilitating 
the proof of the existence of obligations. It is 
submitted that the removal of the requirement of 
writing for such transactfons as land agreements, 
guarantees, money-lending and hire-purchase trans­
actions will create more problems than it will purport 
to solve*
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no pressing need for any integration of the customary 
and imported law rules in this aspect of the lav/*
The enforceability of transactions ought to be determined 
according to their proper law*^
24* xhe local judicial authority on this branch of the law 
can be grouped under two broad sub-heads, namely
(i) Sufficiency of writing for purposes of the Acts;
and
(ii) Exceptions to the unenforceabilitv or void rule* 
Under (i), see Hamilton v liens ah (1937) 3 U.A.C.A*
224, where a receipt containing the particulars of
a transaction was considered sufficient compliance 
with the Statute of .;rauds; Akenzue II v Benin District 
U q u i i c  ii (1959) U.R. N.L.R*I, where a council resolution 
wnich under the councils'rules could be revoked 
after 6 months was held not to constitute such a memo­
randum; Okaleji v Okupe (1939) 15 H.L.H* 28, where 
the Nigerian Supreme Court held that an auctioneers 
receipt at a sale by private treaty was not such a 
memorandum* See also Basra a & Qrs* v Weeks (1948)
Privy Council Appeal Ho. 45* Under (ii77~see;
Alake & Lawal v Awawu (1932) II N*L.B* 39, gift of 
land by illiterate, held statute does not apply;
Hamid Arab v Uorgah (1965) Ghana Current cases, 138, 
claim by illiterate for balance of account in a horse 
dealing transaction, held, the statute did not apply* 
Cases under the equitable doctrine of psrt-performance
are also exceptions to the unenforceability rule 
Sackey v Ashong (1956) Y/.A.L.k* 108.
The courts have also drawn a distinction between 
cases of oral waiver and rescission of the obligation
of an agreement on one hand, and oral variation of 
agreements. The former need not be in writing while 
the latter are unenforceable unless they are put in 
writing. See: John Holt & Co* v Lafe (1939) 15 NVB.R* 
14; U.A.G* v Argo (1938) 14 N.I.R* fQ5.
1 u <v
(iii) Agreements affected by illegality:
The defect in the validity of an agreement could arise 
from the fact that it comes within a class of contracts 
which are absolutely prohibited by law, or whose node of 
formation or performance are strictly laid down by the 
law but the latter restrictions have not been observed 
by the parties or any one of them. It raust be stated 
that it is in this category of agreements that the freedom 
of contracting parties to make whatever agreements they 
please, is up against its most obvious limitations*
This is of course, as it should be, and it will be argued 
in a later chapter that the interference has not gone far 
enough. The major problem in flhana and Nigeria as in 
other developing countries is economic development. This 
spans all aspects of life in a society. The law should be 
an instrument of channelling and charting the course of 
this development, and cannot therefore be left to the 
wasteful process of accidental changes as happened in the 
more developed countries. The proscription or regulation 
of certain types of agreements is one way of fulfilling this
1. See 11 al s b ur y 1 s L aws , (3rd ed.) vol. 8 pp. 125-152;
Pollock on Contracts (13th ed. 1950) pp. 260 et seq;
On Islamic law, see J. Schacht, An Introduction to 
Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964) pp« 144-160. On some 
Nigerian cases on this head, see J.L.HcNeil & H.Hains, 
Nigerian Oases and Statutes on Contract and Tort
(London, 1965) pp. 5^-79* On illegality at the customary
law, see k. 6. Pat tray, Ashanti Lav? and Constitution, 
(London O.U.P. 1956) ppl 2^7 et seq. L.Green. Ibo Village 
Affairs, (London, 1947) Chapter 9.
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function. In this section we are concerned with the 
investigation of the extent to which the parties* freedom 
of contract has' been limited by both the common law and 
statute, and the legal effect of purported agreements that 
do not comply with the rules*
Classification of illegal agreements:
In English law illegal agreements are easily divisible
into two broad groups of common law and statutory illeg-
2ality* The former group consi3ts of six main types of 
agreements namely:
(i) a contract to commit a crime, a tort or a fraud 
on a third party;
(ii) an agreement that is sexually iinmoral;
(iii) an agreement that is to the prejudice of the 
public safety;
2. Several modes of classification have been adopted by
various writers and judges. Pollock*s chapter on “unlaw-? 
ful agreements" consists of three categories namely (a) 
those contrary to positive law, (b) those contrary to 
positive morality, and (c) those contrary to the common 
weal. Cheshire & Fifoot have classified illegal agree­
ments under statutory and common law illegality; sub­
dividing the latter into illegal contracts so called, and 
illegal contracts traditionally so called. Corbin has 
however, based his own classification on the degrees of 
illegality in any particular type of agreement, the 
breach of a dogllicensing law ranking lower than an agree­
ment to rob a bank; in the two cases of Bennett v Bennett
B9523 1 KB. 249 at pp.260-1 and G-oodinson v G-oodinson 954J 2 Q3. 118, a new system of classification has 
emerged, based on (i) agreements which are illegal because 
they are against criminal law, and (b) agreements that 
have no such taint. It is submitted that the merit of any 
system of classification should be assessed on the basis 
of harmony in the remedies available to the parties.
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(iv) an agreement that is prejudicial to the admin­
istration of justice;
(v) a contract that tends to corruption in public 
life; and
(vi) a contract to defraud the revenue#
The latter group is made up of agreements whi£h are expressly 
or impliedly prohibited by statute#
In Ghana and Nigeria however, criminal law has been 
codified and most of the common law offences in English law 
are statutory in the two former territories. Thus, apart 
from those category of agreements e.g. an agreement to 
commit a tort, which is still illegal under the common law, 
the bulk of the case law in the two countries (i.e. Ghana 
and Nigeria) is concerned with varying degrees of statutory 
prohibition.
Distinction between agreements which are illegal by 
statute and those that toe merely void by statute:
A vital distinction between those contracts which are 
illegal by statute and those that are merely void but not 
illegal, must be recognised. The importance of this 
distinction lies in the field of remedies available to the 
parties and will be discussed in some detail in a later sub­
section#^
3. For example in agreements that are absolutely illegal 
any collateral transactions are also affected by the 
original illegality. In void transactions i.e. those 
merely void, collateral rights are enforceable.
Here we are concerned with those statutes which have
declared the making of certain types of agreements to be
void without also making such contracts illegal. Such an
intention in a statute could be express or implied. An
example of an express provision is found in the Ghana Sale
of Goods Act, 1962* Section 8(3) of this Act (which deals
with the fundamental obligations of the seller) provides:
"Any provision in a contract of sale which is incon­
sistent with, or repugnant to, the fundamental oblig­
ation of the seller, is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency or repugnance."
Also Section 67 of the same Act which regulates hire-purchase
agreements states as follows:
"Any provision in a hire-purchase contract whereby the 
seller or any person acting ogi his behalf is authorised 
to enter upon any premises for the purpose of taking 
possession of the goods, or is relieved from liability 
for any such entry, is void".
To the same effect is the provision of section 21 of the Ghana
Lotteries and Betting Act, 1960^ which makes gaming and
other wagering agreements void."* Section 5(2) of the
4. Act 31* This Act has repealed all statutes of general 
application on gaming or wagering agreements that were 
in force in Ghana before its enactment. See Section
26 and second schedule.
5. Gf. S. 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845 (England) which has 
similar provisions. This section has been applied in 
the Nigerian case of Chemor v Sahyoun (1946) 18 N.LR. 
113 in which case the 1 8 4 5 Act was said to be in force 
in Nigeria.But.^eeS.236 of the Nigerian Criminal Code 
which prohibits certain games.
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Ghana Contract Act, I960 (Act. 25) is an instance of an 
enactment rendering an agreement void by implication.
This subsection which deals ifrith exceptions to the rule as 
provided for in Section 5 (i) of third-party rights in 
contracts, provides as follows:
"S. 5(2)
Subsection (i) does not apply to -
(a) a provision in a contract designed for the purpose 
of resale price maintenance, that is to say, a pro­
vision whereby a party agrees to pay money or other­
wise render some valuable consideration to a person
who is not a party to the contract in the event of the 
first-mentioned party selling or otherwise disposing of 
any goods, the subject matter of the contract, at 
prices lower than those determined by or under the 
contract; 6 or
(b) a provision in a contract purporting to exclude or 
restrict any liability of a person who is not a party 
thereto.“7
The effect of this sub-section is that any provision in an 
agreement to sell goods at certain minimum prices, is void. 
The position is the same in the case of any provision in 
a contract to exclude or restrict any liability of a
person who is not a party to the said contract.
Statutory illegality:
There does not appear to be any general rule for dist­
inguishing a statute which makes any contract void or makes
6. Of. Part 1 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956,
(ingland) and the Re-sale Prices Act, 1964- (England)
7• Of. Dunlope v Selfridge (1915} A.C. 847.
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it illegal* It is a question of interpretation from 
the general tenor of a particular enactment and of any 
given provision* In many cases an absolute prohibition 
is followed by a penalty clause for any default* In such 
a case the agreement is said to be illegal* Under the
Q
Ghana Ilonevlenders Ordinance, Section 18 (i) prohibits the 
employment of agents or canvassers by moneylenders, while 
section 18 (2) imposes a fine of twnety pounds on any agent 
or canvasser who accepts a commission from a borrower for 
purposes of introducing him to a lender* Any such comm­
ission agreement will therefore be illegal* The Nigerian
9
case of Patience Kasumu v Baba Agbe concerned the inter­
pretation of Section 19 of the Honeylenders Ordinance which 
imposed a penalty for failure to keep certain records of a 
moneylending transaction* The transaction was held to 
be i l l e g a l * A l s o  section 38 of the Ghana Pawnbrokers 
Ordinance prohibits in absolute terms the taking of certain 
articles in pawn* These include "linen or apparel, unfinish 
goods, or materials entrusted to any person to wash, scour, 
iron, mend, manufacture, work up, finish or make up.1
8* Cap* 176, iiaws of the Gold Coast, (1951)*
9. 0-956] A.C. 539.
10. for a fuller discussion of this case, see post pp.
Also for a fuller investigation of the implitations of 
a penalty provision in enactments, see pp.
infra*
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The penalty for taking any of the articles in pawn is 
double the cost of the said article. Any such pawning 
transaction will therefore be illegal#^
Another mode of determining an illegal agreement is 
the peremptory nature of the wording of the enactment 
prohibiting it. Section 14 (i) of the Ghana Auction 
Sales Ordinance is an example of this kind of provision 
thus
"14 (i) No sale by auction of any land shall take place 
until after at least fourteen days 1 public notice there­
of has been made at the headquarters town of the dis­
trict in which the land is situated, and also at the 
place of the intended sale......."
12A penalty is also provided for any breach of this provision. 
Kinds of statutory illegality*
The legislature in enacting any legislation in this
11* S. 38 (3), Pawnbrokers Ordinance, cap# 189 (19519 laws).
12# Other enactments with similar provisions in Ghana
and Nigeria include,
(i) for Ghana? Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137), Bent 
(Stabilization) Act 1962 (Act. 109); Bent (Stabiliz­
ation) (Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act 168); Control of 
Prices Act, 1962 (Act 113); Manufacture of Spirits 
Act. 1962 (Act. 154);
(ii; Bor Nigeria: The Moneylenders Act and laws of the
Federal Territory and the Regions ¥§9S>ectivGly; The
Auctioneers legislation of all the five jurisdictions; 
The Pawnbrokers laws; The Bent Act and the Control of 
Bents laws of the Pastern, Western and Ilid-V/estern 
Regions. Bor other legislation v/hich render the agree­
ment void but not illegal, see the Ghana Qo&cessions 
Act, 1962; the Illiterates Protection legislation in 
Ghana and Nigeria; transactions under the Sunday Ob­
servance Act; and the Northern Nigeria Land Tenure
law, cap. 59, Laws of Northern Nigeria (1963).
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aspect of the law, often has any one or more of the following 
objectives in view, namely:
(i) the absolute prohibition of the making of certain 
types of agreements;
(ii) the regulation of a particular trade or profession;
(iii) the protection of a particular class of people or 
the general public; and
(iv) the protection of revenue.
Agreements to do any act prohibited under any of the 
criminal codes in Ghana and Nigeria; partnerships or co­
operative societies carrying on business without or comply­
ing with statutory requirements as to maximum or minimum 
numbers respectively; and any other agreement that constitute 
a breach of any absolute prohibition in an enactment, will come 
under the first head'. Under the second head we have such
enactments as those regulating the professions namely,
13 14legal practitioners, medical practitioners, and pharma-
* +  15cists.
13* Legal Practitioners Act, 1962 (Nigeria), No*33 of 1962; 
for Ghana see Legal Profession Act, I960 (Act.32)*
14# Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act, Gap# 116 Laws 
of Nigeria (1958 Revision); for Ghana, see Medical 
Practitioners and Dentists Ordinance, cap# 69 > Laws 
of the Gold Coast (1951 consolidation).
15# Pharmacy Act, cap# 152, Laws of Nigeria (1958 Revision); 
see for Ghana Pharmacy and Poisons Ordinance, cap. 70, 
Laws of the Gold Coast (1951)#
5 3 2
Other enactments regulate such businesses as pawn-
16 17 18brokers, moneylenders, auctioneers and mercantile
4- 1 9  >agents*
Under the third head we have most of the enactments 
under (ii) and also the Illiterates Protection legislation 
in Ghana and the various jurisdictions in Nigeria* finally, 
the Crown lands Ordinance and the other enactments which 
require some payment to be made to the Government (local or 
central) form the bulk of the legislation under the fourth 
head.
It will be demonstrated presently that the enormity 
of any given agreement, (i.e. the degree of the illegality) 
depends on which of the four sub-heads above that the legis­
lature intended to emphasise* ihus there is a vital dist­
inction between the rights of a defaulting lender under the 
moneylenders Ordinance in Nigeria or G-hana (which form of 
agreement is absolutely illegal under the laws of the two 
countries) and the rights of a lessee of Crown lands whd 
obtains a lease without the lessor obtaining the necessary
16. Pawnbrokers Act (Lagos) and the Pawnbrokers laws of
all the four Kegions, cap. 146, Laws of Nigeria (1958)* 
for Ghana, see Pawnbrokers Ordinance, cap. 189, Laws 
. of the Gold Coast (1951).
17* The Moneylenders Legislation in all the jurisdictions 
in Nigeria and Ghana.
18. fhe Auctioneers Ordinances in Ghana and Nigeria*
19. See the '..1 stern ITigeria Mercantile Agents lav/, cap. 77
of laws (1959).
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20£0vexamental consents#
In the former the legislature intended to protect
borrowers from the hazard of unlicensed and indiscreet
lenders* Thus any transaction by an unlicensed lender
21is absolutely illegal and void*
In the latter, however, the intention of the legislature 
was to keep direct control over dealings in land* Any 
dealings in land without their consent is not absolutely 
illegal in the same sense as in rnoneylending matters, but 
is subject to the government acting to annul the transaction* 
Until such annulment, therefore, the lessee can remain in 
possession till the expiration of the lease. H
Legal consequences of a breach of statutory prohibition 
or of other statutory regulation:
The general rule here is that the courts will not en­
force any transaction that arises from a breach of the law. 
This has often been put in the Latin Maxim ex turpi causa
non oritur actio. Thus if two highwaymen disagree over the
division of their booty, the courts will not lend their aid
20. Gf. Ha3urnu v Baba Bgbe (A95(p A*C. 539 where' illegality 
precluded the appellants from being put on terms, and 
Harry v Martins (1949)19 Ii’.L.H* 42 where the Uigerian 
Supreme Court refused a plea of illegality by a de­
faulting defendant in a trespass action under the crown
lands Ordinance (Uigeria).
21. iiee the Hasuuu case, supra.
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22 -  to the aggrieved party. Also where A pays b a sum of
money to kill C, the latter act being an offence under the
criminal codes of Ghana and Algeria, A cannot recover the
23amount paid if B fails to carry out the assignment.
Subsidiary to the above general rule is the position 
that the courts will not entertain an action by the offender 
to recover an indemnity against the consequences of his 
criminal act. 'io allow such an action would be to defeat 
the objects the criminal law is intended to serve. It 
would constitute a negation of tne personal nature of punish­
ment for an offence. It cannot be said in any ordinary sense 
to deter other criminals, where an offender is allowed to 
recover any fines he had paid in a court, through a civil 
action for enforcement of indemnity. Ihe retention of 
capital punishment in Ghana and Nigeria further complicates 
any support there might be for allowing any indemnity for 
criminal acts. 1he practice of insurance appears to be an
exception to this rule but even here the position is far 
from clear. '
22. Everet v Williams cited by Bollock on Contracts (13th
ed. 1950) p.262 n.6.
23- Ibis position is equally true of any agreement that
contravenes any of the provisions of the criminal codes 
in Ghana and Nigeria. Knowledge of the parties.at 
the time of making the transaction that it constituted 
an offence, is not relevant. Ignorance 01 the law 
is not an acceptable plea.
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24Thus although the courts in Haseldine v Ifosken refused 
to enforce an indemnity against the insurers of a solicitor 
on the ground that champerty on which the solicitor^ lia­
bility was based, was an offence, the position was different
in the latter case of Tinline v 7/hite Gross Insurance
25Association Ltd*
In the latter action the plaintiff had paid damages for 
negligence in a motor accident claim. It had been found that 
his negligence was so gross as to amount to manslaughter.
It was held in a civil action for the claim against the in­
surance company that the defendants were liable. An attempt 
to reconcile the two cases could be made on the basis that 
while champerty is an offence in which intention is a vital 
element, negligence arises from inadvertence and the law 
recognises this distinction by allowing recovery in the 
latter case.
24* 0-9333 1133. 822 3ee also Brown Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v
Percy JJalton (London ) Ltd. U957J 2 QB. 621. cf.
Hardy v motor Insurance Bureau (1964) The Times,' 
Tuesday liay 12, where recovery was allowed.
S,
25. 0-921] 3 K.B. 327 see also James v British & General
Insurance Go. 0-9273 2 K.B. 311* Of. the Canadian 
case of CMHearn v Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. (1921) 
50, Ontario L.H. 377, where the Ontario appeal Court 
held that the plaintiff could not recover on facts 
similar to those in the Tinline case. Negligence is, 
however, an offence under the Ontario Boad Traffic 
legislation while in English law as well as in Ghana 
and Nigeria, negligence is only an offence in so far 
as it can be inferred from the offences of dangerous 
driving, driving without due care and attention or 
reckless driving.
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In Ghana and Nigeria however, champerty is not an
offence under any of the criminal codes* In both countries
legal practitioners are allowed to sue for the recovery of
their fees and in Nigeria the Legal Practitioners Remuner-
26ation Committee makes regulations on inter alia, agreements 
between practitioners and clients with respect to charges* 
There is no prohibition against a practitioner taking a 
proportion of the proceeds of any action as part of or all 
his fees. It is unlikely therefore that the Haseldine 
case will be- followed in either Ghana or Nigeria on its 
facts. But the principle i.e. that the courts will not 
help any person to get reparation for the consequences of. 
his own culpable criminal act, will be applied. The 
Tinline case, on the other hand, has a better chance of
being followed in the two countries since the Ghana Motor
27 28Traffic Ordinance, the Nigerian Road Traffic Ordinance
and the Bnglish Hoad Traffic Act, 193Q> have similar pro-
29visions with regard to driving offendes.
26* S.II of the Legal Practitioners Ast, 1962 (Nigeria, 
federation and . .egions), No.33 of 1962.
27* Gap.184) Laws of Nigeria (1958 Revision).
2 8. Cap.184 Laws of-Nigeria (1958 Revision).
29* The allowing of claims against insurance companies under
these heads can thus be said to be an exception to the
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.
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The second general rule about the legal consequences 
of a breach of statutory prohibition or of other statutory 
regulation, is that where the parties are equally at fauly 
the position of the defendant is an enviable one, i.e. 
in pari delicto potior est conditio dependentis. This of
course, logically follows from the first one. If the 
courts will not entertain the action, they certainly cannot 
order the restitution of any property or the refund of any 
money that passed as a .Jesuit of the transaction. But 
life most other maxims, this one ip imprecise and is hedged 
round with many exceptions•^  he shall be looking at the
30. the most obvious doubt has arisen in the field of the 
passing of property under illegal transactions. The 
Privy Council has held in & recent appeal from Malaya 
that there is such passing of property in illegal
Eans^actions. This was in the case of Singh v Ali,S60J 2 W.L.iu 180. In that ease, the plaintiff and 
the defendant were said to be 1 conspirators engaged in 
practising a deceit on the public administration of the 
country.1 In spite of this, Lord Denning had had this 
to say about the effect of the. transaction: "In order 
to succeed in detinue, it was essential for A to show 
that he had the right to immediate possession of the 
lorry at the time of commencing the action, arising out 
of an absolute or special property in it .... And their 
Lordships think he succeeded. Although the transaction 
'between A and 3 was illegal, nevertheless it was fully 
executed and carried out and in that account it was 
effective to pass the property in the lorry to A. The 
reason is because the transferor, having fully achieved 
his unworthy end, cannot be allowed to turn round and , 
repudiate the means by which he did it - he cannot 
throw over the transfer. And the transferee having 
got the property, can assert his title to it against 
all the world, not because he has any merit of his 
own, but because there is no one who can assert a 
better title to it." It is likely that this view of 
the position will be adopted by the courts in Ghana 
and higeria.
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exceptions presently. lor the maxim to operate, the parties
must have formed an intention to break the law either in
31the formation or in the performance of the agreement*
In G-hana and Nigeria the maxim has operated to deprive money­
lenders of any sums lent in breach of the moneylenders leg-
■50islation. Thus in lashina v Qdedina, it was held that 
a moneylender could not recover the sum of £285*5*0* being 
the balance of a loan which contravened section 13 on the 
rate of interest chargeable on such loans. The breach 
constituted an offence under section 14- (i) of the Ordinance.
Breaches of the provisions of the Illiterates Protection 
Acts in Ghana and Higeria have also come under the maxim* 
Section 3 of the Nigerian (Lagos) Enactment provides as 
foil ows s
1 Any person who shall write any letter or document at the 
request, on behalf, or in the name of any illiterate 
person s^all also write on such letter or other document 
his own name as the writer thereof and his address; and 
his so doing shall be equivalent to a statement -
(a) that he was instructed to write such letter or 
document by the person for whom it purports to have 
been written and that the letter or document fully 
and correctly represents his instructions; and
31. It has already been mentioned that knowledge of the 
breach of the law is not relevant in cases of absolute 
prohibition.
32. (1957) V/.H.N.L.E. 45. See also Eke v Odolofin (1961)
'-/•N.L.Ii* 151, where a breach of 5*13 was also in issue*
33» Gap. 83, Laws of Nigeria (1958). This is in similar
terms to the corresponding provisions in the other 
Nigerian jurisdictions and in Ghana. The enactment 
does not apply to legal practitioners in either 
Ghana or Higeria.
539
(b) if-the letter or document -purports to be signed 
with the signature or mark 01 the illiterate person, 
that prior to its being so signed it was read over 
and explained to the illiterate person, and that the 
signature or mark was made by such person*1
Section 4 provides for a penalty of £50 fine or 6 months im­
prisonment for any failure to comply with the said section*
This was in issue in the case of U.A.G. of Nigeria Ltd. v
34Edems & A.iayi. In that case the second defendant was, a 
guarantor to the plaintiffs company on the groundnut account 
of the first defendant. The second defendant being an ill­
iterate, the bond was to comply with the provisions of 1he 
Illiterates Protection Ordinance, i.e. it was to be read over 
to the illiterate, interpreted and explained to him before 
obtaining his thumb-print* The second defendant had pleaded 
his illiteracy and ignorance of the terms of the bond. In 
a claim for £300 from the said second defendant being his
liability under the bond, Smith J. held at the Kano High
> •
Court (Northern Nigeria) that the company could not recover* 
The reason for the decision was the non-compliance with the 
provision of the section.
3*5In the latter case of S.C.O.A* V Okon , the Nigerian 
Federal Supreme Court extended the class of illiterates to 
include a person who could sign his name and read figures but 
not sufficiently literate to understand the meaning and effect 
of the document he is signing. Such a person has to be
34. (1958) N.R.N.L.N. 33*
35. (I960) N.H.N.L.iU 34.
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treated as an illiterate for purposes .of sections.3 and 4 
of the Ordinance# The facts of the case were that the 
appellant company claimed the sum of £200 from the respondent 
as a surety guaranteeing the repayment of any shortages of 
a third party in the event of the latter being employed by 
the company, up to the amount of £200# The letter, though 
signed by the respondent, was written by the appellant's man­
ager# The letter was not read over to the respondent before 
he signed, nor did he ask for it to be read to him# His 
evidence was that he understood the figure of £200 which 
he saw in the document, but that he signed it believing that 
he was witnessing a written transaction between the appellant 
company and the third party. In dismissing the appellant's 
case the Supreme Court held that the failure to comply with 
section 3 of the Illiterates Protection Ordinance was fatal 
to their claim. It was further held in Paterson Zochonis & 
Go. Ltd. v Cuss ail that a person who is literate in, say,
Arabic but illiterate in English is an illiterate in relation
37to a document written in English.
36. (1961)N#K#L#E.I# See also the Ghana case of Pulani Mamidu
v Aban & Anor#(l964) High Court Accra 20/11/34. Unreported 
37# It seems that an agreement that does not comply with 
the section is still admissible in evidence: Amao v 
Z Ajibike & Qrs (1955-56) W.P.N.L.Ii. 121, and Akohwere of 
Ok an v Ema.yobor & Anor#(l959) W.R. N.L.H. 83# But cf. Eke 
v Odolof in (19 61) >v .N.L.H.151 where Ihadarikan, J# cast 
doubts on the authority of the Ema.yobor decision. See 
also on the Illiterates Protection Ordinance, Ntiashagwo 
v Amadu (1959)V/.H.N.1j.R.273; Lagos limber Co # v Tit combe 
(1943/ 17 N.E.E.14; Lodder v Alo wey (1904)A «C# 442* On 
illiterates and printed conditions, see Otegbeye v 
Little (1906)1 N.L.H. 70.
Other enactments which have received similar construct­
ion by the courts under the in pari delicto maxim include
*V O
the Auctioneers legislation in Ghana and Nigeria; the
Ghana Sale of Goods Act; and the Ghana Kent (Stabilization)
T • i l• 40Legislation.
Limits on the application of the in pari delicto rule:
The first is of course, that there has to be a delictum 
before anybody can be party to it. Thus if the object of 
the enactment was not to prohibit the formation of a part­
icular type of agreement but, say the protection of revenue, 
the plaintiff can recover under the gontrsct. In the 
Nigerian case of Harry v Kartins,4  ^the Nigerian Supreme 
Court had to consider the effect of a sub-lease which did
42not comply with the provisions of the Crown Land Ordinance 
with regard to the prior consent of the Governor to the alien­
ation. The facts were that the appellant was a lessee of 
Crown land and had built s shop on the land which he later 
sub-let to the respondent. This sub-lease was without the
38. Luf f at v fradin.: association of Nigeria Ltd. & or s.
(1926-29) biv. ct. 7«
39* N.T.0. v Ohoro (1985) High Court Sekondi 22/2/65* Un­
reported.
40. Qfosu v Bernie (1964) High Court, Accra 22/12/64, Un­
reported; Agberyedzoe v Atta (1964) High Ct. Ho. 
4/12/64; Unreported.
41. (1949) 19 N.L.A.42. Of. Asi v Noruku (1940)15 N.L.H.
116 which was said to have been wrongly decided.
42. Cap. 29, Laws of Nigeria (1958 Revision) S.7.
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consent of the Governor as provided for under section 7 of 
the Crown Lands Ordinance. There was no evidence, however, 
to show that the respondent knew that the land was crown 
land. The landlord (i.e. the Grown lessee) later re-entered 
the land and the respondent sued for inter alia, damages for 
unlawful ejectment. He was successful in his claim at the 
lower court. On appeal it was argued on behalf of the app­
ellant that the sub-lease was illegal and could not found an 
action in favour of the respondent, 
mission Bairamian, J. ’who heard the 
the authorities and continued:
’'The inference that the sub-letting without consent is a 
prohibited act is already contained in the opinion 
that it is against public policy, and the view that the 
sub-lessee is in unlawful occupation likewise hangs upon 
that opinion. Public policy is, as the judgment states, 
a very unruly horse and 'judges are more to be trusted 
as interpreters of the law than expounders of what is 
called public policy1. I distrust that unruly horse 
and prefer to act on the accepted principle that a 
contract freely entered into should be enforced unless 
it is clearly shown to be illegal under some authorit­
ative decision in the common lav/ or to be illegal under 
a statute, and in dubious cases to give it the benefit 
of the doubt and to enforce it. If the sublease without 
consent is not illegal, it wil}. follow that the sub­
lessee's occupation is not unlawful. The question can 
be best resolved by considering the aim and object of 
the crown lands ordinance and the nature of its 'pro­
visions on leases. I have not seen any authority for 
saying that a sub-lessee whose contract was made in 
breach of a covenant not to let without consent is in 
unlawful occupation in the case of private land, and I 
have no reason for saying that he is in unlawful occ­
upation in the case of Grown land. It is an accepted 
rule that a person is not guilty of an offence unless 
he clearly comes within the wording of the enactment , 
creating the offence. I think that in the absence of 
some clear provision in.the ordinance that such a sub­
lessee Is in unlawful occupation or at least that the 
sub-letting is an illegal act, it cannot be said that 
the sub-lessee is guilty of an offence under section 
35 ..... from wnatever angle the question is looked at,
In rejecting this sub­
case on appeal, reviewed
the conclusion is that the sub-lease, though in breach 
of a covenant, is not an illegal contract* The doctrine 
of estoppel makes it binding as between the lessee and 
the sub-lessee, and the lessee is not entitled to eject 
the sub-lessee except in conformity with the law for 
the recovery of possession.!,43
His Lordship did not consider the provision of a penalty
under section 35 of the Ordinance for unlawful occupation
of Crown land, conclusive in determining the illegality of
44the transaction. The earlier case of Hsi v rnoruku in
which it was held that such a transaction was illegal, was
said to have been wrongly decided. be are respectfully
in agreement with the learned judge that the obj ct of the
enactment was not to prohibit the granting of sub-leases
but to regulate them. The imposition of a penalty for non-
compliance does not alter the position at all. It is easily
distinguishable from the moneylenders Ordinance the object of
which is to protect the public from the odd indiscreet lender.
This distinction was in issue in the Nigerian Supreme Court
45appeal of Solanke v Abed & anor in which section 11 of the
4 6Nigerian Land and Native Nights Ordinance, was under con­
sideration. This was concerned with the nature of the title
43* Op.cit. pp.43 et seq. Text cited from J.L.ticKeil h: H.Nainq 
Cases and Statutes on Contract and Tort d o  ndon, 1964) 
pp.70-71.
44. (1940)15 N.L.H. 116.
45. (1962) N.H.N.L.H. 92.
46. S.II provided as follows: “Nxcept as may be otherwise
provided by the regulations.in relation to native occ­
upiers, it shall not be lawful for any occupier to alien­
ate his right of occupancy, or any part thereof by sale,
mortgage, transfer of possession, sub-lease or bequest
or otherwise howsoever without the consent of the gov­
ernor first had and obtained, and any such sale, mortgage 
sub-lease transfer or bequest effected without the con­
sent of the Governor shall be null and void.”
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of a lessee of a right of occupancy granted without the
consent of the ilesident (Northern Nigeria). It was held
that the alienation was not illegal. On the effect of the
absence of any provision for a penalty in the event of non-
compliance with the provisions of the section, the court
gad this to say:
"The btatute at present under consideration says that 
it shall be unlawful for the occupier to alienate his 
right of occupancy, but does not provide e.ny penalty ... 
nor would it appear necessary in the interests of 
public policy for an agreement of alienation to be 
treabcd as illegal. Public policy can be adequately 
safeguarded by the Government's power of revocation.
In these circumstances I hold that the contract was 
not illegal»"47
In other words their Lordships came to this conclusion partly 
because no penalty was provided for any non-compliance with 
the provisions of the section.
Three observations must be made on the above passage, 
firstly, it is not clear if the Solanke case can be said to 
be authority for the view that the provision of a penalty is 
conclusive in determining the illegality of any transaction 
that did not comply with the terms of a statute stipulating 
for the penalty. Such a conclusion would of course be obiter 
since the provision of a penalty was not in issue in the 
Solanke case. In fact their Lordships stressed the fact 
that it was necessary in the interests of public policy that 
agreements for alienation should not be made illegal if an 
alternative course could reasonably be adopted. It would
47* Op.cit. p.
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also be a startling proposition in view of the fact that
different enactments have the attainment of different objects
in view. Where an enactment did not intend the prohibition
as a particular act, the stipulation of any penalty for non-
compliance with any of its provisions will not ipso facto
render any transaction under it illegal. A transaction
under the Grown Lands Ordinance is a ctse in point.^
Secondly, and following from the first point, it cannot
be said that the Supreme Court has by implication overruled
the statement of the law in the previous case of Harry v 
48NartinsT It will be recalled that it was held in that case
that the provision of a penalty was not conclusive. It 
can further be argued, however, that the object of the enact­
ment of the Crown lands Ordinance was the regulation of 
dealings in Crown lands, while the main object of the Land 
and Native Nights Ordinance was the management and control 
of Crown, lands. . In the latter it appears to have been the 
provision of safeguards against natives disposing of their 
land rights without adequate supervision. On this principle 
the provision of a penalty in the former enactment would not 
be very significant for purposes of determining the illegality 
of a transaction in breach of its provisions. The case 
might well be different if a penalty was stipulated in the 
latter enactment.-
48. 3ee Harry v Liar tins (1949) 19 N.L.H. 42.
finally, it is not clear to what extent the basis of the 
oolanne decision has been altered by the Northern Nigerian 
Land -enure LavU  ^which has repealed the Land and Native 
Rights Ordinance (i.e. to the extent the latter statute is 
in force in Northern Nigeria). Section 26 of the Land Tenure 
Law provides lor the imposition of inter alia, penal rent 
for any alienation without the necessary consents. The 
penal provision is equally applicable to natives and non-natives 
of the Northern Region who have not complied with the pro­
visions with regard to consent before any alienation, and 
continues for each day the default is continued. One view
of the effect of the new enactment is that the provision for
the imposition of penal rent to be levied on any owner of a 
right of occupancy who alienates without consent, has operated 
to render any such alienation illegal. In other words such
an alienation will come within the prohibition of the enact­
ment and will be treated by the courts as any other breach of 
an absolute statutory prohibition. Accordingly the Land 
Tenure Law will come under the same category of enactments 
as the moneylenders Ordinance or the Auctioneers Legislation. 
Another view of the new Northern Nigeria enactment is that it 
will be absurd to read into it an absolute prohibition of land 
alienation. If the legislature intended this as the effect 
of the Law, they could have said so in clear terms. It is 
not enough to infer such a radical change of legislative
_             „   — — . ■ ■ —  . . - —
49. Cap. 59, Laws of Worthera Nigeria (1963).
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intention from the provisions for penal'rent.
The Land Tenure Lav/ has not therefore altered the
basic assumption of the former Land and Native Nights 
Ordinance which is that alienations of land without consent 
are not illegal per se.
A second exception to the in pari delicto rule is that 
where the object of a statute is the protection of a part­
icular class to which the plaintiff belongs, he will be 
allowed by the courts to recover any money or property that 
had passed as a result of the illegal transaction, his own 
guilt notwithstanding. Thus if a moneylender had received 
any security on a transaction wLiich has been declared illegal 
under the moneylenders Ordinance, the borrower can recover 
the security without being ordered to pay the loan. This 
was the decision of the Privy Council in the Nigerian appeal 
of K a s urn u v Lab a Nube  ^ where the administrator of a money­
lender was ordered to reconvey real property which had 
been obtained on a transaction that contravened section 19
of the Nigerian moneylenders Ordinance, to the borrower'with-
51out the latter being put on terms*
This principle has been applied in transactions declared
R p
illegal under the G-hana Hire Purchase Act, 1958; the Nig­
erian Illiterates Protection Ordinance and under the
50. (1956)A•C. 539.
51. ■‘■'or a fuller discussion of the implications of this 
decision, see infra pp*
52* U.T.O. v Johnson Qkoro (1965) Nigh Court Sekondi 19/1/6 5, 
Unreported. This met nes now been repealed and re­
enacted under the Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962, Act 
137.
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Restriction of Rents legislation in both Ghana and Nigeria.^
With regard to alienations of land without statutory consents,
this exception to the in pari delicto rule was fully discussed
in the recent Uganda appeal to the Privy Council of Singh v 
54Kulubva. The case raised the question whether, as a con­
sequence of granting an illegal lease, the lessor was debarred 
from recovering possession from his lessee during its currency. 
The plaintiff wqs an African and the registered proprietor 
of certain land known as "mailo" land, situate in Buganda.
The land was divided into three plots, and during 1946 and 
19479 the plaintiff leased each of the plots upon yearly 
tenancies to the defendant, who was an Indian. The defendant 
continued in occupation until he was given seven week's notice 
to quit at the end of 1959 i.e. after being twelve years in 
occupation. The plaintiff thereafter brought an action re­
claiming possession. The leases were unlawful since they
contravened the Possession of Land Lawr*^  and the Land Transfer 
5 6Ordinance. These provisions required the consents of the
53* Under the Ghana Rent Control Ordinance any rent paid in
excess of the Ordinance stipulation is refundable to the
tenant. Cf* Mourabak v Duke Banson (1965) High Court, 
Sekondi, 8/2/65. Unreported. See also the decisions 
under the Rent (stabilization) Act, 1962 (Act 109); the 
Rent (Cocoa Farms) Regulations, 1962 (L.1.186) and the 
Rent (Cocoa Farms) (Amendment) Regulations, 1965 (L.I. 
382)5 Ofosu v Bernie & ors (1964) High Court, Accra,
22/12/64, Unreported. On Nigeria, see the cases dis­
cussed by M.O.Onwuamaegbu, Nigerian Law of Landlord and 
Tenant, tLondon,1965) pp.243 et seq.
54. 11963) 3 All E.R. 499.
55* (Buganda) S.2.
56. Uganda, ss.2, 3 and 4 are in similar terms to the Northern 
Nigeria Land Tenure law, cap.59> Laws of Northern Nigeria 
(1963).
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Governor and the Lukiko for a lease to a non-African, andi
both parties committed offences in not securing that approval* 
The plaintiff had argued that the necessary consents had not 
been obtained but the defendant had replied that as the plaint­
iff was also a party to the illegality he could not rely on 
it for purposes of regaining possession of the land* ThetriaU 
judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the
parties were equally guilty in the breach of the law as to
consents and could not rely on the courts to enforce any
rights under the transaction. On appeal to the Court of
Appeal for Eastern Africa the decision was reversed* A 
further appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
confirmed the judgment of the East African appeal court.
The court gave two reasons for their decision only the second 
of which is relevant here* This was that the purpose of the 
prohibtory legislation was to protect African landowners, a 
class to which the plaintiff belonged. He was therefore 
entitled to succeed, following a well recognised rule that a 
member of a class protected by such a statute is not in pari 
delicto with the party with whom he contracted for purposes 
of recovery of possession* Thus as a member of the specially 
protected class:the plaintiff (Kulubya) even if particeps
criminis "may recover from the other notwithstanding that
57both have been parties to the illegal contract."'
57* Per Lord Morris of Borth - Y - G-est, who read the advice 
of the Privy Council. Bee also Kiriri Cotton Co* v 
Lewani L1960J A.C. 192, a Kenya appeal*
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Now, the Uganda legislation with regard to "mailo1* land
is in similar terms to the Northern Nigerian Land Tenure Law#
It is likely, therefore, that if the defendant in the earlier
58Nigerian case of Solanke v Abed & anor. had instituted an
action for possession instead of forcibly evicting the tenant
who had taken possession under an unlawful sub-lease, he
might well have been successful, on the Kulubya principle#
The latter decision is, however, not binding on the Nigerian
59courts but will be accorded high persuasive force# J
A third exception to the in pari delicto rule is that where
an agreement which is legal as formed can be performed either
legally or illegally, the law presumes, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, that the parties intended not to
break the law and will enforce the rights and duties of the
parties under it#^
This exception was in issue in the Nigerian case of 
61Agbakobar v Meka which was concerned with the alleged in-
62fringement of the Pharmacy Ordinance# , The facts of the 
case were that the respondent, a licensed chemist and druggist
58* (1962) N.R.N.L.R. 92.
59* Considering the earlier Malaya appeal in which their 
Lordships of the Privy Council decided that property 
passes under an illegal agreement: Singh v Ali £l96CtJ
A.C. 167; see also Palaniappa v Cheffier Q.962J A.C.294, 
it can be argued that the Kulubya principle has applic­
ation only in land matters# This view is reinforced by 
the fact that the Kasumu decision (a Nigerian appeal) was 
also concerned with the reconveyance of land. Cf. the 
Kenya case of Denning v Kdwardes L1963J A.C* 245 (P.C.).
60# Chitty on Contracts (21st ed. vol# 1 para.894) p.467*
61. (1962) N.R.N.L.R. 1.
62. Cap.152, Laws of Nigeria (1956 Kevision).
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supplied the appellant with drugs on credit over a period.
Some of the drugs were poisons as defined by Part III or the 
first schedule to the Pharmacy Ordinance. J ) It is an offence 
under the Ordinance for a licensed chemist and druggist to 
sell or deliver any poison as so defined except upon an order 
signed by one of certain specified persons or upon a pre­
scription. At the trial of a counterclaim by the respondent 
for the amount due for the supply of the drugs, the appellant 
contended that the supply of the poisons was illegal. There 
was no evidence as to whether or not the poisons were supplied 
on prescription. Appealing against a judgment in favour of 
the respondent for the amount claimed, the appellant contended 
that the onus lay on the respondent to prove that the supply 
of the poisons was legal. The High Court sitting in its 
appellate jurisdiction held that the contract between the 
appellant and the respondent for the supply of the poisons 
was not on its face illegal, and the onus lay on the appellant 
to prove illegality.
63* S.32 (i) of the Ordinance provides as follows: "No
selling dispenser or chemist and druggist shall sell or 
deliver any poison in Part III of the first Schedule 
except on an order signed by a registered or licensed 
medical practitioner, registered or licensed dentist, 
qualified veterinary surgeon, or selling dispenser or 
chemist and druggist; or on and in accordance with a 
prescription given by a registered or licensed medical 
practitioner, registered or licensed dentist or qualified 
veterinary surgeon."
64. It has not been considered necessary to discuss the other 
exceptions to the in pari delicto rule since these in­
volve a repetition of the existing English judicial 
authority on the subject.
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Gaming and Wagering agreements:
Three types of transactions have often been discussed 
under this heading namely betting, gaming and lotteries, and 
five facets of the discussion ought to be recognised and 
clearly distinguished. The first is their nature, i.e. what 
constitutes a bet, a gaming agreement or a lottery, and the 
extent to which they are lawful. The second is concerned 
with the rights and duties of the parties to the transaction 
inter se. This is of course the whole question of the right 
of the plaintiff to recover any monies won on a bet or other 
wager. The third facet is the relationsnip between the 
parties to a wager and a third party, in particular an agent 
of both parties or any one of them.
The fourth is concerned with the recovery of securities 
deposited as a result of gaming or other wager. Finally 
there is the question whether loans made for bets or other
re
wagers are recoverable.
65* S*or the detailed position in J&nglish lav/, see Hals bury *s 
laws (Jrd ed.) Vol. 16 pp. 167-245* The position in 
Ghana is now governed by the lotteries and Betting Act, 
I960 (Act 31) which has repealed and re-enacted all 
imperial legislation which hitherto were in force in 
Ghana. The Ghana enactment, is in more comprehensive 
terms than the Betting, Gaming and lotteries Act, 1963 
(England), (the latter does not deal with the effect of 
Gaming and wagering agreements). What the Ghana enact­
ment achieved was a simplification,of tne language 
generally and the inclusion of the terms of the Gaming 
Act , 1692 (in respect of agents in gaming and wagering 
agreements). This latter imperial statute was of course, 
not a statute of general application in Ghana, it was 
necessary to include this bit in view of the effect of 
the House of lords decision in Head v Anderson (1662)
10 m.B.l. 100 which judgment had brought about the 
Gaming Act, 1692.
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iv Agreements That infringe public policy:
Assessing doscoe Pounds contribution to sociological
jurisprudence Julius Stone has haa the following to say:
"me aue appreciation of the relationship oetween law 
ana social facts involves four main inquiries:
(i) ascertainment of what are the ae facto interests 
which in the particular civilization men are pressing;
(ii) aefimtion of the limits within which these will ne 
given legal support;
liii) wnat legal precepts and concepts and machinery xor
their enrorcement are available to secure these interests'
this third inquiry involves a fourth, namely
Civ) wnat are the limitations upon eixective legal action
which may prevent or limit she legal support which can
be given even to interests which it is designed to
secure?
It is in the field of these four inquiries that droiessor 
Pound *s important contribution to sociological juris­
prudence aa distinct from the theory of justice has 
been made*M2
fne rirst and second of these inquiries will be discussed in 
the next following part; ana tne third will oe investigated 
unaer the part on Remedies. It is with the fourth that we
1* we are not here concerned with the origiu, history and
development of the concept of puoiic policy in Jtsngiish law 
for these, see: Knignt, MPublic Policy in n^gj-isn iiaw“ 
(1922) 30 L*Q.R* 207f P*Winfield "Public Policy in the 
English Common Law11 (1928) 42 Hary.l.R* 78 (reprinted in 
Select Legal Essays (1952; p*241; also""Ethics in English 
Case Law" I1931) 45 Hary - L*R* 112 (reprinted in Essays, 
p*266) Gelhorn "Contracts and Public Policy" (1935) 35 
Col. L*R* 679; lord Mansfield C.J. in Holman v Johnson 
(1775)'98 E.R* 1120; Julius Stone", The Province and 
Function of law (1950) pp.494-504; 1.11oyd, Public""Policy 
(Athlone Press, 1953); W.Friedmann, legal Theory (4th ed.) 
pp#444-453# For public policy in Islamic law, see J* 
Schacht, Introduction to Islamic law (Oxford 1964) Chaps* 
20 and 21; I.Milliot, Introduction a i fetude du droit 
musulman, (Paris) S.792. On customary laws see R.S.Rattray 
Ashanti law and Constitution (london,1956) pp.294 et seq; 
M.Green, Ibo Village Affairs (london,1947); C.K.Meek,law 
and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, (Oxford,1937); P* 
Bohannan, Justice and Judgment among the Tiv« (Oxford, 
1957) passim.
2. Stone, op.cit. chap.20.
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are concerned here*
This is the whole question of the extent to which the
parties 1 freedom of contract is limited by considerations of
public policy* The concept of public policy has of course,
got its broad and narrow signification. Broadly it is
another name for the fundamental athical, political and
social principles which guide legal evolution, whether in
legislation or legal administration, at any given time*^ In
this sense public policy is enabling and creative, helping
to shape the ethos of any given society* The utilitarians
for instance, believed in and advocated a legislative and
legal policy based on the "hedomic calculus*” The narrower
view;of public policy, and the one with which we are here
concerned, was recognised by the House of lords in the old
5
case of Bgerton v Brownlow* In this case Lord Alford had 
been given an enormous property under a will* But there 
was a proviso that if he should die without having acquired 
the title of Duke or Marquis of Bridgewater, the gift should 
be void. By a majority of 11-2 the lords were advised that 
the condition was valid. The House, however, accepted the 
minority opinion and held the condition void* Pollock, C.B* 
one of the judges in the House, recognised a distinct prin­
ciple of public policy as
3* F o r other aspects of this fourth inquiry, see the discuss 
ion on incapacity, inform&lity^and illegality*
4 * Priedman, op.cit* p.444*
5. (1853) 4 H.l* Cas.l.
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"a principle of law which holds that no subject can 
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious 
to the public, or against the public good.1’
In tnis latter and more specific sense, public policy is
disablingo It has been said that in English law it fulfils
the limited function of supervising the validity of certain
transactions in the light of principles of interpretation
adapted, from time to time, to the changing needs of the
communityo This summary of the position by Sir Percy Win- 
7
field emphasises the varying nature of public ploicy from 
one age to the other. Thus while people were very touchy 
on religious issues in medieval Europe and any unconventional 
view was treated as heresy, the principle of religious 
tolerance was however, recognized in the light of altered 
public policy in Bowman v Secular Society (in regard to 
secular movements) and in Bourne v Keane"1 (in regard to cath­
olic masses). Again, in the days of James I of England, 
titles and honours could be bought and sold and public policy 
saw nothing reprehensible in this. But the integrity of 
political life was recognised in the light of changed public 
policy in the cases of Egerton v Brownlow,10 and Parkinson 
v College of Ambulance. ^  In each of these cases, the courts 
declared agreements for the sale of honours or titles to be
6. It could be said that illegal contracts come under this 
head as well. In a general way this is true, but^contracts 
void on the ground of infringement ol public policy in 
the specific sense mentioned aDove form a separate cate­
gory of agreements from those that are illegal.
7. ’Lpthics in English case Law” supra.
8. U917J a .C.406.
9o CL919jSa .C. 815.
10. (1@53) 4 H.L.Cas.l.
H o  (l924}All E.fi. 325.
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contrary to public policy. In Beresford v Royal Insurance,*^  
however, Lord Wright brought out the limits set to judicial 
law-making by the recognition of changing moral ideas when 
he said:
"Opinions may differ whether the suicide of a man while 
sane should be deemed to be a crime, but it is so 
regarded by our law W h i l e the law remains un­
changed the court must, we think, apply the general 
principle that it will not allow a criminal or his rep­
resentative to reap by the judgment of the court the
fruits of his crime.”13
Since the enactment of the Suicide Act, 1961, the taking of
one fs own life is no longer an offence in England. It is
likely, therefore, that the decision of Swift, J., who heard
the Beresford case, at first instance, reflects the current
English law position on the subject* He had held that the
reprehensibility of suicide had changed sufficiently to allow
the representatives of a person who had committed suicide to
14recover the sum for which his life was insured*
12. 0-93732 K.B. 197. JJf. Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Association Q-89£L)1 Q.B. 147 > where a third party 
beneficiary was allowed to recover*
13* At p.219.
14* Other instances of variation in public policy have also
been^recognised by the courts* In Rodriguez v Speyer
tl919J A.C.116, the majority of the House of Lords held
that the degree tovhich intercourse with enemies is 
prohibited in War was a matter not of strict law but of 
public policy* The extent to which the sanctity of the 
marriage tie prevented freedom of action where the 
spouses had obtained a choree nisi was decided in Fender 
v Mildmay 0-930 A.C*1; when a bare majority decided 
that a spouse, after'decree nisi, could make a valid 
promise of marriage.’The rules about restraint of trade 
cases, and the concept of natural justice in trade union 
and other group expulsion cases, are other facets of 
the varying nature of public policy from one age to the 
other.
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Agreements and public policy in Ghana and Nigeria:^
(A) The imported law:
At the date of reception of English law in Ghana (and 
a fortiori in Nigeria) the following heads of public policy 
had been recognised, namely
16(a)0 Contracts to oust the jurisdiction of the courts;
(b) Agreements that are prejudicial to the status of
17marriage;
18(c) Agreements in unreasonable restraint of trade;
(d) Agreements contrary to morals or good manners.^
All these agreements were declared void by the courts on the
20grounds of the infringement of public policy# What we 
propose to do here is to examine the suitability of the rules 
governing each of the four heads above, to the local conditions 
existing in Ghana and Nigeria#
15* The controversy between those who argue that no new
head of public policy can now be invented (often called 
the restrictionists) and those who assert that the courts 
are free to explore new ground, need not detain us here#
For this see Julius Stone, op.cit# pp.494-501, and W#
Friedmann, op.cit# pp#44b et seq.
16. Thompson v Charnock (1799) 8 Term Rep. 133.
17# iLowe v “Peers (1~76'8) 4 Burr. 2225#
18. Mitch el v Reynolds (1711) 1 P. Wms. 181#
19* Egerton v Brownlow (1853)4 H.L# cas. 1#
20. Public policy has also been used in Nigeria and Ghana 
to disallow any rules of customary law which the courts 
consider to be contrary to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience# This aspect of the subject has been 
fully explored above. See pp. /7^ ^  $ u i ' supra#
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(a) Contracts to oust the jurisdiction of the courts:
^his has to be distinguished from transactions in which the
parties do not intend to create any binding legal relations*
The general rule is that contracting parties may not exclude
the supervision of the courts over any agreement that they
may make* Any term excluding the court*s jurisdiction is
21void and cannot be enforced* A provision for arbitration 
in an agreement does not come within the prohibition of this
rule, provided an appeal lies to the courts at the instance
22of any of the parties to the agreement* The court will
enforce the award of the arbitration if properly made, any 
provisions as to the finality of the said arbitration not­
withstanding* The enforcement of such an award was in issue 
in the Ghana case of Angoe v Nketsia* The facts were that 
the parties by consent agreed to refer an issue in dispute 
to arbitration and further undertook to treat any order 
of the arbitrators as final and that neither party had power 
under the agreement to appeal to any court* The plaintiff 
brought this action to enforce the award but it was argued for 
the defendant that the agreement was void since it tended to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the courts* This argument was 
rejected by the trial judge who held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to succeed in his claim* An appeal to the Pull
21*  G cvcL\a*j>a n\ v '
22* Scott v Avery (1856) 5 H*L* cas* bll*
23* (1920-21)"P.ct• 75*
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Court was dismissed. Smyly, C.J. one of the judges of
the Pull Court who heard the appeal, had this to say about
this type of provisions
uIn my opinion the agreement to submit to arbitration 
did not become illegal by reason of the clause in dis­
pute, although by reason of that clause the agreement 
could not be made a rule of court. But I see nothing 
in the agreement to preclude the courts from granting 
specific performance of the award once it was made, and 
am of the opinion that any appeal from such judgment 
would only have reference to the judgment, and that 
there would be no appeal on it as to the terms of the 
award•"24
In other words, if instead of tne appellant raising the issue 
as an objection i.e. the finality of the award, if he had 
appealed against the awgrd on its merits, the court would not 
have accepted a defence based on the provision to exclude the 
agreement from their jurisdiction* It is submitted that 
there is nothing peculiarly English in this aspect of the 
common law. The parties are free to enter into a transaction 
which will not affect their legal relationships. This will 
be called a gentleman's agreement and the courts will not 
interfere* But where they have elected to alter their 
legal relationship, they cannot at the same time validly ex­
clude the supervisory role of the courts*
(b) Agreements that are prejudicial to the status of 
marriage:
Although marriage in the imported law sense is the union 
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all
24* Op. cit. at p.76*
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others, the state preserves its sacrosanctity by regulating 
its formation and dissolution. Any agreement between two 
or more parties to impugn this aanctity will be void as 
contrary to public policy. Thus where A pays B to introduce 
her to prospective husbands such an agreement is void and 
any amount paid is recoveraule. Also wnere X promises 
to marry Y on the death of the latter*s husband, the courts 
cannot sustain an action for breach of promise of marriage 
founded on such circumstance.
This aspect of the subject is of special importance in 
G-hana and Nigeria where three categories of marriage are 
recognised, namely, the monogamous imported law variety and 
the potentially polygamous customary and Islamic laws var­
ieties. If for instance a man who is married under custom­
ary law rules promises to marry another woman under the 
marriage Ordinance, is such a promise void as being contrary 
to public policy? Will it make any difference in the 
validity of the promise if it was made to the same woman who 
was already married under customary law? To attempt the 
answer to the former question first, such a,promise if ful­
filled will constitute an offence under Section 47 of the
27Nigerian Marriage Ordinance, which provides as follows:
25* Hermann v Charlesworth 0-905.3 2 K.B. 123.
26. Wilson v Carnley I1908)l K.B. 729.'’
27. Uap.ll5> laws of Nigeria (1958 Revision).
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’Whoever contracts a marriage under the provisions 
of this Ordinance, or any modification or re-enactment 
thereof, being at the time married in accordance with 
native law or custom to any person other than the per­
son with whom such marriage is contracted, shall be 
liable to imprisonment for five years.”
It is doubtful therefore, that the courts will award any dam­
ages for the breach of a promise which, if it was fulfilled 
would constitute an offence. It is equally doubtful if 
the knowledge of the promisee as to the married status of 
the promisor will affect the principle. The English author­
ities on the effect of such knowledge do not appear to be of 
any guide since customary marriage is not covered by any of 
the Matrimonial Causes Acts (England). Again, ignorance of 
the law will not be acceptable as a plea by a plaintiff who
pg
is seeking to recover damages for the breach of promise.
The answer to the second question may well be different, since
the promise if fulfilled, will not come within the prohibition
of section 47 of the Ordinance. The plaintiff will not be
"any person other than the person with whom such (customary)
marriage is contracted*'. It is unlikely, however, that the
29promisee will get more than nominal damages.
28. The reverse position i.e. where a person married under
the Ordinance promises to marry another under the cust­
omary law, will be covered by section 48 of the Ordinance. 
But customary breach of promise actions are uncommon.
29. See Ugpoma v Morah (1940; 15 N.L.R. 7 8 . See also the
Ghana case of Ayeh v Kumordzie" (1965) C. cases, 45*
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Again, in Ghana and Nigeria, as in the other African countries^
the practice of giving marriage consideration is still very
much part of the customary law variety of marriage* There
had developed a prevalent practice of carrying out these
formalities even in marriages conducted under the provisions
of the Marriage Ordinance*^ This may take The form, inter
alia, of giving customary drinks to the prospective bride *s
uncles or cousins who might help to persuade an otherwise
reluctant spouse or parent. It will be a startling prop-
psition to suggest that such gifts are void as being contrary
^1to public policy unuer the rule in Hermann v Qharlesworth*J
The fact that the Ghana Court admitted evidence of such gifts
in proving the existence of an Ordinance marriage in the case
12
of Savage v Macfoy, would tend to support the theory that 
such transactions will not be held by the courts to be an 
infringement of any head of public policy*
(c) Agreements in restraint of trade
The modern English law position in agreements in restraint 
of trade has been summarised by the learned authors of The 
Law of Contract^ as follows:
30* See Savage v Macfoy (1909) Ren.504* See also the Eastern 
Nigeria Limitation of Lowry Law,-No. 23 of 1956, which 
tacitly recognised the concept of incidental expenses.
31. &9053 2 K.B* 123.
32. Supra. (N.10)
33* There are of course three facets of this category of con­
tracts, namely those between employees and employers; 
those between vendors and purchasers of businesses; and 
tnose between manufacturers or merchants. It has not been 
considered necessary to discuss these in any detail be­
cause of neavy reliance on English judicial authority.
34. Cheshire and Eifoot (6th ed.) p*326.
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"First, the fundamental principle is xhat every restraint, 
partial as well as general, is contrary to public 
policy and is prima facie void* secondly, this pre­
sumption of invalidity is rebutted by proof that the 
restraint is reasonable* xhirdly, the restraint must 
be reasonable in the interests of both contracting 
parties and also in the interests of the public* The 
onus of proving reasonableness between the parties lies 
upon the covenantee, but the onus of proving that the 
contract tends to injure the public rests with the cov­
enantor. Fourthly, a restraint, to be reasonable bet­
ween tne parties, must be no wider than is reasonably 
necessary to protect the covenantee's interest. Tbe 
existence of some proprietory interest calling for pro­
tection must first be proved, and it must then be shown 
to the satisfaction of the court that the restraint, as 
regards its area and time of operation and the trades 
against which it is directed, is not excessive*
Finally, whether a restraint is reasonable is a question 
for the court, not for the jury.” *
In Ghana and Nigeria, however, only cases of restraint in­
volving employers and employees have exercised the minds of 
the courts and in this, there has been a total reliance on 
the current English law position. Thus in Q.F*A.O* v Leuba* ^  
Pennington Ag. C.J. in the Nigerian Full Court held void a 
covenant in which an assistant employed oy the plaintiff in 
Lagos had bound aimself "not to take part under tany title 
(patron, partner, party interested or clerk) in any commercial 
or industrial enterprise in west Africa during a period of 
twelve months from the moment, when, for any reason whatsoever, 
he ceases to be a member of the staff of the company."
The ’Vest African Court of Appeal came to a similar con­
clusion on similar facts in the later case of u.T.C. v Hawri.^
35. Ilyl8)3, N.L.k . 60.
36. (140)6 w.A.C.A. 148. See also John Holt & Co.Ltd. v
Chalmers (lyld) 3 N.L.ji. 69#
One takes leave to doubt the wisdom of the heavy reliance 
on English judicial autnority* surely, restraints wmch 
nave ueen neld reasonable m  England, are not necessarily 
sro in Ghana and Nigeria# The social and economic conditions 
are different. Thus while a restraint excluding the appell­
ant from competing in the trade purchased by the respondents 
in the whole of Europe, was found reasonable in Nordenfelt
V7
V Maxim Nordenfelt, 1 such a holding in Ghana and Nigeria
will be wholly unnecessary in view of the communications
difficulties in the latter territories.
On combination for the regulation of trade relations,
Part II of the Western Nigeria Co-operative Societies L a w ^
provides as follows:
M14(i) A registered society which has as one of its 
objects the disposal of any article produced or obtained 
by the work or industry of its members whether the 
produce of agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, 
fisheries, hand crafts or otherwise may provide in its 
bye-laws or may otherwise contract with its members
(a) that every such member who produces any such article 
shall dispose of the whole or any specified.amount, 
proportion or description thereof to or through the 
society; and
(b) that any member who is proved or adjudged in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the regulations to have 
committed a breach of the bye-laws or contract shall 
pay to the Society as liquidated damages a sum ascert­
ained or assessed in such manner as may be prescribed 
by the aforesaid regulations.
(2) No contract entered into under the provision of this 
section shall be contested in any court on the ground
37. £i89i3A.C. 535.
3 8. Cap.26 of' 1959, laws of Western Nigeria. See also 3.16 
of the Eastern Nigeria Co-operative Societies law, cap. 
2 8, Laws of Eastern Nigeria (163 consolidation); and s.14 
of the Northern Nigeria Co-operative Societies law,
cap.26, Laws of Northern Nigeria (1963).
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only that it constitutes a contract in restraint 
of trade• *’
This provision reverses the common law position with regard 
to agreements between members of the society* At common 
law any such restriction is void and cannot be enforced 
unless it is reasonable between the parties and consistent 
with the interests of the public* Under the Co-operative 
Societies laws, however, reasonableness and consistency 
with public interest are presumed. The object of the enact­
ment is, of course, to improve credit and marketing facilities 
for the members* Any restraint on their freedom of action
is the sacrifice they make in the attainment of better econ-
., 40omic security*
(e) Agreements that are contrary to morals tr good manners: 
Most of the agreements under this sub-head also come 
under contracts that are prejudicial to the status of marriage. 
There is, however, a residual group which belong to no other 
head of public policy and are therefore lumped together under 
agreements that are contrary to morals or good manners. 
Agreements that derogate from the dignity of national honoursf^ 
come under this category.
39* McEllistrim v Ballymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural 
and Dairy society1X919'! A.CT 548*
40. See the dictum of Scrutton"L.J* in the English case of 
English Hop Growers v Bering (JL928J.2 K.B. 174 at p.181: 
♦♦There was nothing unreasonable in hop'*growers combining 
to secure a steady and profitable price, by eliminating 
competition amongst themselves, and putting the marketing 
in the hands of one agent, with full power to fix prices 
and hold up supplies, the benefit and loss being divided 
amongst the members1’.
4-1 • Parkinson v College of Ambulance |l924] All E.R . 32 5
B. Customary and Islamic Laws: 566
(i) Customary law:
Customary law also recognises and imposes limits to the 
freedom of the parties to make any agreement they please*
These limits do not and need not coincide with the existing 
heads of public policy under the imported law, but like the 
latter, they vary in form and content from one society to the 
other. The example of sales of family property without the 
necessary consents has already been discussed# It is enough 
to mention here that such sales are merely void and not 
illegal, and that they are void on the generally recognised 
principle that only an authorised body can make a valid alien­
ation of family property.
Other limits on contractual freedom have been imposed 
by the Akans (Ghana). Concubinage agreements are frowned 
on by the society and the parties are not allowed to recover 
trhat has passed between them as a result of the relationship* 
Sarbah has set out the limits of the application of this
42custom in the chapter on Marriage in his ffanti Customary Laws! 
Thus, the validity of any collateral transaction during the 
currency of the relationship is not affected by the principle.
j
This was the decision in the case of Hughes v Lavies, ^
42. At p.42, ”A woman living in concubinage cannot sue the
man with whom she is so living for any maintenance, nor 
can her family or parents sue the man for any satisfact­
ion or maintenance. Whatever is given or entrusted by a
man or woman, to the person with whom he or she is living
in concubinage cannot be reclaimed on any consideration 
whatsoever. This custom is called ,Sarwie1 1 
43* (1909) Ren. 550.
where the Pull Court allowed the plaintiff to recover a 
loan made to the defendant for trading purposes. Trans­
actions between the parties after the termination of the 
relationship are also not affected by the Sarwie custom.
This exception to the rule, was in issue in the Pull Court
44decision of Ansa v Sackey. In this case one Prince Albert 
Ansa had, 19 years earlier, had a child with his mistress 
Emma Akua Sackey. The plaintiff had left the then Gold Coast 
to England, while the defendant was in a petty trading business 
The plaintiff sent certain empty bags to the defendant on 
the expressed intention that the latter daould dispose of the 
bags and forward the proceeds to the plaintiff. The bags 
were sold but the defendant kept the proceeds and when sued 
by the plaintiff's attorney, pleaded the Sarwie custom. The 
trial judge rejected the defendant's plea and held in favour 
of the plaintiff. This was upheld by the Pull Court on 
appeal
(ii) Islamic law:
It has aptly been pointed out by a learned author that
44* (1923-25) P. ct. 113.
45* Other agreements that will be held void on grounds of the
infringement of public policy include marriage within
the prohibited degrees of relationship; among the Ibos
and the Yorubas (Nigeria) any agreement for service to be
performed on any of the days on which local bye-law
prohibits people going to farm; and any agreement for the
cutting of palm fruits on a communal land when the cutting
season has not been officially opened. On these, see U.S.
Rattray, Ashanti law and constitution, (London, 1947) pp.
292 et seq.; ■ C.K.Meek, Law and Authority in a N&gerian
Tribe (London, O.U.P.l937)pp.l7 et seq; and pp7207 et seq..
M.Green Ibo Village Affairs (London,1947) pp.32-48, 149 et
sea. On the Tiv. see P.Bohannan, Justice and Judgment 
j aaidng the Tiv, (London O.U. P. 19p?)‘ pp".70” et seq.' ----
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Islamic law does not recognise the liberty of contract, 
but it provides an appreciable measure of freedom within 
certain fixed types* Freedom of contract would, of course, 
be incompatible with the ethical control of legal transactions^ 
As a result, those transactions which are forbidden by the 
principle of the Sharfa cannot be enforced as valid agree­
ments. They are void, or as they are more often described
47in Islamic law, fasid. Y/e shall be looking at some of
these transactions.
Firstly, any agreement which contravenes the rules
prohibiting riba is fasid. Riba has been defined as ”a
monetary advantage without a countervalue which has been
stipulated in favour of one of the two contracting parties in
48an exchange of two monetary values.” This rule is, of
course, part of the general policy of the sharia which frowns 
at any cases of unjust enrichment. Under this rule the 
Sharia prohibits the reletting of a hired object for a 
greater sum, the re-selling at a higher price of a bought 
object before payment has been made for it; and the taking 
of interest generally. The rules prohibiting riba are only 
applicable, however, to objects which can be valued and weighed 
and in addition, belong to the same species. Where these
46. J.Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford,1964) 
p.144*
47* We are only concerned with the concept of fasid in ob­
ligations created by agreement.
48. J.Schacht, op.cit. p.145*
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conditions are satisfied, any excess in quality or delay 
in performance are forbidden! Any agreement concluded 
in contravention of these rules i£ fasid. Where, however, 
the objects are different e.g. dates and rice, or the object 
cannot be measured or weighed e.g. cloth made of one material 
with another made from another material, the rules against 
riba do not apply but under no circumstances will delay in 
performance be permitted.
Another category of agreement that is forbidden by the 
sharia is the undertaking of risk (gharar). This prohibit­
ion has been traced back to the Koranic attitude towards a 
certain game of hazard called maysir• Thus the sharia 
insists that there must be no doubt concerning the obligations 
undertaken by the parties to an agreement. An example of 
this type of agreement is the selling of unripened dates to 
be delivered when ripened. Such a transaction is fasid. 
Following from the prohibition against the undertaking of 
risk, gambling and other aleatory transactions are fasid 
under the sharia* Two exceptions have, however, been recog­
nised, namely agreements making provisions for prizes for 
the winner or winners of horseraces. This is because of 
the importance horsemanship played during the holy war.
Another predictable exception is an agreement for prizes for 
the winner or winners of competitions concerning knowledge 
of Islamic law.
A third instance of the limits placed on the contractual
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freedom of a moslem by the sharia is the prohibition against
a stipulation in a contract of sale (bay1) which provision is
collateral to the main purpose of an agreement# Such a
stipulation is f&sid, and any sale that takes place conveys
an invalid title and can be set aside. The right of resV’'
fission is however, lost when the article has been resold
49by the purchaser#
Other prohibitions connected with sale include the rule 
against the sale of a carcase. Any such sale is void since 
a carcase is not a proper subject matter of ownership in 
Islamic jurisprudence# Another one is the conclusion of 
an agreement at the time of the call to the Friday prayer#
Such an agreement has been said to be reprehensible but
61 62 not void, by Schacht, but Ruxton^ is of the view that
such a contract is fasid. Here, one is of course, g.p against
the profound problem of translating arable terms into their
precise English law equivalents# In view, however, of the
49* If, for instance, one buys leather on condition that 
the seller should make it into thores, the contract 
would be fasid under the above rule, but this prohibit­
ion has not been strictly observed. It has in f$ct been 
suggested that the contract is valid e.g. by istihsan.
50. Abdur Rahim, Muhammedan Jurisprudence p#200#
51. Op.cit. p.152#
52# F.H.Buxton, Maliki Law (London,1916)* The learned author 
may of course be stating the position in the Maliki 
School# Schacht was describing the general position.
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importance of the Friday prayer in the life of a moslem, 
Ruxton’s view appears to be the more logical one* Such 
a conclusion also compares favourably with the effect of
certain agreements that are concluded on a Sunday in contra-
Sunday 57
vention of the/Observance Act. J
The problems posed;
Two problems would seem to be posed by the above limits 
on the contractual freedom of a moslem* The first is how 
a rigid application of the prohibitions would be reconciled 
to any theory of economic development generally and the ad­
vancement of commerce in particular* How could the rules 
prohibiting riba be reconciled to hire-purchase and money- 
lending transactions or to the idea of economic co-operatives? 
How could the law of insurance be developed if the Sharia is 
so rigid in its prohibition against the assumption of risk? 
Could these two facets of the Sharia be harmonised with the 
general welfare of the state, the guide-light in most instances 
of public policy? The answers to these lie partially in 
the"degree to which the ideal theory of the Sharia succeeded 
in imposing itself on the practice of commercial life* There 
is little doubt that the grip of theory over practice was very 
firm in the field of family law and the law of wakf (i*e* pious 
foundations), and weakest or even non-existent on penal law,
53* See the Ghana case of Testa & Co. v Duncan (1926-29)
Div. ct* 191* where the Act was said to be in force in 
Ghana* It is doubtful, however, that this decision will 
be widely followed today*
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taxation, constitutional law and the law of war#
The law of contractual obligations appears to occupy
an intermediate position between the two extremes# Here,
although the Sharia had to resign an ever increasing sphere
of its influence and rules to practice and custom, its main
principles and institutions were respected# This was achie-
54ved with the aid of legal fictions or hiyal, as it is called 
in Islamic law parlance. An example or this is the circum­
vention of the prohibition against the taking of interest
in moneylending or hire-purchase transactions. A prospective
55debtor could purport to sell some valuable security to a 
prospective lender at a price of say £40 and would immediately 
re-purchase the security for £60# While the original £40 
was paid in cash, the latter £60 was not# It was a loan on 
the security of an object but with £20 interest# Since the 
Kadis in Islamic law were encouraged to look at the form and 
not the substance of any transaction for purposes of the 
prohibition of the Sharia, there was nothing reprehensible in 
this sort of arrangement, and it has been widely used in
C /T
other types of transactions#^ Also, the prohibition against
54# This has been defined as the use of legal means for 
extra-legal ends, ends that could not, whether they 
themselves were legal or illegal, be achieved directly 
with the means provided by the Sharia#
55* Before the abolition' of slave trade and slavery, this 
type of security used to be a slave#
56# e.g. to overcome the rule about the irrevocability of 
a sale of land, borrowers have devised a means whereby 
money is obtained from a lender on the security of land; 
the lender making use of the land in the meantime and 
reconveying to the borrower when the loan is repaid#
This device also circumvents the prohibition against the
taking of interest# The use of the land by the lender 
constituted .he interest paid on *cne loan#
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the undertaking of risk, was reconciled to the needs of 
commerce by a resort to a type of credit co-operative 
(Sharikat alwujuh) and the sleeping partnership (Mudaraba)#
In .the former the partners pool their credit for buying goods, 
resell them and share the profit, while in the latter the 
active partner occupies a fiduciary relationship in respect 
of the interest of the sleeping partner and any profits 
are shared by the parties.
In this way, the strict requirements of the sharia are 
tempered oy the needs of commerce. The resulting conflict 
is not as serious as the theory would tend to indicate.
The second problem is the one posed by the involvement 
of a non-moslem in a particular transaction. This raises 
the issue of internal conflict of laws which will be more 
fully discussed in the next following part. It is enough 
to point out at this stage that this aspect of the issue has 
not agitated the courts in either Ghana or Nigeria in the 
field of obligations. This is understandable in view of 
the fact that the bulk of commercial activity is in the hands 
of non-religious bodies. These bodies employ labour, award 
contracts, appoint local buying agents, and do other types of 
business. It will be unlikely that they would voluntarily 
opt for the application of the principles of the Sharia to 
govern their transactions with a moslem. Short of legis­
lative imposition (a rather remote contingency), the problem
of internal conflicts in transactions between moslems and
non-moslems in Ghana and Nigeria is unlikely to assume
any importance in the law of obligations in the two 
57countries.
57* 3*5 of the Civil Justice Ordinance of the Sudan excludes
the application of Islamic law in commercial transactions• 
There is no such provision in the Northern Nigeria High 
Court law but most of the reported decisions in the 
Superior Courts of the Kegion in this branch of the law, 
have been based on imported law rules, cf. Alhaji Amadu 
‘'John HoltM v Idah (1956) N.K.iM.L.it. Ol (on defect dis­
covered after sale); and Dan Juma v Standard Co. of 
Nigeria> Ltd. (1922; 4 iNT.L.K. 52, on acceptance of 
groundnuts.
ro
3• .oefects due to Impossibility of Performances
we have so far seen examining defective agreements in
the light of
(a) defects in reacning an agreement; and
(b) defects in the validity of an agreement* In this
section we shall be investigating agreements which have be­
come defective because of an impossibility of performance*
In this respect it is important to state and discuss the 
distinction between initial impossibility and supervening 
impossibility* While the former properly belongs to the 
creation of agreements tthus preventing such creation e.g* 
defective consent), the latter concerns the question of 
frustration. The former was fully discussed under (a) above, 
and it is with the latter that we are here concerned*
The doctrine of frustration:
It can be said tnat the judicial supervision of the^ 
creation and performance of agreements reached its apogee 
in the invention of the doctrine of frustration. It is 
unquestionably illogical that the courts whose primary duty 
is anu should be the enforcement of contracts that are valid 
for all purposes, should refuse this enforcement on the 
ground that the parties nave undertaKen whao in the court's 
opinion, is an impossibility* This doctrinal ambivalence
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led to a very restricted definition of the concept of 
frustration and has become an inherent source of weakness 
in its growth and development* Yet it is in the overall 
interest of the society that when the basis on which the 
parties contracted has altered, or the performance of an 
agreement, has become illegal after the making of such an 
agreement, or performance will make the contract radically 
different from the one in the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of the making, the law should intervene to 
put them on terms# This is what rhe doctrine of frustration 
is about, and although judicial and legislative caution 
have so far prevailed, there is little doubt that the doctrine 
is being used as a check on the freedom of the parties to 
insist on the performance of certain agreements or certain 
terms thereof.
The origin and development of the doctrine in the common
law need not detain us here. It must however, be mentioned
2
that the old case of Taylor v Caldwell has often been cited
1# For instance, if the parties knowingly contract to do 
what is physically impossible, the court m i l  not apply 
the doctrine to discharge them from their obligations# 
There is also the serious doubt as to the application of 
the doctrine to leases in English law. See the Ghana 
case of Tening Amoako v Bartholomew & Co. (1955) I W.A.l. 
R • 4 •
2# (1863) 3 B & S. 826. It was in this case that the old
rule as to absolute contracts as enunciated in the case 
of Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn, 26, w§s limited by 
the acceptance of the doctrine of frustration, cf# London 
and Northern Estates Co. v Schiesinger 0.916} 1 K.B. 20, 
where it was held that-the rule did not apply to leases.
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as the beginning of its recognition by the courts. In 
that case the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the 
defendants for the hire of a certain music hall for the 
purpose of giving a series of concerts. Before the series 
was due to begin, the hall was destroyed by accidental fire. 
In an action for damages for breach of contract, it was held 
that the destruction of the hall excused both parties from 
the performance of their promises# In English law there 
is considerable doubt as to whether or not the doctrine of 
frustration applies to leases.^
Extent to which doctrine applies?
4There is no doubt that Taylor v Caldwell, on which case 
the common law doctfine is based, is part of the imported 
laws of Ghana and Nigeria, being decided in 1863# What is 
not so obvious is whether the Schlesimger and Cricklewood 
Properties line of cases, which excluded executed leases from 
the operation of the doctrine, will be followed by the courts 
of Ghana and Nigeria. Both cases are post-1 9 0 0 decisions of 
English Courts, and it has already been convincingly argued 
in another place that such decisions are not binding on Ghana 
and Nigerian courts. It is suggested that the doctrine of 
frustration should apply to leases whether executory or
3. See Cricklewood Property aind Investment Trust Ltd. v 
Leighton's Investment Trust Ltd."CL945) A.C. 221#
4. TTB6TT3 B & S7~825.
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executed, as much as it applies to any other category 
of contracts. The reasons given by Lush, J. in the Schles- 
inger case for excluding leases, and his basis of distin­
guishing leases from other categories of contracts are, it is 
submitted:;with respect, tenuous and unpersuasive.
His Lordship had had this to says
wIt is not correct to speak of this tenancy agreement 
as a contract and nothing more. A term of years was 
created by it and vested in the appellant, and I can 
see no reason for saying that, because this order dis­
qualified him from personally residing in the flat, 
it affected the chattel interest which was vested in 
him by virtue of the agreement.115
In view of the fact that what the doctrine of frustration 
sets out to achieve is the disengagement of the parties when 
the basis on which they contracted has radically changed, it 
is not easy to evaluate the importance of the distinction 
which his Lordship tried to draw between leases and other 
types of contract. This distinction becomes more farcical 
when executory leases are held to come within the operation 
of the doctrine. The conflicting opinions of their Lord­
ships of the Houae of Lords in the Cricklewood decision as 
to whether or not the doctrine applies to executed leases,
5. At p.24. The facts of the case were that the defendant, 
an Austrian, was a lessee of a flat at V/estcliff-on-Sea.
On the outbreak of war the defendant became an alien 
enemy and as such was prohibited from living in certain 
places, including the place where the flat was situate. 
Refusing to pay his rent, the plaintiffs brought this 
action to recover it. The plea of frustration was rejected 
by the court and judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.
6. Cricklewood Property & Investment Trust Ltd. v Leighton's 
investment Trust itd. 5J945J A.C.221.
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emphasised the sterile nature of the argument for their 
7
exclusion. It is difficult to distinguish between a 
contract for the delivery of machinery which was held to 
have become frustrated as a result of the outbreak of war, 
and a lease of a flat in which the lessee can no longer 
redide, also because of the outbreak of war. It is not 
enough to argue that such an alien enemy could sub-let to a 
national who could then pay the reserved rent to the superior 
landlord, since even the sub-lease will be held illegal as
g
an agreement with an alien enemy. It is therefore submitted 
that the exclusion o£ executed leases from the operation of 
the doctrine of frustration in English law, is unnecessary, 
and should not be followed in either Ghana or Nigeria.
legal consequences of holding an agreement frustrated:
What are the rights and duties of the parties to an 
agreement when the doctrine of frustration has operated to 
bring their contract or any terms thereof, to an end? This 
is the question that we have to investigate in this sub-section* 
Lord Wright attempted to summarise the position at common law
Q
in the Eibrosa case, when he said that "The contract is 
automatically terminated as to the future, because at that 
date its further perfomance becomes impossible in fact, in
7. Compare the opinions of Lords Simon and Wright who held 
that the doctrine equally applies to leases, and those of 
Lords Bussel of Eillowen and Goddard L.C.T.; who argued 
in favour of the exclusion, in the Cricklewood decision.
8. See Furtado v Rogers (1802)3 Bos. & n.191.
9. L1943}A.C. 32, at p.70.
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circumstances which involve no liability for damages for
the failure on either side*” The vital question is whether,
after the occurrence of the frustrating event, any rights
which had accrued earlier could be enforced and any sums
paid in pursuance of the agreement before the frustration,
are refundable* In this respect two streams of authority
developed at common law* The first was the one relating to
entire contracts which had its origin in the case of Cutter v
Powell.^ In that case it was held that "if a sailor hired
for a voyage, takes a promissory note from his employer for
a certain sum, provided he proceed, continue, and do his duty
on board for the voyage, but before the arrival of the ship
he dies, no wages can be claimed either on the contract or
on a quantum meruit* This principle operated to bar a
plaintiff's claim for the value of work done on a premises which
agreement provided for payment at the completion of the work
11but the premises was burnt down before the said completion*
In such cases the plaintiff recovers nothing since no#right
accrued before the completion of the assignment. There are,
12however, some exceptions to the rule in Cutter v Powell*
10. (1795)6 T.R. 320.
11. Apple by v "Myers (1867)L.E. 2 c.p.651* See also Whincup 
v Hughes (lo71)L*R* 6 c.p* 78*
12* The rule does not apply (i) where the parties agreed to 
rescind and substitute a new contract; (2) where the 
completion of the assignment was prevented by the other 
party to the agreement; (3) where the contract has been 
substantially performed; and (4) where the impossibility 
arose from factors unconnected with the contract. See 
Dakin v Lee {1916^1 K.B. 566. C.A.
'i'he other stream of authority was that based on the curious
13case of Chandler v v/ebster to the effect that after the 
frustrating event, the loss lies where it falls. Thus 
in such a case, accrued rights are enforceable and any money 
paid in pursuance of the agreement is not recoverable. This 
rule was the target of severe judicial criticism in the 
House of Lords in the Fibrosa case. Lord Shaw described 
it as a maxim that worked well enough among tricksters, gam­
blers and thieves. In the earlier case of Russkoe Qbschest- 
yotvo d*Iia lzgstovlenia v John Stirk & Sons Ltd; ^  Atkin 
L.J. had doubted whether any two business people in the 
world would ever make a contract which embodied such a doc­
trine as Chandler v Webster laid down. It is not surprising 
therefore, that the rule was rejected by the House of Lords 
in the Fibrosa case. The current English law position in 
this second facet oi frustrated contracts, is that contained 
in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, which 
recognises the problem posed by Chandler v Webster and em­
powered the courts to order the refund of any sums that had 
passed having regard to the rights of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case.
13. CL90431 K.B. 493 (C.A.)
14. Cl942jl K.B. 12 at p.28. See also Cmnd. 6009 of 19391 
where the‘law Revision Commission (England) criticized 
the rule. .
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The position in Ghana and Nigeria:
The position in Ghana and the various jurisdictions in
Nigeria is a bit confused* Part I of the Ghana Contracts
Act, I960 J has adopted the English law position on the
rights and duties of the parties after a contract has been
held frustrated. In Nigeria, the English legislation on
the subject has been copied in the Law Reform (Contracts)
1 6
Act, 1961 (Federation), and the Western Nigeria Contracts 
17Law which is also in force in the Mid-Western Region. It 
is not clear if the courts of Eastern and Northern Nigeria 
will still prefer to follow Chandler v Webster or the later 
House of Lords decision in the Fibrosa case. A case for 
prompt legislative action in this aspect of the law in the 
two latter regions can hardly be overemphasized.
Critique of the position:
Having said this, one has to advert to the confusion in 
this branch of the law in Ghana and Nigeria, and.the limited 
scope of the enactments on the subject to date. Surely, 
the legislature ought to do something to clear the doubts 
there are as to the application of the doctrine* In English 
law it is still not clear if it applies to leases. The Act 
of 1943 did not tackle the problem of the limits of the
15* Act 25*
16. No. 64 of 1961.
17* Cap*25, Laws of Western Niger (1959 Revision)*
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doctrine in any serious way. By copying the English en­
actment without comment, the legislatures in Ghana and 
Nigeria perpetuated the uncertainty and did nothing to 
remove the existing confusion.
Secondly, neither the Nigerian nor the Ghana enactments 
made any attempt to get round the anomalous situation 
created by the rule in Cutter v Powell. Consequently, it is 
still possible to argue that the Acts do not apply to entire 
contracts. In fact section 9 of the Western Nigeria enact­
ment which is in similar terms to the Ghana and Nigerian 
(Lagos) provisions, lend greater weight to the argument that 
Cutter v Powell is still very much in force* This section 
provides as follows:
1 Where any contract to which this part applies contains 
any provision which, upon the true construction of the 
contract, is intended to have effect in the event of 
circumstances arising which operate, or would but for 
the said provision operate, to frustrate the contract, 
or is intended to have effect whether such circumstances 
arise or not, the court shall give effect to the said 
provision and shall only give effect to the provisions 
of this part to such extent (if any) as appears to the
court to be consistent with the said provision."18
In other words, if as happened in tne Powell case, A agrees 
to pay B a specified sum on the completion of a voyage,
the fact that B dies just before the said completion of the
voyage will not be considered as frustrating the further per­
formance of the agreement for purposes of the Act. It is
18. See also s.3(2) of the Law Reform (Contracts) Act 1961, 
(Nigeria, federation) and s.3 of xhe Ghana Contracts 
Act, I960, (Act.25)#'
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submitted that the better position would be to allow recovery 
on a quantum meruit, having regard to all the circumstances<> 
In this connection section 40 of the Apportionment Act,
1870, (England) appears to be more happily worded for pur­
poses of doing justice between the parties to a partnership®
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P A R T  V I I
OBLIGATIONS CREATED BY AGREEMENT; 
A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
OBLIGATIONS CHEATED BY AGREEMENT; A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS1
In this part we propose firstly to examine the role of 
the courts in Ghana and Nigeria in the construction of 
obligations created by agreement, and secondly the place 
of agreements as an integral part of the legal systems of 
the two countries. The importance of a functional re­
appraisal of agreements can hardly be over-emphasised.
Several factors account for this importance of which the 
following are but a few:
Firstly, an agreement, it has been said, is a set of 
promises which the law will enforce . The primary role of 
the courts, therefore, has been to delimit the scope and 
interpret the sense of the promises exchanged by the parties. 
If, in the opinion of the court, no agreement has been 
created, then that is the end of the matter, at any rate as 
far as enforcing the obligations created by the alleged 
agreement goes. The way the courts have construed the terms
1. See w. Friedman, Law in a changing Society (London, 1959), 
Chapter 4; B.U. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process, (Hew Haven, Yale Univ . Pr e s s , 19^5) ; F.p'." Wait on, 
The Egyptian law of Obligations (London, 1920), Vol.11,
pp.261-285; M.S. Amos ‘'Common law and Civil law in the 
British Commonwealth" (1937) 50 Harv.L.R. 1249; O.K.
Allen, "The Judge as. a man of the world" (1930) 46 L.Q.E. 
151; L. Duguit, "Collective acts as distinguished from 
Contracts" (1930) 27, Yale L.J. 753; SS 2-302, United 
States Uniform Commercial Code; Hale "Bargaining, Duress 
and Economic Liberty1 [ ) 43 Col.L.B. 603*
2. Courts here are used to mean both the Superior and 
Customary Courts so far as the decisions of the latter are 
ascertainable•
3. Anson's Law of Contract (22nd ed; 1964) Intr. Chap.
587
of an agreement, therefore, assumes a new importance in 
an analysis of the law of obligations.
Secondly Professor Kahn Freund has recently described 
"the implied intention of the parties" to an agreement as 
a "protective cover behind which the judges legislate in 
many countries"^. How far is this statement representative 
of the positions in Ghana and Nigeria?
Thirdly, there is the vital phenomenon of the 
changing nature of the concept of agreement brought about 
by modern economic trends. Multiple firms and large 
monopolistic combines are fast replacing the small trader 
and the family company. Equality of bargaining power 
which was an essential attribute of agreements has yielded 
place to standard-form contracts in which strange things 
are done in the name of equality. The menace of exception 
clauses has posed many unanswered questions about the 
suitability of the existing rales of contract in the solution 
of modern economic and social problems. ' Yfhat are the 
Ghana and Nigerian courts doing and what is yet to be done 
in this sphere of the law?
Finally, one of the primary functions of the state is 
to balance the realisation of reasonable individual expec­
tations with the overall interest of the Society. To what 
extent have the legislatures in Ghana and Nigeria adverted 
to this postualte and what measure of success has there 
been so far? The answer to these and to many ancillary
4. An Inaugural lecture delivered to the University of Oxford 
on 12th May, 1965 - "Comparative law as an academic 
subject"*
attempted in this chapter.
SECTION 1
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(I) Agreements and the courts:
MThe function of the court is not to carry 
out a psychological investigation, hut to 
interpret the sense of the reciprocal 
declarations in a manner which was commonly
accepted by the parties, or, in the absence
of a commonly accepted particular sense, in 
such a way as a reasonable man would under­
stand them in the circumstances.u 1.
The above statement by Bean Roscoe Pound summarises the basic 
attitude of Anglo-American jurisprudence with regard to 
the construction of agreements by the courts. Their 
concern is not what the parties willed, but a reasonable 
construction of the external manifestations of their dealing. 
This is what has often been called the objective theory of
contracts. The exceptions to its general application in
English lav/ have been recognised in cases of misrepresentation, 
fraud, duress, undue influence, and defective consent (i.e. 
mistake). This approach has often been contrasted with 
the •will’ or subjective theory of contracts in the conti­
nental systems. Here the courts set out to discover what 
the parties willed and will enforce such a fwill' as the 
contract between them. It must be stressed, however, that 
the gap between the subjective and objective theories is 
not as wide as it has often been made to appear. The basic 
similarities between the English and the continental approaches
1. R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (Los 
Angeles, 1953)*
to the interpretation of agreements need not detain us 
here. Our concern is to examine the role of the courts 
in Ghana and Nigeria in the enforcement of agreements.
For this purpose we shall be looking at the roles of both 
the customary and superior courts.
2
(i) Customary Courts
The place and function of the customary courts in the
•3
overall judicial system has already been discussed .
Here mention must again be made of the civil jurisdiction 
of these courts. In Ghana the Local Courts have juris­
diction to hear personal suits where the debt, damage or
4demand does not exceed £100 . Thus the courts administer
both the customary and imported laws according to the nature
of the transaction or the intentions of the parties. In
Northern Nigeria Sections 23 and 24(4) of the Native Courts 
5Law'' empower the native courts to apply both English and 
native law with similar qualifications to those in the 
Ghana enactment. Corresponding provisions are also found in 
the Eastern, V/estern and Mid -Wes tern Regions of Nigeria.
2. In Ghana these are called Local Courts, in Northern Nigeria 
they are called Native Courts. Here we use "customary 
courts1 to refer to all of them since it appears to be 
the more common form. In Eastern, Western and Mid-Western
Regions of Nigeria, they are referred to as Customary
Courts.
5. See p. supra.
4* C . 98(f) Ghana Courts Act, I960 (C-A.9). The Courts Act, 
I960, has been repealed by the Courts Decree, 1966, which 
has abolished the Local Courts and transferred their 
jurisdiction to the District Courts.
5. Cap. 78, Laws of Northern Nigeria (1963).
The question that arises here is, what factors guide the 
courts in determining and enforcing the terms of an agree­
ment? In other words, on what ethical assumptions are their 
decisions based? This question must be distinguished 
from the issue of the intentions of the parties as to the 
law applicable (i.e. whether it is native or the imported 
law that applies to the transaction). To go back to the 
former question, a close study of the decisions of several 
customary courts in Ghana^ and Nigeria has not revealed 
any sound basis for extracting some general principles on 
the factors that guide them in coming to their decisions.
What one finds is a more or less general pattern of a given 
set of facts and a decision on the facts by the court.
There is a remarkable dearth of reasoned judgments. The 
following ten cases taken from two local court areas in 
Ghana for the years 1963-1964 will illustrate our point 
here.
A. Amengi Local Court - Akropong
1. Johnson Ikoro v. Samuel Omoware
Suit Fo. 13/64
Plaintiff claims from the defendent the sum of £70
amount defendant received from the plaintiff as dowry
in respect of a marriage between plaintiff and Rosaline,
6. Cases on Contract and allied matters decided in the Ghana 
local Courts for the year 1963 were as follows: Central
Region 8090; Western Region 11407; Ashanti Region 4884; 
Yolta Region 2593; Northern Region 870; Upper Region 
163« Figures extracted from Ministry of Justice File - 
Accra, Ghana.
a daughter of the plaintiff; but defendant having 
received the said sum despatched the said Rosaline 
to Nigeria without the knowledge and consent of the 
plaintiff and the defendant has refused to refund the 
money to the plaintiff.
Judgment - in favour of plaintiff for £70 with 
£4.11s.6d. costs.
It is not clear here whether the plaintiff sued for 
breach of promise of marriage or on a total failure of 
consideration. The decision appears to be based on the 
latter head.
2. Ama Ediyaah v. Offori 
Suit Ho. 232/62
Plaintiff claims £l.5s. from defendant being the cost 
of fufu bought from plaintifffs chop bar and defendant 
has failed payment upon several demands.
Judgment: For plaintiff for£L.5s. plus costs at
£1.10s. making a total of £2.15s. I order that
defendant pays the amount in full at the end of current
month (i.e. the month of November, 1962),
Perhaps the court was influenced here by the importance of 
the plaintiff’s service to the community through his
cho-bar business. The amount of £1.10s. costs on a claim
for £1.5s. is obviously very excessive.
3 . Kwame Bnin v * Byemf i " ^  &
Suit No. 16/63
Plaintiff claims £11.13s. from the defendant. £10 
being money defendant obtained from the plaintiff 
for clearing a vice form and £1.13s. being expenses 
incurred by plaintiff during the demands which the 
defendant has failed payment since 12 years ago.
Court: I enter judgment for plaintiff for £10
plus costs at £l.l7s.6d. I order that the defendant 
pays the costs.
In this case nothing appears to have been said about the 
debt being statute-barred. All the parties appear to have 
presumed the application of native law. The fact that the 
plaintiff has got more than he claimed tends to indicate 
that the court places great importance on the performance 
of promises. In this case, it is of course in the general 
interest of agriculture that such promises be kept.
4. Kojo Addae v. Kwabina Ansah 
'Suit No. 269/63
Plaintiff sues for judicial relief for defendant to 
show cause why he should refuse to give l/3 share of 
corn from farm to plaintiff’s niece G-yanea, whom the 
defendant has stayed with as concubine since three 
years and the defendant could not perform marriageable 
contingencies until defendant separated her - contrary 
to Vasa Amengi marriage Bye laws.
Judgment: in favour of plaintiff with costs
assessed at £6.8s.6d. Plaintiff’s niece is entitled 
to l/3 share of the corn which is reaped at present 
and also 1/3 share of the farm itself.
Quite apart from this case being evidence of specific 
performance in the customary courts (not to say anything 
about illegal contracts, i .e.immoral), one finds here an 
instance of the courts enforcing what the parties willed 
at the inception of their obligations.
5. Kofie Ampong v. Amoaful 
Suit No* 14/ 6 4 .
Plaintiff claims judicial relief for the defendant to 
show cause why the defendant should sell the cocoa 
proceeds and fail to give the plaintiff’s hare of 
1/3 as already scheduled by both parties.
Judgment: for plaintiff with costs assessed at
£9*15s.6d. Plaintiff is entitled to l/3 share of all 
proceeds reasiled from the cocoa by the defendant.
Here is another instance of the court enforcing the will of 
the parties.
B. Kade Akwatia Local Court, Eastern Region.
1. Kwasi Odame v. Kwadjo Danso & ors 
Suit No. 2 91/63
Plaintiff claims from the defendants the sum of £8 
being amount received from plaintiff by U.K. Boadi 
with intent to give plaintiff a land to build a house 
as per receipt on hand dated 19th November, 1957, and
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defendant has refused plaintiff the land, as defendant 
has refused payment of the money after incessant 
demands.
Ex parte judgment for plaintiff for £8 with costs
assessed at £1.2s.6d.
Here it is doubtful if the plaintiff could have obtained
specific performance of the sale of land. Ollennu seems
7
to suggest he would .
2. Suit ITo. 407/63
Plaintiff claims from the defendant the sum of £30 
being cost of cover cloths plaintiff gave to defendant 
for washing; which said cover cloths defendant 
alleged to have been missing; that defendant agreed to 
pay for tha cost of the said cover cloths, but failed 
to fulfil his promise after incessant demands.
Judgment for plaintiff for £30 and 33/- costs.
It is not clear whether the courtfs decision would have been 
any different if there had been an exception clause in the 
washing agreement•
5* E.B. Gyasi v. Sowonu 
Suit ITo ♦ 467/63
Plaintiff claims from defendant the sum of £2 being 
an advance received from plaintiff against one cupboard 
to be made for the plaintiff but defendant failed to
7* See the Ghana case of Lartei v. Fio (I960) G-.L.R.119*
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make the said cupboard and also to refund the said £2.
Ex parte judgment for plaintiff for £2 with.
16/6 as costs,
A similar decision was reached in Ayisi v. Ahyia Suit ITo,
465/63, a claim for refund of £6 for the weaving of Kente 
cloth which defendant had failed to do.
4. Kwame Asare v, Kwaku Sono 
Suit ho. 462/63
Defendant employed the plaintiff as his farm labourer 
at Tweapease a place known and called Aprokumaso** 
under the Abunu system. The plaintiff had worked for 
the defendant for three years by cultivating all the 
defendant’s farmstead, forest land for farm, replanted 
cocoa tree where necessary; but the defendant refused 
to give "agreement paper1 on the abunu system, nor to 
give part share of the cocoa plantation to the plaintiff. 
Defendant had stopped plaintiff from further culti­
vation. Plaintiff therefore claims from the defendant 
the sum of £99 - being £75 for three years’ labour and 
£14 being expenses incurred by the plaintiff in building 
a hut of 2 rooms and a kitchen at the defendant’s 
request.
Judgment for plaintiff for £9 9 v/ith costs assessed 
at £8.13s.
Although this decision appears to be based on a quantum 
meruit it is doubtful if the absence of &n "agreement paper* 
affected the validity of the abunu systsim. This system
does not depend on writing to be valid. 5*9 7
5. J.B. Baidoo v. Abene Korkor & anor.
Suit Fo. 469/63
Plaintiff claims from defendants £-50 damages jointly 
and severally for breach of marriage contract in that 
the second defendant as mother of first defendant 
after receiving £1 introductory drink from plaintiff 
and further accompanying plaintiff to her relatives 
at Kwae for additional drink of £1.2s. which was paid 
by plaintiff, have both agreed to disappoint plaintiff 
in the said marriage contract and that the second 
defendant has given the first defendant in marriage to 
one Addai at Akim Oda.
Judgment: no cause to sue. Claim dismissed.
£20 costs allowed to the defendant.
Perhaps the decision might have been different if the 
plaintiff*s claim had been for the refund of the amount he 
had spent instead of a claim for damages for breach of 
promise of marriage.
Rationale of the cases:
Three principles emerge from a study of the cases. 
Firstly, the courts tend to operate on the basis that 
whoever seeks the aid of the court first, must be the 
aggrieved party and therefore has a better case. Apart 
from case ITo. B(5) on an action for breach of promise of 
marriage (which in any case is not recognised in customary
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law , all the other plaintiffs in the cases were successful 
in their claims, and each of them in fact got more than 
he claimed since costs form a regular feature of the "awards.
The second xDrinciple follows from the first, which is 
that the courts are anxious to preserve the sanctity of 
agreements. Broken promises are punished with heavy legal 
costs. Only in this way can business be encouraged (as in 
the fufu case) , and agricultural progress enhanced (the 
farm cases). These examples are, of course, a strong 
case in support of the existence of agreements in Customary 
Law.
The third principle that emerges is the presumption 
that native law applies in transactions between natives.
In none of the cases was it ever argued that the parties 
intended the application of any other law. It is doubtful 
if the conflict between the imported and customary lav/s is 
of any great significance in the customary courts.
(ii) The Superior Courts
Here the position is a bit more complex. The courts
are face to face with the problem of finding out the
intentions of the parties not only as to the terms of the
agreement but also as to the applicable law. The latter
task is made more difficult by the fact that there are
8. See, for instance, the judgment of the court in the 
Nigerian case of Ugboma v. I lor ah (1940) 15 N.L.R.78 - 
\/here it was stated that the action for breach of 
marriage promise is not recognised in customary law.
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statutory pro visions in Ghana^ and in all the jurisdictions 
in Nigeria^ for the freedom of the parties to choose 
either the imported or customary/Islamic laws to govern 
their transactions. In practice they hardly ever do so.
The courts have therefore been up against the difficult 
exercise of finding out what law the parties intended to 
govern their obligations. This aspect of the subject has 
often been discussed under the heading of internal conflict 
of laws. We feel, however, that in a study on the law of 
agreements it appropriately belongs to the interpretation 
of agreements by the courts. In this sub-section, there­
fore, we shall be examining the factors that guide the courts 
in getting at the intentions of the contracting parties (A) 
as to the law applicable to the transaction, and (B) as to 
the meaning of the terms used in the agreement.
(A) Intention as to the law applicable:
"Daily the European buys from the native, 
daily he makes use of his services and 
labour both inside and outside the home, in 
the office, on the estate and in connection 
with his transport; and yet in these matters 
judgments are scarce as long as land and 
houses are not involved. On the one hand, 
this is due to the fact that the amounts con­
cerned are so small that they would not warrant 
the expense of a law suit, and on the other 
because when larger sums are involved, use is 
made of a means that is encountered in many 
colonies where the European law of contract is 
not applicable, i.e. the right of the native
9. S.66(1) Rule (2) of the Ghana Courts Act, I960 (C.A.9)*
10. S3.12 and 13 of the Western Nigeria High Courts Law Cap. 
44, Laws of Northern Nigeria; and S3.15 and 20 of the 
Eastern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap.61, Laws of Eastern 
Nigeria; See also SS 13 and 27 of the High Court of 
Lagos Act, Cap.80, Laws of the Federation (1958).
party to choose the European civil law in 
respect of a certain transaction. The 
European often makes this voluntary sub­
mission one of the conditions of the contract 
if it is at all important, so that inter­
racial conflict is nipped in the bud.1 11.
If the above passage is representative of the position in 
the former Dutch Colonies of the Malaya Archipelago, it 
is only partially true of the state of the lav; in Ghana 
and Nigeria. There are, of course, many instances of 
transactions that are unknov/n to traditional native law. 
Examples of these are company shares, bankruptcy and 
banking lav/s. Here the nature of the transaction indi­
cates the application of rules other than those of customary 
lav;. We shall be discussing some of these cases presently. 
The importance of determining what law the parties intended 
to apply arises from the fact that a difference in the law 
applicable to a transaction might well be the difference 
between losing a claim and obtaining a judgment in one’s 
favour. This is most true in cases where a claim is
12statute-barred if the imported law governed the transaction 
Other instances are cases where certain formalities
11. R.D. Kollewijn "Inter-Racial Private Law" in the Effect 
of Western Influence on Native Civilization in the iiaTa.ya 
Archipelago. (ed. B . Schrieke, 1929)• '
12. Compare the results of the Nigerian cases of Hotibi v. 
Savage (1944) 17 N.L.R.77, where the Statute of Limi- 
tations was held not applicable, and Bakare v. Coker 
(1955) 12 N.L.R.31, where it was held to apply to the 
transaction. See also the Ghana cases of Ferguson v.
Dune an (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 316 and Kwesi-Johnson v. Effie 
(1953) 14 W.A.C.A.254. The latter decision was criti­
cized by Allott in Essays, p.252. The Statute of Limi­
tations was also in issue in Amarq,uaye v. Broener (1889) 
Ren. 145 and Hughes v. Davies (1909) Ren.556^
prescribed by the imported law are not observed. Non-
compliance with the Statute of Frauds as to writing in
certain contracts and absence of consideration in convey- 
13ances are some other examples of the difference in the 
effect of the transactions•
The case-law on the subject can be discussed under two 
sub-headings, namely (l) where either or both of the 
contracting parties are non-natives; and (2) where both 
the contracting parties are natives.
a) Where either or both of the contracting parties are 
non-natives:
Before I960 there were very similar provisions in 
both Ghana and Nigeria for the freedom of the parties to 
choose the law governing their transaction. The normal 
pattern was often a general provision for the application 
of the imported lav/ to all persons, similar to the juris­
diction of the High Court of Justice in England. Then 
there would be a more limited provision for the application 
of customary law under certain circumstances. Section 27 
of the High Court of Lagos Act^* is characteristic of the 
provisions of the latter category, this states:
ll27(l) The High Court shall observe and 
enforce the observance of every native 
lav/ and custom which is applicable and 
is not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience, nor incom­
patible either directly or by impli­
cation with any lav/ for the time being
13. Hue v. N.yumutei (1926-29) Liv.ct.93; Muffatt v. Trading 
Association (1926-29) Liv.ct.59* See also the Nigerian 
case of Ravage v. Uweehia (JL9613 1 All Ii.il. 830 P.O.
14. Cap.80, Lav/s of the federation and Lagos (1958).
in force, and nothing in this ordinance shall 
deprive any person of the benefit of any such 
native lav/ and custom.
27 (2) Any such native law and custom shall 
be deemed applicable in causes and matters 
where the parties thereto are natives and 
also in causes and matters between natives 
and non-natives where it may appear to the 
court that substantial injustice would be 
done to either party by a strict adherence 
to any rules of law which would otherwise 
be applicable.
27(3) No party shall be entitled to claim 
the benefit of any native law or custom, if 
it shall appear either from express contract 
or from the nature of the transactions out 
of which any suit or question may have arisen, 
that such party agreed that his obligations 
in connection with such transactions should 
be exclusively regulated otherwise than by 
native law and custom or that such trans­
actions are transactions unknown to native 
law and custom.’'
One obvious effect of this section is that it empowers
the courts to enforce either the imported or customary lav/s
according to the choice of the parties or the nature of
the transaction. Another effect is that it does not
appear to cover situations where neither of the parties
is a native. The latter instance will be governed by
the general provisions for the application of the imported
15
law . Thus it is doubtful if two parties none of whom 
is a native would have the freedom to choose, say Ashanti 
customary law to govern their transaction. It is con­
tended, however, that if contracting parties have the
15. See S. 15 of the Lagos High Court Act; £>.50 of the
Northern Nigeria High Court ^aw and ^.12 of the Uestern 
Nigeria High Court Law.
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freedom to choose, e.g. German or Soviet law to govern the 
terms of their obligations, the same freedom will be 
accorded to them if they prefer any particular rule of 
customary law, barring any considerations of public policy.
The courts will coine to such a conclusion only on the express 
v-rords of the agreement between the parties* Thus, where both 
the parties are non-natives, there is a presumption that 
the imported or general law applies, but this presumption 
is rebuttable by the express choice of law by the parties.
Where either of the parties is a non-native, barring 
any express choice of law governing the transaction, the 
courts have paid lip-service to the "substantial injustice11 
rule in determining the intention of the parties. Here 
the presumption is that the parties intended their obli­
gations to be governed by the rules of the imported law, 
but this presumption is rebutted by evidence to the effect 
that substantial injustice would be done to either party by 
a strict adherence to the imported law rules. It is
remarkable that while this rule operated to bar the plaintiff's
16claim in Koney v. U.T .C. , it was one of the reasons for
the plaintiff's success in the later case of Nelson v.
17Nelson . The facts of the Koney case were as follows:
The defendants, a European company supplied the 
plaintiff, an educated African carpenter, writh a 
portable sewing machine. The order was obtained from
16 (1934
17. (1951) 13
Switzerland in October 1924. By the terms of a 
written agreement between the parties dated 3rd 
November 1924 the defendants agreed to sell the machine 
to the plaintiff, but there was express provision for 
the title in the machine remaining in the defendants 
till the full purchase price had been paid* In fact, 
the machine turned out to be unfit for the purpose 
for which it was bought, 8.11 attempts at repairs not­
withstanding. On 7th November, 1927, the plaintiff 
demanded his deposit from the defendants adding that 
they should take back the machine# The machine v:as, 
in fact, returned to the defendants, but no refund of 
deposit was made to the plaintiff. In his claim for 
damages of £500 for breach of contract, which claim he 
made on 26th September, 1933, the defendants contended 
that Bnglish law applied and that the claim was statute- 
barred *
Dean, G.J., who decided the case at first instance in Accra
Divisional Court held that native law applied and awarded
the plaintiff £329 with costs. On appeal to the Y/est
African Court of Appeal the vital issue before the court
was whether this was a case in which substantial injustice
would be done to either of the parties by a strict adherence
to the rules of English law. On this, Kingdon, C.j.
(Nigeria) had this to say:
T,Now in one sense there must always be an 
injustice when a plea under the statutes is 
set up and succeeds. The plaintiff may or
may not have a good case, but good or bad it 
is refused a hearing on its merits# If I 
understand the reasoning of the statute aright 
it is that a greater injustice is likely to 
be done by allowing stale claims than by 
refusing them a hearing on the merits # Any 
plaintiff against whom the statute is success­
fully pleaded must feel a sense of grievance 
and that he has suffered a hardship# But I 
think the words of Section 19 of the Ordinance 
'substantial injustice' imputes something more 
than this, something more than the ordinary 
hardship which always accrues when the statute 
is enforced. I cannot find that this 'something 
more' is present in the case now under appeal.
The case appears to me to be typical of the 
cases at which the statute is expres sly aimed, 
vis: cases in which the plaintiff cannot be 
expected to have kept available the evidence 
necessary to answer the plaintiff's case.
The plaintiff is a native of the literate class, 
the members of which are, in my experience, well 
able to take care of themselves and their legal 
rights. There is very strong suspicion in 
this case that the delay has been deliberate 
and I think it would be a dangerous precedent 
to offer encouragement. to such conduct. More­
over, are the equities really all on the plaintiff's 
side? It was he who had the idea of experi­
menting with this machine and it was he who 
stood to make a profit if the experiment were 
successful. Is it not fair that he should 
bear the loss and why should it all fall on 
the defendants? They are suffering some 
anyway. 18.
Reversing the decision of the Court of first instance, it 
was held that the claim was statute-barred. The decision 
of Hutchinson C.J. in Fischer & Co# v. Swaniker^ » as to 
the circumstances under which the Statute of Limitations 
will be applicable to transactions between natives and 
Europeans, was followed. These circumstances were similar
18. Supra at p.
19. Redwar's Comments on Gold Coast Ordinances, p.137.
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1d those in the Koney case* On the other hand, in Kelson v. 
20
Kelson Ga customary lav/ was held applicable in a
transaction between the plaintiff’s agent and the second
and third defendants who were non-natives* The Yfest
African Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Smith,
C.J. (Gold Coast) and held that substantial injustice would
be done to the plaintiffs by a strict adherence to the
principles of English law* Verity, C.j, who read the
Court’s judgment felt that such an adherence to English
law would defeat the intentions of the plaintiff’s father,
the testator. His obvious intention from the facts of
the case was that all transactions concerning the land
should be as much as possible regulated by the principles
of customary lav/* Also in Asante v* Gold Coast Drivers1 
21Union , one of the issues before the court was the lav; that 
the parties intended to apply to their transaction, in this 
case the hiring of rooms. The defendants, an unincor­
porated association of drivers, had agreed to rent the 
plaintiff’s rooms but had in fact broken the contract. In 
a claim for damages for the breach, the court had to decide
(1) whether an unincorporated association of natives was a 
native for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the native 
courts, and (2) if the answer to a) is negative, whether 
the parties intended the application of English law, having
20. (1951) 15 U.A.C.A.248.
21. (1957) 5 U.A.L.R.5. See also Hamilton v. Mens ah (1957)
3 U.A.I.A. 224.
regard to the nature of the transaction. Adumua-Bossman,
J. determined the first question in the negative, holding
that such an association was necessarily a non-native.
On the second question he held that native law had no notion
of the renting of rooms and that the parties intended the
application of English law. The defendant’s appeal based
on a plea to the jurisdiction of the Native Court was
22therefore allowed
Quite apart from the contested finality of the assertion
that the hiring of rooms was unknown to traditional native
law, it is curious that the learned judge did not advert to
the "substantive injustice” principle in adjudicating on
the rights of the parties. The court quoted with approval
several passages from Earbah’s works to support the view
that land could be rented out in customary law, but did not
see any connection between a house (or the rooms therein)
and land. It is submitted with respect that any definition
of land that excludes a house or part thereof is a very
narrow one indeed. In fact, land is defined in the Ghana
Interpretation Act, I960, to include "land covered by
water, any house, building or structure whatsoever, and any
23estate, interest in or right in, to or over land and water . 
On the question of the nationality of the Drivers’ Union,
22. The question of the jurisdiction of the native or local 
courts as to the lav/ and persons is now purely an academic 
one in Ghana in view of SE.96 and 98 of the Courts Act, 
I960 (C.A.9)» Also the Court Decree,1966, has abolished 
the local Courts. See E.l.C. Decree Uo.84 of 23rd 
September, 1966.
23. 3.32(1) of the Interpretation Act, I960.
there is evidence that it was not incorporated under the 
then Companies Ordinance. It was not, therefore, a legal 
person for purposes of that Ordinance. In order to deter­
mine its nationality, one has got to look at the nationality 
of its members. On this test, there is no evidence that 
any of the members was a non-native. In the light of 
these facts, it is not easy to see the basis on which the
learned judge came to the conclusion that it was a non-
the
native. It is submitted with respect that/As ante Case is 
a poor guide to the courts in determining the implied 
intentions of the parties to any given transaction.
(2) hhere both parties are natives:
Here the presumption is that natives intend their 
obligations to be governed by native law, and whoever 
asserts the contrary has the onus of adducing evidence to 
prove it. This is as far as theory goes. In fact, the 
superior courts have often proceeded on the assumption that 
the parties intended the application of the general law 
and that anyone who asserts that native law applies should 
adduce evidence to prove it. The cases; here will be 
discussed under two sub-headings, namely, where the parties 
made use of documents, and where the nature of the trans­
action is alien to customary law notions.
24(a) v/here the parties made use of documents .
It has often been stated that traditional customary law
24. For a comprehensive tstudy of this aspect of the law, 
see Allott, Essays, Gha.pter 10.
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knew of no writing. It is also true that since the later
decades of the 19th century documents have been in ever
25increasing use by natives. Allott has set out some of 
the pertinent legal questions that arise from the use of 
writing by natives. These are:
(i) Does the writing serve only as a memorandum of 
the agreement or transaction; or does it bind like an
English deed, excluding (subject to equity) all evidence 
of the transaction between the parties?
(ii) Does the use of writing or of any particular
form of writing indicate a desire on the part of the parties 
to be bound exclusively, or substantially, by the rules of 
English law?
(iii) Does the use of conveyances mean that thence­
forth land is held not under "native tenure”, but under 
English real property law?
(iv) Does the use of writing in the transfer of land 
mean that thenceforth subsidiary interests created over 
the land are subject to English law?
(v) Does the use of writing take consideration of any 
matter concerning the transaction out of the jurisdiction 
of the native courts, and into the original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
These questions are, of course, interconnected and a
25. Essays t p.242. It may be added that question (v) is no 
longer important in Ghana since the Courts Act, I960, 
has no formal limits on the jurisdiction of the local 
Courts.
discussion of one might well involve the discussion of the 
case law on many others. An attempt to answer the first 
question will be made in the next section. Here we are 
primarily concerned with the answer to the second question, 
i.e. the intention of the parties as to the lav/ applicable
to a given transaction.
26Ilotibi v. Savage was an action between two Nigerians 
at the town of Owerri (in Eastern Nigeria). The plaintiff 
had lent the defendant £336 free of interest in 1933, and
received from the defendant a ’paper* which the court found
to be an I.O.IJ. or an acknowledgement of the debt, but not 
a promissory note within the meaning of that term in the 
Bills of Exchange Ordinance (Nigeria). Further loans 
totalling £97 were also made in 1941* The defendant 
pleaded the Statute of Limitations as regards the original 
loan made in 1933. The defendant had written a letter to 
the plaintiff on the 22nd November, 1942, which the court 
would have held to be a sufficient acknowledgement to revive 
the debt, had it been found that the Statute of Limitation
was applicable to the transaction.
The issue that arose was whether the use of the I.O.TJ. 
was sufficient to take the transaction out of the domain of 
customary law. The court found as a fact that both parties 
were natives and that under their native law there was no
26. (1944) 17 N.L.R.77.
Bit
period of limitation in an action of recovery of debt.
It was also found that the plaintiff had done nothing more 
than lend the money free of interest, and had not entered 
into any obligation towards the defendant which he had agreed 
should be regulated exclusively by English law. 2he obli­
gations were all on the defendant’s side. In a review of 
the authorities, Waddington, J. referred to the cases of
27 28
Egebor v • Agberegbe , Bakare v • Soker and Bearse v •
29 ,
Aderoku . In each of these cases (transactions between
natives), promissory notes were used and the Statute of 
Limitations was held to apply. He, however, distinguished 
the Rotibi case from the other cases holding that the trans­
action was governed by the rules of customary law. On 
the use of the documents the learned judge had this to says
"While after prolonged consideration I have 
formed the opinion that plaintiff must 
succeed in this action on grounds upon which 
no argument was addressed to me, and there­
fore no need to discuss the above arguments 
arises, I think I might usefully make an 
observation on this document (i.e. the I.O.U.) 
and its effect. In Bakare’s case the court 
expressed the view that the giving and taking 
of a promissory note is very strong evidence 
that the parties intended their transaction 
to be governed exclusively by English law.
With this view, with respect, I agree. But 
I think care should be taken against applying 
that principle where the document amounts to 
no more than the kind of ’paper1 which most 
natives nowadays like to have as evidence of a 
money transaction, and which at this day is,
I suppose, quite a familiar object in most
27. Supreme Court Suit 194/1933 - Unreported.
28. (1935) 12 H.L.R.31, concerning the sale of goat skins to 
the defendant who gave a promissory note in return.
29« (1936) 13 U.L.R.9 - claim on account stated.
native courts, and frequently bearing 
an impressive array of stamps.11 30.
With this view of the learned judge we are, respect­
fully, in agreement. It would be anomalous in the extreme 
if the mere use of documents should be sufficient to exclude 
the application of customary lav;. Ihe distinction between 
a document intended only as evidence of a money trans­
action and the instrument on which any claims on a trans­
action must be based, ought to be maintained. Unfortunately 
the decisions of the courts in Ghana and Nigeria are not
neatly divisible along these lines.
31In Ajike v. Souza the Court presumed that the parties 
intended the application of English law since promissory 
notes were used. Also where the plaintiff had given the 
defendant’s predecessor £780 loan and the deceased gave a 
note called "promissory note" in which he undertook to sell 
his land to the plaintiff in default of payment of the loan, 
the Privy Council held the note to be a promissory note
within the terms of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance (Nigeria)
32and applied English lav; to the transaction • But in Green
•Z  ’2
v. Owo native lav; was excluded on the ground that there 
was no native law or custom as regards the effect of purely 
documentary titles in English conveyancing form.
Unfortunately also, the distinction between a document
30. Supra, at pp.
31. (1938) 14 N.L.R.103j affirmed (1939) 5 V.A.C.A.134.
32. Savage v. Uwechia £l961)l 1 All 15.R.830.
33. (1936) 13 li.L.R.43.
as evidence of the transaction and an. instrument of the 
said transaction, was not observed in. the important Ghana 
case of Hughes v. Davies & Co.^ .  In this case the 
plaintiff sought to recover from the defendants, the 
executors of one late R.A. Harrison, the sum of £250.1.7d. 
said to have been lent at different times to the deceased 
by the plaintiff. The defendants had contended among 
other things that the debt was statute barred. Both 
parties were natives, but it was argued for the defendants 
that the use of I.O.U.G by the deceased and the keeping of 
a sales book in the plaintiff’s store in. which entries of 
goods sold were made, excluded the application of customary 
law. As regards the I.O.U. the trial court disposed of 
the defendant’s argument by asking itself two questions. 
Firstly, "Would Mr. Harrison have liked the public to know 
that he was borrowing money from the plaintiff, or would 
he have preferred to have the matter known only to the 
two? In answer to this the court stated that Mr. Harrison 
would rather that the matter rested between them. Secondly, 
"Can it therefore be contended that the plaintiff in merely 
accepting the I.O.U.s had such knowledge of the difference 
of the effect of native law or custom and English law 
bearing on the transaction? i.e. in the one case time can 
be no bar to her remedy, and in the other it would deprive
34. (1909) Ren.550.
her of that remedy, and agreed to be bound that time should
be a bar to her remedy." The court considered all the
surrounding circumstances and answered the latter question
in the negative. Having also found that the sales book
was kept by the deceased and not by the plaintiff, it was
held that the parties intended their obligations should be
regulated by customary law rules and since this law did not
admit of limitation periods to debt claims, the plaintiff’s
action succeeded. This decision was lightly set aside by
the Full Court in a very brief judgment. J-hus unlike
 ^6the decision in the Higerian case of Rotibi v. Savagey 
discussed above, the use of an I.O.U. was deemed by the 
court to mean that the parties had opted for the appli­
cation of English lav;. It is curious, however, that the 
Full court did not deem it wise to give reasons for 
upsetting the rather sounder judgment of the trial court*
It might be naive to suggest that they were swayed by the 
personality of Sarbah who argued the case for the defendants.
Equally curious is the difficult case of Aradzie v. Yaandor 
57& Anor ', a loan transaction between two native chiefs.
Here English law was deemed to be the lav; the parties 
intended to govern their obligations. The reason for this 
was that the parties made use of a document which was
35. (1909) Ren., at p.556.
36. (1944) 17, H.L.R.77.
37. (1922) F.Ct. 91.
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construed by Treacy Ag*J.,by no means one of the leading 
judges in the territory, to be a promissory note* In his 
judgment the learned Judge referred to ^arbah with approval 
on the traditional methods of making a loan . He 
continued:
“With increasing commerce, however, a quicker 
and more private mode of effecting a loan was 
found desirable and under the English law the 
promissory note system met this need* Erom 
the lenderfs point of view this method had 
the disadvantage that after the lapse of a 
certain time the debt became irrecoverable, 
but often the lender, who sees large interest 
and what appears sound security, is as anxious 
to lend as the borrower is to borrow* Be 
that as it may, the promissory note has become 
a popular institution in the Gold Coast. I 
can conceive an ignorant native making a loan 
on a promissory note believing that he would 
still have the right to recover after any 
lapse of time, and if the court were convinced 
that he really believes so, probably it would 
hold that the statute did not apply, but in 
the present case the substantial sum of £250 
was lent by one African chief to another, so 
we may take it that both parties knew the 
native custom with regard to loans, and I 
think one may not unfairly surmise that they 
also knew the English law especially as the 
loan was made in a timber district long after 
the timber trade had been well established, 
yet they deliberately selected the English 
method. There is nothing before me to show 
why they did so, but both parties must have 
found it convenient. This being so, it is 
impossible for me to decide in favour of one 
party and to the detriment of the other that 
having realised the advantages of this method 
he failed to realise the disadvantages. The .
38. Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Lav/, pp. 74-77 on Suretyship.
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whole nature of the transaction shows that 
both parties intended to be bound by English 
law at the time when the note was made, and 
that such intention must be taken to form 
part of the agreement.rf
Three objections immediately leap to one’s mind after
reading the above judgment* The first is the learned
judge’s suggestion that the charging of interest is a
peculiar feature of the imported law* This is obviously
not borne out by the authorities* In fact, the case of
39Eynn v. Quassie J is a direct authority for the contrary 
view* Here it was held that interest is chargeable on 
customary loans. Secondly, the learned judge tended to be 
influenced by the amount of money involved in the trans­
action to hold that the parties must have intended the 
application of English law. He did not, however, indicate 
the financial limits of customary law transactions nor did 
he rely on any authority for suggesting that there was.
It is submitted with respect that there is no authority for 
the view that £250 is outside the ambit of customary lav; 
transactions except, perhaps, his lordship’s decision.
Thirdly, the learned judge emphasised the decisive nature 
of the use of a promissory note in excluding the appli­
cation of customary law. It has already been shown above 
that there is a distinction between a document as evidence
39• (1873) Ren.l. See also 2?olly Hill, Migrant cocoa-farmers 
of Southern Ghana (1961); Report of the Commission on 
the marketing of West African" cocoa - 1938 Gmnd* 5845~;
Sir Casely-Hayford, Hold Coast Native Institutions (1903)*
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of a transaction and an instrument of the said transaction* 
It could still be argued, however, that the decision was 
right but for the wrong reason. If the plaintiff decided 
to sue on the document he should be held bound by its limi­
tations in the imported law sense^.
(b) Mhere the nature of the transaction is alien to 
customary law notions:
Mention has already been made of transactions such as 
company shares, bankruptcy law and banking as natters that 
are alien to customary law concepts. Other transactions in 
which the courts have excluded the application of native law 
are where the parties make use of technical terminology.
This is most common in land matters. Thus in the Ghana 
case of Kwesi-Johnson v. Dffie^ ,  a land transaction between 
two natives it was held that as a conveyance forms no part 
of a sale by native lav; and custom, the parties intended 
the application of Snglish law. In that case the defen­
dant first got a receipt for the purchase price of a house 
from the vendor. The receipt wound up with the words
ft and in pursuance of the terms of the conveyance to
be prepared in this behalf.” Later the defendant also 
received another receipt from the same vendor for £3 
1tirama*. This latter sum represented earnest money in 
customary law transactions. The plaintiff claimed the
40. See also Quartey v. Akuah, Redwar p.158 and Adoo v.
Bannerman (Redwar), p. 139• ^ee also Rerguson v.
Duncan (l953T'"l4 W.A.C.A.316.
41. (19557 14 V.A.C.A.254.
house from the defendant on the strength of a conveyance in 
English form which he had obtained from the vendor. This 
conveyance was found to be valid under the imported law.
The question that the court was to decide was whether the 
original transaction between the defendant and the vendor 
was a valid customary law sale. If this issue was deter­
mined in favour of the application of native law, then the 
defendant’s title which was prior in time would be a 
better one. The court, however, considered the fact that 
the parties were educated natives and their use of technical 
conveyancing terms was deemed to import the application of 
English law. The trial court held, therefore, that the 
parties intended English law to govern their transaction. 
This decision was affirmed by the West African Court of 
Appeal. Referring to the use of the "tirama1 in this 
transaction, Foster-Sutton, P., who read the judgment of 
the court, observed, approving of the dictum of the trial 
judge, "old customs die hard, and deeds drawn by lawyers
according to English law frequently specify "tirama".
42This decision has been criticised on three grounds. 
Firstly, that although traditional customary law knew no 
writing, the modern tendency has been for natives to make 
use of the devise resorted to by the defendant in this case, 
i.e. following a customary law transaction with an English 
conveyance. But this decision tends to overlook this fact.
42. A.R. Allott, Essays, p. 252.
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Secondly, in customary law transactions, the payment of
4**5ntrama completes a customary sale of land. Danquah was 
cited as the authority for this view. Thirdly, that there 
was no evidence from the facts of the case to indicate 
that the parties opted for the exclusive application of 
English law to their transaction. We may add that it is 
sad that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish the 
effect of delay in completing the payment of ntrama. It 
is anomalous that customary law which does not recognise 
any periods of limitation should construe two days1 delay 
as fatal to the validity of a customary sale^.
The position in Ghana since I960:
Paragraph 64(1) of the Courts Decree, 1966 has given
the courts a clearer guide in determining the intention of
the contracting parties as to the law applicable to their
transaction. The paragraph provides:
,f64(l). Subject to the provisions of any 
enactment other than this sub-section, in 
deciding whether an issue arising in civil 
proceedings is to be determined according 
to the common lav/ or customary law, and, if 
the issue is to be determined according to 
customary law, in deciding which system of 
customary law is applicable, the court shall 
be guided by the following rules, in which 
references is the system of customary law to 
which he is subject or, if he is not shown to 
be subject to customary law, are references to 
the common law.
45• <T.B. Danquah, Cases in Akan Lav/, p.xxxii, cited by Allott, 
supra.
44. For other cases on this head, see for Ghana: As am o ah v.
Mprenguo (1949) WWA.C.A. Civil Appeal No.72/48 - Unre­
ported; In Uigeria: Green v. Owo (1936) 13 2T.L.R.14;
Griffin v. Talabi (1948^ 12 W.A.C.A.371. See also cases 
cited by Allott in Essays, Chapter 10.
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Rule 1:
Where two persons have the same personal 
law one of them cannot, by dealing in a 
manner regulated by some other law with 
property in which the other has a present 
or expectant interest, alter or affect 
that interest to an extent which would 
not in the circumstances be open to him 
under his personal law."
Thus, if A and B have interests (vested or contingent) on a
piece of land and this interest is regulated by, say,
customary lav/, A cannot by dealing with the land or part
thereof under any other law exclude B’s interest under
customary law which binds both of them. This provision,
of course, is the ratio of the IT els on v. Nelson^  decision
discussed above. It is not clear, however, if B fs delay
in objecting to any dealings in the common property by A
will not be a vital issue in determining whether he can
get relief. Presumably such a delay would defeat his
claim since section 66(3) of the Courts Act provides for
savings for the doctrines of equity.
Rule 2.
"Subject to Rule 1, where an issue arises 
out of a transaction the parties to which 
have agreed, or may from the form or the 
nature of the transaction be taken to 
have agreed, that such an issue should be 
determined according to the common law or 
any system of customary lav/, effect should 
be given to the agreement." 46.
* Transaction1 was defined to include marriage. Here the
45. (1951) 13 W.A.O.A.248.
46. Courts Decree, 1966 (Ghana) Paragraph 64(1) Rule (2). 
See also Rule 3 of the same section v/hich makes similar 
provisions with regard to disposition of property 
generally.
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position is not very clear. If an issue arises from a 
transaction between A and B, in the absence of any express 
statement as to the law applicable, the courts are to infer 
the intention of the parties from the form and nature of 
the transaction. The two vital words are ’form* and 
•nature1. It has already been shown above that neither 
form (as seen in cases where the parties used documents) 
nor nature (as in cases where technical terms were used) 
is a safe guide in determining the intention of the parties 
as to the law applicable • V/hat the above rule has done is 
to enact in statutory form the confusion existing in the 
case law on the subject without indicating sufficiently or 
at all the circumstances under which a particular type of 
law is presumed to apply to a transaction. Perhaps 
definitions of 'form1 and fnature1 in the interpretation 
part of the Courts Act, I960, would have gone a long way 
to clarify the position. It is respectfully submitted 
that the above rule has not done anything to improve the 
law on the subject.
Rule 6:
"Subject to the foregoing rules, an issue 
should be determined according to the common 
law unless the plaintiff is subject to any 
system of customary lav/ and claims to have 
the issue determined according to that system, 
when it should be so determined.M 47*
This is, of course, a vital rule in the law of agreements. 
The effect appears to be that any issue before the courts 
47* S .66(1) Pule (6). Courts Act, I960. (C.A.9)*
(superior or local) will prima facie be determined 
according to the common law, but if the plaintiff reason­
ably claims the application of customary lav/ he will be 
entitled to the benefit of such a claim. This rule, of 
course, presumes the existence of the other rules, partic­
ularly the rule on the power of the Court to refuse to 
apply the law chosen by the plaintiff, if it will unduly 
prejudice the rights of the defendant, where they both 
have an interest in the same subject matter. It is also 
an enactment of the practice of the superior courts who 
have hitherto operated on the theory that the parties 
intended the application of the general lav/, until a 
contrary intention is shown either by express v/ords or by
A  O
inference from the nature of the transaction .
(3) Intention as to the meaning and effect of terms used
,4-Q
in the agreement •'s
So far we have been considering the principles that 
guide the superior courts in determining the law that the 
parties intended to govern their transactions• In this 
section we are concerned with the examination of the v/ays 
in which the courts have construed the terms and determined
48. In Nigeria there are no statutory provisions similar to 
the Grhana choice of lav/ provisions.
49. See L.M.W. Melville "The core of a contract’1 (1953) 19 
M.L.R.26; Prof. Unger ’’The doctrine of the Fundamental 
Term” (1957) Business Law Bev.30; K.W. Wedderburn, 
’’Collateral Contracts” (1959) C.L.J. pp. 66-7; H.
Berger, ’’Usury in instalmental sales (1953) 2 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 148; Hale ’’Bargaining, Duress and Economic 
Liberty” (1930) 43 Col. L. Hev. 603; Friedmann,
Law in a changing Society Chapter 4; B.Coote, Excep­
tion Clauses [London, 1964).
the effect of stipulations in agreements. Three issues 
must be clearly distinguished here, namely, the distinction 
between mere representations which are not intended to be 
terms of the agreement and the other statements which are; 
secondly, the relative importance of the terms used in the 
agreement; and finally the total effect of the terms used 
on the rights and duties of the parties. These will be 
examined seriatim.
(i) Representations and terms:
During the course of negotiations leading to the
conclusion of a binding agreement, one or other of the
contracting parties may make a statement or give an assurance
calculated to produce in the mind of the other party .a
belief that facts exist which render the proposed bargain
advantageous to his interests. When, later, there is
disagreement, a court will have to decide whether this
statement or assurance formed part of the contract, or whether
it was merely a representation which the party making it did
not intend to be binding on him. If the agreement is an
oral one as many are, the determination of the parties1
intention as to what is binding and what is not is one of
considerable difficulty^ . Here the courts will rely
solely on the deportment of the parties and the credit and 
credibility of their witnesses. Where, however, the .
50. See for instance the difficulty that confronted the 
court in the Ghana case of Ankrah v. African Trading 
Gompany (1905) Ren.400; and' also in G-.B. Ollivant v.
J. Allen & Go. Sup.Ct. 88/1964, unreported.
agreement is in writing, the courts in Nigeria are guided
51by the Evidence Ordinance . Sections 151-133 of this
Ordinance lay down the conditions under which parole
evidence is admissible in construing the terms of an
agreement• Section 131 is as follows:
"131 (1)• hhen any judgment of any court 
or any other judicial or official proceedings, 
or any contract, or any grant or other dis­
position of property has been reduced to the 
form of a document or series of documents, 
no evidence may be given of such judgment 
or proceedings, or of the terms of such 
oontract, grant or disposition of property 
except the document itself, or secondary 
evidence of its contents in cases in which 
secondary evidence is admissible under the 
provisions hereinbefore contained; nor may 
the contents of any such document be contra­
dicted, altered, added to or varied by oral 
evidence: 5 2 .
Provided that any of the following matters 
may be proved:-
(a) fraud, intimidation, illegality; want of due 
execution; the fact that it is wrongly 
dated; existence or want or failure, of 
consideration, mistake in or law; want of 
capacity in which a contracting party acted 
when it is not inconsistent with the terms of 
the contract; or any other matter which, if 
proved, would produce any effect upon the 
validity of any document, or of any part of 
it, or which would entitle any person to any 
judgment, decree or order relating thereto;
51. Cap. 62, Laws of Nigeria (Federation, 1958).
52. See also Halsburyfs Laws (2nd ed.) Vol. VII, p. 321:
"But when a contract has in fact been completed and 
reduced to writing the courts is not entitled to 
consider antecedent acts or correspondence, or to 
look at'words deleted before the conclusion of the 
contract, in order to ascertain the meaning of the 
contract in writing finally agreed upon." 
of. Chief Qkoro Orukumakpor v. Itebu & ors., Privy 
Council Appeal No. 42 of 1959 , report ed in" (1961) 5 
J.A.L.159, in which the Privy Council considered the 
effect of S.12 of the Evidence Ordinance on the con­
struction of the written agreement between the parties.
(b)the existence of any separate oral agreement 
as to any matter on which a document is 
silent, and which is not inconsistent with 
its terms, if from the circumstances of the 
case the court infers that the parties did 
not intend the document to be a complete and 
final statement of the whole transaction 
between them."
Other exceptions to the parole evidence rule include the 
proof of the existence of any separate oral agreement 
constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of 
any obligation under any contract, grant or disposition 
of property . There are also instances of conditions 
subsequent, usage or custom (where these are not repug­
nant or inconsistent with the express terms of the written 
agreement)^.
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There have, of course, been some decided cases in 
Ghana and Nigeria on the admissibility or otherwise of 
parole evidence in determining the parties1 intention as 
contained in a written agreement. Thus in the Ghana case 
of African & Colonial Go. Ltd. v. Blemir Syndicate^  the 
defendants sought to adduce oral evidence as to the family 
ownership of a piece of land. This evidence conflicted 
with the unambiguous terms of a lease which was in the 
name of an individual member of the family. The trial
53. S.131 (1)(C) of the Evidence Ordinance*
54. S.151 (iVcEj and (E).
53. (1923-25) F.Ct*40. See also Russell v. Martin (1900), 
Ren.193) where a strong Pull Gt. composed of ^ir William 
Brandford Griffith and Mr. Justice Nicoll held that in 
every case in which a member of a family holds himself 
out as owner, and is allowed by the family to so hold 
himself out, very satisfactory evidence is required to 
prove that the land or house is not his sole property.
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court held that such oral evidence was inadmissible, and 
this decision was affirmed on appeal by the Pull Court*
Also in Thomas Hutton-Mi 11s v. Nkansah II & ors^  the 
question before the court was whether or not oral repre­
sentations made to the plaintiff (respondent) but which 
were not contained in the commission deed, formed part of 
their agreement. The Vest African Court of Appeal resolved 
the question against the plaintiff, i.e. in the negative.
The Ghana Court of Appeal (as it then was) came to a similar
conclusion in the recent case of Gold Coast Industrial
57Development Corporation v. Dune an * Here the plaintiffs 
sued the defendant for the recovery of £4,590.14.2d. under 
a written agreement. The facts were that the defendant 
planned to establish a cassava factory on a commercial scale. 
To this end he borrowed various sums of money from the 
plaintiff corporation. Between the 18th July, 1949 and 
the 3rd May, 1952 these amounts totalled £4,300. By 
agreement dated the 25th August, 1952 the defendant agreed 
to repay this sum (with interest by quarterly instalments) 
over a period of three years, the first repayment to be 
made on the 15th April, 1953. No such payments being made, 
on the 29th October, 1954 the plaintiffs.sued for the debt 
and interest outstanding. The defendant denied liability 
alleging that the plaintiffs were in fact in breach of an 
oral agreement reached with him in July, 1949* ^he terms
56. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 32.
57. (1959) G.L.R. 444.
of this agreement included a promise to give the defendant 
adequate assistance to enable him to establish his cassava 
factory on a commercial scale. Also in March 1952, 
another oral promise was made to the defendant, this time 
of £3,000 but the plaintiffs refused him the loan on his 
application for it. The defendant had proceeded with the 
factory in reliance on the promises and had suffered 
damage. One of the issues before the court was the signi­
ficance of the oral promises ms.de by the plaintiffs to 
the defendant. On this it was held that the oral agreement 
merged in the written agreement of August, 1952, which 
superseded the oral agreement without incorporating it.
It was not, therefore, admissible to vary the terms of the 
written agreement. It appears, however, that the court 
left considerable emphasis on the ultra-vires nature of the 
oral agreement, which was therefore void. In the absence 
of this vital factor, it would be curious that the court 
did not consider the collateral oral agreement as binding 
as the subsequent written contract.
On the other hand, in Pickard v. Innes^  the defendants 
agreed in writing to engage the services of the plaintiff as 
mining surveyor at a salary of £150 a month and some other 
allowances. The plaintiff brought an action for damages 
for the breach of the contract but the defendants pleaded 
the existence of an oral agreement which operated as a 
condition precedent to the contract in writing. The oral
58. (1919) P.Ct. 12.
6 2 8
agreement was to the effect that the plaintiff was to get
what was described as f,an amicable clearance11 from his
former employers with whom the defendants were in cordial
business relationships. It was held by the Full Court
that this oral agreement was admissible to prove the
intention of the parties and to defeat the plaintifffs claim
since he did not get the "amicable clearance". Also in
the Nigerian case of I.T. Palmer of Nigeria Ltd. v. Julia 
59Fonseca , Jibown J. considered oral evidence in varying the
terms of an agreement between a principal and his agent.
finCiting the old English authority of Goss v. Nugent , the 
learned judge drew attention to Section 131 (1)(d) of the 
Nigerian Evidence Ordinance which deals with the admission 
of oral evidence to vary a written document under certain 
circumstances. He held that the conditions for the admission 
of such parole evidence were present in the ce.se. A fair 
assessment of the rationale of the cases is that whether or 
not preliminary negotiations form part of the agreement 
(whether oral or written) depends on the circumstances of each 
particular case. Nhere the agreement is in writing the 
onus of proving that oral negotiations formed part of the 
contractual terms is a heavy one and it is on him who 
alleges it to prove same. Prirna facie the courts operate 
on the basis that the written agreement is all the contract
59. (1946) 18 N.L.H. 49.
60. (1833) 2 L.J. K.B. 127.
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finbetween the parties until the contrary is proved
Certainty, of course, demands that the court should
rely on what is before them in the form of a document until
any additional or other terms are established by evidence.
But a rigid application of this rule in a jurisdiction
where the vast majority of the people are illiterate is
62bound to inflict hardship on some of the parties 
Although the Illiterates Protection Ordinances in Ghana and 
Nigeria have gone some way in safeguarding the rights of 
illiterates, it is contended that the Ordinances have no 
answer to situations v/here the illiterate is himself 
relying on the document. In such cases the courts have 
always stuck to the principles of the imported law.
(ii) The relative importance of the terms used:
There are three main facets of any discussion on the 
terms of an agreement. The first is the distinction 
between express and implied terms. Express terms are 
apparent on the face of the agreement, while the implied 
terms are those that are read into it as a result of custom, 
statute or by the court. The second is the effect of a 
purported exclusion from liability by the parties in the 
event of any breach of the terms (express or implied). The
61. c.f. Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J. in Gillespie Bros, v. 
Chen ex Eggar & Go. £l890 2 Q.B.59 at p.62; and also 
K.N. Redder burn, ""Collateral Contracts'1 (1959) C.L.J.58 
at pp. 59-64• The learned author stated in this article 
"that a document which looks like a contract is to be 
treated as the whole contract".
62. c.f. Graves v. Ampimah (1905) Ren.318 v/here the court 
considered the defendant’s inability to read and write 
and amended the written contract on that ground.
third is the relative importance of the terms used in the 
agreement. The first two aspects will he considered in 
the next following section. Here we are concerned with 
the third facet, i.e. the relative importance of the terms 
used.
It has aptly been pointed out by Cheshire and Pifoot^ 
that "common sense suggests and the law has long recognised 
that the obligations created by a contract are not all of 
equal importance. It is primarily for the parties to set 
their own value on the terms that they impose upon each 
other". But explicit hierarchical ordering of contractual 
stipulations is a rare phenomenon. The courts are there­
fore up against the task: of construing the meaning and 
assessing the importance of the terms used.
64-English law has adopted the terms "conditions"  ^ and 
"warranties" in discussing the various provisions of an 
agreement. The former is defined as a stipulation in an 
agreement the breach of which may given rise to a right to 
treat the contract as repudiated, while the latter is also 
a stipulation but its breach gives rise to an action in 
damages^.
63. The Law of Contract (6th ed. 1964) p. 122.
64. This use oi the term is easily distinguishable from 
conditions precedent and conditions subsequent. See 
the analysis of James L.5 in Re Lees (1875) L.R.10. 
Ch.App. at p. 372, where the ..learned judge used 
condition in three different ways: precedent, subse­
quent , inherent•
65. See SS. 11(1) and 62 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 
(England)•
Objection to the division of contractual terms into
conditions and warranties has been based mainly on the fact
that a breach of condition need not only entitle the
plaintiff to repudiate the agreement* In many cases,
where the plaintiff has affirmed the contract or done any
act that is not consistent with the owner’s continued title,
his only remedy is in damages and in such a case there is no
66distinction between a condition and a warranty • It was 
with a view to avoiding this confusion that the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872, preferred the phrase "reciprocal 
promises”•
It must be observed, however, that the vital consider­
ation is not whether or not contractual terms are neatly 
divisible into conditions and warranties. It is rather 
that the importance of a term in an. agreement should be 
reflected in the type of remedy available for its breach*
In deciding on the available remedy the courts will consider 
each term in relation to the agreement as a whole. This 
approach will render unnnecessary the controversy about the 
wisdom of the division of terms into conditions and 
warranties^.
66. See Cheshire & Fifoot, op.cit*, pp* 123-129. See also 
Williston, Contracts* S.665.
67. The Sale of Soods Act, 1895 (England) is still jnforce 
in the Eastern and Northern Regions of Nigeria as well 
as the Federal Territory, there is a Sale of Goods Law 
in the Western and Mid-Western Regions, but the division 
into conditions and warranties has been followed in all 
the jurisdictions. The Ghana Sale of Goods Act. 1962 
(Act 137) has adopted the phrase llfundamental obligation1', 
although warranties and conditions still remain in her 
Merchant Shipping Act*
(iii) Effect of terms on obligations of the parties:
In the two preceding sub-sections we have examined the 
distinction between mere representations and terms of an 
agreement, and the relative importance of the stipulations.
An attempt will be made here to analyse the legal effect of 
the terms used by the parties as seen by the courts* An 
examination of the law on the subject has revealed a more or 
less neat bifurcation of approach by the courts. We shall 
call these the purist individualistic approach and the pater­
nalistic approach. The first approach, which roughly
6acoincides in time with the period 1874-1958 except in
moneylending transactions, is conce.rned among other things,
with contracts of employment, guarantees, sale of goods
(including standard-form contracts and exception clauses)
and commission contracts. The latter approach, which is a
more dynamic view of the function of agreements, is concerned
69mainly with money-lending and hire-purchase transactions *
A critique of each of the approaches will be attempted as we 
go along.
(a) The Purist Individualistic Approach:
Wealth in a eommerical age is made up largely of promises.
An important part of everyone1s substance consists of
6 8. There is no special significance in the choice of the
dates except that the cases could be conveniently ana­
lysed on this basis.
69. Hire-purchase has often been treated as an aspect of the 
sale of goods. The separate treatment here is brought 
about by the different attitude of the courts to this 
category of transactions from those in other facets of 
sale of goods.
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advantages which others have promised to provide for or to
render to him; of demands to have the advantages promised,
which he may assert not against the world at large, but
70against particular individuals' . In this process of 
enforcing promises and demands, the role of the courts 
assumes a unique feature in shaping the economic basis of 
the society* Here we are concerned with the underlying 
principles that have served as a guide-light to the courts 
in construing the effect of contractual terms in Ghana and 
Nigeria between the years 1874-1958.
The reception of English law into Ghana and Nigeria
71has already been discussed in another place* • It is 
enough to mention here that the date of reception (i.e.
24th July, 1874, in the case of Ghana, and 1st January, 
1900, in the case of Nigeria) coincided with an era in 
the English law of contract when the emphasis of the 
courts was on the freedom of the individual to enter into 
any type of agreement he liked (barring public policy 
considerations). In legal theory this was the age of
the mechanical positivists who viewed law negatively as
72"a system of hands off while men do thingsn 1 rather than 
as a system of ordering to prevent friction and waste so 
that they may do things. Freedom of economic motion and 
locomotion was its logical extension into the arena of
agreements. Equality of the parties was presumed and any
70. Anson*s law of Contract (22nd ed., Guest 1964)*
71. See p. supra.
72. Eoscoe Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 
(Yale, 1961), p.143.
interference by either the state or the courts with con­
tracts, was viewed with undisguised disapproval# This 
then was the state of contractual theory when it was 
imported into Ghana and Nigeria#
Now, in the two territories (i#e# Ghana and Nigeria) 
the personnel of the superior courts during the period 
under review were substantially British# Their legal 
training and background was English (here we include Scots 
and Irish laws). Also the circumstances in the two 
countries favoured a laissez faire attitude towards agree­
ments freely entered into by the parties. The slave trade 
had been abolished and several European companies extended 
their other commercial operations to the West African terri­
tories. These companies enlisted the services of natives 
as agents in collecting raw materials from the farmers; 
employed them as workers in their local branches; exported 
raw materials to the home market (i.e. to Europe) and 
imported the finished goods back to West Africa to sell to 
the natives# This explains the fact that most of the 
local cases during this period and long afterwards dealt
with agency agreements, contracts of employment, sale of
73goods, guarantees and trade marks * The basic attitude 
of the courts was to interfere as little as possible with 
these agreements# This attitude of non-interference with 
contracts freely entered into by the individuals is what we
73. Land agreements also loomed large during this period 
because of the rise in the economic value of land 
particularly in the urban areas.
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prefer to discuss under the name of a purist individualistic
approach to the construction of agreements*
Contracts of Employment*^
This approach has been most evident in contracts of
employment* Section 5 of the Conspiracy and Protection
of Property Act, 1875, which makes the breach of an
agreement of service an offence, and Section 3(3) of the
Employees and Workmen Act, 1875 (both are English Statutes)
which gave the Court power to order specific performance
75of certain service contracts , indicate quite clearly the
sanctity of this category of agreements during this period*
In Ghana and Nigeria two streams of authority in this
aspect of the law have been recognised* Ihe first relates
to the obligations of the parties while the employment
lasted, and the second relates to their rights and duties
at the termination of the relationship, especially when
the termination was wrongful* In both groups of cases
the courts have tended to treat the provisions by the
parties as sacrosanct. In the latter group of cases,
however, there is a noticeable tendency on the part of the
courts to imply terms into the agreement made by the parties*
We shall be looking at these presently, but first we shall
74. See G* de H* Clark, "How wrong is wrongful dismissal?"
(1966) 63 I*aw Society Gazette, p.255- 
75* c.f. Fry, 1.J* in De Francesco v* Barnum (1890) 45 Oh*I>*
430 at p.438: "I should be very unwilling to extend
decisions to compel persons who are not desirous of 
maintaining continuous personal relations with one 
another, to continue those personal relations lest they 
should turn contracts of service into contracts of 
slavery."
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examine the former group of decisions.
In John Holt & Co. Ltd. v. lafe^the plaintiff employed 
Stephen Lafe, the defendant, as a salesman and produce 
buyer. A clause of their written agreement was that the 
defendant gave credit to customers at his own risk and any 
balance due must be paid off by him before stock-taking. 
Another clause of the agreement made the defendant res­
ponsible for any loss or shortage whether caused by himself 
or any person to whom he might delegate any of his duties. 
Subsequently, and perhaps as a result of trade competition 
and in order to attract more customers, the plaintiff's 
local agent orally agreed to waive the "no credit" clause 
during the cocoa season. The present action was a claim 
for the losses sustained by the plaintiffs partly as a 
result of goods sold by the defendant on credit. The 
defendant pleaded the oral agreement to waive the "no 
credit" clause, but the plaintiffs replied by pleading the 
Statute of Frauds which required such variations to be in 
writing. Jackson Ag.J. held that the oral waiver was 
only a "forbearance for a limited period or variation of 
the manner of fulfilling the original agreement" which 
need not be in writing to be pleaded* Accordingly,
76. (1939) 15, H.L.R.14* In Peters of Pron v. Symmons 
(1924) 5, U.L.R.79 the couri implied into the oral 
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants 
the term that the plaintiff was to be paid according 
to the rate prevalent at Oron instead of a higher rate 
which he was paid while at their Calabar Stores•
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judgment was given in favour of the defendant on this head 
77of claim •
78G.B« Ollivant Ltd# v. Adetutu was a claim for 
£387.0 .7 1* by the plaintiffs against the defendant, their 
employee, being shortages in the plaintiffs1 store manned 
by the defendant* The defendant had had the written per­
mission of the company to give goods on credit to certain 
specified persons and the shortage occurred partly as a 
result of the credit given within the relevant period.
The issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs could 
be allowed to retain any profits made by the defendant’s 
credit system while debiting him with any losses. On 
this Oarey, J. remarked:
"In my experience of claims such as this it 
is invariably asserted and not disproved 
that unless the salesman gives credit to 
customers he will do practically no business 
and yet the large firms also engage such 
salesmen, tie them down not to give credit 
but know they will and must do so, and they 
turn their blind eye on the breach of such 
a provision until such time as a default 
is made by a credit customer and then they 
hold the salesman liable. To my mind this 
is an iniquitous practice. There should be 
a definite provision one way or the other 
which should be strictly adhered to.” 7 9*
The learned judge held that the defendant was not liable for
77* ln Morris v. Baron 4.19183 A.C.l. the House of lords drew 
a distinction between cases of variation (where writing 
was required for contracts that must be in writing) and 
cases where one party at the request of and for the con­
venience of the other forbears to perform the contract 
in some particular respect according to its letter, e.g. 
Ogle v. Vane (1868) I.E. 3 Q.B.272.
78. Tl5?0) 157V.L.R.99.
79. Op.cit., at p. 101.
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the shortages since these arose as a result of the plaintiff’s
written consent to give goods on credit. Also in another
case where the plaintiffs acquiesced in the giving of
goods on credit by the defendant contrary to the written
terms of their employment agreement, the court held the
defendant was not liable for shortages in the stock which
80arose as a result of the credits given
On the other hand the Ghana Court of Appeal (as it
then was) found against the defendant in the recent decision
81of Korsah-Brown v. John Holt & Co. ltd. . The facts were 
that the appellant was a servant of the respondent company 
responsible for the purchase of cocoa with cash supplied by 
the company. A clause in the service agreement made him 
liable to them for any loss which they might sustain by 
reason of such produce not conforming with the standards of 
purity and quality required by their instructions or by 
current legislation. The appellant was to be paid commi­
ssion on his purchases but such payment was to be made after 
the verification of his accounts following a stock-taking.
The plaintiffs claimed £3,538.10.10d. being the cost 
of 383 bags of cocoa which the defendant claimed to have 
purchased but whieh were not found in their stores. The 
defendant counter-claimed for the same amount being the price 
he paid' for the bags of cocoa, and also for £83.15.8d., his
80. U.A.C. &  Co. ltd. v* Argo (1935) 14, K.L.R. 105.
81. 11959) G-.l.k. 75."
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commission for the purchases based on the terms of the 
agreement* He denied liability for the loss of the bags 
of cocoa, adding that it was due to thieves who broke into 
the store* In fact, police investigation revealed that 
the burglary was ’staged* by the defendant.
The court found as a fact that the defendant was the 
servant of the plaintiffs and that the property in the 
cocoa purchased, had passed to the plaintiffs. But it 
was held that the onus of proving that the loss was due to 
burglary lay on the defendant and since he had not discharged 
that onus he was liable under the terms of the agreement.
It was held further that the defendant had not faithfully 
discharged his obligations as a servant and therefore was 
not entitled to the commission.
The remarkable fact about this decision is that it in 
effect places the defendant in the position of an insurer 
for the plaintiff^ goods. By attaching responsibility for 
the loss of the goods to the defendant in default of a 
strict proof of a burglary the court raised the onus of 
proof in the civil claim to that of a criminal prosecution. 
One should have thought that the onus on the defendant as a 
bailee, was to prove that he exercised due care (which would 
rebut any allegation of negligence) •
Secondly, by depriving the defendant of his commission 
on the ground of bad faith, the court was in effect con­
victing him of the larceny of the goods. As the facts of
6 4 0
the case did not establish this beyond reasonable doubt, 
it is submitted with respect that the decision was rather 
hard on him* In deciding where the loss of the amount 
claimed should lie the court ought to have considered who 
stood to gain if the goods were sold in the normal course 
of business. If that test were applied, there is no 
doubt that the plaintiff*s claim would have been lost.
The other line of authority to which reference has
already been made is concerned with cases of wrongful
82termination of employni§nt . Tho 1§§U0 in most of them is 
the importance the courts attach to the remedies to which 
the plaintiff is entitled under the agreement if the 
dismissal was found to be v/rongful*
8*5In Bisset v. Prestea Block A. Ltd# , however, the 
issue was whether or not the plaintiff had been wrongfully 
dismissed (i.e. dismissed contrary to the terms of the 
employment agreement)* Bisset was engaged as a miner by 
the defendant company and one of the terms of the agreement 
was as follows: ”1 agree to do the work I am engaged for,
or any other work that the management may reasonably 
require me to do.” Ihe plaintiff, however, refused to
82. It is felt that this class of cases will assume less and 
less importance as trade Unionism and its membership 
becomes better organised and more widespread. Indu­
strial rather than legal action will then be the sanction 
for most wrongful dismissal cases. See the Nigerian 
Labour Code Ordinance, Cap.91f Laws (1958) j and the 
Ghana Industrial Relations Acts 1958, 1962 and 1965*
See also Anene v. J. Allen sup.cf.suit 88/1964 (Nigeria) 
unreported.
83. (1913) Ren. 761.
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work underground since he claimed that the work was the 
sort that was done by the 'natives'. He would not, 
however, have minded doing the work alone but he objected 
to sharing the same tank with a 'native1 * T h e defendant 
company dismissed him on grounds of refusal to carry out 
the terms of the employment agreement. His action for 
damages for wrongful dismissal (among other things) was 
dismissed by the trial judge and this decision was affirmed 
on appeal by the Pull Court (Gold Coast).
In Boiihey V. Findlay^  the Divisional Court at Accra 
was to decide whether the plaintiff's damages for wrongful 
dismissal were to be assessed on the basis of the unexpired 
term of his contract of service for a fixed period (in this 
case 5 years), or on the basis of the period within which 
the plaintiff ought to have found himself another employment. 
After a review of the English authorities on the matter, 
Michelin J. ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to one 
year's salary and commission for the breach of the contract 
of employment. T h e court purported to follow the leading 
English case of Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd.^» But in the 
Addis case the House of Lords in fact held that where a 
servant is wrongfully dismissed from his employment, the 
damages for the dismissal cannot include compensation for 
the manner of the dismissal, for his injured feelings, or
84. (1921-25) Div.Ct. 98. See also Lawson v. Walkden. 
85* (1909) App. Cas. 488.
for the loss he may sustain from the fact that the dismissal
in itself makes it more difficult for him to obtain employ- 
86ment . It is curious in the extreme that the court 
awarded a whole yearfs salary and commission as damages 
to the plaintiff in purported reliance on the authority of 
the Addis decision. Perhaps the court in implying into 
the service agreement a term that the defendants will pay 
the plaintiff a year’s salary and commission for any breach 
of the said agreement, was influenced by the difficulty 
of obtaining alternative employment in the territory#
This view is re-inforced by the later decision in Tay v.
87¥alkden , a claim for damages for refusal to employ the
plaintiff after he had paid some security in favour of
the plaintiff's claim. The Divisional Court cited with
approval the statement of the law on the subject by Erie,
88J. in the English case of Beckham v. Drake as follows:
"The measure of damages for the breach of 
promise now in question is obtained by 
considering what is the usual rate of wages 
for the employment here contracted for, and 
what time would be lost before a similar 
employment could be obtained. The law 
considers that employment in any ordinary 
branch of industry can be obtained by a 
person competent for the place, and that 
the usual rate of wages for such employment
8 6. c.f. ffagle v. Pielden fl96$3 2 W.L.E. 1027 at 1034 per
Lord Denning, K.R.: "I have said before, and I repeat
it now, that a man's right to work at his trade or 
profession is just as important to him as, perhaps 
more important than his rights or property. Just as 
the courts will intervene to protect his rights of 
property, they will also intervene to protect his 
rights to work."
8 7. (1921-25) Div.ct. 176. See also Bel field v. Cold Coast 
Amalg. (1910) Hen. 583.
88. (1894) 2 H.L. Cas. 579*
can be proved, and that when a promise 
for continuing employment is broken by 
the master, it is the duty of the servant 
to use diligence to find other employment."
Although the Tay decision can be distinguished from 
the Bonney case on the basis that in the latter case the 
plaintiff had had employment with the defendants for some 
time before the dismissal while in the a^;y case there never 
was any employment at all, it is submitted that this distinc­
tion does not affect the substance of the claims. In 
both cases the plaintiffs1 claims were for the breach of 
the contract of employment# It is contended that the Tay 
decision has a sounder and more rational basis than its 
predecessor*^.
In the interesting case of Sackey v. Sick-Hagemeyer
(Ghana) Ltd.^, Bannerman J. was faced with construing the
meaning of a term in an agreement of service giving the
employee certain benefits if his employment was terminated
under specified circumstances. The relevant provision in
the agreement was as follows:
"Article 24 - Payment of Indemnity (Gratuity) . 
Employees who are covered by this agreement on 
leaving the employment at the request of the 
employer, on grounds of redundancy, ill-health 
supported by medical evidence or old age shall 
qualify under this article.'"
The plaintiff had worked for the defendants for 39 
years, and was being retired by the company when he was 60
89. See also Shaul v. African & Eastern Trade Corpn. (1923-25) 
E.Ot.66 and Onogen v. Xeventis (1959) G.B.R. lo5;
Dixon & ors. v. Gold Coast Amalgamated (1911) Ren.615.
90. High Ot. Accra, 15th August, 196*5'. TJnreported.
years of age* The issue was whether or not he was entitled 
to any benefits under the agreement. The defendants 
claimed that the plaintiff would only be so entitled if his 
termination of appointment was premature. The letter that 
retired the plaintiff was in these terms:
"Dear Sir, 7th February,1963•
Much to our regret we have to inform you 
that the time of your retirement has come. 
According to information received, the maximum 
age of retirement is 60 years and since you have 
reached that age oil December, 1962, we are obliged 
to ask you to take your retirement.
It may be that you don’t feel yet that you 
need to leave the work, but unfortunately we 
must stick to what is customary and we cannot 
establish a precedent by allowing an employee 
to exceed the age of retirement. Therefore we 
suggest that you leave the service of this 
company at the end of next month, or earlier if 
you wish to do so.
Yours faithfully,
C. Van Aken, Manager,
Sick-Hagemeyer (Ghana) Ltd."
The plaintiff contended among other things that he was still
young in heart, that he did not see the provision in issue
at the time of his employment, but as he was being retired
on account of old age when he was still willing to work, he
was entitled to the benefit. In a judgment that depended
91more on logic than on the provisions of the law*7 , the 
learned judge held in favour of the plaintiff’s claim.
91. The issue revolved on the meaning of ’old age’ in the
agreement. In this respect the Ghana Industrial Relations 
Act (Act.299) would have been a safe guide to the judge.
In fact, no reference was made to the Act in the 
judgment•
In Higeria the position as derived from the authorities
is that in eases of wrongful dismissal the courts are
guided by the period of notice as specified in the contract 
92of employment • In the absence of any specific provision 
for notice in the agreement damages are assessed on what 
the court considers to be a reasonable notice. Reasonable 
notice in cases of employment for a fixed period has been 
held to be the unexpired term of the employment agreement^. 
Thus in Cattareo v. Da Rocha & anor^  the plaintiff 
was engaged as manager of the defendants* hotel, and being 
later dismissed by the said defendants, brought an action 
for wrongful dismissal claiming £440 damages* 2his 
amount represented the full amount of the plaintiff *s 
salary, allowances and passage money, to which the plaintiff 
was entitled if the contract had run its full and normal 
course. The trial court found as a fact that the dismissal 
was wrongful and that the employment was for a fixed period 
which had not expired at the time of the dismissal, 3?he 
plaintiff1 s claim was allowed in full. On appeal to the 
Pull Court, the principle of allowing damages for the 
expired term was affirmed by the court, although certain 
deductions were made from the claim for what the court 
described as “these amounts being payable de praesenti 
instead of their due dates,11
92. Madrides v. Tangalakis & Co. (1932) 1 1, H.L.R. 62.
See also Walters v. Harrison (1922) 4# H.L.R. 71*
93. (1932) 1 1, H.L.B. 57.
On the other hand in Madrides v. Tangalakis & Co.^» 
the plaintiff was in the employment of the defendants in 
Nigeria under an 18-months1 contract which expired in 
January, 1929* At the request of an authorised agent of 
the defendants his stay was extended and he was promised 
continued employment after his leave• In fact the defendants 
refused to re-engage him after his leave and in an action 
for the breach he claimed the full amount of his salary and 
other allowances for the unexpired term of the agreement.
The contract, however ? contained a clause under which the 
company could terminate the employment at any time by 
giving the plaintiff one month's notice or paying him one 
month's salary in lieu of notice. A judgment by the trial 
court giving the full amount claimed to the plaintiff was 
upset by the Full Court on appeal. It was held that the 
plaintiff's damages were limited to the period specified 
in the agreement^.
Q g
Ahuronye v. The University College, Ibadan  ^ dealt with
the peculiar situation of an employment for an indefinite
period with no provision for notice in the agreement. Here
the plaintiff had worked for the defendants for seven years
as a printer and had been dismissed. His annual salary at
the time of his dismissal was &144 paid at the monthly rate
94-. Madrides v* Tangalakis & Co. (1932) 11, N.L.R. 62. See 
also Walters v. Harrison (1922) 4, N.L.R. 71*
95. See also the old English cases of Hartley v. Harman 115
E.fi. 617 and French v. Brookes 150 S.A. 141 on which the 
Nigerian Court relied heavily for the decision of the 
Madrides case.
96. (1959)PW*.E.N.L.H. 232.
of £12. In an action for damages for wrongful dismissal 
it was argued for the plaintiff that an employment at a 
salary per annum represented a general or indefinite hiring, 
meaning a .hiring for a year certain and then from year to 
year and determinable only by a period of notice expiring at 
the end of the year. In rejecting this submission Hedges, 
Ag. C.J. held that the plaintiff belonged to a category of 
employees whose contracts were terminated at one month's 
notice by the University, and that the plaintiff was entitled 
to a similar period o£ notice. The important point about 
the case is that the court was ready to imply a period of 
notice similar to those of other employees comparable in 
status with the plaintiff.
Two recent decisions of the Nigerian Supreme Court
have raised afresh the vital issue of the role of the courts
in the security of employment in Nigeria. 2he first is
97David Nwaokoro v. Sapele Urban District Council  ^. In 
this case the plaintiff was a labourer in the service of the 
plaintiff council. Although he was rated on a daily basis 
he was in fact paid on a monthly basis. A letter purporting 
to terminate his appointment was in these terms:
"Termination of Appointment:
I regret to inform you that in view of the 
heavy rains, and the fact that you are lazy
97* Supreme Court Suit No. 180/1963, 25th June, 1965 - 
unreported.
and idle, you have been found redundant,
and the council has decided that you be Oio
terminated* This serves as a week's
notice to you, and your services will not
be required as from the 29th August, I960*
You should report to collect your money 
after this date.”
In an action for damages for wrongful dismissal, it was 
argued for the plaintiff that the letter of termination did 
not comply with a regulation of the Local Government (Staff) 
Regulations, I960 of Western Nigeria^, and that on the 
English authority of Vine v. National Dock Labour Board^  the 
plaintiff's damages was his wages from the time of dismissal 
to the date of judgment. Regulation 91 of the Local Govern­
ment (Staff) Regulations provided as follows
"91• The appointment of a daily paid 
employee may not be terminated on the 
grounds of inefficiency unless hehas 
within the immediately preceding six 
months been warned in writing that his 
work or conduct has been unsatisfactory."
In fact, no such written warning had been given to the
plaintiff. The trial magistrate therefore allowed the
plaintiff's claim, but on appeal to the High Court this
judgment was set aside on two grounds, namely, that the
plaintiff did not belong to the category of workers covered
by the regulations, but that even if he did, the Council
acted within their powers under Section 32 of the Labour
Code Ordinance, which provides for seven days' notice to
terminate the employment of daily paid labourers'*^.
98. Regulation 91. Part IX.
99. D-956J 3 All E.R.946.
100. Cap.9 1 , Laws of Nigeria (1956). Labour being a Federal 
Subject under the Nigerian Constitution (1963), the 
Federal provision is equally valid in tne tesuern Region.
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Secondly, that the English decision was no guide since it 
was based on English legislation not in -pari materia with 
the local enactments on the same subject. The Federal 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court.
Several issues are raised by the above decision, but
the one that concerns us here is the argument put forward
by the Supreme Court in support of the defendants1 case.
Referring to the reasons for the dismissal, his Lordship
#
had this to say:;
"If a master gives his servant a weekfs notice 
orally and tells him it is because he is lazy, 
he may feel that he did not deserve the epithet 
and ought not to be discharged, but cannot 
complain that he was wrongfully dismissed; 
so, too, if the master gives notice in writing
and adds that the servant is lazy and idle:
the servant need not show the letter to anyone.
We are concerned with a claim based on breach 
of contract, anchwith the power to discharge 
and the sufficiency of notice given by the 
Council in this case, in the light of the law 
of Nigeria." 101..
It is submitted with respect that this view of the role 
of the courts in safeguarding the interests of the parties 
in employment cases is a very narrow one. There is no 
reason why the law in Nigeria should not provide a remedy,
not only for cases of wrongful dismissal (i.e. breach of
contract as at present defined), but also instances of 
arbitrary dismissal. If employers are allowed to terminate 
the appointment of any employee even without good cause 
shown, there is a strong cose for a re-examination of the
1 0 1. Op.cit., p.4 . See also to the same effect Choizie v.
| U.A.C. Ltd. (1956) I, E.R.N.L. R. 28.
ti
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102legal rules governing the security of employments
The second case is Anene v. J. Allen & Co. Ltd.^^.
This was another claim for among other things damages for 
wrongful termination of employment. The plaintiff had been 
in the service of the defendants for 25 years. On 5th 
July, I960, he took part in a strike called by Joe Allen 
African Workers* Union (a registered trade union) of which 
he was a mamber. The strike lasted two weeks. In a 
settlement of the trade dispute between his Union and the 
defendant company (to which settlement the Government 
Industrial Relations Commissioner represented the Federal 
Ministry of Labour) the following terms were agreed on inter 
alia::
"(2) both the Management of the Company and 
the Union agreed that all employees of 
the Company who do not elect to return 
to work should be given their full normal 
benefits.
(5) the Union recognises a process of gradual 
recovery to normal production at all estab­
lishments of the Company, which will entail 
taking on those who elect to work by stages. 
The Company undertakes to re-employ as many 
staff as work can be found for.
(4) with a view to facilitating these arrangements,
the management offers to restrict overtime 
for the time being.
(5) the Company will review all staff re-employed 
within a period of three months with a view 
to making a special recommendation to the 
Board for re-instalment of back service and 
all benefits attached to it.”
102. In the Nwaokoro case the Magistrate found that in fact
the plaintiff was dismissed because he refused to offer
£5 as bribe to the councillors which all the other 
labourers had done to retain their jobs.
103• Supreme Court Suit No. 88/1964 „ 15th Feb. 1965 -
unreported.
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The plaintiff had applied for re-instatement but the defendants
replied informing him that they regarded the withdrawal of
his services as his resignation and that they were entitled
to this view on the basis of the agreement reached with his
Union to which the Industrial Relations Commissioner was a
party. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court accepted
the defendants* contention. Accordingly the plaintiff
lost both his claim for damages for wrongful dismissal and
for other benefits. Again this is another hard case on
the employee. It is not easy to see how a Union whose
primary function is to safeguard the interests of its
members, could have intended the meaning read into the
clauses of the agreement by his Lordship. It is submitted
with respect that this is another sad instance of the purist
104individualistic approach to the construction of agreements
Sale of goods:;
This is another aspect of the law in which the judges,
have adopted the purist individualistic approach to the
interpretation of agreements. Contracts relating to the 
sale of goods are regulated in England by the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1893# This act is also in force in Nigeria (except in 
the Western Region)^ 5  sj_nce ± Q a pre-1900 English Statute
104. See also Moeller v. Monier Construction Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. 
(1961) 1 All N.L.R. (67: Garabedian v. Jemakani (1961) ' 
1 All N.L.R. 177.
105. See the Western Nigeria Sale of Goods Law. Cap.115 of
1959* This enactment has been part of the law of the
Mid-Western Region since the creation of the latter in 
1963.
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106  ^of general application . It is not, however, in force in
Ghana, and before July, 1962, the Ghana Courts had to rely
on common law rules when any dispute arose between the
parties to an agreement for the sale of goods'^'7. The
present position in Ghana is regulated by the Sale of Goods.
Act, 1962 (Act 137)* Thus in the two territories with
which we are here concerned the subject is governed by
three separate though substantially similar enactments,
namely, the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (England) which is
substantially in force in Nigeria (Federal Territory),
Eastern and Northern Nigeria; the Sale of Goods Law,
1081959 , which is in force in the Western and Mid-Western
Regions of Nigeria; and finally the Sale of Goods Act,
(Ghana), 1962, which regulates the subject in Ghana.
It must be observed that the position is not as com­
plicated as it at first sight appears to be* In Eastern 
and Northern Nigeria the Sale of Goods Act, 1893> is in 
force* The position is different from the current English 
law on the subject, since the Law Reform (Enforcement of 
Contracts) Act, 1954-* which in England repeals section A of 
the Sale of Goods Act, 1893? does not apply to the two
106. Nigerian Sweet Confectionary Co* Ltd* v. Tate & Lyle (NigJ 
Jjtd* Supreme- Ct♦Suit No. 380/1964 - unreported; S*;C*0*>A. 
v * Ndaeyo* High Ct. Portharcourt (E.Nigeria) 45/A/60 
(i960) - unreported.
107* See Simmons v. B.B.W.A* (1905) Ren*344; Akotey v.
Commonwealth Trust: (1923-25) F.Ct* 78•
108* Cap. 115.
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regions. Thus in both the Eastern and the Northern regions
contracts for the sale of goods of up to and above £10
10Qare only enforceable if they are evidenced in writing ♦
The Nigerian Law Reform (Contracts) Act, 1961 
(Federation) by its section 7 adopts the current English 
law position with regard to contracts made after the 
commencement of the enactment (i.e. 28th December, 1961).
The effect of this is that for those contracts made before 
28th December, 1961, the Sale of Goods Act, 1893* is still 
in full application.
The Western Nigeria Sale of Goods law also adopts the 
current English position on the sale of goods. It is 
arguable, however, if pre-1959 contracts are affected by 
the new enactment in view of section 4(c) of the Law of 
England (Application) Lav/, which makes savings for existing 
"rights, privileges, obligations or liability which 
accrued” or were incurred under any hitherto applicable 
imperial statute. Although one would stipulate for a 
more uniform law on the sale of goods in alLthe Nigerian 
jurisdictions, it must be emphasised that there has not 
been any noticeable divergence from the position in England. 
The Ghana legislation, however, quite apart from its
109. The value of writing has been discussed under defective 
agreements, supra - p.
110. No. 64 of 1961 (Federation).
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being more comprehensive and wider in scope^'^ than its 
English and Nigerian counterparts, also makes slight 
departures from the English model.
Firstly, Section l(i) defines a contract of sale of 
goods as a "contract whereby the seller agrees to transfer 
the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration 
called the price, consisting wholly or partly of money"#
Thus in Ghana unlike in England and Nigeria, the price of 
goods need not be wholly in money form. Although there 
have been no local judicial decisions on the meaning of 
this section, it is contended that it includes in the cate­
gory of sale of goods such situations as trade by barter 
where the differences in value are made up by one of the 
parties in the form of money.
Secondly, Section 8 of the Ghana Act, provides for 
what is described as the "fundamental obligation" of the 
seller of goods. There is an express prohibition against 
his excluding any liability on himself for a breach of 
this obligation. This is an obvious step forward in this
aspect of the law. It is an improvement on the English 
112position *.
Thirdly, Section 16(2) provides that unless a contrary 
intention appears, stipulations as to the time of delivery
111. The Ghana enactment also deals with C.I.JV and F.O.B. 
contracts under its Part VII, and Hire Purchase contracts 
under Part VIII, both of which subjects are treated 
under different Acts in England and in Nigeria.
112. More will be said about this provision in the discussion 
on exception clauses, infra - p.
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are conditions of a contract of sale. This is of course
an enactment of the common law position where time is of
the essence of the contract unless the parties expressly
113make it not so .
Finally, the Ghana legislation provides against the 
forfeiture by the buyer of any sums paid by him in further­
ance of the sale. The provision is as follows::.
"57(1) where under a contract of sale the 
buyer has paid a part or all the price to 
the seller and the seller refuses or 
neglects to deliver the goods to the buyer, 
having the right so to do, or, after delivering 
the goods, recovers the possession thereof 
having the right to do so, the buyer is 
is entitled (without prejudice to any other 
rights, but subject to any counterclaim for 
damages by the seller) to recover from the 
seller the amounts which he has paid.
(2) This section applies whether the amounts 
paid by the buyer were expressed to be by 
way of part payment or deposit or otherwise, 
and notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary.
(3) Nothing in this section affects any case 
where the seller's refusal or neglect to 
deliver the goods, or his recovery of the 
possession thereof is wrongful."
There is no corresponding provision in the English or
Western Nigeria enactment on the subject. The meaning of
the section was in issue in the recent Ghana case of Obeng
114- /v* Gyamfi decided by Charles, J. at Synyani (Brong Ahafo
Region). This was a claim by the plaintiff for £500 or,
113. Parkin v. Thorold (1852) 16 Beav.59; Bowes v. Shand 
"(1877) 2 App.Gas.4-55 which was a case on the time for 
the performance of a sale of rice. This presumption 
as to time is saved under the Common-Law provisions 
of the Sale of Goods Act. 1895 - See S.62.
114-. High Court, Sunyani - 29*1*6>5- - unreported.
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in the alternative, a car on which he had paid a deposit 
but which the defendant had sold to a third party. The 
facts were that the plaintiff had entered into a credit 
sale agreement with the defendant one of the terms of which 
was "that according to the tenor of this agreement if the 
second party shall fail the terms herein stated the first 
party shall have to seize the vehicle and give him one 
month notice in writing and if he shall still fail, the 
vehicle must be sold by the first party for money to cover 
or liquidate the then balance of its actual cost”. The 
plaintiff had paid an initial deposit of £150 and had 
paid only £20 in instalments after three months. In fact 
he was to pay £40 monthly. The defendant therefore 
seized the car but without the requisite notice, sold it. 
Charles, J. held that the sale was wrongful and applied 
section 57(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1962 in awarding 
the plaintiff £170 damages based on his £150 initial deposit 
and £20 subsequent payment.
It is, of course, too early to comment on the impact 
of Section 57 of the Ghana Act, but if the Obeng case is 
anything to go by, then it is submitted with respect that 
the Ghana experiment can hardly recommend itself to any 
other jurisdiction. Perhaps the courts may yet adopt a
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more liberal interpretation of the provision^^.
116Standard form Contracts and Exception Clauses t
The practice of one party preparing the terms of an
agreement in advance and offering them on a take-it-or-leave
it basis to a mass of consumers has become a characteristic
feature of modern contracts^*'7. This ready-made contract,
usually called the "standard form" contract, but sometimes
called the rather uncommunicative name of "contracts of 
118adhesion" , seems to have first appeared in the courts in 
England in the so-called "ticket-cases". In these cases 
terms were printed on the receipt that the traveller got 
when he deposited his bag with the station attendant. 
Common-sense would dictate that such a document is but an 
acknowledgement of the fact that a passenger has paid his
115. It has not been considered necessary in view of the 
heavy reliance on English judicial authority, to under­
take a detailed discussion of the case law on the 
subject. For these see - (1) Ghana:1 Simmons v. B.B-W.A.. 
(1905) Ken.344; Mercer v. Anglo-Guinea Produce Co.
(1922) F.Ct.114; Akotey v. Commonwealth Trust 11925-25)
F.Ct.78; Nanka-Bruce v. Laing & Anor. 11925-25) F.Ct.89 
(E.C.);: Amnofo v. Quartey C1926-29) Div.Ct.151: 
Atchiapong v. Hiller (1926-29) Div.Ct.207; Bodoo v. 
Ashittey (1965) Current Cases, No.6 . (23 Nigeria*
Halliday v. Alapatira (1881) 1,N.L.JR.. 1 ; Ban Juma v. 
Standard Co. of Nigeria Ltd. (1922) 4, N.L.K. 50;;
Western African Import & Export Co. v. Jasser (1939)
1 5 , N.L.K. 21.
116. See particularly H.B. Sales, "Standard form Contracts" 
(1953) 16 M.L.K. 518; Kichard O ’Sullivan, "A scale of 
values in the common law" (1937)f H.Ii.-H* 27; American 
Law Institute Uniform Commercial Code SS. 2-302; J.B. 
Milner, Cases and Materials on Contracts (Toronto, 1963) 
pp. 497-540.
117. Standard forms were more regularly used in shipping and 
Insurance transactions, e.g. charter parties, bills of 
lading and marine policies. Ste©-
not to deal at all.
ess
fare or left his luggage at a particular store, but the 
courts did not adopt this course even as a working prin-
There has, however, been a phenomenal use of standard 
forms in all kinds of commercial transactions in recent 
years. In themselves these forms are of vital service to 
modern commerce. It is a timely answer to the problems 
posed by the large volume of modern economic activity in 
the age of automation. If the Electricity Board or the 
Gas Board had to enter into separate and different nego­
tiated contracts with their millions of consumers, the 
resultant delay would be frustrating in the extreme.
Having said this, one has to advert to the more fundamental 
issues raised by standard-forms. We shall be examining 
two of these issues here, namely, the reasonableness of 
the terms embodied in the agreement, and secondly, the 
freedom of the parties to exclude themselves from liability 
for a breach of the terms. The subsidiary issue of the 
impact of illiteracy on this aspect of the law in Ghana and 
Nigeria will also be investigated.
Reasonableness of the terms zl
A remarkable feature of standard form agreements is 
the basic inequality of the parties. With the increasing 
concentration of business in the hands of a few large mono­
polies and multiple firms, and more threats of take-over
ciple11^
119. See the English Court 
South Eastern Railway.
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bids, equality of bargaining power has become a trans­
parent farce* Sir Henry Maine's statement in 1861 that
"the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been
120a movement from status to contract" , is now in obvious
reverse* The position now appears to be from contract to
status* The question that arises is, how far are the
courts prepared to go in protecting the victim of patently
unreasonable terms?- Two hypothetical examples of such
terms have been put forward* Professor Milner in his
121Cases and Materials on Contracts , has the following:
"I am wholly responsible for the return of the
said article or articles and upon failure to
return it or them on the due date, it shall be
lawful for the lessors, their servants, or 
agents and with such other assistant or 
assistants, as they may require, at any time 
during the day or night to enter in or upon 
my lands, tenements, houses and premises 
wheresoever and whatsoever, where the said 
articles or any part thereof may be and for 
such persons to break and force open doors, 
Hocks, bolts, fastenings, hinges, gates, 
fences, houses, buildings, enclosures and 
places for the purpose of taking possession 
of and removing the said articles for the 
purpose of regaining possession of them*" 121
Bramwell, L.J* in the Parker case has also the followings
"It is asked: What if there was some
unreasonable condition, as for instance to 
forfeit £1 ,0 0 0 if the goods were not removed 
in forty-eight hours? Would the depositors 
be bound?" 1 2 2.
120* Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (Ed. Pirth, 1963)
See also Henson v. London & North Eastern Railway CX946J 
1 All E.R.653- per Scott, L.J. "It is such misuse of 
contract which makes the legislature tend to substitute 
status".
121. Op.cit., p. 498.
122. C.f. Watkins v. Rymill (1883) 10 Q.J3.D. 178 where such 
impossible conditions were disallowed by the court.
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The answer to the questions posed by similar terms has 
agitated the English Courts for nearly a century* Their 
basic attitude to these terms is exemplified in the state­
ment of Erie* J. in the Exchequer Chamber decision of 
McManus v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway^^, that "the 
notion that customers of railways require protection on 
account of incapacity to resist oppression, is not more 
true than the notion that, against a large proportion of 
customers, railway companies stand in need of every aid 
the law can afford". Even if this approach was consistent 
with 19th century economic theory in England, there has
been a large volume of protest against its continued
124application in the present century . It is obviously 
unsuitable for present-day conditions in both Ghana and 
Nigeria often described as welfare states. Yet the local 
Judicial opinion in the two countries have had very little 
to offer in any attempt to make the claim real.
Their approach to the construction of terms in contracts 
of employment has already been discussed. This attitude 
has been followed up in contracts of guarantee where the 
courts have persistently refused to exonerate the surety 
from his obligations even in clear instances of
123. (1859) 157 E.fi. 865.
124. See Sales, supra; W. Friedmann, Law in a changing 
society. (London, 1959) Chapter 4; -dale, Bargaining, 
duress and economic liberty" ((‘iso ) 43 Col. L.R. 603.
variation***^ . Fire and accident insurance policies have
also been construed in this light. Thus in a recent case
before the Ghana Supreme Court the plaintiff was injured
in a motor accident and sued the defendants who were the
insurers. The facts were that the plaintiff was picked
up as a passenger for a fare from Accra to Aburi. The
car, a private car, belonged to X (the insured) and was
driven by Y. On the way the car ran into a ditch and
the plaintiff sustained injuries. He did not in fact pay
the fare because of the accident. The plaintiff obtained
judgment against Y in the High Court for £1,4-73# 10s. and
since the car was covered by the defendant under Section 10
of the Ghana Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act,
1958, he sued the defendants for the amount. The defendants
argued that the car was covered for social, domestic and
pleasure purposes, and for the insured's business only and
did not cover use for hire and reward, or for racing, pace-
making, reliability and speed tests, etc. The trial court
125. Ode v. J.F. Sick & Co. and Anor. (1939) 15, N.L.R.4-,
where the 2nd deft, was held liable for debts incurred 
before he undertook the guarantee; Molade v. John Holt
& Co. (1937) 13, N.L.R. 150, where the plaintiff was 
held liable for shortages due to burglary (see W.A..C.A., 
3rd Nov. 1937- ); Bucknor & Anor. v. Barclays Bank
(1924-) 7,N.L.R.l, where the court allowed the defendant
bank to take additional security without giving further 
credit; Miller Bros. Ltd. v. Oyegunde & ors. {1924-)- 5 , 
N.L.R. 97, where the court held that additional res­
ponsibilities on the employee did not absolve the 
surety from liability; c.f. Pettiford v. May (1937)
13, N.L.R. 138 where surety was absolved because the 
full amount stated was not paid by the plaintiff. See 
also Bamiro v. John Holt Be Cp, (1938) 14-, N.L.R. 63.
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held that the terms of the policy were wide enough to cover 
the plaintiff but this decision was upset bn appeal by
i
the Supreme Court *. The Nigerian Supreme Court arrived 
at a similar conclusion in the casecf Malik Mattar v.
Norwich Union: Fire Insurance & Anor^^7* But there was a 
counter blast in the Enugu High Court decision of Oduah v.
1 po
The Lion of Africa Insurance Co* Ltd. where Palmer, J.
found for the plaintiff*
In cases involving the carriage of goods both by sea and
on land the courts have also adopted the attitude of
presuming that the terms used by the parties are fair and
therefore should not be interfered with* It needs hardly
be pointed out that such a presumption in jurisdictions
where the mass of the population are illiterate reflects a
very poor image of the law. As has been aptly pointed out
by Sir Frederick Pollock in another connection "no law has
ever been able to ignore the economic stratification of
society"'**^ . We would add that the law should equally
reflect the social stratification of society. Thus the
position as set out in Section 70 of the American Restatement
126. Supreme Court Suit 21*6.65* - unreported (Ghana).
127* Supreme Court Suit No. 217/1963 (Nigeria) unreported.
See also Qkenla v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co* Ltd* 
(1958) WJ-j.N.L.E. 185: Jia Enterprises v* British
Comm. Insurance Co. Ltd. (1965) N.M.LJR. 147.
128. High Court Suit No. E/72/62 (Enugu,. E.Nigeria) unreported 
Here the defendants sought to enforce a provision in 
the policy to the effect that the plaintiff would lose 
his rights to any sums if he failed to inform the 
company of any claims promptly.
129* Cited by Holdsworth in H.JD.Ii.. Vol. VIII-* p. 479*
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of Contract that "One who makes a written offer which is
accepted or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a
writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer
or proposed contract, is bound by the contract though
ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper
130interpretation" y , is hardly applicable in its entirety 
to Ghana and Nigeria. It is no defence to rely on the 
Illiterates Protection Ordinances, which provide that any 
terms should be interpreted to the illiterates by licensed 
letter writers. Quite apart from the difficulties of 
translating technical terms into vernaculars (which the 
letter-writers are rather ill-equipped to undertake), it 
is submitted the unconscionable terms do not become less 
so by reason only of their being rendered in vernaculars.
If the aim of contract is to regulate the economic life 
of the society there is no reason why the doctrine of 
repugnancy should not be imported by the courts into this 
aspect of the law to strike down any terms which are repug­
nant to the general principles of fair dealing. In this 
way the courts will regain the confidence both of business 
and the common man in the judicial process and arrest the
130. C.f. Halliday v. Alapatira (1881)/ N.L.P. 1, where it 
was held that the delivery of a printed circular to 
an illiterate person without an explanation of its 
contents does not convey notice of an act of bank­
ruptcy available for adjudication under English law, 
and that any payment by the illiterate to the bankrupt 
after the receipt was a valid payment.
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increasing tendency of resorting to extra-judicial
151measures to redress breaches of agreements  ^♦
Exception clauses"^ :^:
The other problem posed by the prevalence of standard 
forms is the regular practice of one of the parties inserting 
terms in the agreement to the effect that he will not be 
liable in the event of any breach of some of or all the 
obligations created by the contract. These clauses are 
most common in cases of carriage, bailment and sale of 
goods. Consistent with their theory of the equality of 
the parties to an agreement, the English courts (with a 
few dissenting voices) have often been ready to enforce 
the agreement freely entered into by the said parties.
But as has already been noted, not all the stipulations 
of an agreement go to its root. Also some of the terms 
are implied into the contract either by trade usage or by 
statute. Examples of such implied terms are found in 
cases of carriage by sea and sale of goods'*"^ . The vital 
question that arises is the extent to which (if at all) 
the parties will be permitted to exempt themselves from 
liability for breach of the terms, express or implied, of
131. Legislative efforts in curbing unreasonableness of 
contractual terms will be discussed infra - p.
132. See B. Coote, Exception Clauses. (London, 1964);
E.M. Harrington^ "A case study of conditions and 
warranties (1965) Nigerian Law Journal, p. 289•
133« e.g. S. 35(3) of the Nigerian Marine Insurance Act 
(Federation). No.54 of 1961; and S.11 of the Sale 
of Goods Act. 1893«
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their agreement* This problem has been accentuated by the 
prolixity of modern business, the comprehensive nature of 
the documents used, with the clauses almost always in very 
fine print, in nearly all cases hardly read by the other 
party1^.
The orthodox treatment of this subject has been 
befogged by the use of such words and phrases as conditions, 
warranties, fundamental terms and fundamental obligations.
A, case study of the meaning of each of these words and
155phrases leaves an enquirer more confused than he began 
The recent House of Lords decision of Suisse At1ant v.
N.V. Rotterdam etc.^^^ in which Viscount Dilhorne and Lord 
Upjohn tried obiter to distinguish between a fundamental 
term and a fundamental breach, stresses the urgency of a 
clear statement of policy in this branch of law. The 
Northern Nigerian High Court was up against the same problem 
in Ogwu v. Leventis Motors Ltd. '^'7.
Three questions appear to us pertinent in any discussion 
of the subject of exception clauses. Firstly, have the 
parties or any a£  them the freedom to exclude himself from
134. The position is much worse where the other party has to 
rely on an interpreter to tell,him the meaning of the 
terms used. This is the problem of illiteracy and 
exclusion clauses. />
135. Compare Wallis v. Pratt Cl91QJ 2 K.B.1003; Karsales 
(Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis G.953J 1 W.L.K. 1468; and 
Smeaton Hanscomb and Co.Ltd. v. Sassoon & Sethy Son & Co. 
C3-91LJ A.-C.394; Andrews v. Singer £1954} 1 K«B. 17*
136. <&966J 2 All E.R. 61.
137. (1963) N.N.L.R. 115. See also Boshali v. Allied Commer­
cial Exporters Ltd. (1961) All N.L.H. 917*
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liability for the breach of any of his obligations under
the agreement? Secondly, if the answer to the first
question is positive, are there any, and if so, what'
exceptions to the general rule? In other words, are there
any terms which the parties cannot exclude liability for
under the agreement? Finally, what is yet to be done in
this aspect of the law?.
(a) Freedom to exclude terms:.
The presumption that the equality of the parties to a
contract is the basis of the Fnglish law of agreements, has
been sufficiently discussed. The basic inequality of
these parties in modern contractual situations has also
been mentioned. In spite of the latter tendency, there
is still statutory and judicial support for the view that
the parties are free to exclude any liability for the
breach of certain terms. In respect of sale of goods and
hire-purchase contracts, the Ghana Sale of Goods Act,
138
1962  ^ , provides as follows:^
"S.7 6: Subject to the provisions of this
Act, the rights, duties and liabilities of 
the parties to a contract of sale, as laid 
down in this Act may, as between the parties 
themselves,be varied by express agreement, or 
by the course of dealing between parties, or
138. Act 137 (Ghana). See also S.55 of the Western Nigeria 
Sale of Goods Law. Cap.115, laws (1959); and S.53 of 
the Sale of Goods Act. 1893, all of which are in similar 
terms to the Ghana provision. In this connection it 
must be observed that Islamic law regards as invalid 
(fasid)any provision in an agreement purporting to
exclude any of the parties from liability for a breach 
of any term. See ochacht, Introduction to Islamic Law. 
(Oxford, 1964).
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by trade usage, or by custom (whether a 
rule of customary law or not) which the 
parties may be taken to have agreed to 
be applicable to the contract•"
A peculiar feature of the Ghana enactment is that the 
freedom of the parties to exclude terras is subject to the 
provisions of the Act* Thus under Section 8 of the Act, 
which deals with the fundamental obligations of the seller, 
it is provided that any provision in a contract of sale 
which is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the funda­
mental obligation of the seller, is void to the extent of
139 140the inconsistency or repugnance . In the Suisse- Atlant
case where the House of Lords had to determine the effect
of an exception clause in a charter party, it was held
among other things that::
"There is no rule of lav/ that an exception 
clause is nullified by a fundamental breach 
of contract or breach of a fundamental term, 
but in each case the question is one of the 
construction of the contract whether the 
exceptions clause was intended to give 
exemption from the consequences of funda­
mental breach; if a breach occurs, 
entitling the other party to repudiate the 
contract, but he elects to affirm it, the 
exception clause continues unless on the 
true construction of the contract the 
exceptions clause is not intended to apply 
to and to continue after such a breach, in 
which case the party in breach is unable to 
rely on the exceptions clause♦"
Without at this stage going into the distinctions between
a fundamental breach and the breach of a fundamental term,
it must be observed that this decision of high authority
139. S.8 (3) of the Act, (Act 137, Ghana)
140. £1966] 2 All E.R. 61.
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summarises the position in English law. The parties are
free to exclude any terms from their agreement; all the
courts do is to construe the effect of the exclusion clauses
having regard to the dealings between the parties. The
Nigerian courts, on the other hand, have adopted the
position that, although the parties are free to exclude
themselves from liability for the breach of certain terms
of the agreement, there are some obligations which are
vital to the very existence of the agreement where no such
141exclusion will be recognised . This is, of course, the
position in Ghana in view of Section 76 of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1962, to which reference has already been made.
(b) Limits on the parties' freedom to exclude terms*
Two recent decisions of the Nigerian courts have
attempted to delimit the scope of the freedom of the parties
to exclude any liability for their breach. In the first
case, the defendant had agreed by correspondence to buy a
specified quality of foreign cloth from the plaintiffs.
141. Boshali v. Allied Commercial Exporters Ltd. (1961) All 
N.L.R. 917; and Ogwu v. Leventis Motors Ltd. (1963)
N.N.L.R. 115. The facts of these cases will be dis­
cussed below. No local cases in either Ghana or 
Nigeria have been decided on the question of sufficient 
notice, but the dicta of Carey J. in Bamiro v. John 
Holt & Co. Ltd. (1938) 14 N.L.R. 63, that "in dealing 
with a semi-educated African, one would expect a reput­
able English firm, in spite of the unwisdom of the 
surety in not acquainting himself with the precise 
terms to be inserted in the service agreement, to bring 
the latter to his notice especially where, in effect, 
the property of the surety was being jeopardised every 
month", tends to indicate that the standard of notice 
is higher for illiterates than for literate parties.
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A. sample had been supplied the defendant and it was a term 
of the contract that the consignment should correspond to 
the sample and description* The agreement also contained 
an exemption clause to the effect that the plaintiffs did 
not undertake any guarantees or admit any claims for foreign 
goods beyond such as were admitted by the manufacturers.
In fact the first consignment did not conform to the des­
cription and the defendant rejected the goods. The plain­
tiffs sued for the price of the consignment and the defendant 
counterclaimed for the breach of contract. The plaintiffs 
relied on the exemption clause. The trial court found for 
the defendant but this was upset by the Federal Supreme 
Court on appeal. The defendant appealed to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council where it was held, inter
142alia, that an exemption clause in a contract will avail
a party only if he is carrying out the contract in its
essential respects; and a breach which goes to the root of
a contract disentitles the party from relying on such
clause. In this case, the exemption would apply only if
the goods were in accordance with the contract:- as they
were substantially different, the exemption cannot avail
the respondent (plaintiffs)^^. In the second case where
the defendant delivered a car four years older than the one
contracted for and in many respects radically different
142. The clause has been variously called exception cl&use, 
exemption clause and exclusion clause.
145. The Boshali case - supra.
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(except the number plate), Smith, S.P.J. in the Northern
Nigeria High Court, held that there had been a breach of
a fundamental term of the contract and that the exception
144clause did not avail the respondents • The latter 
decision has been criticised on the ground that the exclusion 
clause in the agreement exempted the defendants from 
liability only for breach of warranties and not for breach 
of conditions. In fact, what occurred was a breach of 
condition and so the exception clause did not apply. But 
the Court decided the case on the basis of a breach of a 
fundamental obligation, which would introduce some con­
fusion into this aspect of the law^^. We are in agree­
ment with the learned author that the introduction of such 
phrases as fundamental breach of agreement or the breach 
of a fundamental term would further confuse rather than 
explain the law. This is borne out by two dicta from the 
House of Lords. The first in Smeaton Hanscomb and Co.Ltd. 
v. Sassoon and Sethy Son & Co. as follows:
"It is, no doubt, a principle of con­
struction that exceptions are construed 
as not being applicable for the pro­
tection of those for whose benefit they 
are inserted if the beneficiary has 
committed a breach of a fundamental term
in the contract I do not think that
what is a fundamental term has ever been
144. (1963) N.N.L.R. 115. His Lordship purported to follow 
the English decision of Andrews v. Hopkinson y-957J
1 Q.B. 229*
145. E.K. Harrington, "A case study of conditions and 
warranties (1965) Nig. Law Journal, 289*
671
clearly defined. It must be something,
I think, narrower than a condition of a 
contract, for it would be limiting the 
exceptions too much to say that they applied 
only to breaches of warranty. It is, I 
think, something which underlies the whole 
contract so that, if it is not complied with, 
the performance becomes something totally 
different from that which the contract 
contemplates.1 14-6.
And the second by Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Upjohn and
to which reference has already been made is an attempt to
distinguish a fundamental breach from the breach of a
fundamental term^"^.
On the other hand, we must with respect differ from
the author1s substitute of conditions and warranties as
a safer test in assessing the importance of the stipulations
in a contract. This is because there is no magic in the
words. In fact, the courts are still up against the
task of determining the remedies due to a plaintiff who
has affirmed an agreement in which there has been a breach 
_ 148of condition . It is submitted that what the courts 
require is the acceptance of a theory of agreements based 
on fair play and good faith. Any stipulation in a 
contract that is repugnant to this theory will-be void to 
the extent of the inconsistency. If after removing the 
void stipulations of an agreement the contract can no 
longer exist as such, then the rights and duties of the 
parties will as much as possible be restored to status quo
146. 0-9liJ A.C. 3 9 4.
147. At p. supra. -
148. See Ruben v. ffaire D-949|l All E.R. 215*
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ante. . This approach will conveniently avoid the hair 
splitting distinctions of conditions, warranties, etc. with 
their attendant dead . weight of judicial and academic 
literature.
This approach is also consistent with the Islamic
law view of exception clauses. It is against the general
theory of Islamic law for a party to insert a clause that
will exclude him from liability for the breach of his
obligation under any transaction. We would commend this
view for quick importation into the general law of agree- 
149ments • So the answer to the second question is that 
any exclusion of liability for the breach of any stipulation 
in an agreement should be consistent with a general theory 
of fair dealing and good faith in contracts.
(c) What is yet to be done in this aspect of the law?
The experience of English law in respect of standard 
forms and exception clauses has belied the suggestion of 
the Erench philosopher, Voltaire, that even the worst of 
evils become respectable with age. In fact, the menace 
of exclusion provisions is still very real. The attempts 
so far made, or which ought to be made, by the legislatures 
of Ghana and Nigeria to curb the worst excesses of this 
development will be discussed later*^^. Mr Sales in the
149. See E.H. Ruxton, Maliki law (London, 1916);
A. Rahim, Muhammedan jurisprudence.
150. See p. infra.
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151article  ^, to which reference has already been made, has
advocated a more liberal approach by the courts to the
construction of these terms. He has also proposed a 
supervisory body in the form of a Consumers1 Board to 
oversee the terms of agreements. Allott, in a proposal 
called "Fair Contracts (Consumers Protection) Act1 has 
proposed a Consumers' Court to protect the interest of the 
parties to certain agreements. The remarkable feature of 
the latter proposal (which will be discussed in some
detail in a subsequent section) is the sweeping powers that
the consumers1 court will possess. These powers will 
mainly be exercised in favour of the consumer. It needs 
hardly be said that no weapon is too lethal in the defence 
of the otherwise helpless consumer, in the face of the fast 
misviag a^Leskehe of monopolies and multiple firms. Such 
powers will also be a necessary corrective to the so many 
weaknesses of the purist individualistic approach to the 
construction of agreements.
(b) The Paternalist Approach*^  ^
151. (1953) 16 M.L.R. 318.
152. Proposal made in April, 1966, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, African Law Department.
153* See K. Berger, Usury in instalmental sales" (1935)
2 Law and Contp. Prob. 14-8; J.B. Birkhead, "Collec­
tion tactics of illegal lenders" (194-1) 8 Law and 
Contp.Prob.78; A.L. Diamond, "The hire purchase 
dealers' liability" (1958) 21 M.L.P., 177; A.D.M.
Oulton, "Loans in Kenya on the security of chattels" 
(i960) 4- J.A.L., pp. 17; 79.
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Under this subheading we shall be examining two 
categories of agreements - hire purchase and moneylending 
transactions. Although the former has often been sub­
joined to a discussion of the sale of goods, and the latter 
under illegal agreements, we feel, however, that the courts 
in Ghana and Nigeria adopt a basic similarity of approach 
in dealing with cases arising under these heads. The 
similarity in the end results of these cases justifies the 
joint treatment and it is the approach that the courts 
have adopted that we are here to explore. The principle 
that runs through most of the cases is that of a court 
posing as a father-figure to protect the hirer and the 
borrower against the owner and the moneylender respectively,
(i) Hire Purchase transactions:
The increasing variety of the amenities of modern 
life, the limits imposed by limited incomes, and the 
economic theory of choice all combine to welcome the 
timely arrival into the commercial scene of payment by 
'instalments either in the form of credit sales or of hire- 
purchase transactions. This practice which has reached a 
high degree of sophistication in the more highly industrial-
154.
ised countries  ^, is fast becoming an important factor in
154. S.21 of the Hire-purchase Act. 1964- (England), specifies 
three kinds of agreement under which goods are acquired 
by payment of instalments. These are hire purchase, 
conditional sales and credit sales agreements. In 
England these are regulated by the Hire-purchase Acts. 
1958, 1954 and 1964,. and to some extent, the Sale of 
Goods Act. 1895.
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the commercial life of the people of Ghana and Nigeria.
In Ghana a hire-purchase contract is defined as a contract 
of sale of goods in which the price is paid in five or 
more instalments’**^ . It is distinguished from credit-sale 
agreements in this respect that in the latter the property 
in the goods passes to the purchaser on delivery while 
in the former, the title does not pass until after the
y
payment of the last instalment. An attempt to evolve a
third category called "work and pay" contracts in the case
of Dodoo v. Ashitey***^  was disallowed by Archer, J. at the
High Court, Accra. Distinguishing it from a credit sale
agreement, he added:.
"I regret I have not been able to classify 
it and as I do not wish to take judicial 
notice now of the concept of "work and 
pay", it is my hope that another judge well- 
versed in the niceties of ascertaining and 
taking judicial notice of such amphibious 
commercial concepts will be bold enough to 
do so with confidence."
Before 1953, hire purchase in Ghana was regulated under
the common law which in this case meant the agreement of
the parties. Thus even if 99 per cent of the purchase price
had been paid the owner could seize the goods from the
1 5 5. S.81 of the Ghana Sale of Goods Act. 1962 (Act 137)-
156. (1965) Current Cases, No.6 . These agreements which 
are in regular use by taxi drivers are in the following 
form:* the driver accepts delivery of the vehicle on 
payment of a deposit and pays the remaining amount by ' 
instalments. It has most of the elements of a credit 
sale agreement. It is curious that the learned judge 
distinguished it from the latter. See also Kofi v. 
Hensah (1930) 1 W.A.C.A., 7 6.
the hirer who would have no remedies under the agreement 
in the event of a default. In such a case the owner would 
often get more than his due share of profit on a particular 
transaction. It must be added that some hirers exploited 
hire-purchase facilities to acquire goods that they had no 
means of paying for. The Hire-Purchase Act, 1958^^
(Ghana) was enacted on the model of the 1938 English Act 
to regulate these transactions. Among other things . 
the Act provided for a resort to the courts by the owner in 
order to recover possession of the goods if three quarters 
of the price had been paid by the hirer. The Sale of 
Goods Act, 1962 (Ghana), which now regulates hire-purchase 
contracts in Ghana, substitutes 50 per cent of the price 
for 75 per cent*^^.
The remarkable fact is that the courts, perhaps as a 
result of the general feeling that hirers of goods are a 
class which the Act was intended to protect, have resorted 
to a strict construction of the provisions of the enact­
ments. The general attitude has been that of allowing the 
hirer to recover all his instalments and any initial deposit.
157* Ho.55 of 1958 (repealed by Act 137? 1962). But while
under the Hire purchase Act, 1938, financialUmits were 
placed on transactions to which the English Act applied, 
the Ghana Act had no such provision. It is strange 
that the Ghana Parliament thought it wise to provide 
for the parties opting out of the 1962 Act in trans­
actions where the amount involved exceeds £1,000.
The Law Commission in England has recommended that 
there should be no such financial limits. These 
limits still exist in the 1964 English enactment on 
the subject.
158. Act 137. More will be said below about its provisions, 
see p..
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if there was a slight deviation from the terms laid down 
in the Acts. Thus in U.T.C. v. Johnson Okoro1^ .  the High 
Court at Sekondi (Ghana) was faced with the effect of 
Section 17 of the 1958 Act. This was the section that dealt 
with the restrictions on the owner*s right to recover 
possession when three-quarters of the purchase price had 
been paid. In the present case the defendant had in fact 
paid more than the statutory provision on the first agree­
ment, but the plaintiffs had purported to substitute a 
second hire-purchase agreement. This second agreement 
did not, however, comply with the schedule of the Act in 
respect of the owner not being allowed to retake possession 
if three-quarters of the purchase price had been paid.
The court therefore held that the second agreement was 
void. Since the plaintiffs had taken possession of the 
vehicle, the subject-matter of the agreement, and were 
suing for the balance of instalments due, the court was to 
decide whether the defendant was liable. The defendant 
had counterclaimed for his initial deposit and the instal­
ments already paid. It was held that the defendant was 
entitled to recover. Also in Yeboah v. C.F.A.O., (Tech­
nical)1^0 , Section 12 of the Hire-purchase Act, 1958, was in:. 
159* (1965) Current Cases, N0.54.
160. (19 65) Current Cases No.166. c.f. Awortwi v. Hendersons 
(Manchester) Ltd. (1 9 2 5) F.Ct.139? i*e* before the 1958 
Act. But see Akuffo v. As ante (1953) 14 W.A.C.A.. 275*
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issue. The facts were thatt-
In I960, the plaintiff, a timber contractor, bought a 
tractor, on hire purchase from the defendants at a 
cost of £9,810. When £5,360 had been paid, the 
tractor developed some trouble and was taken in by 
the defendants for repairs. In 1961 the account 
was transferred to a new tractor and a new agreement 
was made between the parties. The cost of the new 
tractor was £9 ,9 5 0, and since £5,360 had been paid 
the defendants could not take the tractor without the 
consent of the plaintiff or a court order. in fact, 
the defendants had repaired the said tractor and had 
sold it because the plaintiff had not continued with 
his instalments nor paid for the repairs. In an 
action for the refund of his deposit and instalments, 
it was held that he was entitled to succeed.
In addition to the sums so refunded the court also awarded 
the plaintiff £5,360 damages for what it called wrongful 
seizure of the vehicle. This was the amount paid on the 
first transaction which, as has been noted, was trans­
ferred to the new agreement. The court further awarded 
£2,000 damages against the defendants for their selling the 
vehicle while proceedings were already instituted. Costs: 
totalling 200 guineas were added on to the pile. In 
effect, the defendants in addition to losing £7,985*4-.7d. 
which was paid back to the plaintiff, were also ordered to
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pay £7,570 in the form of damages. Perhaps the court 
was influenced by the fact that the defendants made some 
good profit from the sale of the tractor and the fact 
that the sale took place while the proceedings were before 
their lordships* If this can be said for the £2,000 
damages, it is difficult to find any support for the 
additional £5,360 based on an agreement that was neither 
before the court nor in issue. It is respectfully sub­
mitted that with this approach to the interpretation of 
this category of agreements no hire-purchase company can
stay in business very long. The whole purpose of this
161type of agreement will be sadly defeated .
This attitude of the courts since the enactment of
the Hire-purchase Acts is in vast contrast to the position
162before the Acts. Thus in Swanzy Ltd* v. Dnarnie an 
action by the plaintiff company to recover arrears of
161. See also Dodoo v. Ashity (1965) Current Cases Ho.6, to 
which reference has already been made, supra p.
S.57 of the Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137) 
was then in issue; and Obeng v. Gyamfi (1965) Current 
Cases Ho 64.
162. (1926-29) Eiv.Ct. (Ghana), 178. Here the defendant 
relied on Lord Kinnear's statement in the Privy Council 
decision of Kwamin v. Kufuor (1874—1928) P..C* at p.36
as follows:: "When a person of full age signs a contract
in his own language, his own signature raises a presum­
ption of liability so strong that it requires very 
distinct and explicit averments indeed in order to 
subvert it. But there is no presumption that a 
native of Ashanti who does not understand English and 
cannot read or write, has appreciated the meaning and 
effect of an English instrument, because he is alleged 
to have set his mark to it by way of signature. That 
raises a question of fact to be decided like other such 
questions upon evidence." But the court found that 
He understood the nature of the document.
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instalments after taking possession of thelsrry (the subject-
matter of the agreement), it was held that the defendant
wouldvforfeit his £100 deposit and was also liable for the
arrears of instalments, A. plea of illiteracy did not
avail the defendant. Also in Sani v. the
plaintiff bought a lorry from the defendants on hire-
purchase, and in January, 1928, was in arrears to the
extent of £34.2*6d. Then he bought a second lorry,
paying a deposit of £102. Subsequently he paid £26 and
£28, but nothing was said as to which lorry the payments
were for. The defendants seized the first lorry on
account of the arrears and the plaintiff sued for its
return. It was held by the Divisional Court (Accra) that
the defendants were entitled to appropriate the payments to
164the s econd lorry
There was no enactment regulating hire-purchase in 
Nigeria before the Hire-purchase Act, 1965, and this Act 
applies only to the Federal territory. Under Section 9 of 
the Act, the owner cannot retake possession of the goods 
hired without obtaining a court order, if the hirer had 
paid three fifths of the purchase price in the case of 
motor-vehicles, and half the price in other cases^^. Thus
163. (1926-29) Div.Ct. 189. See also Sengena v. Poku (194-3) 
9 W.A..C.A. 143.
164. See also Atchiappng v. Miller (1926-29) Div.Ct. 207#
165* One important effect of this enactment is that agree­
ments made in Lagos but which are performed outside the 
Federal territory will be governed by their proper law, 
in this case, the Hire-purchase Act, 1965*
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in Nigeria (with the exception of the Federal territory) 
the hirer is at the mercy of the hire-purchase company.
It is hoped that the other jurisdictions will realise the 
urgency of regulating these transactions in the interests of 
the society"*^.
(ii) Moneylending transactionsi
In both Ghana and Nigeria moneylending transactions
caught the attention of the legislatures at an earlier
period than did hire purchase agreements. This may be
due to the high rates of interest charged by these lenders.
Thus as early as 1918 the Ghana Loans Recovery Ordinance
was enacted, Section 3 of which empowered the courts to
reopen transactions between moneylenders and borrowers with
167a view to disallowing cases of excessive interest .
A. similar provision against excessive interest is found in
168the Nigerian Moneylenders1 Ordinance , Section 14 of which 
imposes a penalty on any moneylender who charges interests 
higher than those provided in the enactment. The whole
166. The Nigerian cases on this head follow the pre-1958 
pattern of the Ghana decisions. Thus Amao v. Ajibite 
& ors. (1955-56) W.R.L.L.R. 121 dealt with the distinc­
tion between outright sale and payment by instalments;
G.B. Ollivant & Go. v* Akins any a & Anor. (1930) 10 
N.L.R. 73 on the test as to whether it is hire-purchase 
or credit sale; Joe Allen v. Adewale (1929) 9 N.L.JR^ 
111: Williams v. U.A.O.Ltd. (1957) 13 N.L.R. 134;
M. & K. v. Economides (1957) W^R.N.L.-R., 94-; At ere v. 
Dada fe anor (1957) W.R.N.L. 176.
167. &ee also the Ghana Moneylenders1 Ordinance, cap. 176, 
Laws of the G0ld Coast (1951 Revision).
168. Cap. 124, Laws of Nigeria (Federation, 1958).
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tenor of the Nigerian and Ghana legislation, as is the
English Moneylenders Acts of 1900 and 1927» is on the
protection of the public against the excessive charges of
some moneylenders. Thus in each of them the moneylender
169must be properly licensed , must keep correct and con­
sistent records'1'^ and must furnish certain information 
on demand*1^ .  While the English legislation makes any 
agreement that does not comply with the enactment unenforce­
able, both the Ghana and the Nigerian Ordinances impose 
penalties on the defaulting lender, thus making the agree­
ment illegal and void1^ .  There is, however, in the 
latter enactments, protection of the rights of third 
parties who have acted in good faith and without notice.
We shall now look at the way the courts have construed 
the provisions of these Ordinances. In Nwosu v. Ekezies^^.
169. S.4. of the Ghana Ordinance; S.4. of the Nigerian 
Ordinance and S.4. of the Eastern Nigeria Moneylenders 
Law, Cap. 84, Laws (1963).
170. SS. 19, 20 and 24 of the Ghana Ordinance, and the 
corresponding sections in the Nigerian enactment.
171. S.20 of the Ghana Ordinance and S.20 of the Nigerian 
Ordinance.
172. S.5 of the Ghana Ordinance and S.5 of the Nigerian 
Ordinance.
173. (1963) L.Ii.R. 53.
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174-section 6 of the Lagos Moneylenders Act 1 was in issue*
The facts were that a moneylender obtained a licence on a 
certificate which was defective as it did not specify 
the name and address of the bank at which the moneylender 
maintained a current account as required by Section 6 (3A) 
of the Moneylenders Act. In an action to recover the loan 
from the defendant it was argued that the omission did 
invalidate the certificate and that the transaction was 
unenforceable. It was, however, held by De Lestang, C.J. 
that the plaintiff should succeed. The reason for the 
holding was that the omission was not the fault of the 
plaintiff but that of the magistrate who issued the certi­
ficate without adverting to the new provision regulating 
the giving of certificates.
In Abesin & anor v. Iyaegbe^ 7^  the respondent was a 
moneylender who had succeeded in the lower court in an action 
for a claim of £100 from the appellants. In fact, the 
memorandum relied on by the respondent was not shown to have
174-. The Lagos Act is in the same terms as the Moneylenders 
Ordinance which is in force in all the jurisdictions in 
Nigeria except such Regions as have enacted a local 
statute to replace it (e.g.the Eastern Region,Cap.84-) 
S.6(l) provides as follows:: "A moneylender1 s licence
shall not be granted except to a person who holds a 
certificate granted in accordance with the provisions of 
this section authorising the granting of licence to that 
person, and a separate certificate shall be required in 
respect of every separate licence. Any moneylender's 
licence granted in contravention of this section shall 
be void.n See also the Moneylenders (Amendment) Act, 
I960, which applies only to Lagos and on which the 
Nwesu case was argued.
175. (1959) W.JR.N.L.R. 67.
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been signed by the moneylender or her agent in compliance 
with Section 12(l) of the Ordinance, and the interest 
charged on the loan was said to be excessive'*'^ (in contra­
vention of Section 13(l) of the same Ordinance). The 
High Court at Abeokuta (W. Nigeria) held that the agree­
ment was unenforceable, thereby allowing the appeal. The 
respondent’s plea of illiteracy and that the document was 
signed by a deceased agent, v/as lightly dismissed by the 
Court177. -Qu.t where the loan was secured with a mortgage
and the moneylender had exercised his power of sale under 
the mortgage, it was held that the title of the innocent 
purchaser for value without notice of the defect in title 
was not defeated by the said defect’**^. This decision is, 
of course, in accordance with section 23 of the Ordinance 
which makes saving for the title of innocent assignees.
Also in Sanusi v. Daniel & anor^ ^  an innocent purchaser
176. The respondent had charged 48 per cent interest on a 
loan secured by a third party as guarantor. The 
statutory maximum for this class of transaction is 17 
per cent. See Section 13 of the Ordinance.
177* See also Kadiri v. Ulusoga (1956) F.S.C.*59; Qguachuba 
v. Minimeh H.Ct. Enugu 10/59* unreported; Fashina v. 
Odedina (1957) 45 where an interest of 9d. in the £ was 
charged in spite of the security of a car; Molake v. 
linibu (I959y L.L.R. 128 on S.12(3) of the Ordinance. 
178. Baloguu v. Obisanya & anor (1956) F.S^C.22; see also 
the Ghana case of (5ff 1 ~&~~or3 v. Appiah & ors (1965) 
Current Oases 193*
179* (1956) F.SX^93. See also A,ietunmobi v. Omowunmi (1961) 
All N.L.N.. 120.
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at an auction sale validly conducted by the agent of a 
moneylender who had contravened section 12(l) of the 
Ordinance, was held to have acquired a good title, A. 
remarkable feature of these decisions is that although the 
innocent assignees acquire good title, the overriding 
consideration is not that of the moneylender1s interest but 
that of the third party. This view is reinforced by the 
provision for a penalty against the moneylender under 
Section 14 of the Ordinance^^.
It is Section 19 of the Ordinance that has agitated 
the Courts most. In the leading case of Kasumu v, Baba-.
lOI
Egbe the respondent had mortgaged some leasehold land
to a licensed moneylender as security for a loan. The
appellants were the administrators of the moneylender1s
estate. The moneylender had admittedly kept no book
recording the transactions as required by section 19 of
the Moneylenders Ordinance, The respondent therefore
instituted proceedings claiming the redemption of the
property and the recovery of possession. The relevant
provision of the Ordinance is as follows^
rf19(l) Svery moneylender shall give a 
receipt for every payment made to him on
180, Bee Kadiri v, Olusoga (1056) F.S.C. 59 a°.d Fashina v, 
Odedina (1957) W,.R,N.L.R. 45*
181.
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account of a loan or of interest thereon.
Every such receipt shall be given immediately 
the payment is made.
(2) Every moneylender shall keep a book (which 
shall be securely bound and paged so that 
leaves cannot be removed or inserted without 
apparent damage) in which he shall enter in 
connection with every loan made by h i m -  
(a) the date on which the loan was made; 
lb) the amount of the principal;
Cc) the rate of interest|*
(d) all sums received in respect of the loan 
or the interest thereon, with the dates 
of payment thereof, and shall produce 
such book when required to do so by 
any court.” 182.
(4) Any moneylender who fails to comply with 
any of the requirements of this section shall 
not be entitled to enforce any claim in 
respect of any transaction in relation to 
which the default shall have been made. He 
shall also be guilty of an offence under this 
Ordinance and shall be liable on conviction to 
a fine of ten pounds or in the case of a 
continuing offence to a fine of five pounds 
for each day or part of a day during which 
such offence continues."
The issue before the court was whether the respondents would
be allowed to regain possession of the mortgaged land
without making good the loan from the deceased moneylender.
The appellants had relied on the leading English authority
of Lodge v. National Union Investment Co. Ltd.^ ^  where it
was held by Parker, J. that in an equitable action by a
borrower to recover securities mortgaged to an unregistered
moneylender the morgagee will not be ordered to give up to
the mortgager the securities the subject of the mortgage
except upon the terms that the mortgager shall repay the
money which has been advanced to him. The respondents on
182. It was this sub-section that was in issue.
183. jp-907] 1 °k*300.
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the other hand had relied on the judgment of Eve, J. in the 
equally important case of Chapman v. IvIichae 1 son ~^^ ~ where 
it was held that in an action by the trustee of a debtor 
under a scheme of arrangement with his creditors against 
an unregistered moneylender who had taken a mortgage from 
the debtor to secure a loan, the court will make a mere 
declaratory order that the mortgage is illegal and void 
under Section 218^ of the Moneylenders Act, 1900, although 
no ancillary relief is asked. In such a case the court 
will not impose upon the plaintiff equitable terms as to 
repayment of the actual money advanced as a condition of 
making the declaratory order. The Supreme Court of 
Nigeria ruled that an account be taken by the parties and 
that the appellants be paid any outstanding balance as a 
condition for the delivery of the premises. On appeal to
IOC
the West African Court of Appeal this ruling was set 
aside and it was held that the loan and mortgage trans­
action was void as being contrary to the provisions of 
the Moneylenders Ordinance. This decision was affirmed on 
appeal by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Lord Radcliffe, who read the judgment of the Committee, 
stressed the impact of the penal provision in Section 19 of 
the Nigerian Ordinance to which there is no corresponding
184. 1908 2 Ch.612, See also C0hen v. Lestfcer 1939 J.K.B*504.
185• This section provides for registration of all money­
lenders.
186. Under the name G-badamosi BabaEgbe v., j^atience Kasumu & 
ors. (1954) 14 \\ .A.C.A.444.
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provision in the English enactment. To ask the respon­
dents to refund the amount borrowed as a condition for 
regaining possession, was, in his Lordship*s view, tanta­
mount to enforcing what the legislature had expressly 
prohibited. Secondly, the respondents were not asking for 
an equitable relief but a declaration that the transaction 
was void. Thus the Lodge case was distinguishable while 
the Chapman decision was more applicable. The result was 
that the respondents kept both the £1,541.2.6. being the 
balance found by the Supreme Court of the loan of £2,000, 
and in addition had reconveyed to them the premises which 
the deceased moneylender had occupied for five years before 
the proceedings were instituted.
Two aspects of the Kasumu decision deserve some 
comment. Firstly, it is not helpful to distinguish between 
a legal and an equitable remedy in a court where both law 
and equity are to be administered concurrently. To 
continue to draw this distinction is to allow the decision 
in a case to depend on the form of the plaintiff*s claim 
and not the substance of the action. The distinction 
between a declaration that the mortgage transaction is 
void and an order for the cancellation of the mortgage 
(legal and equitable remedies respectively) is, it is 
submitted, a question of the use of words. The legal 
effect of the two should not be as vastly different as the 
Kasumu case tends to suggest.
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Secondly, their Lordships argued that the Money­
lenders Ordinance was intended to protect a class of 
people to which the respondents belonged. The effect of 
this is that they are not themselves guilty of breaking 
the provisions of the Ordinance and are therefore entitled 
to relief. The Kasumu decision, however, goes much 
farther than protecting borrowers. It provides them with 
a safe avenue for financial advancement at the expense 
of an unfortunate moneylender who happened to omit an 
entry into his books. He loses both his money and any 
security he may have received. Surely the court ought 
to be given some discretion in the matter so that they 
can adjust the equities of the parties. It is submitted 
that the present rigid application of the provisions of 
the Moneylenders Ordinance underestimates the service that 
these licensed lenders give to the society. A discretion 
similar to that given to the courts in cases of frustrated 
contract s'*’8*'7 ought to be imported into moneylending 
transactions. This will be a better way of adjusting the
rights of the parties. It is obviously a worthwhile boost
1RRto the moneylending business . The latter suggestion is
187* See Section 3^4) of the Law Reform (Contracts) Act,
1961 (Nigeria), No.64 of 1961.
188. For other moneylending cases, see Ukhueduan v. Qkoye
(1956) E.R.N.L.R.5 2 on limitation - S.30 of the Ordin­
ance; Efuwape v. Ologbosere & anor. (i960) L.L.R.328 - 
on SS. 12, 19. 23 of the Ordinance; Nwankwo v. Onji 
H.Ct. Enugu 94/60 - unreported; Okworo v. Onwussilike.
H.Ct. E/23/60 - S.26.
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equally true of all the other decisions on the various
189sections of the Ordinances both in Ghana and in Nigeria
Critical assessment of the role of the courts in the 
construction of agreements::
We have so far been concerned with a case-study of 
the role of the courts in the construction of agreements.
It has been shown that in one group of cases the courts 
treat the terms used by the parties as more or less sacro­
sanct, while in another group of decisions they assume 
the role of protecting the less privileged party to the 
agreement. The question that must be answered here is 
whether the courts have done all that they should do in 
reconciling the conflict between individual liberty and 
the general welfare of the community through the con­
struction of agreements.
It must be pointed out that none of the two approaches 
described above is adequate on its own. The dissenting 
opinion of Frankfurter, J* in the leading United States 
case of Bethlehem Steel v. United States Steel Corporation^^, 
demonstrates very clearly the absurdity of the purist 
individualistic approach to the interpretation of agreements.
189. See the Ghana case of Offi & ors v. Appiah & ors (1965) 
C.C.193 where S.A(l) (moneylenders must take out license^ 
S.9 (transfer of business premises);; S.12 (form of a 
moneylending contract)., and S.26(l) (penalty for taking 
promissory notes with blanks) of the Moneylenders Ordi­
nance. (Cap.176, Laws of the Gold Coast,1951) were in 
issue•
190. 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
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In that case the United States Government sought to recover 
from the Bethlehem Steel Corporation vast profits claimed 
under wartime contracts made in 1918 between Bethlehem 
Steel and the U.S. Steel Corporation. Bethlehem Steel 
undertook to build a number of ships to meet the emergency 
caused by German submarine warfare during the second world 
war. The Government claimed that the agreed profits 
averaging over 22 per cent of the computed cost were excessive 
and, due to the exploitation by Steel Corporation of a wartime 
emergency, the Government, it was contended, was compelled 
to accept the terms of the country*s leading shipbuilder.
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this 
attempt to apply what it described as “corrective justice”, 
or the principle of “social solidarity” in wartime to a 
commercial contract. One reason for this decision was the 
rejection of the suggestion that the U.S. Government was 
in a position of bargaining inferiority; and the other 
was that the court felt that it was for Congress to deter­
mine the proper method of obtaining war supplies from the 
citizens and not for the Court to do so. Frankfurter J., 
on the other hand, held that “the court should not permit 
Bethlehem Steel to recover these unconscionable profits 
and thereby make the court the instrument of injustice".
With this dissenting opinion of the learned judge we are 
respectfully in agreement. The judicial process should not 
shy away from the vital task of social and economic
redistribution. Wholesale enforcement of the terms set
down by the parties is hardly consistent with the attain­
ment of this cherished goal.
On the other hand, the extreme attitude of construing
the statutory provisions in hire-purchase and money-
191lending transactions strictly against commerce J cannot 
be justified. What is required is an element of discretion 
in the courts which willbe exercised in a manner consistent 
both with the advancement of modern business and the 
freedom of the individual.
1 9 1. 1‘hese were discussed in the cases, supra pp.^7y-£t
SECTION 2 693
2. Agreements and the State
In this section we are concerned with the role of
the State in the regulation of obligations created by
agreement. An attempt will.be made to find answers to
the questions: (l) Ought the State to interfere with the
freedom of the parties to make whatever pacts they please?
and (2) To what extent have the legislatures in Ghana and
Nigeria interfered with this freedom?
(l) Ought the State to interfere?
Political theorists admit with varying degrees of
persistence that the overall interest of the State takes
priority over that of any single individual or a group***.
Whether we accept the thesis that the State is nothing but
2the protector of individual rights and liberties , or that 
it is a great public utility company^, we still have to 
contend with the task of adjusting any conflicts between 
the individual and the society of which he is part. This 
conflict is most apparent in the lav/ of agreements.
Mention has already been made of the presumption of
1. In countries often described as; part of the free world, 
this is most true in times of national emergency.
2. See Jeremy Benthem, A fragment on Government and the 
principles of morals~nd legislation." COxford, 1948) .
3. L. Duguit. The Law and the State 11917: see also 
Law in the Modern State H92lJ) trans. by H. Laski.
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the equality of bargaining power of the parties to an 
agreement, as the basis of the English law of contract*
The extent to which this assumption is out of touch with 
the realities of the modern law has also been discussed*
When a labourer on weekly wages and notice is equated in 
bargaining strength to a giant concern such as the Imperial 
Chemical Industries, even a transparent fiction is strained. 
Should the State sit back while the parties made any 
agreements they liked without any guidance to the courts 
on what agreements should be enforced? Our answer to 
this question is a categorical no, and for the following 
reasons* If the state undertakes to direct the economy 
as is in fact the case in both Ghana and Nigeria, run most 
of the social services and determine the foreign policy 
of the country, it cannot at the same time admit the 
maintenance of contract relations contrary to those it 
envisages. If the Constitution prohibits forced labour 
and human slavery, nobody will be permitted to enslave him­
self by contract or otherwise. The weaker sector of 
the community ought to be protected against the stronger arm 
and purse of the more privileged. Thus the State ought 
to intervene on behalf of minors, illiterates, lunatics 
and other victims of harsh bargains. On the other hand, 
the state ought also to protect business against indiscreet 
dealers and habitual debtors. The administration of
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credit facilities and the improvement of bankruptcy laws 
ought to be instances of state regulation of commercial 
transactions^. The answer to the question posed above, 
i.e. whether the state ought to intervene is positive, 
but that such interference should only be in the overall 
interest of the society as in the instances of the admini- 
stration of credit, or in cases of individual hardship .
(ii) To what extent have the legislatures in Ghana 
and Nigeria interfered with this freedom?
We shall here be examining the extent of legislative 
interference in the making and regulation of agreements. 
This interference has taken many forms* firstly, there 
is the group of enactments in Ghana and Nigeria which lay 
down the basis on which the parties can contract. The 
Ghana Industrial Relations Acts^, the Eastern Nigeria
o
Co-operative Societies law and the Nigerian Labour Code 
Ordinance^ are instances of this category of statutes.
A. E.g. hire-purchase and moneylending transactions. See 
also the Bills of Exchange Acts in Ghana and Nigeria.
See also the Eastern Nigeria Co-operative Societies Law, 
cap.
5. See the Ghana Insolvency Act, 1962 (Act. 155)*
See also Allott, "Legal development and economic growth 
in Africa" in Changing law in developing countries (ed. 
Anderson, 1965) p. 194.
6. See A.S. Miller "Government Contracts and social control: 
A preliminary enquiry" (1955) 41 Va.L.R. pp. 56-7; N. 
Friedmann, Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain 
(1951) pp.71 et seq.;; F. Cohen Law and Social Urder 
(1933) pp. 102 et seq.
7* Acts 7* 119 and 299 (Ghana).
8. Cap.28. Laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963).
9. Cap.91, Laws of Nigeria (Federation., 1958).
Other enactments prescribe the only permissible
form to which a particular type of contract must conform.
The Nigerian Marine Insurance Act^, the Bills of Exchange 
11Acts of Ghana and Nigeria; and the Ghana Merchant
12Shipping Act, 1963 are examples of this type of legis­
lation.
There has also been interference in the form of the 
imposition of terms which must be incorporated in specified 
types of agreements. These are duties which are imposed 
on one of the parties to an agreement and which he cannot 
exclude by agreement. Thus the duty imposed on the seller 
of goods in Section 8 of the Ghana Sale of Goods Act, 1962^,
14
cannot be excluded by agreement .. Also the terms to be
implied under Sectionl3 (l)(a) of the same Act as to quality
ISand fitness of the goods cannot be excluded by agreement 
In hire purchase transactions, Section 66 of the Ghana Sale 
of Goods Act lays down the duties of the owner. Failure 
to perform them or any of them will render the agreement 
void^. Similar provisions in respect of the duties of 
moneylenders are found in the Moneylenders Ordinances of
10. No. 54- of 1961 (Nigeria).
11. Act 55 (Ghana) and Cap. 21, Lav/s of Nigeria (195&)*.
12. Act 183 (Ghana). See also the Ghana Bills of Lading Act
(Act 42) 1961; State Property and Contracts Act, I960
(C.A.6).
13. Act 157 (Ghana).
14. S.8(3) of Act 137 (Ghana).
15* S.13(3) of Act 137 (Ghana).
16. S.66.
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Ghana and Nigeria"^. Auctioneers^, Pawnbrokers'^ and
PO
Mercantile agents are regulated in similar terms*
Another method of interference is the prohibition 
of the inclusion of certain terms. Section 62 of the
r
Ghana Sale of Goods Act provides as follows
"Any provision in a hire-purchase contract 
whereby the seller or any person acting on 
his behalf is authorised to enter upon any 
premises for the purpose of taking possession 
of the goods, or is relieved from liability 
for any such entry, is void."
Thus in construing any agreement in which the above terms
have been inserted the courts will operate on the basis that
the insertion would not affect the rights and duties of
the parties . Section l(l) of the Rents (Stabilisation)
Act, 1962 (Act 109) prohibits the charging of rents higher
than those laid down in the Act. Similar prohibitions
22are found in the Loans Recovery Ordinance , Moneylenders
17* Gap. 176 (Laws of the Gold Coast, 195l); Cap. 124 
(Lsws of Nigeria, Federation, 1958).
18. See S.22(j) of the Western Nigeria .auctioneers Law, Cap.
9 of 1959 laws; and also a corresponding provision in 
the E. Nigeria Auctioneers Law, Cap. 12 of 1965*
19. Western Nigeria Pawnbrokers Law,.Cap. 87 (Laws 1959)•
20. W. Nigeria, Mercantile Agents Law, Cap.77 (Laws, 1959)*
21. c.f. S.45(7) of the Transport Act, 1962 (England).
"The Boards shall not carry passengers by rail on terms 
or conditions which (a) purport, whether directly or 
indirectly to exclude or limit their liability in 
respect of the death, or bodily injury to, any passenger 
other than a passenger travelling on a free pass, or
(b) purport, whether directly or indirectly, to 
prescribe the time within which, or the manner in which, 
any such liability may be enforced."1
22. Cap. 175 (Laws of the Gold Coast, 1951) 8.2(3) •
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27) 24-Ordinances ^ and the Auctioneers Laws
Other instances of State interference with the
parties1 agreement include the development of the concept
of frustration of contract to adjust the rights of the
parties when enforced performance would be radically
different from what the parties originally intended* To
this effect enactments in both Ghana and some jurisdictions
in Nigeria regulate frustrated contracts^. Protection
of minors and illiterates, and limitation statutes are
26some more examples of this interference
Critique of the role of the legislature in Ghana and 
Nigeria::
Erom the above analysis, it is clear that apart from 
the isolated instances of rules regulating frustration of 
contracts and the Ghana provision about the seller's funda­
mental obligation, the legislatures have not adverted 
sufficiently or at all to the problems posed by the inequality 
of the parties in the modern law of contract. The 
problem of standard form contracts and exception clauses 
has already been discussed. It is enough to repeat here 
the menace of harsh and unreasonable terms to which the
25* Supra.
24. Supra. See particularly S.25(iii) of the Western Nigeria 
enactment•
25* S.l of the Ghana Contracts Act, I960 (Act 25). See
also S»2 of the Law Heform (Contracts) Act, 1961 (Nigeria, 
Lagos). ;
26. Illiterates Protection Ordinance, Cap.85, Laws (Nigeria, 
Eed. 195S), Ghana Admini strati on :of Estates Act, 1965*
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courts have no effective answer under the present law.
Mr Sales in his article to which reference has already 
been made recommended a consumers board to j^S^rsee
27the reasonableness of terms included in standard forms .
The United States Uniform Commercial Code has the following
provision about unconscionable terms:
M(l) If the Court as a matter of law finds 
the contract or any clause of the contract 
to have been unconscionable at the time it 
was made the Court may refuse to enforce 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder 
of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application 
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid 
any unconscionable result.
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the 
Court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties 
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity 
to present evidence as to its commercial 
setting, purpose and effect to aid the 
Court in making the determination.u 28.
It is interesting to note that Article I of this code
preserves the parties1 freedom of contract. Such freedom
must, however, be consistent with the obligation of good
faith, diligence and reasonableness. A similar note is
29struck by Allottfs recent proposal referred to above .
The proposal which tends to cover all the situations we
are concerned with here is in the form of a model enactment
in the following terms
"Fair Contracts (Consumers Protection) Act. 1966.
1. This Act shall apply to all contracts for
27. (1953) 16 M.L.E. 518.
28. See the comments in the American Uniform Commercial Code
Handbook (New York, 1964K
29. See p. supra.
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the supply of goods or services, and its 
provisions shall take effect in addition 
to any other restrictions or requirements 
imposed by law. It shall not apply to 
contracts for the sale of land.
"2(l) A consumers Court shall have power 
to vary the terms of, or revoke, any 
contract which shall appear to the court 
to be unfair in any substantial respect, 
so as to render the contract fair as 
between the parties thereto.
(2) A contract is unfair in which it 
appears that a supplier of goods or services 
is able, by reason of the disparity between 
his own economic position and that of the 
consumer to whom he supplies goods or 
services, to impose conditions on the 
consumer which the consumer would not other­
wise be prepared to accept. 30.
(3) In particular, but without derogating 
from the generality of other provisions of 
this Act, the following classes of contract 
shall be deemed to be unfair until the 
contrary is proved to the satisfaction of
a consumers ' court:
(a) a contract to which one of the 
parties is a monopoly supplier of the goods 
or services affected by the contract;
(b) a contract which is in standard 
written form habitually employed by a 
supplier for the purpose of regulating the 
supply of the particular goods or services: 
concerned. 31*
(c) a contract which contains conditions 
derogating from the common law or statutory 
rights of the consumer or obligations of
the supplier.
"For the purposes of this section ‘monopoly 
supplier1 includes any supplier who envoys 
50 per cent or more by value of the market, 
locally or nationally, in the particular goods or 
services concerned.
n3(l) Any consumer who objects to the terms 
of any contract to which he is a party 
affected by this Act on the ground that it 
is unfair, may apply to a consumers' court
30. These sub-sections are in similar terms to the American 
Lav/ Institute Uniform Commercial Code, to which, 
reference has been made.
31. This deals with the problem of standard form contracts.
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for an order to vary or revoke such contract 
in accordance with the powers provided under 
' S.2.
(2) Where any such applications has been 
made under S.3(1), or when a contract has 
been deemed unfair under S.2(3), the supplier 
shall not have power to enforce any term or 
condition of the contract until the consumers1 
court has so ordered.
”4(l) The Consumers1 Council may in respect 
of any contract affected by this Act, and 
a supplier may in respect of any contract or 
class of contracts affected by S.2(3) of 
this Act, apply to a consumers1 court for an 
advisory opinion on the fairness of such 
contract or contracts.
(2) The consumers1 court, by its advisory 
opinion,
(a) shall declare the said contract to 
be fair or unfair in whole or in part; and
(b) may recommend such variance of the 
contract or contracts as would in its opinion 
render the contract fair.
(3) If the consumers1 court has, by its 
advisory opinion, declared a contract or class 
of contracts to be fair, or has recommended 
its or their variance so as to render it or 
them fair, a supplier may enforce any contract 
having the same terms and effects as the 
contract declared fair, notwithstanding the 
provisions of SS.2. and 3. 32.
"5 (1) Every consumer court shall consist of:—
(i) a president, being a person who
holds or has held judicial office in a superior 
court of record in Britain or in any other 
common law jurisdiction, or is qualified to 
hold such office;
(ii) two assessors, being persons desig­
nated by the president of the court from a 
panel of assessors for that court.
(2) The Lord Chancellor shall have power to 
designate persons as presidents of consumers1 
courts; to assign areas of jurisdiction^ 
whether geographically or by subject-matter, 
to such courts; and to appoint fit and proper 
persons to the panels of assessors for such
32. The question of advisory opinion is in line with Mr. 
Sales* proposals about the powers of a Consumers' 
Board.
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courts. In the appointment of assessors, 
the Lord Chancellor shall have proper regard 
to the necessity for the representation of 
consumers' interests.
(3) The Consumers' Council shall have the 
right to he represented by counsel and to 
be heard as amicus curiae before the 
consumers' court in any case falling within 
this Act.
"6. This Act shall be liberally interpreted.
In case of doubt or inconsistency affecting 
the proper interpretation of this Act, such 
doubt or inconsistency shall be resolved in 
favour of the consumer whence it is possible 
so to do." 33*
Mention has already been made of the fact that the
proposal is weighted heavily in favour of the consumer.
This apart from Section 4(3) of the proposal, all the
other provisions of the model Act are designed to protect
34the consumers' interests^ .
Another unique feature of the model is the vast 
powers of the proposed consumers' court. It can give 
advisory opinions on the fairness or otherwise of terms 
to be included in an agreement and any terms so included 
will be binding on the parties (S.4(1) and (2)). It can 
also vary the terms of an agreement already concluded 
between the parties and can declare void any particular 
provision or series of stipulations that it considers
33. It has been found necessary to reproduce the whole of 
Allott's proposal because of its concise covering of 
all the situations where consumers' interests clash 
with those of the suppliers.
34. Also while the interests of the consumers are repre­
sented in the panel of assessors in the court, the 
same favour is not extended to suppliers.
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unconscionable in an agreement (S.3(l) and (2)). Any 
doubts in the meaning of the provision in any agreement 
will be resolved in favour of the consumer"^.
Apart from the omission from the panel of assessors 
to assist the consumers* court^, 0f somebody representing 
the interests of suppliers, one would recommend the model 
Ajst for a wholesale adoption in Ghana and Nigeria^.
35* S«6 of the model Act.
36. See S.5(2) of the proposal.
37* Since the constitution of the Consumers' Council is not 
given it is likely that the suppliers' interests would 
be represented on such a council.
SECTION 3 704
Remedies for the breach >or other avoidance of
obligations.^*
The enforcement of obligations created by agreement
has been fully discussed in Section I of this part. What
we propose to do here is a critical examination of the
effectiveness of remedies available to the plaintiff, in
the law of agreements. Conventional treatment of ’remedies1
in the law of contract has often been on the basis of what
2
the plaintiff can sue for. Having obtained judgment, 
writers on the law of agreements are no longer interested 
in what happens next. The general attitude has been that 
of leaving such matters to civil procedure, which treats
1. See J.S. Pawate, Contract and the freedom of the debtor 
in the common lawT (Tripathi Ltd; Bombay, 1953);
O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (42nd Imp.) pp.296-302;
Sir David Hughes Parry, The Sanctity of Contracts in 
English Law, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1959). For 
the position in customary laws, see R.S. Rattray,
Ashanti law and constitution, 1956, pp.285 et seq;
C.fc. Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian Tribe (1937) 
pp.207 et seq. especially p.231. 8ee also Qdgers 
on pleading and practice, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1966) 
pp.379 et seq.
2. These have usually been, damages, injunction and specific 
performance, rescission or restitution of property or 
money.
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them under the head of ’execution of judgment’, whether or 
not the judgment was satisfied is of no interest to the 
traditional writer on contracts, or indeed,any other 
facet of the law of obligations. It is submitted, however, 
that in so far as what happens to the parties to a case 
after judgment, will affect the formation or performance of 
future obligations between the same parties, and to 
some extent, others, the satisfaction or otherwise of a 
judgment in a contract case, is of great significance in 
any functional study of the law of obligations. It needs 
hardly be argued that the way the law treats a debtor will 
to a very large extent determine the future conduct of the 
creditor towards credit generally. The importance of this 
approach to the subject for our purpose here, is accentuated 
by the divergent modes of enforcement in customary laws on 
the one hand, and the imported law bn the other. We 
shall examine each of these modes of enforcement and their 
effectiveness.
(i) The position in the imported law:
"I think we would be deceiving ourselves if we were 
to believe that the respect of the ordinary 
citizen for his formal contractual obligations is 
as great today as it was, say, a hundred years 
ago.”3
3. Cited by K.W. Wedderburn, in (1959-63) 5-7 Journal of 
the Society of Public Teachers of law, at p.145*
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The above statement on the genial attitude towards con­
tractual obligations, by Sir David Hughes Parry, echoes an 
earlier statement of the position by J.H. G-ebhardt in his 
£.rticle in the Modern Law Review, entitled, "Pacta servanda 
sunt11, where the learned author had said,
HIn the area of English law there exists neither a 
legal nor a moral duty to carry out a contractual 
promise for damage; this, subject to the discre­
tion of a judge in certain narrowly circumscribed 
cases."4
These two passages above represent what has often been
called the '’compensation theory” of agreements. In
opposition to, the ”compensation theory” is the "enforcement
theory" exemplified in the statement of Thomas Erskine
Holland in his book on Jurisprudence in 1916, as follows:
"When the law enforces contracts it does so to 
prevent disappointment of well-founded expectations, 
which, though they usually arise from expressions 
truly representing intention, yet may occasionally 
arise otherwise."-'
In support of Holland's contention, A.L. Goodhart has
also stated that
"the normal basis of contract is that the promisor 
has by his promise created a reasonable expectation 
that it will be kept."6
4. (1947) 10, M.L.R. 159 at p.167-166.
5. T.E. Holland, Jurisprudence, (12th ed. 1916) p.262.
6. A.L. G-oodhart, English law and the moral law, (London,
Stevens & Sons, 1953)> p.lOlT See also to the same
effect, Corbin on Contracts, (1950) vol. 1 p.2.
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In spite of the obvious merits* of the latter theory, the 
common law has come to accept the position that the primary 
obligation of the promisor is to buy off his promise rather 
than perform it. In many cases the promisor gets away 
without doing either. Thus in any action on a contract, 
the courts are more readily disposed to award damages for 
breach, than to order specific performance, Further there 
is even no certainty witb regard to the award of damages.
The action may have become statute-barred, or frustrated, 
or illegal, informal, or either of the parties may have
Q
been devoid of contractual capacity. In each of these 
cases the plaintiff is denied both specific performance 
and the right to any damages. Even when all these factors 
are not present, and the plaintiff has been awarded damages 
by the court, there is still no certainty,, that he will recover
7. Historically, failure to perform one's obligation was 
regarded as a sin, since contracts were enforced by the 
Ecclesiastical Courts. Also, commercially, the whole 
basis of any economic structure is based on the security 
of credit. People should be able to rely on the 
performance of promises made to them by others. It
is equally inequitable not to perform one's obligations 
to one's neighbour.
8. These have all been treated under 'defative agreements' 
Supra.
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all or any of it. The defendant may be a'man of straw} 
or may have become insolvent or is just unwilling to pay. 
The position is much more acute in Ghana and Nigeria where 
insurance has not been sufficiently developed*.
There are of course at least three modes of 
obtaining satisfaction for a judgment debt in both Ghana 
and Nigeria. The first is that laid down in the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the two countries.under execution
o .
of judgments. The second, in the case of Ghana (and
for companies in the case of Nigeria) is that laid down
in the Ghana Insolvency Act,1^ and the Nigeria Companies
Ordinance respectively. The third is available in the
case of a guaranteed liability. Here the creditor can
look to the guarantor for the satisfaction of his
claim.11
9. For Ghana, see the Courts Decree, 1966. Paragraph 89 
which by implication makes saving for the existing 
Rules of the Supreme Court. For Nigeria, see the 
Handbook of the Federal Suprrme Court (1954), and the
Sheriff and Civil Process laws of the four regions.
10.1962, Act 153.
11. It can be argued however, that this is preliminary to 
a resort to any one of the two other modes of satis­
faction.
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(a) execution of judgment:
Part III of the Sheriffs and Civil Process law
12 . . .  of Eastern Nigeria which is m  similar terms to the
corresponding provisions in the Supreme Court Rules of the
other jurisdictions with which we are here concerned,
makes provisions for the execution of the judgments of the
superior courts and the committal of debtors. The judgment
creditor can proceed against any ascertainable assets of
the judgment debtor for the satisfaction of the debt.1^
He can seize a specified category of his g o o d s , c a n
15attach his debts, ** levy execution against his immovable
16 17property, or proceed by way of judgment summons.
On the face of it, the above arrangement is adequate to
secure satisfaction for the judgment debt. In practice,
however, this is only so if the judgment debtor is able
and willing to pay. If he is able to pay (and the test of
this is his ascertainable means of income), but unwilling
12. Cap. 118, laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963 consolidation).
13. This is of course, done through the agency of the Sheriff.
14. SS. 24 - 28 of the Easten Nigeria Sheriffs and Civil 
Process law.
15* S.82 of the Eastern Nigeria enactment.
16. SS.43-45 of the Eastern Nigeria enactment.
17. S.54 of the Eastern Nigeria law.
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to do so, in both. Ghana and all the jurisdictions in Nigeria,
there is provision for his being sent to prison to remain
18so imprisoned until he can pay the debt. But in many 
cases, the means of income is difficult to ascertain. In 
such cases, sending the debtor to prison would not avail 
the creditor since he still has to pay the subsistence
19allowance of the debtor for as long as he is in prison. ^
At this point the law is powerless to help the judgment 
creditor and any satisfaction of the debt may well depend on 
the benevolence of his debtor or other extra-legal factors 
such as ridicule. We shall be looking at the merits or 
otherwise of this system presently.
20(b) Under the Insolvency Act, 1962:
One of the terms of reference of the Insolvency 
Commission in Ghana in I960, was to consider the better
18. S . 64 of the Eastern Nigeria law.
19* S.77 of the Eastern Nigeria law. For Ghana, see the 
Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954, appended 
to the former Courts Ordinance.
20. See Polly Hill, The Gold Coast cocoa farmer, (London, O.U.P 
1956; also the pledging of cocoa farms, terms and 
conditions. (University College of Ghana, 1959); P.T. 
Bauer, 'West African Trade (London, O.U.P. 1354); P.C. 
Garlick, African Traders in Kumasi (U.C.G.; 1959); A.N. 
Allott, "Legal development and economic growth in Africa” 
in Changing law in developing countries (ed.J.N.D.Anderson, 
1962) pTl94; B.A.Kwaw-SwanzyTConstitutional development in 
the Gold Coast - (1901-1925),an unpublished work submitted 
to the University of Cambridge in 1955; Report of the 
Commissioners" appointed to enquire into the Insolvency law 
of Ghana  ^ (Govt.Printer,Accra,1961) For the legislative 
history of Insolvency law in Ghana, see pp.7-17 of the 
Report. It may be observed that no date has yet been spe­
cified for the coming into force of the Insolvency Act 1962
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protection by law of creditors and debtas in case of
insolvency. This, the Commissioners claimed, involved wide
considerations of humanbehaviour, property relationships,
economic advancement, and ultimately, the sort of society that
the people of Ghana intended to establish. The Commissioners
found in course of their investigations that difficulties
in granting credit arose from lack of security, attitudes
towardsrepaying, and lack of remedies for non-payment. Their
answer to the demand for reform was the Insolvency Bill,
which later became law (with minor amendments) in November,
1962. The Act sets up under Section 1 the office of the
Official trustee to whom creditors are empowered, under
Section 8 to apply for a protection order against the assets
of an insolvent debtor. An insolvent debtor is defined
to mean any debtor who is unable to meet up his debts
21within three months; such debts not being less than the
sum of five hundred pounds (£500). Provision is made for
the public examination of the insolvent at which examination
he has to declare any assets that he may have. These will
21. S.9 of the Act defines an insolvent to include anybody 
against whose property a sheriff has proceeded against 
in respect of a judgment debt of not less than £500.
Such execution being either pending, or levied within the 
preceding three months.
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be applied to a satisfaction of the debts if sufficient to 
meet all the liabilities, or on pro rata basis. The 
Official Trustee is empowered to allow assets up to £50 
to be kept by the insolvent. If however, the insolvent 
has been guilty of misconduct, he might, after the public 
examination be adjudged a bankrupt which carries more
22far-reaching disabilities than just being an insolvent.
It must be repeated that the provisions of the
Insolvency Act will only apply where the liquidated debt is
2^not less than £500.
(ii) Position in the customary laws:
The relationship between a debtor and a creditor
is so universal that all organised societies have their
laws and customs for its regulation. This is particularly
true of the traditional societies in Ghana and Nigeria,
24In Ghana, Sarbah has described three modes of enforcing 
payments. The first is the one he called dharna.
This method involved the creditor in an uninterrupted fasting 
until the debt was paid by the debtor. It frequently 
happened that the creditor starved himself to death in an
22. See SS.23 and 24 of the Act.
23. The third mode of enforcing debt is of course by pro­
ceeding against the guarantor if the liability was 
guaranteed. Suretyships and guarantees were discussed 
under defective agreements, and in the first Section
of this Part.
2 4. J.M. Sarbah, Panti customary laws, pp.114 et seq.
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attempt to get his debt paidl No doubt this is a very
curious way of enforcing one's obligation.
The second mode described by the learned author is
that of panyarring or the kidnapping of the debtor or persons
connected with him, or in some cases, even strangers. The
seized person was detained until the debt was paid, and if
payment was not effected within a reasonable time, he was
sold into slavery. It was also possible to panyarr the
debtor’s goods and other moveable property, retaining such
goods until the debt was paid.
The third mode of enforcement was more prevalent
in the more centrally organised systems. This involved
detention of the debtor in the chief’s prison or village
lock-up until payment was made.
Of the three modes of enforcement, dharan appeared
to have been the least used. In fact a learned author has
. 25stated that it was unknown among the Ashanti. Panyarring
later became unpopular and was in fact abolished by the Bond 
of lb44.26
Writing on the Ashanti, Eattray included the effect
27of ridicule as one of the debt enforcement factors.
25. E.3. Rattray, Ashanti law and constitution (1956) p.370.
26. See also Native jurisdiction Ordinance, I8 8 3, No. 5 of 
1883, which made panrarring an offence under native law.
27. op.cit. pp.372-373*
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In Nigeria C.K. Meek has had this to say about the
Ibos:
"Again, if a member of one local group had been 
seized by a member of another in account of a debt, 
the ikoro-oha of the debtor’s group would go to 
the Ikoro-oha of the creditor’s group and ask for him 
to release, in return for an undertaking that, if 
the debt were proved, it would be paid. The 
ikoro-ohas acting in conjunction, were collectors 
of debt, receiving for their trouble fees propor­
tionate to the amount of the debt. If a debtor 
refused to pay, the ikoro-oha would seize one or 
two of his goats."28
The function of the ikoro-oha in the Owetfyi society about 
which Meek was writing, is to cater for the general well­
being of the village group. Like other age-group systems 
it looks after the interests of the village as a whole during 
their period of office.
It must be observed that the traditional systems 
of debt-enforcement were greatly modified by the intro­
duction of extraneous concepts of justice and judicial 
practice. The seizure of the goods or other property of
the debtor became a more regular feature of enforcing the
2Q
payment of a debt. ^
In Maliki law, however, imprisonment for debt
after investigating a debtor’s ability to pay, was widely
recognised. It was stated by the Northern Nigeria High
Court in the recent case of Atayi v. Maohnagoru, ^  that
28. C.K. Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian Tribe, (London, 
O.U.P. 1937) p.207. See particularly pp.231 et seq.
29* See Handbook of Native Courts in Ashanti, (G-ovt.Printer, 
Accra, 1954).
30. (1959) N.R.N.L.R. 36.
"according to our understanding of Maliki law, before 
committing a judgment debtor to prison, investigation of 
his ability to pay is necessary; and Order XXV of the 
Native Court Rules, makes such an investigation an essential 
preliminary before committal,1
The Northern Nigerian Native Court Rules, based 
on the Native Courts law, is therefore a statutory 
recognition of the Maliki law mode of executing judgments.
Critique of machinery for enforcement ofobligations in 
Ghana and Nigeria:
We shall now examine the merits or otherwise 
of the current modes of enforcing obligations in Ghana and 
Nigeria. The first step in the recovery of adebt is, of 
course, for the creditor to satisfy the Court of the amount 
of the debt and that the debt is owing, and to obtain the 
leave of the Court to enter judgmentf to this effect. The 
creditor applies to the Court by writ of summons, a copy
of which must be served oh the debtor by personal service.
The Court, if satisfied that the debt is owing, gives the
creditor leave to enter judgment for the amount of the debt.
After obtaining judgment, the creditor may then proceed to 
execution.
The initial problem that arises here is that of the 
difficulty of effecting personal service on the defendant.
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He may be a man of no fixed address, or a difficult debtor
who would do anything to avoid being served on by the
bailiff. The position is made much more acute by the
paucity of bailiffs who, in both Ghana and Nigeria, are
the only persons authorised to serve processes on the parties^
Although substituted service has been allowed in certain
cases, this has not in fact made any noticeable impact on
the actual recovery of the amounts involved. A man of
straw is not any the less so by reason only that he has
^2been served by substituted service. In any case, the 
Courts in Ghana and Nigeria are reluctant to allow 
substituted service because of its obvious proneness to 
abuse by plaintiffs.
Secondly, even after the defendant has been duly 
served, except in the case of the summons procedure under 
Order 14 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules,
Ghana, ^  there might well be considerable delay before the 
case is listed for hearing. A clear evidence to this effect
31. See pp.25-29 of the Ghana Insolvency Commissions Report, 
(1961).
32. i.e. delivery to an inmate living in the same house, or 
to an agent, by advertisement, by notice or by registered 
letter.
33. (1954). There is also the question of flimsy counter­
claims and sets-off, which also help to delay the final 
judgment.
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was seen by the present writer during his field studies in 
the Superior Courts of G-hana and Nigeria in 1965. Many 
of the appeals which were heard in the Supreme Courts of 
both countries in 1965, were on cases that arose three to 
four years earlier. Surely, it will be very frustrating 
to a lender if he has to wait this long to realise his loan. 
The consequent adverse effect this trend will have on 
economic development generally, is obvious. It is sub­
mitted that an improvement of the existing position is 
called for, and this should take the form of extending the 
scope of the Order 14 procedure to include cases of un­
liquidated damages where the defendant has not entered an 
appearance. Secondly, an increase in the number of Courts, 
and of the magistrates and judges, would go a long way to 
relieve the current congestion.
Thirdly, even after judgment has been obtained, 
the existing mode ox execution has been found to be most 
ineffective in compelling the debtor to pay. This is 
because of the ineffectiveness of the system of judgment 
summons in Nigeria or summons to show cause in G-hana.
These modes of enforcement were introduced in each of the
two countries to allow the courts a discretion in the
^4matter of sending a debtor to prison for the debt.
\A/r
34. After the abolition of the unft of Ca.£>>a.
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The courts now have to consider the conduct of the debtor 
having regard to his ascertainable means of income* It 
is over the question of the requisite evidence in the 
ascertainment of the debtor's income, that the machinery 
breaks down* The onus is on the judgment creditor to show 
that the debtor can pay but is unwilling to do so. Further, 
the Court is more easily disposed to accept the evidence 
of the debtor as to his means of income, and has not in­
frequently ordered him to pay nominal instalments to clear 
the debt# As was noted by the Commissioners:
“The principle underlying the 1935 changes (i*e* the 
abolition of the writ of Ca.$;a)35 was that while 
the courts were no longer compelled to send a 
defaulting debtoh to prison irrespective of his 
conduct, these debtors who were guilty of mis­
conduct could still be gaoled if they refused or 
neglected to pay. In practice things have not 
worked out this way. To those using this pro­
cedure (i.e. summons to show cause), it often 
seems that the Courts will accept any proposal 
by the debtor, however inadequate, rather than 
send him to prison. Thus although imprisonment 
continues to exist as a potential threat, recal­
citrant debtors are nowadays seldom gaoled as a result 
of a summons to show cause, although the^ are not 
infrequently put inside for failure to obey a court 
order arising from such summons.11^
In respect of the evidence necessary for the as­
certainment of the debtor's means of income, it is clear 
that the ikoro-oha system described by Meek, if modified
35• Capius ad satisfaciendum.
36. Ghana Insolvency Commission Report, pp.31-32.
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to suit modern conditions, will prove to be more effective 
in getting the debtor to pay. This involves any member 
of the community who has any knowledge about the debtor's 
means of income, coming forward to give such evidence.
This can be achieved by putting up a public notice to
this effect. If the members of the family of the debtor 
desire to avoid such adverse publicity, they will act 
quickly to pay the debt. This method of enforcement 
may not change the position very much where the debtor is 
totally unable to pay but it will achieve the very desir­
able effect of checking the debtor who is able but unwilling
to pay. In such latter instance, imprisonment may not
have any deterrent effect. It may in fact be a safe resort 
for the debtor after the planting season, since he will be 
well-fed while in prison.
Another method of improving the systemof evidence
47id that suggested by the Evershed Committee in England,
where the same problem arose under the English Rules of the
Supreme Court. The Committee made two recommendations.
The first was that if giving more inquisitorial powers
to the examiner who questions the debtor on his means of
47. Evershed Committee on Supreme Court Procedure and 
Practice, Cmnd. 8878 (England) See paras. 450-454.
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income. Hitherto, the examiner, although an officer of 
the Court had always been satisfied with whatever state­
ments as to his income were made by the debtor. The 
committee recommended that the examiner should satisfy 
himself as to the veracity of the debtor. Secondly, that 
when a judgment debt had been unpaid for 14 days, the 
judgment creditor should be entitled to call uponthe 
judgment debtor to make within 14 days a sworn affidavit 
of his assets. In Appendix XI to the Report the 
committee suggested a form of notice and affidavit which 
could be used for this purpose. It required the debtor to 
give details of his marital status, dependants, employment, 
trade or profession, income after paying income tax, out­
goings on house owned or rented, banking accounts, stocks 
and shares and other securities, insurance policies, house 
and other property, and debts owing to the debtor. In the 
views of the committee, an examination as to the debtor's 
means after such an affidavit had been filed, will prove 
more effective than the existing system. We are respect­
fully in agreement with the learned members of the Evershed
48committee in this respect. It is submitted that the
adoption of these recommendations will (in the case of
Ghana) improve the system of enforcing obligations,
48. The Ghana Insolvency Commission was of the same 
opinion. See p.34 of their Report.
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particularly where the amount involved is less than £500, 
as in such cases, the Insolvency Act, 1962, is inapplicable. 
In the case of Nigeria, the recommendations will, no doubt, 
stimulate economic growth which results from credit 
mobility.
49. It has not been considered necessary to subjoin an
examination of the various minus of remedies available 
to the plaintiff i.e. damages, specific performance, 
injunction, rescission, cancellation and rectification, 
and other equitable remedies. Fascinating as this facet 
of the subject is, all the existing judicial authority 
point very clearly to a to'cal adoption of the current 
English law position. For the local cases, see:
S.C.O.A, v O&ana (1958) N.R.N.L.R.141, - self-help; 
Qkenla v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co. Ltd, (1958) 
W.R.N.L.R. lb>5, damages in insurance cases; Solomon v. 
Pickering & Co. Ltd. (1926) 6 N.L.R.39 - nominal and 
special damages; Taiwo v . Princewill, (1961) 1 All. 
N.L.R. 240 - adoption of the rule in Hadleyv . Haxendale 
(185-,) 9 Ex.341 ; also Poole & Go. Ltd. v. Salami
Agbaje (1922) 4 N.L.R. d; Economic Exports Ltd. v 
Qchitola (1959) 'W.R.N.L.R. 239 - measure of damages 
according to section 50 (2) or (3) of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893 (England); Garabedian v Jamakani (1961)
1 All. N.L.R. 177, measure of damages in wrongful dis­
missal cases, Ilso v. Iketubosin (1957) W.R.N.L.R. 187, 
measure of damages in breach of marriage promise actions; 
Williams v. Smith & ors (1948) 19 N.L.R. 21 - specific 
performance, Zard v. Saliba (1955-56) W.R.N.L.R. 63 - 
injunction to restrain use of land in breach of covenant. 
On the question of specific performance in customary 
laws, ir is submitted that Ollennu's contention that 
it exists for executory transactions, as contained in 
the recent case of Lartrei v. Fio (i960) 6 L.R.119, 
tends to stand alone.
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PART VIII OBLIGATIONS I1.IP03ED BY LAY/
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Obligations Imposed by Law^
So far we havo been considering obligations that are 
created by the agreement of the parties. In this part we 
are concerned with instances where the law imposes an 
obligation on the parties to refund money or disgorge any 
other benefits| irrespective of the absence of any agreement 
or delict. The separate existence of this third element 
in the classification of civil liability has already been 
mentioned in the introductory part of this thesis. Here 
we shall be attempting a brief survey of the existing auth­
orities and venturing a synthetic view of a juridical basis 
for its operation in Ghana and ITigcria. This is followed by 
a short-listing of three possible sub-heads under which any 
study of the local judicial authority on the subject could 
usefully be carried out.
1. See W.A. Keener, Quasi-Contracts (1893); F.C. Woodward,
The Lav; of Quasi-Contracts (l91T); Sir P.H. Winfield, 
Province oT the law or Tort (193l); and alsoQuasi- 
Conbracts 11932); R.II.Jackson, History of Quasi-Contract 
in hnglish Law (1936); American Restatement of the Law of 
Restitution U957): G .L / Wil 1 iuasY '"Joint GbllgationsC1949): 
Lord Wright, Legal £3says and Addresses '<■19397; J .n.tlunlman, 
The Law of Quasi-Contracts 11950): J.P.Dawson. Unjust 
Enrichment; A comparative Analysis (1951); L* Kubin, 
Unauthorised Administration in South African Law (1958)
Amos & Vial ton, Introduction to French Lav; (2nd ed»); 
Buckland & McNair, iRoman haw and Common Law, (2nd ed.1952)
P. Hill,Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana (1961);
G.E.Palmer7 Mistake and bnjust Enrichment 11962);J.Schacht 
Introduction"to Islamic Paw (1954) Green. Ibo Village 
Affairs ( 1 9 4 - 7 J .8to 1 jar, The Law of Quasi-Contracts 
(19^4) ;L.H.Waters, The Constructive Trust (l96d-J;J.W.
Wade, Cases and Materials on Restitution,'(1958); H.Goff 
& G • Jones, The law of Restitution Cl966);Halsbury1 s Laws, 
(3rd cd.) Vol. 8 pp." 225 ctseq.*
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SECTION A
Juridical basis of obligation imposed by law:
(i) The position in English law:
Although English law has reluctantly accepted the pos­
ition that the heads of civil responsibility are not exhausted
by the categories of agreement and delict, it has not yet 
evolved any generally acceptable theory of obligations imposed 
by law. It still treats the residual group of heads of 
liability as an appendage on the law of contract, and this 
residual group has more often been called quasi-contracts.
An explanation for this attitude lies in legal history. The 
action of Indebitatus assumpsit, from which quasi-contract 
emerged, had come to be used in similar situations^" as 
’debt!1 and 'account1 both of which formed the rational basis 
of contract. It was therefore argued that quasi-contractual 
actions would only lie where a contract could reasonably be 
implied by law but not otherwise. The fragile nature of this 
attempt at a general theory was obvious. It is of course, 
easy to imply a contract to pay a reasonable price in cases 
v/here the defendant has accepted goods delivered by the plain­
tiff at the defendant's request, or to imply an agreement to 
pay for services rendered at the defendant's request but 
without an antecedent contract with the plaintiff. But it 
will be fanciful in the extreme to imply a contract to repay
1. (1760) 2 Burr. 1005 at p.1012.
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where A steals B's money, or where X pays Y £50 when in fact 
he intended to pay Z or to pay Y only under certain circum­
stances* There are also cases of compulsion and the quest­
ion of disgorging benefits acquired through the defendants 
wrongful act, none of which could be sustained on the theory 
of implied agreement*
This was the position when Lord Mansfield attempted the 
enunciation of a general theory of restitution based on the 
idea of unjust enrichment in 1760 in the case of Moses v
p
Macfarlan* The facts were that Moses had received from
Jacob four promissory notes of 30/- each* He indorsed
these to Macf arlan who, by a written agreement, contracted
that he would not hold Lloses liable on the indorsement.
Subsequently, however, Macfarlan sued Hoses on the notes in
a court of conscience wnich refused to recognise Macfarlan !s
written agreement not to sue Moses, and therefore, decided in
favour of Macfarlan. Moses then brought this action in the
King's Bench for money had and received to his use* In
deciding in favour of the plaintiff Lord Mansfield had had
this to say about the basis of this type of action:
"This kind of equitable action, to recover back money 
which ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial 
and therefore much encouraged* It lies only for money 
which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund; 
it does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff, which
2* (1760), 2 Burr 1005 at p*1012.
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is claimed of him as payable in point of honour and 
honesty, although it could not have been recovered 
from him by any course of law; as in payment of a 
debt barred by the statute of limitations, or contracted 
during infancy, or to the extent of principal and legal 
interest-iOn an usurious contract, or, for money fairly 
lost at play; because in all these cases, the defendant 
may retain it with a safe conscience, though by pos­
itive law he was barred from recovering.
But it lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a 
consideration which happens to fail; or for money got 
through imposition, (express or implied); or extortion; 
or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the 
plaintiff*s situation, contrary to laws made for the 
protection of persons under those circumstances. In 
one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the 
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged 
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund 
the money."
Nov/, like many general theories, this statement of the position 
by Lord Mansfield needed, and did . in fact receive various 
modifications in theory and was subjected to severe restrict­
ions in application. It is remarkable that although th'e 
learned judge did not say that the law would imply a promise 
(he in fact said that the law will imply an obligation, which 
is not synonymous with promise), critics have concentrated on 
those instances where the law cannot imply a promise, in 
order to discredit nis basis for a general principle. In­
fant *s contracts and ultra vires agreements, have been freely 
cited as cases in which the law cannot de facto imply prom­
ises which, if made de jure it would inexorably avoid.^
Again, the idea of aequum et bonum on which Lord Mansfield's
3. Per Lord Haldine in Sinclair v Brougham G-9147 A.C.398; 
see also Leslie v Sheill (19147 3 K.B. 607.
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generalization was based, was not a popular concept in
nineteenth century legal or political theory# It is not
surprising therefore, that it has been variously stigmatised
4
as ”well-meaning sloppiness of thought11, and Mvague juris­
prudence which is sometimes attractively styled justice as
H
between man and man#"
Unjust enrichment or unjust benefit as the basis of
quasi-contractual actions was said to have been finally
rejected in the House of Lords decision of Sinclair v
Hrougham decided in 1914# Here the House of Lords refused
to allow the action for money had and received, to depositors
of money with a Building Society which was carryin on an
ultra vires banking business with the deposits# The House,
however, allowed a quasi proprietary remedy in favour of the
depositors# The basis for the refusal of the action for
money had and received in this case was summarised in the
famous dictum of Lord Summer in these words:
"The law cannot de jure impute promises no repay, 
whether for money had and received or otherwise, which, 
if made de facto, it would inexorably avoid."7
4# Per Scrutton L#J# in Holt v Mar km an ^292,35 1 5C#B# b04 at 
po!3*
5# " What ever may have been the Ease 146 years ago, we are 
not now free in the twentieth century to administer that 
vague jurisprudence which is sometimes attractively 
styled 'justice between man and mqntu - per Hamilton L#J* 
in Baylis v Bishop of London (UJ913J -1 Ch. .127 at p. 140#
6. C1914J 39&.
7# Op.cit# at' p.452 Cf. Lord Dunedin in the same case who 
was prepared to admit the existence of a ‘supereminent 
equity1 in cases of unjust enrichment#
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In other words, the ultra vires doctiine precludes the
implication of any agreement to refund the amount lent by
the depositors*
There have been doubts as to whether or not their
Lordships of the House of Lords have said the last word
on the juridical basis of quasi-contractual actions in Eng-
lish law. Lord Wright has pointed out that the statement
q
of the position in Sinclair v Brougham was obiter, and could
not therefore be said to have put the authority of the House
on the implied contract theory of quasi-contractual actions*
Lord Atkin^ has said that it is not altogether certain
whether the law Lords locked the door when they decided the
11point as it arose in Sinclair v Brougham, while Winfield 
has contended that "even if they did lock the door for pur­
poses of that case, they left the key hanging on a nail so 
that if anyone now wishes to enter he can still do so."
8. Brook's wharf and Bull V/arf, Ltd. v Goodman Bros* 0  93[$
1 K.B. 934.
9* Supra'*
10. Banque Beige v Hambrouck &921J 1 K.B. at p.335* See also 
the Learned Judge's dictum in United Australia Ltd. v 
Barclays Bank Ltd. £Ll94lJ A.C. 1 at pp. 2*8^ 29 • “These 
fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to 
meet the requirements of the law as to forms of action 
which have now disappeared, should not be allowed to 
disturb actual rights. Y/hen these ghosts of the past 
stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval 
chains, the proper course for the judge is to pass them 
undeterred."
11. Province of-.the Law of Tort p. 137* Bee also Lord Denning 
in Kiriri Cotton Co. v uewani £l960j[ A.C. 192 at p.204 
and Creer, L.J. in uraven-Dliis v Canons' Ltd. Cl93y 2 
K.B. 403 at p.412.
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6  -
Winfield relied on the quasi-contractual nature of actions 
to enforce foreign judgments in English courts, on cases of
waiver of tort and cases of recovery of money paid as a
result of ineffective transactions. He concluded that the 
rationale of the cases on these.neads was the theory of the
recovery of unjust benefit and not contracts implied by law.
12The judgment of Cotton L.J. in an earlier case had, however,
pointed out the vital distinction uetween the lav/ implying
a promise to pepay, and imposing an obligation to refund in 
these terms:
"Now the term 'implied contract1 is a most unfortunate 
expression, because there cannot ue a contract by a 
lunatic. But whenever necessaries are supplied to a
person who by reason of disability cannot himself
contract, the law implies an obligation on the part of 
such person to pay for such necessaries out of his own 
property. It is asked, can there be an implied con­
tract by a person who cannot himself contract in
express terms? The answer is, that what the law im­
plies on the part of such a person is an obligation, 
which has been improperly termed a contract, to repay 
mlney spent in supplying necessaries. I think that the 
expression 'implied contract* is erroneous and very un­
fortunate. "13
Unfortunately, this timely warning by the learned judge
received scant judicial support. Mention has already been
made of the dicta of their Lordships of the House of Lords
in this connection. It is interesting to note that two
12years after the decision of He Bhodes the french Courts 
laid the foundation of the actio de in rem verso, an action
12. C.1890J 44 Ch. D. 94
13* Op. Cit. p.105*
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by which a plaintiff could recover any unjust benefits 
which the defendant had obtained to the plaintifffs detri­
ment* More will be said about this action later* ,J-‘he 
point that requires emphasis here is the fact that the judicial 
and doctrinal ambivalence in English lav/ as to the juridical 
basis of obligations imposed by law, has had at least two 
far-reaching adverse consequences* Firstly, the Implied 
contract' theory has been used to deny the plaintiff any 
remedy in situations where in the opinion of the court a 
promise cannot be implied in law* Thus where an infant had 
fraudulently misrepresented his age in order to get a loan 
from the plaintiff, it was held that a promise to repay could 
not be implied,^ since such a promise would be in conflict 
with the provisions of the Infants Relief Act, 1874* Again, 
in a case where the defendant who was an infant businessman, 
had received £35 from the plaintiff but did not deliver the 
goods ordered, the court, also on the basis of the 1874 
enactment on Infants, refused to allow the plaintiff to re­
cover*^ It is ourious that the Infants Relief Act, 1874, 
which was primarily intended to protect infants against
14* Leslie v Sheill 9143 3 K.B. 607.
15* Qowern v Field Cl9l2i 2 K.B*'419* G-oif and Jones have 
argued in their recent work', The Law of Restitution,
(1966), that these two cases could be reconciled to a 
general theory of restitution on the basis that any such 
theory must have its limits and that the case of infants 
contracts can be said to be one of such limits* It is 
submitted however, that, to pass as an exception to a 
rule such an exception should not be a negation of the 
rule* The two cases above are difficult to reconcile to 
any notions of justice and fair dealing.
indiscreet adults, should be used as a shield to cover
infantile fraud# x'his is a sad commentary on the implied
contract theory, and stresses the urgency of a general law
16of restitution based on the theory of unjust enrichment*
Secondly, the implied contract theory has been a major
set-back in any attempt by English law to evolve a general
law of restitution as has been done in United States# The
principle of the restoration of unjust benefit is present in
many branches of English law, but its development has been
impaired by the strict requirements of the different branches.
Maritime salvage and general average have developed within
the confines of maritime law. The constructive trust has
been treated as an aspect of the law of trust, with its
strict requirements of a fiduciary relationship as a condition
for the granting of any remedies. Waters has convincingly
demonstrated the seriousness of this latter limitation on a
general law of restitution, and has opted for the American
16solution on the matter. Subrogation and quasi-subrogation 
have been treated as facets of the law of insurance or as 
equitable remedies. Limited legislative recognition of thte 
principle of unjust enrichment as a basis for restitution is 
found in the Partnership Act, 1870, the Law Reform (Harried
16. L# V/. LI .Waters, The Constructive Trusts The case for a new 
approach in English Law. (1964) passim.
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Women and Tottfeasors) Act, 1935 and the Law Reform
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943* It needs hardly be
pointed out that the above situation is indeed chaotic and
that the factors which helped to mould the law of tort out
17of a similar collection of remedies are present in 
English law. It will be argued at the appropriate place, 
that if this was the lav; that was imported into Ghana and 
Nigeria (which is very doubtful), then there is a very 
strong case for a re-examination of the basis of its app­
lication in the two countries.
17* "We are inclined to think that torts is not a proper 
subject for a law book”, per O.W.Holmes Jnr* (1871)
5 American L.R. pp. 340-341, reviewing an abridged 
edition of Addisonfs Torts*
Three years later,-Holmes came "to recognise there were 
satisfactory reasons, both historical and analytical, 
for including the subject in the corpus juris."
Mark De Wolfe Howe, Mr. Justice Holmes, The Proving 
Years, 1870-1882, pp. 65, 184* Cited by Goff and 
Jones, op.cit. p.5*
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(ii) The Position in American Lav/:^
As was pointed out by Lord ./right in the Fibrosa case, 
most mature systems of law have found it necessary to pro­
vide, outside the fields of contract and civil wrongs, for 
the restoration of benefits on grounds of unjust benefit*
This has been the whole basis of the American Law Instituted 
Restatement of the Law of Restitution, paragraph I of which 
provides that a person who has been unjustly. enriched at the 
expense of another is required to make restitution to the 
other. Restitution is not concerned with damages, or com­
pensation for breach of contract, or for torts, but with rem­
edies for what, if not remedied, would constitute an unjust 
benefit or advantage to the defendant at the expense of the 
plaintiff. Hence an action for restitution is not primarily 
based on loss to the plaintiff but on benefit which is enjoyed 
by the defendant at the cost of the plaintiff, and which is 
unjust for the defendant to retain. The benefit may consist 
of money or property of the plaintiff which the defendant is 
unjustly retaining, or it may be that the plaintiff has under 
particular circumstances discharged a liability primarily 
resting on the defendant or has supplied necessary services
!• See The American Restatement of the Law of Restitution,
Quasi-Gontracts and Constructive Trusts (1937); Lord \/right 
"Restatement of the Law of Restitution" (1937) 51 Harv.L. 
R.369; P.H.Y/infield, "The American Restatement of Restit­
ution',' (1938)54 L.Q.H.529* See also W.A.Seavy and A.V/.Scott 
Notes on Certain Important Sections of Restatement of 
Restitution; tl937)•
2 * [CI9431a .C. 32 at p.61.
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or goods to the defendant which would unjustly enrich 
the defendant if the plaintiff were not reimbursed. It is 
this unjust retention of what should be restored to the 
plaintiff that constitutes the relationship on which the 
American remedy is based. It is interesting to note that 
most of the situations mentioned by Lord Mansfield in his 
famous opinion in Moses v Macferlan,^ were treated in The 
American Restatement.
Two features of the Restatement of Restitution deserve 
special mention. The first is the way the problem of the 
forms of action was resolved. The menace of the fiction of 
implied contract to a coherent development of a general law 
of restitution in English law, has already been stated and 
discussed. The Restatement adopted a threefold solution to 
the problem, as follows:
(a) for thoses states where the common law forms of action 
were retained, it was laid down that the appropriate proceed­
ing in law for the payment of money by way of restitution was 
an action of general assumpsit. This approach dispensed 
with the difficulty of implying a promise as is experienced 
in English law.
(b) For those states where contractual actions were disting- 
guished from actions based on civil wrongs, the appropriate
3. (1760),2 Burr, 1005 at p.1012
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proceeding was that of contract; and
(c) In those states where the forms of action have been
abolished by statute, it was sufficient to set out the
4
facts entitling the plaintiff to restitution*
The second feature is the inclusion of topics that 
are outside the English law of quasi-contract. 'Ihe 213 
sections of the Restatement are arranged in two parts*
Part I covers quasi-contracts and what is called kindred 
equitable relief, while Part II treats constructive trusts 
and Analogous Equitable Remedies. %he common basis for the 
whole treatment is the search for a remedy for unjust en­
richment. Part I deals with all situations in which there 
is a right to equitable proceedings and includes situations 
in which the relief sought is the payment of a sum of money 
or the transfer of land or a chattel, or the declaration of 
an interest therein. Part II, on the other hand, is limited 
to the situations in which as a result of his right to rest­
itution, a person is entitled to obtain a specific thing or
fund, or to have a lien established thereon, or to be sub-
■ 5
rogated to the claim of another*
The English law of quasi-contract, however, is limited 
to actions at law to secure the payment of money. But the
4* This latter approach would of course, have been a surer 
basis for the development of restitution in English law. 
This is in fact the whole point of the recent work of Goff 
and Jones on The Law of RestitutionC1966)* The authors 
however, prefer the existing English judicial authority 
but would adopt the American system of classification*
5* see Restatement of Restitution p.3*
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Restatement includes "not only such actions but also similar 
equitable remedies. 1’hese remedies include ^ vh ere there are 
grounds for invoking the jurisdiction of equity and also an 
action on seeking restitution of specific property or a de­
cree for the enforcement of a lien upon property* Thus this 
subject includes the situation in which, by way of remedy, a 
constructive trust or equitable lien is decreed* Such a 
remedy is granted where restitution is due and there is 
specific property to which equitable rights can attach*"^
Thus in spite of their common law heritage American law has 
evolved a third head of civil responsibility to cater for the 
residuallgroup of claims that are neither contractual nor 
delictual. I'he idea of unjust enrichment or unjust benefit
has been accepted as the juridical basis of the operation
7
of the law of restitution.
6. Op.cit. pp. 1-2. It is this concept of the constructive 
trust as a remedy that XIaters suggests should be imported 
into English law. See The Constructive Trust, (1964)*
7. It has not been considered necessary to deal in any 
detail with the various provisions of the American Re­
statement of Restitution or, in particular, with the 
limits to the right to restitution. In fact the Restate­
ment recognises certain limits on the plaintiff's right 
to recover benefits from a defendant, although on the 
whole a plaintiff is better off under the American 
arrangement than under English law. Eor details, see
The Restatement of Restitution (1937) and the comments 
of Lord Wright on it, in (1937) 51 Harv.L.R. pp. 369- 
383.
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(iii) The Position in Prench Law:^
The Prench civil code did not lay down any general
theory of a restoration of money or other property on grounds
2
of unjust enrichment* There were, however, two situations 
in which such a right was recognised* One wqs when a person 
performed an act on behalf of and in the interest of another, 
without that other’s authority but to the latter*s benefit*
The Code empowered the person who performed the act to recover 
any reasonable expenses from the other party* This principle 
was known as gestion d ’affairs and has been defined as ftWhen­
ever a person, le gerant de 1 ’affaire, performs an act on 
behalf of and in the interest of another, le maitre de 1 ’aff- 
aire, without that other 's authority” . G-estion d ’affaire 
is of course, the Prench rendering of the Roman law express- 
ion negotiosum gestio, and the rules applicable to the former
A
show traces of Roman law influence. Por the gestion d ’aff­
aire to arise, it is essential that the intervention was
1. See Amos and Walton’s Introduction to Prench Law (2nd
ed. P*H*Lswson,1963) pp. 192 et seq; G-utteridge and David, 
"Unjustified Enrichment” l1934)5 Camb.L.J. 204*
2* Art. 1371 of the Code Civil recognised the category of
quasi-contracts in Prench law as a situation where a per­
son who has benefited by a lawful action on the part of 
another may be involuntarily obliged to him.
3. Article 1374 of the Code Civil.
4* In a penetrating study of this institution, Leslie Rubin
in his book, Unauthorised administration in South Africa
(1958) has traced its origin and development in Roman 
law, and its application in South African law. The learned 
author concluded fcfter examining the authorities, that 
at the time the corpus juris was compiled, the obligation 
had been known to Roman law in some form, for more than 
five hundred years.
urgent; that it was necessary; that it was advantageous 
to the m ait re and not prohibited by him. If these conditions 
are not satisfied, the intervention will be an officious one
5and no right of refund will accrue to the gerant de 1 "affaire.
The other situation in which the principle of unjust
enrichment was recognised in the code is under articles
1376 and 1377. These provide as follows:
"1376: He who receives by mistake or knowingly that 
which is not due to him, is obliged to restore the 
payment which was not due to him from whom he has re­
ceived it.,f
”1377 s When a person believing in error that he is a 
debtor has paid a debt he has a right to claim restit­
ution from the creditor. Nevertheless this right 
ceases to exist when the creditor in consequence of the 
payment has destroyed his title, but saving the recourse 
of the person who has paid the debt against the true 
debtor.116
Thus the right of recovery of money paid in error to the 
defendant is recognised if there has been no change of cir­
cumstances since the payment. This right of refund though 
commonly called its Homan law name - condictio indebiti, is 
known in French law as the action en repetition de 1 "indu.
The payer is the solvens and the payee is the accipiens.
It arises only if three conditions are satisfied, namely, 
that the debt did not legally exist, that the payment was 
made by the solvens in error; and that the creditor has 
not destroyed his title to the debt.
5* The English law obligation arising from instances where 
the plaintiff acted out of necessity is narrower than the 
Prench concept.
6. See Amos & Walton, op.cit., pp.194-195•
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Thus, apart from these two instances in the code, there 
was no provision for the recognition of a general principle
were but species of a wider principle of unjust enrichment. 
This argument was proffered and accepted by the chambre des
verso was recognised in french lav/. The juridical basis
of the action has been on the argument, which has been upheld
in french Courts, that natural justice must be regarded as a
subsidiary source of french law. The decisions of the courts
are fully justified on this ground even when they appear to
conflict with one another.
In 1892 the court of cassation had ruled, in the case
cixed above, that the only requirement is that the plaintiff
should allege and prove that he has conferred a benefit on
the defendant by some sacrifice which he has made or by some
act on his part. After two subsequent decisions in 1914 and
191b the rule is now stated in tne following manner:
"The actio de in rem verso is founded on the principle 
of equita which forbids an enrichment at the cost of one*s 
neighbour. It applies ineevery case in which the
7. It has however been argued that this principle was scatter­
ed in several articles of the code civil e.g. articles 648,
1433 and 1437* See also articles 12^ -1, 1926 on ineff­
ective contracts; 861, 862 - undeserved improvements of 
left property by the plaintiff.
8. Domat and Pothier regarded it as a rule of conduct raiher
than as a rule of law.
9* ^ap^i^^hrly; by Aubry and Rau. See Dutteridge and David,
7
of unjust enrichment. This latter position was recognised 
in 1892 in response to academic writers in Prench lav/. It
Q
was argued that gestion d faffaire and paiement de 1 findu
Requetes in 1 faffaire Eoudier, where the actio de in rem
cited b
patrimony of one person is without legitimate cause, 
enriched at the expense of the patrimony of another, and 
the person suffering the detriment has no remedy based 
on contract or quasi-contract, or on delict or quasi­
delict."ll
Thus, three conditions must be satisfied ror the rule to op­
erate. Firstly, the defendant must have been enriched, and 
the plaintiff must have been impoverished. Secondly, the 
enrichment of the defendant must not have arisen from any
circumstances which the law will recognise as giving rise to
12a right to retain the benefit. Finally, but the French 
courts have not always observed this one, that there must be 
no other remedy available to tne plaintiff.
Striking similarities between the French actio.; de in 
rem verso and the American law of Restitution can easily be 
observed. f'he most important facet of the similarity is 
their common acceptance of the principle of unjust enrichment 
as a touchstone for testing the plaintiff's right to recover. 
This principle nas also been recognised in many other European 
countries. The uerman (Jivii coae provides in Article 812 
that anyone wno receives a benefit at the expense of another 
without a sufficient legal ground must restore such benefit 
to the person at whose expense it was received. Kven where 
such benefit was originally received on a sufficient legal
II. Civ. May. 12, 1914 (S. 1918-19, I, 41, note Naquet);
Ci^ r. March, 2, 1916 (IMP. 1920, I, 102. Cited by Outter- 
idge & David, op.cit. p.211. The new formula is said to 
reproduce the actual words of Anbry and Kan (Vol.ix s. 
5 1 8 ) .
12. The existence of a contract can be such a circumstance.
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ground, but which has subsequently ceased to operate, or 
flows from some act in law which nas failed to attain its 
object, the benefit must still be restored. Also, the Swiss 
federal Code of Obligations, under Article 62, provides tnat 
anyone who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another 
must restore the benefit so received.
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(iv) The Position in Ghana and Nigeria:
(a) Customary and Islamic Laws:'*'
The issue of classification of legal concepts in custom­
ary laws has already been sufficiently discussed m  the 
introductory chapter. Here we are concerned with the exist­
ence or otherwise of a general theory of obligations imposed 
by law irrespective of the agreement or delict of the parties. 
It must De stated that legal authority, both academic and 
judicial in this aspect of customary law, is very thin ideed. 
Apart from the question of the accountability of the family 
head to the other members of the family on the proceeds of 
the sale or other disposition of family property, and the
important question of a refund of money paid in pursuance of
2
an ineffective transaction, writers on the customary laws 
of G-nana and Nigeria nave not adverted sufficiently or at 
all to the circumstances under wnicn tue law w i n  recognise 
a ngut m  tue plaintiff to recover unjust benefit from the 
defendant, which benefit was acquired at the plaintiff*s 
expense.
1. On Islamic lav/, see particularly J.Schacht, Introduction 
to Islamic Law (I964)pp* 144-145> Abdur Rahim, Muhammedan 
Jurisprudence; E.H.Ruxton, ilaliki Law, (London*!! 1916) •
See also L.Milliot,' Droit Ilusulman (1953)
2. See H.I.Jegede, "The position of Head of a family in 
relation to family property. Is he a trustee in the Engl­
ish sense? (1966) Nig. Bar Journal, p.21. and S.H.B.
Asante, ^Fiduciary principles in Anglo-American and 
Ghanaian Customary law: a comparative study" (1965) 14,
I.C.L.Q.1144.
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Having said 'this, the relative wealth of anthropological
data on the customs and practices of the different peoples
of Ghana and Nigeria has got to be recognised. Without
derogating from the high quality of some of these materials,
it has to be admitted that their value for purposes of legal
conceptual analysis is sadly limited. Y/riting on the Tiv
3
of Northern Nigeria Paul Bohannan, apparently pre-occupied 
with the idea of showing the concept of fdebt1 as an all- 
embracing head of civil responsibility in Tivland, grouped 
under this head, cases which could properly have been consid­
ered as instances of unjust enrichment. The following is an 
example of this attitude:
flJir No. 56. MbaAsor calls ./anshosho, who has tried to 
help her recover a debt:
"MbaAso called Y/anshosho, the market master of Atsar 
market, in the matter of her cloth. She told the 
Iibatarev that a new cloth disappeared from her hut, and 
she knew someone had stolen it, but not who. A week 
after missing it, she had gone to the market and seen a 
young man wearing it. She asked him for it and, when 
he refused, went to Vanshosho for help. Y/anshosho sent 
one of his assistants to get the youth.
When he arrived, Y/anshosho asked him where he had 
got the cloth. He replied unhesitatingly that he had
won 8/~ gambling at snail shells, and had taken the 
cloth in lieu of the money. He added that if it belonged 
to MbaAsor he was willing to give it to her if she 
produced his 8/-. Y/anshosho asked from whom he had won 
the cloth. He named a youngster who lived in MbaAsor fs 
compound, and who was therefore probably the thief. 
Y/anshosho took 8/- from his own bag and handed it to the 
boy, telling him that his claim on the cloth was finished. 
The boy took the money and departed happily. Y/anshosho 
then told MbaAsor that she could redeem the cloth for 8/-
3• Justice and Judgment among the Tiv (1957)•
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meanwhile he (Y/anshosho) would keep it* ^he cloth was, 
of course, worth well over 8/-.
She went off to try to get the money from her hus­
band *s nephew, who had gambled away the cloth. Mean­
while somebody else came to Y/anshosho and said that 
MbaAsor had sent him to redeem the cloth. Y/anshosho 
took his money and gave him the cloth. Soon after the 
stranger had disappeared, MbaAsor came with her 8/-. 
Y/anshosho, in great surprise, asked her if she had not 
already sent on agent to redeem her clotji. She said 
that she certainly had not. She was, therefore, now 
suing Vanshosho for the return of her cloth.114
The Mbatarev decided that Vanshosho was liable and although
IibaAsor had set the value of the cloth at 35/-i the jir
considered the fact that the cloth had been worn on a few
occasions and asked Vanshosho to pay 20/- and 2/- court fees.
Commenting on this case, Bohannan stated that he had been
told that Y/anshosho v/ould have a case for the recovery of his
money if he ever discovered the man who had tricked him into
parting with a 20/- cloth for 8/-. He added that it was a
general rule in Tivland that anyone who buys from a gambler
or a thief, stands to lose both his money and the property
5
if the rightful owner discovers it.
Now, there is no doubt that many fact-situations have 
been packed into this case. The following is of course, the 
most vital, namely, the basis of the liability of Y/anshosho 
the market master of Atsar. Was he in any contractual re­
lationship with MbaAsor? Y/as he a bailee, a trustee or a 
stake-holder? Had he been negligent in respect of the cloth?
4. Op. cit. at pp. 110-111.
5. Op. cit., p.111.
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Did he owe MbaAsor any duty of care? If so what was the 
basis of this duty? The jir decided that he was at fault 
because he had been tricked and imposed the liability for 
the payment of the value of the cloth. It is remarkable 
that the case was being cited by Bohannan to support the 
theory that Y/anshosho could recover from the thief if and 
when he was found out. From this, a more startling general 
rule of Tiv law was put forward to the effect that anyone 
who buys from a thief or a gambler stands to lose both his 
money and the property if the rightful owner discovers it.
If the latter rule were of general application, one wonders 
why Y/anshosho had to go the length of paying the 8/- alleged 
gambling debt instead of returning the cloth to MbaAsor 
without putting her con terms.
It is not enough to attempt to explain off the position 
by pointing out that the Tiv jir leaves more emphasis on re­
conciling the parties than, say, an English county court.
This is to confuse the execution of judgment with adjudication, 
although the former might afiect the latter. The real anwwer 
lies in the futility of searching for clear-cut analysis of 
legal concepts in an anthropological material.
In this respect the commendable effort of Margaret 
G-reen^ on the Ibos of Agbaja-Ngwo (Eastern Nigeria) deserves
6. Ibo Village Affairs, (London, 194-7) pp«32 et seq..
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special comment. The learned author set out to describe
the customary observances of the locality with regard to
the cutting of palm-nuts. She stated that certain seasons
are set aside for this cutting by the whole community and
that anybody who broke the prohibition (i.e. cutting palm-
fauts out of season) was guilty of an offence. But to the
question - who could sue and recover the palm-nuts or their
value from the defaulter, so as to deprive him of benefiting
from his wrongful act, ureen had no answer. Sadly enough
for the lawyer, it is this latter query that is of interest
to him for purposes of extracting any general principles of
7
obligations imposed by law.
The absence of any right to foreclose in traditional 
gages (i.e. mortgages, pledges, liens and pawns), can be put 
forward as militating against any general theory of unjust 
enrichment in customary law. There is of course, no dearth
3
of authority, to support the proposition that time is no 
bar to a gagor's right to redeem at the amount that was orig­
inally borrowed.
This does not normally take into account any improvements 
on the land. Apparently, this could be a case of the gagor
7# On the position among the Ashanti of Ghana, see R.S. 
Rattray, Ashanti law and constitution (London, 1956) 
chapter 30. See also P.Hill, The migrant cocoa farmers 
of Southern Ghana (1961).
8. See P.O.Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law (1962) S.C.N. Obi, Ibo Law 
of Property (1962).
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being unjustly enriched at the expense of the gagee. But 
this will be an oversimplification of the position. If the 
open-ended right of the gagor to redeem is recognised in 
traditional customary law, the parties entered into the trans 
action on that basis and the gagee who expended in improving 
the land did so at his own risk. This issue is fast becom­
ing an academic one in view of the intervention of equitable
principles in this aspect of the law, and in some cases
9
statutory intervention. But even in the absence of the 
two latter features, it is submitted that an exception does 
not destroy the rule which gives it its stature as such an 
exception. As has often been stated, customary law consists 
in the performance of what is considered reasonable having 
regard to all the circumstances It will obviously be
unreasonable to allow a defendant to retain a benefit which 
he has got at the expense of the plaintiff.
Islamic law also recognises a general theory of rest­
itution based on unjust enrichment. It is against the basic 
principle of the shari’a for anybody to be unjustifiably 
enriched at the expense of another.^
9. See Part I Supra.
10. There is a striking similarity between this and the 
Prench actio de in rem verso, and the American concept 
of restitution.
11. See J • Schacht, op.crt. p • 14 4" •
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(b) The general lav/5
So far we have been examining the juridical basis of 
obligations imposed by law, as in English, American, Prench 
laws, and in the customary laws of Ghana and Nigeria. It 
has been seen that in Prench law the actio de in rem verso 
or unjustified enrichment, was evolved by the courts in 
response to academic opinion, while in American law, restit­
ution, also based on unjust enrichment, is cased on the re­
commendations of the American lav/ Institute. In English 
law the position is far from cleari uurrent academic and 
judicial opinion however, tend to favour the American approach 
but without derogating from the existing English case law*
Now, what is the position in Ghana and Nigeria? In theory 
this is the pre-1874 state of the lav/ in England (in the case 
of Ghana) and pre-1900 position in English law in the case of
Nigeria. Thus, the forms of action had been abolished in
12England at the time of the reception, and with it the nec­
essity for the fiction of a contract implied by law. She
position then was that summarised by Lord './right in his comm­
itents on Lord Mansfield's opinion in Moses v Macferlan as 
follows:
"Lord Mansfield does not say that the law implies a 
promise. The law implies a debt or obligation which is 
a different thing. In fact, he denies that there is a
12. See the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which abolished 
the forms of action in English law.
13* (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at p.1012.
749
contract; the obligation is as efficacious as if it 
were upon a contract. The obligation is a creation of
the law, just as much as an obligation in tort.n14
It was also that summarised by Winfield, who in a penetrating
review of the pre-1914 authorities in his Province of the law 
15of Tort, came down in favour of a general theory of rest­
itution based on the principle of unjust enrichment or unjust 
benefit.
In practice, however, the courts in both Ghana and Nigeria 
have adopted without question, the 'implied contract1 theory 
of quasi-contract with its restrictive impact on the develop­
ment of a general law of restitution. In this - they .. have
16been supported by Elias and the joint authors of Nigerian
17cases and Statutes on Contract and Tort. In the Nigerian
18case of I.T.Palmer (Nigeria) Ltd. v Fonseca, where the 
plaintiffs sued the defendant for the recovery of secret pro­
fits made by the latter while acting as their agent, Jibowu,J.
14. (1938) 6 Camb. L.J. 305-
15. (1931).
16. Nigerian Legal System, (1961) chap. 20.
17 • "(London," 1965).
18. (1946) 18 N.L.H. 49* See also Agbaje v Williams (1940)
15 N.L .H. 136 and British India General Insurance Co.Ltd. 
v Alhaji Ka.iia, E.S.C. Suit No. 132/1963, unreported 
(on subrogation). But see Aiyodede B.C. v Adelakun (1-958) 
W.B.N.L.H. 52, where Taylor, J, suggested that unjust 
enrichment formed the juridical basis of quasi-contractual 
actions. This opinion has not been generally followed.
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•implied a contract to refund the money, so received to the
principals*1 The ‘implied contract1 theory was also the
19basis of the Ghana cases of Davies v Horton , a case of a 
doctor claiming remuneration from the defendant who had in­
vited him to treat his (the defendant's) brother, and Hughes 
20v Powels, a case of services rendered at the defendants 
request. It is submitted with respect that this tenacious 
attachment to the 'implied contract1 theory is neither supp­
orted by authority nor does it reflect any desire on the part
of the courts to develop this aspect of the law* The House
21of Lords authority of Sinclair v Brougham was decided in 
1914, and even if that case represented a triumph in English 
law for the 'implied contract1 school of thought (which it 
is not), it is not binding on either the courts of Ghana or 
Nigeria* What is required is an acceptance of the theory 
of obligations imposed by law as a third head of civil res­
ponsibility. The juridical basis of this head of liability
will be unjust enrichment. This position can be achieved
22by adopting either the French approach (i.e. by the courts 
adjudicating on the basis of this principle) or by a civil 
code similar in structure to the American Restatement*
19. (1874) Ren. 3.
20* (I896) Ren. 129* See also Hclaren Bros, v Nartev (1926-
29) Div. ct. 30- waiver of tort; flora v Okant'a v 1926-29) 
Div. ct. 97- quantum meruit; and Huttoh-Mills v Nkansah
II (1940)6 W.A.C.A: 32- mistake of law.
21. 0-914) A.C. 398.
22. Not necessarily the French substantive law on the subject
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SECTION B
Analytical study of obligations imposed by laws
This category of obligations can be examined on the 
basis of the remedies available to the plaintiff, i.e. money 
had and received, account, or quantum meruit; or on the basis 
of the rights that have been infringed; or, and this is the 
one we prefer to adopt, on the basis of the persons affected. 
On the latter principle a plaintiff could be claiming an 
unjust benefit which
(i) he himself has conferred on the defendant and which the 
law should compel the defendant to disgorge;
(ii) a third party has conferred on the defendant but which 
the plaintiff is the proper person to receive; and
(iii) the defendant has received through a wrongful act and 
should not be permitted to retain.
(i) Unjust benefit- which the plaintiff himself has conferred 
on the defendant;
Four types of cases come under this sub-head, namely
(a) where the plaintiff had conferred the benefit in error,
1
or as it is more commonly said, by mistake;
(b) where the benefit had been conferred on the defendant by 
compulsion;
1. The mistake referred to here is different and.distinguish­
able from the 'mistake1 to which reference was made in 
our discussion•of|obligations created by agreement.
The latter was examined under the heading of 'defective 
consent'. See pp. supra.
752
(c) where the plaintiff had acted for and on behalf of the 
defendant (though without the latter's authority) as a matter 
of necessity; and
(d) where the benefit had been conferred under an ineffect­
ive transaction.
Although each of the above four types of cases are gov­
erned by different detailed rules, the general principle 
underlying ail of them is that the defendant will not be 
allowed to retain any benefit which the plaintiff has not 
officially conferred on him. The word 'officious1 adopts 
a varying shade of meaning under each of the four groups of 
cases and in part, determines the limits of the plaintiff's 
right to recover.
(a) Where benefit was conferred in error:
Discussion of this gfoup of cases has often been conducte 
on the basis of what has been called mistake of fact and mis­
take of lav/. An attempt at clarifying the issues involved 
can be attempted in the following way:
Intangible things are divisiblejinto four types of 
situations. The first is made up of such instances as car X 
hit lamp post Y; this can be called a physical fact. The 
second is descriptive of a situation such as that water boils 
at 212°F. This is an empirical fact. The third which is the 
main province of the law, consists of an inference such as, 
that A intended to deceive u or that B was negligent. This 
is a legal fact.
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Apart from these three sets of factual situations, any
other question that arises for decision in a case, is a
question of law and forms the fourth and residual group of
2
intangible things.
The common law has reluctantly*^ adopted the position
that money or other property which the plaintiff has parted
with as a result of a mistake of law is irrecoverable. If
the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law
were as precise as our analysis above suggests, the plaintiff*
right to recover would pose a less serious problem to the
the
courts than hitherto it has done. But/cases involve much 
more complicated issues. In the Nigerian case of Attorney- 
General, Western Region v Chief geden Futughe,^  this dist­
inction between law and fact was in issue. The facts were 
that in a suit between the respondent as defendant and a 
third party as plaintiff the sum of £144 had been paid into 
court to abide the final determination of the rights of the 
parties to the suit. Judgment was entered for the respondent 
on the ground that the wrong action had been brought but the 
rights of the parties were not determined thereby. The reg­
istrar nevertheless paid out the moneys to the respondent*
2. See Fridman, "Quasi-contractual aspects of unjust enrich­
ment" (1956) 34 Can. B.R. 393.
3. It will be recoverable if the defendant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff and the payment was as a result of a breach of 
such duty.
4. (1957) V/.R.N.L.it. 217.
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The third party on a petition of right recovered from the 
government of Western Nigeria the sum so paid out to the 
respondent in error, and the Attorney-u-ener al of the Region 
then brought the present action in the Magistrate's Court 
to recover the sum from the respondent to whom it had been 
wrongly paid out. 'T'his action was dismissed. On appeal 
to the High Court, it was argued on behalf of the respondents 
that the registrar's mistake was an error of construction, 
and since such an error is a mistake of law, the money was
irrecoverable. In rejecting this submission, Doherty Ag. J.
15
had this to say:
"The learned counsel for the respondent contended that 
the mistake was one which arose in the course of con­
struction of a document on the part of the Registrar 
and that therefore it was a mistake of law. I am un­
able to accept this proposition. There was no^evidence 
that the Registrar construed or purported to construe 
the judgment although it is abundantly clear that he 
misunderstood the efiect of it particularly in relation 
to the amount which had been deposited in court. I am 
unable to find any book of reference which gives the 
legal definition of the verb "to construe". But the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word .to mean'to 
combine (words with words) grammatically," or "to analyse 
(a sentence)", or "to translate word for word" or "to 
expound" or "to interpret". I am satisfied on the 
evidence that any dealing of the Registrar with the 
judgment couldjjbe said 10 cume within any of These mean­
ings of the verb "to construe" • I therefore hold that 
whatever action the Registrar took in connection with 
the judgment it did not amounx to a construction of the 
document as that phrase is legally understood and that, 
consequently, the mistake was one of fact and not of law"
p. Op. cit. at pp. 217-218.
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It must be admitted that his Lordship's distinction between 
consxruing a judgment and misunderstanding its legal effect, 
is a very fine one indeed* More important for our purpose 
here is the difficulty to wnicn the courts are put in decid­
ing that a particular set of facts constitute a mistake of 
fact if in their opinion the defendant should not be allowed 
to retain a benefit conferred on him by the plaintiff*
Baron Parke had attempted a general principle in the old 
case of lyelly v Solari when he said that where money has 
been paid to another under the influence of a mistake, that 
is, upon the supposition that a specific fact is true which 
would entitle the other to the money, but which fact is un­
true and the money would not have been paid if it had been 
known to be untrue, an action will lie to recover it back*
It is clear that this statement of the position has not 
resolved the problem of distinguishing between a mistake of 
fact and that of law* The real point is that this distinct­
ion is unnecessary and confusing* If the category of ob­
ligations imposed by law is accepted, and the basis of the 
liability is unjust enrichment, the courts will not allow a 
defendant in the position of Chief Putughe referred to above, 
to retain any money paid to him in the circumstances of that 
case. This approach, it is submitted, is a much clearer 
basis for determining the plaintiff's right to a refund than
6* (1841) 152 E.R. 24.
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the massive literature on mistakes of law and fact*
Even if this were adopted, the courts will still have to det­
ermine the limits of the plaintiff fs right to recover* It 
is suggested that the test for the right to recover should 
be whether the money or other property had been officiously 
transferred to the defendant, that is a voluntary transfer
to close the transaction. If the court finds that there had
g
been such a 'voluntary payment1 the plaintiff's right to 
recover is defeated.
b. Where benefit was conferred under compulsion:
,J-'his group of cases include where the plaintiff has 
paid or transferred other property to the defendant directly 
or indirectly under duress, undue influence or had discharged 
some responsibility to which he was in joint liability with 
the defendant. It also includes cases where the plaintiff 
had compulsorily discharged a liability where the defendant 
was primarily liable. Local judicial authority in this
g
aspect of the law is rather thin. In Agba.je v Williams, 
the defendant had obtained judgment against the plaintiff in 
another suit in 1928 for payment of =€350 and costs. In 1940
7* Eor other local cases on this head, see Agbaje v Williams 
(1940) 19 N.L.R. 138; the Ghana cases of Hutton-Mills v 
Nkansah II & ors (1940) 6 V/. A.C. A. 32; Barclays Bank D.G.O. 
v D a b o~ (19~§4)~~h7ct. Ifumasi 24th Nov. 1964* Unreported - 
where the defendant had received the plaintiff 's money 
when he had nothing in his account.
8. The learned authors of The Law of Restitution (London,1966) 
would also prefer the use of 'voluntary payment* to deMnit 
the plaintiff's right to recover. See pp. 61 et seq..
9. (1940) 15 N.L.R, 136
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he issued a judgment debtor summons in respect of the 
balance, which the plaintiff agreed to be £84, and an order 
was made for payment by instalments with £5*5*0* costs. The 
plaintiff subsequently discovered more receipts for payments, 
and applied by notion for the order for instalments to be 
reviewed, by which time he had paid £19 and the costs under 
the order for instalments.
At the hearing of the motion an order was made by consent 
by which the order for payment of the instalments was res­
cinded. The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendant in a 
Magistrate's Court for the £19 and the costs, which he had 
paid, as money had and received, and obtained judgment for 
that amount. On appeal to the High Court, the appellant 
contended that money paid by the plaintiff in pursuance of the 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction could not be 
said to have been paid under anyccmpulsiOEu^^ This argument 
did not persuade Butler Lloydl Ag. C.J. who therefore held 
that the cancellation of the order for the payment of £84 was 
retrospective to the very date the original order was made. 
Accordingly there was no legal basis for the payment of the 
£19 by the plaintiff. The defendant was therefore to refund
this amount to the plaintiff.^
10. Harriot v Hampton (1797) 7 T.R. 269.
11. It has not been considered necessary to discuss the
detailed rules under this head as this would involve a 
repetition of English case lav/ on the subject.
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12c. Where defendant acted as a matter of necessity:
The rationale of this group of cases is the justice
of reimbursing a stranger who has intervened in an emergency 
for and on behalf of the defendant. This intervention is 
necessary for the preservation of life, health, property, 
credit and other amenities of another person. It is also 
vital for the fulfilment of the duty of another, of which 
duty the interest of the public requires immediate perfor­
mance. In Homan law, the right of the intervener in an
emergency to recover his reasonable expenses was fully recog-
1^nised within certain limits. J
The Homan law principle influenced the development of
this aspect in the lav; in South Africa, Trance,*^ G-ermany
16and Scotland. The American Restatement of Restitution
17also recognises this principle. In each of them, however, 
the officious intermeddler had no remedy.
12. Although fagency of necessity1 was discussed in the chap­
ter on defective agreements, it is contended that the 
basis of any liability under it, is not agency but ob­
ligations imposed by law. See infra.
13* W.W.Buckland & A.D.McNair, Homan law and Common law: A
Comparison in Outline (2nd ed. 1952)
14* L.Rubin, Unauthorised Administration in South Africa
(1958) passim.
15. Amos & Walton, Introduction to I'rench Law (2nd ed.) pp. 
192-197.
16. T.3.Smith, Scotland (British Commonwealth, Laws and 
Constitution, vol. II), pp. 531-632.
17. Restatement of Restitution (1937) See also J.P.Dawson, 
"Negotiorum gestio: The altruistic intermeddler"(1961)
74 Harv. L.R. 617, 1073*
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English law, on the other hand, has been more cautious* 
Perhaps this is duevto the common law principle that "lia­
bilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs 
any more than you can confer a benefit upon a man against 
his will*1
Two streams of authority have been recognised, namely, 
cases where there was a pre-existing relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant; and cases where there was 
no such pre-existing relationship. The former group of 
cases were discussed under the heading of agreements involv­
ing more than two parties. Here we are concerned with the 
latter. It must however, be pointed out that the principle 
of recovery in both groups of cases is based on an obligation 
imposed by law.
In the latter group of cases, English law has adopted 
the position that the plaintiff can only recover where the 
defendant has had an opportunity of accepting or rejecting 
the plaintiff *s services and had expressly or impliedly
19adopted the former course i.e. accepted the intervention.
This aspect of the law has not very much bothered the courts 
in Ghana and Nigeria but in two relatively old cases, reported 
by Renner, the principle of the right of an intervening
16. Per Bowen L.J. in Balke v Scottish Imperial Insurance
Co. (1886) 34' Ch. D. 234 at p.248.
19* Cases of maritime salvage are rationalised on the basis
of the special demands of maritime law.
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stranger in an emergency to be reimbursed his reasonable 
expenses, has been superficially discussed by the Ghana
20courts. The first of these is Samuel Davis v Dr. Horton, 
decided in June, 1874* Here the appellant had invited the 
respondent who was a medical practitioner to attend to the 
former's brother who was suffering from severe gun-shot 
wounds. The brother had been treated, although it is not 
clear from the facts whether he later died or was still alive 
at thfc time of the action. The doctor had sued the appellant 
at the I/Iagistrate fs Court to recover reasonable remuneration 
for his services to the latter's brother and had obtained 
judgment in his favour. On appeal to the Chief Magistrate 
this judgment was reversed. The reasoning of J. Marshall, 
the Chief Magistrate and Judicial Assessor, is of consider­
able interest. He stated that the appellant had done no 
more than call in a doctor to attend a citizen who was ser­
iously in need of medical attention; that as there was no 
evidence of the age of the wounded brother (which fact might 
have been relevant in determining his dependence on the 
appellant), or other evidence of his reliance on the appellant 
for support, the doctor's right of action lay against the 
person who received his treatment. Any alternative course 
which compelled a person in the position of the appellant 
to pay for such services, might lead to the absurd situation
20. (1874) Ren. 10
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whereby a benefactor was penalised for his kindness in 
trying to help save life or other property*
Two features of the argument of the Chief Magistrate 
require some comment. The first is the clear demarcating 
line that he draws between the affairs of the two brothers* 
Surely in the 1874 Gold Coast such a line of demarcation 
would not reflect the true customary law position. It is 
not clear if the learned Assessor would have decided in the 
same way if the doctor had sued the family of the wounded |
Pi
brother for his services to one of their member.
The second feature is the implication that the respondent
i
could have sued the wounded brother for his services rendered 
as a matter of necessity. If this position is accepted in
the Ghana courts, then this aspect of the law corresponds
P2more to the position in Canad'a 1 than in English law.
The latter is yet to shake off the restriction placed in it 
by the idea of the defendant being in a position to accept 
or reject the intervention or its incidents. It is submitted 
with respect that the Canadian position as reflected in the 
Horton decision accords more with the requirements of justice
2 3than Bowen L.J. *s limitation as contained in the Falcke case •
21. If the brother had died from the gun-shot wounds, probably 
the successor to his estate, who in this case will be the 
family, will be liable to the doctor for his services.
22. Matheson v Smiley (1932)2 D.L.R.5 8 7 (C.A.Ontario)- per 
Robson J.A.s "The common law takes notice of such emer­
gencies and aecl9.res.t0 be 2 duty what is almost invariably 
a<pne upon human impulse.. I look upon the surgeon's ser- • 
vice here as a necessary for bniley (i.e. the patient who 
later died) even though the effort was unavailing.'I 
therefore think a right to recover from the defendant's 
estate exists in favour of the plaintiff." 1
23* (1886)34 Ch. D. 234 at p. 248.
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24i'he other case is Dolphyne v Ansah. The facts were 
that the plaintiff had incurred considerable expenses in 
arranging for the burial of the defendant’s deceased wife 
and claimed in this action the reimbursement of the said ex­
penses. The defendant did not dispute his liability to pay 
but objected to the amount alaimed on the ground that it was 
excessive. The District Commissioner (Cape Coast) who heard 
the case at first instance, allowed the claim for £23* From 
this decision, the defendant appealed to the High Court.
After considering the status of the defendant the court ruled 
that the amount alleged to have been spent on drinks was 
rather excessive. The claim was reduced by £ 8 and the def­
endant was ordered to pay accordingly. xhis case could thus 
be said to be authority for the view that in a claim based 
on necessitious intervention the courts will allow the plaint­
iff to recover only such expenses as they consider to be 
reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances of the case 
This head of liability is neither based on contract nor on 
delict but on obligations imposed by law.
It can be argued on the basis of the two cases discussed 
above that there is scope in Ghana for a judicial development 
of the law on necessitous intervention. There is no direct 
local authority in Nigeria in this branch of the law. It is 
hoped, however, that its development in the latter country 
will follow the patterns in Canada and the United btates 
rather than that of English law.
24© (1885) Hen. 60.
d. v/here the benefit was conferred under an ineffective 
transaction:
Basically these are cases of unfulfilled expectations.
The most common instances are cases of ineffective contrasts;
cases of benefits conferred under trusts which do . not exhaust
their beneficial interests or which have failed; and cases
25of conditional gifts* tfe are not here concerned with 
cases where as a result of illegality, incapacity or statutory 
prohibition, such benefits are irrecoverable. The contractual
aspects of this latter facet have been fully discussed else-
, 26 where.
An ineffective transaction might involve the transfer 
of money, the rendering of services or the transfer of objects 
with monetary value. Although different detailed rules apply 
to the recovery of money, from those applicable to payment 
for goods or services the primary condition for the existence 
of the right of recovery in all of them, is that the plaintiff 
is not suing on any existing contract* If there is such a 
contract, the plaintifffs remedies are limited to the provis­
ions of its terms. The court cannot make an agreement for 
the parties. This was the ruling in the Privy Council appeal
25* In this sub-section we shall be examining cases of re­
stitution based on ineffective agreements* It has not 
been considered important to dwell on cases of trusts 
and conditional gifts in view of the repetition of Eng­
lish case law in this branch of the law.
2 6. See chapter sjipra.
764
91from Ghana of Obu v Straus & Co. Ltd.
The facts of the case were as follows:
By an agreement signed by the appellant, who was the 
agent in West Africa of the respondent company for the pur­
chase and shipment of rubber to the company in London, it 
was provided, inter alia, that 'the company has agreed to re­
munerate any services with a monthly sum of fifty pounds - 
subsequently reduced to twenty pounds to cover any personal 
and travelling expenses. A commission is also to be paid 
to me by the company which I have agreed to leave to the dis­
cretion of the company*. The respondents, after the termin­
ation of the appellants employment, having instituted pro­
ceedings againwt him claiming money alleged to be due from 
him as their agent, ne entered a counter-claim for an account 
to be taken between them, of all the rubber shipped by him 
between specified dates, and for commission on all the rubber 
purchased by him for the respondents.
The trial court allowed the respondents' claim but dis­
missed the appellant's counter claim. This decision was 
affirmed by the West African Court of Appeal. On appeal to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it was held that 
the relief which the appellant claimed by his counter-claim 
was beyond the competence of any court to grant. The court, 
it was further argued could not determine the basis and rate
27. (1951) 12 V.A.U.A. 281. (P.C.)
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of commiss.Lon. To do so would involve not only making a
new agreement tut transferring to the court the exercise of
28a discretion vested in the respondents.
Y/here however, there no longer exists any legal basis for
a contractual relationship, the courts have to adjudicate on
the rights and duties of the parties who have purported to
enter into the transaction which consequently has become
ineifective. where the plaintiff has transferred a sum of
money, he will be entitled to a refund on the basis of a
29total failure of consideration. In cases involving goods 
and services, the plaintiff can only recover if the uenefit 
was conferred on the defendant at his request, or nave been 
freely accepted by the said defendant with an opportunity 
of rejection ana with knowledge, actual or presumed, that it 
was to be paid for.^ If these conditions are fulfilled, 
the law will imply an obligation on the part of the defendant 
10 pay a reasonable price. This right of recovery has often 
been described as actions on quantum meruit in the case of 
services and quantum valebant in the case of goods. The
2 8 . See also Mens ah v Sackey (1899) Ren. 165 wnere a claim 
for the services of a married woman who had been sent 
away by her husband, was disallowed on the basis of the 
marriage relationship. The marriage was conducted under 
customary law.
29. In cases of frustration of contracts, the failure of 
consideration need not pe total. See supra pp*
30. Hughes v Powells (1896) Ren. 129.
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basis of the 'liability in each of these cases is that the 
defendant -should not be permitted to retain the benefit
without paying the plaintiff a reasonable price therefor.
31The G-hana case of ^arburton v Barrett, was a claim 
by an auctioneer for a reasonable remuneration for his 
services which had been rendered at the defendants request. 
The plaintiff in that case nad contracted with the defendant 
to sell certain land and buildings in Accra for and on behalf 
of the said defendant. The property was put up for sale by 
public auction and sold to the highest biuuer at such sale 
for the sum of £lj?00. f'he purchaser, however, failed to com­
plete nis purchase, and the auctioneer oecame entitled to put 
up the property for a new sale. Instead, nowevtr, of the 
defendant allowing the plaintiff to put up the property for 
a new sale, ne withdrew the sale from the plaintiff, ana sold 
the property oy private treaty for the sum pf £700. The 
plaintiff claimed for commission, hot on the basis of 7 per 
cent of the price as specified in the agreement, but on quan­
tum meruit. It wqs held that he was entitled to succeed. A 
remuneration of £49 was allowed by the court.
Also where the plaintiff, a road contractor had completed 
three-quarters of the work while the defendants had failed to 
pay him as stipulated in their agreement, a claim for quantum 
meruit based on the work already done, was allowed by the
31. (1921-25) liv. ct. 152.
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Divisional Court at Accra (Ghana) On the other hand,
where a photographer had rendered voluntary service to the
defendant without any antecedent agreement, the court held
that the plaintiff had no right of action against the def- 
33endant. The reason for this decision wan that the defend­
ant had had no opportunity to accept or reject the services 
nor had he requested for them.
(ii) Unjust benefit which a third party has conferred on 
the defendant:
In this sub-head are included cases of attornment; 
subrogation; actions by next-of-kin, legatees or creditors 
where a personal representative has paid money to another 
who is not entitled to it; actions by beneficiaries under an 
inter vivos trust, where a trustee has paid money to another 
person not entitled to it, and fraudulent dispositions of 
property. I'he basis of recovery in all these cases is one 
or more of the following that there is a special relation­
ship between the plaintiff and the defendant. This is true 
of insurers and the assured, or a surety and a principal 
debtor.^ Secondly, that the plaintiff has a special right
32. liora v Okanta (1926-29) Div. ct. 97*
33* Hughes v Powels (1896) Ren. 129. See also the Nigerian 
case of Qdunsi v Akitove (1964) Sup. ct. Suit No. 568/64, 
Unreported.
34* Thus where the insurer has paid the claim of the assured 
he is subrogated to his rights in respect of the trans­
action out of which the claim arose. This is equally 
true of the surety and the principal debtor.
of property in an object and in pursuance of that right 
the defendant cannot in justice be allowed to keep the 
benefit.^ finally, a defendant should not be allowed to 
keep benefits which were intended for the plaintiff. Trust 
assets or the estate of a deceased person going to the wrong 
beneficiaries, are examples of the latter category.
There is a total absence of any reported local judicial 
authority on this aspect of the law. In the Nigerian case 
of British India General Insurance Go. Ltd. v Alhaji Ka.jia, 
the Nigerian Supreme Court had to consider the claims of an 
insurance company to be subrogated to the rights of their 
assured in respect of a lorry policy. The facts were that 
one Jarmakanis had insured his vehicles with the plaintiffs 
and had become involved in an accident with vehicles owned 
by the defendant in this case. In an action for damages 
instituted by Alhaji ICajia against Jarmakanis, the plaintiffs 
purported to repudiate the insurance policy and disclaimed 
any liability to Alhaji Kajia. Later however, there was 
an arbitration in respect of the policy but before then, 
judgment had been given against Jarmakanis in the claim again­
st him by the present defendant. Thevplaintiffs had there­
fore to pay the amount of the damages awarded. rThey there­
fore claimed to be subrogated to Jarmakanis rights and in
35* This is the doctrine of following one's property, or as 
it is more often called, 'tracing1 at law and in equity.
36. (165) Sup. ct. Suit No. 132/1963; decided on 2nd July 1965
Unreported.
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pursuance of this, applied to the court for leave to appeal
out of time, against the judgment awarding damages to "the
defendant. In fact the defendant had levied execution of
the judgment on Jarmakanis but later agreed to be paid the
amount of the judgment debt by instalments*
It was therefore contended on behalf of the defendant
that any rights of appeal that Jarmakanis, the assured, may
have had, were lost as a result of the settlement out of
court in respect of the judgment debt; that the plaintiffs
were subrogated to only such rights as the assured had on
the day they admitted liability on the policy; that such
subrogation did not relate back to the date of the judgment,
and since the assured's right of appeal had been lost, the
37plaintiffs had no such right to be subrogated to* This
argument was fully accepted by their Lordships of the ITigerian 
Supreme Court who seized the opportunity to endorse v/itbout
■5 o
discussion, the English law position on subrogation. Thus 
thfchplaintiff can only be subrogated to any existing rights 
of the third party at the time that his right of action ag­
ainst the defendant arose. It follows that any sets off or 
counter-claims available to the defendant against the third 
party, are also available against the plaintiff, provided any
37. See Ha'lsbury's Laws, (3rd ed.) Vol.22 pp. 261 et seq.
38. Ademola C.J. who read the judgment of the court quoted 
Halsbur.y's Laws with approval as follows: "The right does 
not arise until the insurers have admitted their liabil­
ity to the assured, and have paid him the amount of the 
loss." - at p.2 of the judgment.
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such counter-claims must have arisen before the plaintiff’s 
cause of action arose and is limited to the amount of the 
plaintiff’s claim*
(iii) Benefits received by the defendant through his own 
wrongful act:
It would be anomalous if a defendant were allowed to 
retain any benefit which he has gained through a wrongful 
act* Such a situation would defeat the purpose which the 
law is intended to serve. Under this sub-head will be 
grouped oases of a plaintiff waiving his right of action in 
tort and suing for the restoration of the benefit acquired by 
the defendant at his (the plaintiff’s) expense; cases where 
the defendant has abused his fiduciary relationship and made 
a personal gain in the business of another; and cases where 
the defendant has profited from his criminal act* he shall 
be examining the first and the last of these examples briefly*
(a) Waiver of tort:
It needs hardly be argued that the compartments of civil
39* It is unnecessary to repeat here the English case-law on 
tracing and the other facets of this sub-head* Mention 
has already been made of our objections to the restrict­
ive impact of the requirement of a fiduciary relation­
ship in cases of ’’following property”. It is enough to 
accept the solution proposed by Waters that the construct 
ive trust in English law should be treated as a remedy 
and not an extension of the law of express trusts* This 
position can be achieved by accepting the existence of 
obligations imposed by lav/*
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responsibility are not watertight. 'i'he same set of facts
40can found an action in contract as in tort* This is
equally true of tort and restitution or obligations imposed
by law. Paragraph 525 of the American Restatement of
Restitution provides as follows:
"A person upon whom a tort has been committed and who 
brings an action for the benefits received by the 
tortfeasor is sometimes said to waive the tort.”
Thus a plaintiff may for a variety of reasons prefer to sue 
in restitution rather than in tort. ^here are of course, 
obvious advantages to the plaintiff who sues for the.rest­
itution of unjust benefits from the defendant rather than 
for damages in tort. firstly a defendant who converts the 
plaintiff's goods and sells them for an amount higher than 
their value on the date of conversion can be compelled in 
restitution to restore the proceeds of the sale. Secondly, 
where the defendant has made a profit by using the plaintiff 
property, the plaintiff can recover the profit so made in a 
restitutionary action, where no action in tort could lie.
Thirdly, under certain circumstances the limitation 
period in claims based on obligations imposed by law, are 
more favourable than those in a claim in tort. This is 
particularly so in cases of conversion where time begins to
4 0. Afi Example* of tris is seen in cases of negligence car­
riers, or other wrongful performance of a contractual 
duty.
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run from the first act of conversion* If such a claim were
based on restitution time will begin to run from the last
u. . 4 1act of conversion*
Fourthly, on a tort committed abroad the plaintiff’s
right of action will depend on the double test that the act
is actionable in England and not justifiable by the law of
42the place where the act was done* A suit in restitution
being for a liquidated sum, will not be subjected to this 
double test* Finally, it could be argued that a claim in 
restitution where a tort has been waived is a way of going 
round the prohibition against the assignment of a bare right 
of action, for a restitutionary claim is a claim for liquid­
ated damages*
Having mentioned these, it has to be added that it is 
only such torts that enrich the defendant which are capable 
of this type of waiver in favour of restitutionary claims. 
Thus, assault, or false imprisonment cannot be said in the 
ordinary sense to have enriched the defendant and cannot 
therefore be waived by the plaintiff in favour of a suit under 
obligations imposed by law.
41* See for instance s*3 of the Limitation Act, 1939> (Engl­
and) .
42* Phillips v Eyre (1870) L.P. 6 Q.B. I. See also A.V. 
Eicroy, Conflict of Laws, Pules ISO and 181.
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As to the time the plaintiff has to elect which remedy he 
will sue for, the position in English law is that it is only 
the satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim that operates as an 
effective bar to any alternative cause of action*^ This 
position appears to have been adopted in Ghana. In Hclaren
A A
Brothers (Manchester) Ltd* v Nartey, the Divisional Court 
at Accra was to decide whether the plaintiff's original suit 
in quasi-contract (the judgment in which had not been satisfied 
was a bar to a later claim on the same facts but based on tort* 
In that case the defendant was a storekeeper for the plaintiff, 
under an agreement not to give credit. In spite of this, 
he allowed one Korkor to run a credit account and this was 
considered a deficit in his account* The plaintiffs sued 
him for the recovery of the money and joined Korkor. The 
latter admitted liability and action was discontinued in 
respect of the defendant, judgment being given for the amount 
claimed against Korkor. The plaintiffs later sued the def­
endant in tort for the same amount since Korkor had not paid 
up. Under Order 38 Rule I of the then Rules of Court, such 
an action required leave of the court since it was based on 
the same facts as those on which the plaintiffs had withdrawn 
the defendant's name from tneir original action. No leave 
had in fact been obtained from the court, and accordingly it
43* United Australia Ltd* v Barclays Bank £l94l3 A.C.l.
44. (1926-29) Div. ct. 30.
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was held that the action could not lie, and the fact that 
it was in tort did not alter the position. It is a poss­
ible inference from this case that if leave had been obtained 
the fact that judgment had been given (but not satisfied) 
in tjie original claim, would not be a bar to a subsequent 
action in tort*
b. './here the defendant has benefited from his own crime:
The interconnection between the criminal law and civil
responsibility comes out in bbld relief in this group of
cases* As has been rightly observed by Fry L.J* in the
English case of Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Associat- 
45ion, ^
"No system of jurisprudence can with reason include 
amongst the rights which it enforces rights directly 
resulting to -the person asserting them from the crime 
of that person."
No doubt, this is a general statement to which there are 
obvious exceptions. It will be a curious system indeed 
that will treat the incidents of a crime of murder or bank 
robbery in the same way as the breach of a dog licensing 
statute or a minor traffic offence. But the general prin­
ciple is clear and can be said to be universally true, that 
the law will compel a criminal to disgorge an$ benefits which 
have been derived directly from his criminal act. Thus 
where a woman has maliciously murdered her husband, the law 
will not allow her to retain any policy monies accruing to
45« ClJ392jl* Q.B.147 at p. 156. See also Beresfor v Ko.yal 
Insurance Co* £1938Ja.C. 586 per Lord Atkin at p.596.
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46her or her estate as a result of the husband's death.
This principle has been given statutory recognition
in both Ghana and Nigeria. Sections 144 to 151 of the Ghana
47Criminal Procedure Code make general provisions for the dis­
posal and restitutron of articles and other property acquired 
as a result of a criminal offence. Sections 145 and 146 are 
most relevant for our purpose here and provide as follows:
”145* Where, upon the apprehension of a person charged 
with an offence any property is taken from him, the 
court before which he is charged may order that the 
property or a part thereof be restored to the person 
who appears to the court to bo entitled thereto, and, 
if he be the person charged, that it be restored either 
to him or to such other person as the court may direct, 
or that it he applied to the payment of any costs or 
compensation directed to be paid by the person charged.”
S.146: Where any person is convicted of having stolen
or having obtained any property fraudulently or by 
false pretences, the court convicting him may order that 
the property or a part thereof be restored to the per­
son who appears to it to be entitled thereto.”
A O
The same principle applies to any offences of dishonesty, 
defined under section 1470 of the code as any offences of 
stealing, fraudulent breach of trust, robbery, extortion, de­
frauding by false.pretences and dishonest receiving. The 
order for restitution is valid even against third parties who
46. Cleaver *s case, supra 
47# Act. 30.
48. S.147 A and B.
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49have received the proceeds of the crime.
Similar provisions are found in the Nigerian Criminal 
50Procedure Code.
In relation to the sale of goods, the V/estern Nigeria
Sale of Goods law provides as follows:
S.25 (i) "Where goods have been stolen and the offender 
is prosecuted to conviction, the property in the goods 
so stolen revests in the persop who was tne owner of 
the goods, or his personal representative, notwithstand­
ing any intermediate dealing with them whether by sale 
in market overt or otherwise."51
A distinction is drawn between goods which were stolen and
those that were obtained by fraud or other wrongful means
not amounting to stealing. In the latter case the property
in the goods do not revest in the owner by reason only of
52the conviction of the offender.
49* Ss* 147; 147A. But recovery is barred where
(a) the defendant gave valuable consideration commensur­
ate to the payment of money or transfer of property 
made to him or
(b) he is dependant of the person convicted and the pay­
ments of money were his reasonable living expenses 
made to him as such dependant.
50. Part 30 sections 263-273, particularly sections 269 and
270. See also to the same effect section 45 of the Lar­
ceny Act, 1916 (England). Negotiable instruments accepted
for value without notice of any defect, are excluded from 
the Nigerian provisions for restitution - see s.270(i)(b) 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap.43, Laws of Nigeria 
(1956, Federation).
51. See to the same eff ect, s. 24( i) of the Sale of Goods Act,
1893 (England) wftich is still in force in Lagos, Eastern 
Nigeria and Northern Nigeria# Apparently this provision 
is ihcohsistent with s.270(2)(a) of the Nigerian Criminal 
Procedure Code which makes savings for bona fide purcha­
sers. Ihis can be reconciled on the basis that the court 
is empowered unaer the C.P.C. to order the owner to pay
a sum of money as a condition for recovering his property
from afthircl party. Where the thing stolen is money, the 
Sale of Gooas Act does not apply.
52. S.25(2) of the Western Nigeria Sale of Goods Law - Cap.
115* Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 Revision).
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There is no similar provision in the G-hana Sale of Goods
Act, 1962*^ She position will of course, be covered by
the criminal Procedure Code, to which reference has already 
54been made.
Summary of obligations imposed by law:
We started off by postulating a third head of civil 
responsibility after examining the positions in other systems 
of law. 1'he case for unjust enrichment as the juridical 
basis of its application in Ghana and Nigeria was stated and 
fully argued. An attempt was made at providing the struct­
ural basis of any analytical study of the case-law of the 
subject in Ghana and Nigeria. Finally the statutory recog­
nition of the principle of unjust enrichment in Ghana and 
Nigeria in respect of benefits acquired through the defendant' 
criminal act, was examined.
53. Act 137.
54. It has not been considered necessary to discuss cases
of breach of fiduciary relationships in view of the
relative unimportance of this aspect of the subject in
Ghana and Nigeria. On family property! see pp.
supra.
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